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 1 
Introduction 
The context 
The prohibition of the use of force between States is enshrined in article 2(4) of the United 
Nations Charter and customary international law, and is considered a ‘cornerstone’ of the 
international legal system.1 Article 2(4) of the UN Charter provides as follows:  
 
‘All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.’ 
 
Despite the central importance of this provision in the international legal order, there remains 
genuine uncertainty among States, scholars and jurists about the meaning of a prohibited ‘use 
of force' under article 2(4) of the UN Charter and customary international law. As Andrea 
Bianchi notes, ‘despite the rhetorical commitment to the Charter, the interpretation of its 
provisions, particularly Article 2(4) and Article 51, has become highly controversial. In other 
words, the social consensus on the centrality of the Charter regulatory framework to the use 
of force evaporates when it comes to interpreting the content and scope of application of its 
most fundamental provisions.’2 The International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) has made scant 
contribution to elucidating the meaning of a prohibited ‘use of force’. The ICJ first 
considered the interpretation and application of article 2(4) in its earliest decision in the 
Corfu Channel case in 1949.3 Since then, it has had occasion to consider the interpretation 
and application of article 2(4) either directly or indirectly in a number of cases, including the 
1974 Fisheries Jurisdiction case (Federal Republic of Germany v Iceland);4 the 1980 Tehran 
Hostages case;5 the 1986 Nicaragua case;6 the 1995 Fisheries Jurisdiction case (Spain v 
 
1 Case concerning Military and Paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of 
America), Merits, Judgment 1986 ICJ Reports 14 (‘Nicaragua Case’), Separate Opinion of President Nagendra 
Singh, 153; Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America), Judgment 2003 ICJ Reports 
161 (‘Oil Platforms’), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Elarby, para. 1.1; Armed Activities on the Territory of the 
Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda) (2005) ICJ Reports 168, para. 148. 
2 ‘The International Regulation of the Use of Force: The Politics of Interpretive Method’ (2009) 22 Leiden 
Journal of International Law 651, 659. 
3 Corfu Channel, Merits, Judgment, (1949) ICJ Reports 4. 
4 Fisheries Jurisdiction case (Federal Republic of Germany v Iceland), Merits, Judgment, (1974) ICJ Reports 
175. 
5 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, (1980) ICJ Reports 3. 
6 Above n.1. 
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Canada);7 the 1996 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion;8 the 2003 Oil Platforms case;9 the 
2004 Wall Advisory Opinion10 and the 2005 Armed Activities case.11 Of these, the Nicaragua 
case and the Armed Activities case are the most relevant to the meaning of a prohibited ‘use 
of force’. These cases are discussed in further detail in the relevant sections of this work. 
 
Similarly, few scholars have examined the question directly.12 As early as 1963, Ian Brownlie 
noted that  
 
‘[a]lthough the terms ‘use of force’ and ‘resort to force’ are frequently employed by 
writers they have not been the subject of detailed consideration. There can be little doubt 
that ‘use of force’ is commonly understood to imply a military attack, an ‘armed attack’, 
by the organized military, naval, or air forces of a state; but the concept in practice and 
principle has a wider significance.’13 
 
Most of the scholarly attention to date has instead been on elucidating the meaning of ‘armed 
attack’ under article 51 and the definition of aggression. Defining aggression has been an 
international law project of central importance for various reasons including its connection to 
crimes against peace (and recently the crime of aggression under the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (‘ICC’)) and its triggering of UN Security Council enforcement 
powers and international state responsibility.14 It is also regarded as significant because it is 
seen as the other side of the coin to self-defence, and hence connected to protecting the 
territorial integrity of the State.15 As a major exception to the general prohibition on the use 
of force, the right to self-defence is not only an essential bastion of security and survival of 
the State, but also a key source of insecurity due to its potential for abuse. The meaning of 
‘force’ has to date received significantly less attention, though it is also (though perhaps less 
obviously) of fundamental concern for the reasons that follow further below.  
 
 
7 Fisheries Jurisdiction case (Spain v Canada), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment, (1998) ICJ Reports 432. 
8 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, (1996) ICJ Reports 226. 
9 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America), Judgment, (2003) ICJ Reports 161. 
10 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion), 
(2004) ICJ Reports 136. 
11 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda), (2005) ICJ 
Reports168. 
12 Scholars who have analysed the meaning of ‘use of force’ include Olivier Corten, The Law against War : The 
Prohibition on the Use of Force in Contemporary International Law (Hart, 2010), chapter 2; Mary Ellen 
O’Connell, ‘The Prohibition of the Use of Force’ in Nigel D White and Christian Henderson (eds), Research 
Handbook on International Conflict and Security Law : jus ad bellum, jus in bello and jus post bellum (Elgar, 
2013) 89; Tom Ruys, ‘The Meaning of “Force” and the Boundaries of the Jus Ad Bellum: Are “Minimal” Uses 
of Force Excluded from UN Charter Article 2 (4)?’ (2014) 108(2) American Journal of International Law 159; 
Christian Henderson, The Use of Force and International Law (Cambridge University Press, 1 edition, 2018), 
chapter 2. 
13 International Law and the Use of Force by States (Clarendon, 1963), 361, footnote omitted. 
14 See Dapo Akande and Antonios Tzanakopoulos, ‘The International Court of Justice and the Concept of 
Aggression’ in Claus Kreß and Stefan Barriga (eds), Commentary on the Crime of Aggression (Cambridge 
University Press, 2015) 214. 
15 Brownlie, above n.13, 351-2. 
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Thus far, scholarly analysis of the meaning of an unlawful ‘use of force’ leaves unclear the 
actual content and meaning of a prohibited ‘use of force’, namely, its elements, the 
relationship between those elements, and the lower threshold of a ‘use of force’ under article 
2(4) of the UN Charter. It seems that generally, scholars are more comfortable analysing and 
arguing about ‘armed attack’ because it has more substance; it is at least clear what precisely 
they are arguing about. In contrast, since the criteria for an act to fall within the scope of the 
jus contra bellum are less clear, there is no shared language to talk about international 
incidents in terms of the prohibition of the use of force. The concept of a ‘use of force’ thus 
appears inchoate, even if there is an emergent language developing with respect to a de 
minimis gravity threshold and hostile intent.16 Clearly, this situation is unsatisfactory for a 
norm of fundamental importance to the international legal system and one that is said to be a 
primary example of jus cogens.17 For these reasons, setting out the scope of the prohibition of 
the use of force and elucidating its criteria is essential – at the very least, even if the criteria 
themselves are debated, it provides a framework for analysing and discussing these issues 
using a shared language, leading to a clearer understanding of the law and ultimately 
increasing its compliance pull. 
The research question  
This work therefore aims to set out an analytical framework for a prohibited ‘use of force’ 
between States under international law, which will enable the prohibition of the use of force 
to be analysed and discussed with greater clarity. The focus of this work is on clarifying the 
scope and content of the prohibition of the use of force. It will do so by applying a process of 
treaty interpretation to the prohibition of the use of force between States in article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter to elucidate a range of possible interpretations of this provision, and to identify 
the elements of a prohibited ‘use of force’ as well as to highlight some of its grey areas.  
 
Some of the fundamental grey areas regarding the meaning of ‘use of force’ that will be 
addressed include the following: 
 
• Whether ‘force’ means physical/armed force only and if kinetic means or the use of 
particular weapons is required. 
 
• Whether a (potential) physical effect is required; if such effect should be permanent; 
the object or target that must experience the effect and the required level of directness 
between the means employed and these effects. 
 
• Is there a gravity threshold, below which a forcible act violates international law but 
does not violate the prohibition of the use of force in article 2(4) of the UN Charter? If 
 
16 See Chapter Seven. 
17 See Chapter Four for a discussion of the prohibition of the use of force and jus cogens. 
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there is such a threshold, how low is it? Does mere unauthorised presence of a State's 
armed forces in the territory of another State suffice? 
 
• Is a coercive intent required in order for conduct to qualify as a prohibited ‘use of 
force’? Or are forcible acts which are unintentional, mistaken or with a limited 
purpose also prohibited by article 2(4)?  
 
• Does the jus contra bellum govern a State using force in response to a small-scale 
incursion within its territory, such as a small troop of soldiers crossing the border, 
unauthorised overflight of a military aircraft, or a submerged submarine passing 
through its territorial waters? States have the right to respond to such incursions, but 
on what legal basis?  
 
• What distinguishes a prohibited ‘use of force’ under article 2(4) from police measures 
against civil aircraft or merchant vessels registered to another State, either within a 
State’s own territory or outside its territory (e.g. within the territory of another State, 
or beyond)? When does the exercising by a State of its sovereign rights within its own 
jurisdiction become a prohibited use of force?  
 
This work will not directly address accepted or claimed exceptions to the prohibition such as 
self-defence, UN Security Council authorisation, humanitarian intervention and targeted 
operations within the territory of another State to rescue nationals or combat terrorism. 
Why does it matter? 
It is important to determine the meaning of a prohibited ‘use of force’ between States because 
it has significant practical and international legal consequences. 
 
Firstly, it provides legal certainty to States about the range of measures they may use to 
address modern security threats outside of self-defence or UN Security Council authorisation. 
This is increasingly important with respect to law enforcement, counter-terrorism and 
counter-proliferation measures, and is also relevant to countermeasures, including in response 
to uses of force that fall in the ‘gap’ between a ‘use of force’ and an ‘armed attack’ giving 
rise to a right to exercise self-defence. The lower threshold of a prohibited use of force 
determines the applicable legal regime and the conditions for lawfulness for particular acts. 
For instance, when do law enforcement actions on land/sea/air become a prohibited ‘use of 
force’? The threshold for a prohibited use of force also determines the applicability of 
circumstances precluding wrongfulness; acts which are not a use or threat of ‘force’ could be 
legally justified by circumstances precluding wrongfulness, such as necessity, force majeure, 
distress and countermeasures. The justification is necessary to the extent that those acts 
violate other rules of international law, such as the non-intervention principle. For instance, 
 5 
how far can countermeasures go before violating the prohibition in article 2(4)?18 For 
example, if certain cyber operations are not characterised as a ‘use of force’, the same 
measures may be used in response by the victim State in the form of non-forcible 
countermeasures.  
 
Clarifying which forcible acts are lawful reinforces respect for the jus contra bellum, since it 
acknowledges the intended balance between peace and security in the UN Charter by 
recognising the range of tools available to States when protecting their legitimate interests; 
this makes it less necessary for States to resort to very broad interpretations of current 
exceptions to the prohibition in order to justify their actions (which undermines the jus contra 
bellum). Ensuring clarity regarding the scope and content of the prohibition of the use of 
force thus increases the ‘compliance pull’ of the norm and makes it harder to justify acts 
which are prohibited by the rule.19 
 
Secondly, the lower threshold of a prohibited use of force necessarily affects the size of the 
gap between article 2(4) and article 51 by making it larger (if article 2(4) has a low threshold) 
or smaller (if article 2(4) has a high threshold). This has direct relevance for national security, 
as well as international peace and security. Under article 51 of the UN Charter and customary 
international law, States are only permitted to respond in self-defence to prohibited uses of 
force rising to the level of an ‘armed attack’. If one holds that there is a large gap between 
‘use of force’ and ‘armed attack’, this reduces the scope for States to take measures in 
response to acts falling within the gap (since a higher article 2(4) threshold means that a State 
that is a victim of ‘gap’ measures cannot itself use measures falling above the threshold of 
article 2(4) in response since it is prohibited unless it is the victim of an ‘armed attack’). For 
instance, if a particular cyber operation is characterized as a ‘use of force’ but does not rise to 
the level of an armed attack, this raises the problem of the inability of the victim State to 
lawfully respond with in-kind countermeasures. Conversely, if one holds that there is a small 
gap between ‘use of force’ and ‘armed attack’ due to a high threshold of the former, this 
results in greater permissibility for States to have recourse to forcible measures which fall 
short of that threshold. 
 
Thirdly, clarifying the meaning of a prohibited ‘use of force’ under international law also 
reduces the scope for exploitation of legal ambiguity (grey zone conflict). Grey zone 
operations are designed to take advantage of ambiguity in the law or to remain below legal 
thresholds for armed response.20 Examples of grey zone operations include the use of 
 
18 ILC, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of State for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, in 
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session’ (A/56/10, 2001) (‘ILC 
Draft Articles’), art. 49. Article 50 (1)(a) of the ILC Draft Articles provides that ‘Countermeasures shall not 
affect the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force as embodied in the Charter of the United Nations’. 
19 Thomas M. Franck, ‘Legitimacy in the International System’ (1988) 82(4) The American Journal of 
International Law 705, 713. 
20 SW Harold et al, ‘The U.S.-Japan Alliance and Deterring Gray Zone Coercion in the Maritime, Cyber, and 
Space Domains’ (RAND Corporation 2017), introduction, fn1, 1. 
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maritime militia21 and the building of artificial islands in disputed zones of the South China 
Sea.22 It is surmised that there is increased instability at the lower boundary of the jus contra 
bellum (‘use of force’) due to increased stability at the higher end (‘armed attack’), resulting 
in more frequent ‘grey zone challenges’ at the lower end of the spectrum.23 Strengthening 
international norms can play a role in deterring or reducing incentives for grey zone 
activities, and responds to the changing nature of armed conflict.24  
 
Finally, the lower threshold of a prohibited use of force is important because acts which meet 
the threshold give rise to distinct legal consequences for States, both under the UN Charter 
and customary international law. Under the UN Charter, the concept of a ‘use of force’ is 
important for delineating between articles 41 and 42. These two articles set out the measures 
that the Security Council may decide shall be taken to maintain or restore international peace 
and security once it has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace 
or act of aggression under Chapter VII of the Charter.25 Articles 41 and 42 distinguish 
between forcible and non-forcible coercive measures.26 Under article 41, the UN Security 
Council may call on States to take certain coercive measures not involving the use of armed 
force to give effect to its decisions. In contrast, the Security Council may only ‘take such 
action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international 
peace and security’ if it considers that ‘measures provided for in Article 41 would be 
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate’. Therefore, the definition of a ‘use of force’ may 
be relevant to whether, for example, certain types of cyber operations,27 maritime 
interdictions28 and peace operations29 fall under article 41 or 42 of the UN Charter.30 
 
21 James Kraska, ‘China’s Maritime Militia Upends Rules on Naval Warfare’ [2015] The Diplomat. 
22 South China Sea Arbitration (Republic of the Philippines and PRC) [2016] Permanent Court of Arbitration 
PCA Case No 2013-19 (12 July 2016). 
23 Junichi Fukuda, ‘A Japanese Perspective on the Role of the U.S.-Japan Alliance in Deterring – or, If 
Necessary, Defeating – Maritime Gray Zone Coercion’ (RAND Corporation, 2017) 23, 30, citing the ‘stability-
instability paradox’ discussed by Glenn Snyder in relation to nuclear and conventional weapons, in “The 
Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror,” in Paul Seabury, ed., The Balance of Power (San Francisco, 
Calif.: Chandler, 1965). 
24 See further Michael J Mazarr, ‘Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding a Changing Era of Conflict’ (United 
States Army War College Press, December 2015), who argues that large-scale grey zone operations will be the 
'dominant form of state-to-state rivalry in the coming decades' (p2). According to Mazarr, grey zone conflict is 
not a new phenomenon but is becoming increasingly important for three reasons: increased reliance on these 
techniques by Russia, China and Iran; global economic interdependence and high costs of outright military 
aggression incentivize grey zone conflict; new tools (like cyber; new forms of information campaigns and new 
forms of state force like coastguards) intensify grey zone conflict (p3). The overall idea is that strategic 
gradualism (through salami-slicing and series of small fait accompli p34)) is being combined with grey zone 
actions (including with new tools) to pursue revisionist intent. 
25 Article 39 of the UN Charter. 
26 See Nico Krisch, ‘Chapter VII Powers: The General Framework. Articles 39 to 43’ in Bruno Simma et al 
(eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2012) vol I, 1237. 
27 See Michael N Schmitt, ‘The Use of Cyber Force and International Law’ in Marc Weller (ed), The Oxford 
Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2015) 1110, 1118. 
28 Douglas Guilfoyle, ‘Interdicting Vessels to Enforce the Common Interest: Maritime Countermeasures and the 
Use of Force’ (2007) 56(1) The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 69. 
29 See James Sloan, The Militarisation of Peacekeeping in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford and Portland, 
Oregan: Hart Publishing 2011), 256 who notes that the legal basis for use of force by the peacekeepers going 
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Under customary international law, a prohibited use of force gives rise to international State 
responsibility and the obligation to cease the unlawful act,31 make reparation32 and the right 
of the victim State to take non-forcible countermeasures.33 There are additional consequences 
if a use of force in violation of article 2(4) is considered to be a peremptory norm,34 namely, 
that other States shall cooperate using lawful means to bring the violation to an end, shall not 
recognise the situation as lawful and shall not render aid or assistance in maintaining the 
situation,35 and that the prohibition cannot be overridden by inconsistent treaty. In addition, 
under article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘VCLT’), ‘[a] treaty is 
void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the 
principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations’. This was held 
by the ICJ in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case (UK v Iceland) to reflect customary international 
law: ‘There can be little doubt, as is implied in the Charter of the United Nations and 
recognized in Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that under 
contemporary international law an agreement concluded under the threat or use of force is 
void.’36 
 
Further legal consequences of whether an act is a ‘use of force’ or not are that it may 
constitute a breach of an erga omnes norm, which could permit third States to take (non-
armed) countermeasures against the breaching State under customary international law; and 
that it may bring into effect an international armed conflict between the two States 
concerned,37 thus making the international law of armed conflict applicable (though any 
further use of force e.g. in self-defence remains subject to the rules of the jus contra 
bellum).38 A further consequence of this is the possibility of prosecuting certain acts as a war 
crime either before an international tribunal (such as the ICC) or before domestic courts, 
subject to issues of immunity ratione materiae.39 
 
beyond self-defence could be based on article 40 or 41 of the UN Charter rather than article 42 if it is 
sufficiently limited. 
30 Although this may be of little practical relevance as the general practice of the Security Council is to just refer 
to Chapter VII: see Niels Blokker, ‘Outsourcing the Use of Force: Towards More Security Council Control of 
Authorized Operations?’ in Marc Weller (ed), The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2015) 202, 209. 
31 ILC Draft Articles, above n.18, art. 30. 
32 Ibid, art. 31. 
33 Ibid, art. 22. 
34 See discussion in Chapter Four. 
35 Ibid, art. 41. 
36 Jurisdiction, 1973 ICJ Reports 3, para. 14; see further 1966 ILC Yearbook, vol. II, 246, draft article 49 of the 
Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties with commentary, reprinted in ILC, ‘Report of the International Law 
Commission on the Work of Its Eighteenth Session, 4 May-19 July 1966 [UN Doc A/CN.4/191, UN Doc 
A/6309/Rev.1], Chapter II Law of Treaties’. 
37 Although it is uncertain whether a ‘use of force’ under the jus contra bellum has the same meaning as for an 
international armed conflict. 
38 Dapo Akande, ‘The Use of Nerve Agents in Salisbury: Why Does It Matter Whether It Amounts to a Use of 
Force in International Law?’ on EJIL: Talk! (17 March 2018) <https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-use-of-nerve-
agents-in-salisbury-why-does-it-matter-whether-it-amounts-to-a-use-of-force-in-international-law/>. 
39 Akande, ibid. 
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Aims and contribution of work 
It is hoped that the key contributions of this book will be twofold: Firstly, to set out a sound 
methodology for interpreting the meaning of a prohibited ‘use of force’ between States under 
international law, both under treaty and customary law. And secondly, to ascertain the 
meaning of a prohibited ‘use of force’ in article 2(4) of the UN Charter by applying the 
methodology for treaty interpretation. This distinguishes this work from most other scholarly 
treatments of the topic, which tend to apply a customary international law standard to treaty 
interpretation. The second major contribution of this work will thus delineate the context and 
scope of the prohibition of the use of force under article 2(4); determine the range of 
interpretations permitted by the text of article 2(4) including subsequent agreements; and 
identify the grey areas regarding the elements of a prohibited ‘use of force’ under article 2(4).  
 
The results of this research aim to provide a framework for identifying a prohibited ‘use of 
force’ under article 2(4) of the UN Charter. This will yield a definition of the term in the wide 
sense of the word, by comprehensively analysing and laying out the range of interpretive 
possibilities of the text. Identifying the elements of an unlawful use of force, their content and 
their relationship to one another provides a useful framework for analysis and discussion of 
the rule and its application to particular incidents, even if the individual elements are 
themselves debated. This will be practically useful to States, legal advisers and scholars. 
 
On the concept of definitions, Brownlie has noted that a balance must be struck between the 
practicality of succinctness, with the drawback of generality, and a comprehensive technical 
treatment which may lack the conciseness for practical application.40 Brownlie recognised 
that: ‘Definition must involve generalization and employ elements which require further 
definition. It may also be said that no definition is “automatic”, since the organ concerned 
must necessarily apply any criteria to particular facts.’41 The aim of this work is not to 
present the one true meaning or definition of a prohibited ‘use of force’ between States under 
international law. Rather, this work follows Hans Kelsen’s approach of laying out the range 
of interpretive possibilities supported by the text: 
 
‘The task of a scientific commentary is first of all to find, by a critical analysis, the 
possible meanings of the legal norm undergoing interpretation; and, then, to show their 
consequences, leaving it to the competent legal authorities to choose from among the 
various possible interpretations the one which they, for political reasons, consider to be 
preferable, and which they alone are entitled to select…’42 
 
40 Brownlie, above n.13, 357-8. 
41 Ibid, 356. 
42 The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems, (Stevens, 1950), xvi. 
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Outline of thesis 
This Introduction sets out the research question and why it matters, explains the legal 
consequences of the meaning of a prohibited ‘use of force’, outlines the structure of this 
thesis and sets out the form of results that will be provided. 
 
Part I deals with how to determine the meaning of a prohibited ‘use of force’ between States 
under international law. This part is concerned with the relationship between the treaty (UN 
Charter) and customary prohibition, which one to interpret or apply and the appropriate 
method for doing so. Chapter One examines whether the customary and treaty prohibitions 
of the use of force are identical and asks whether one can apply the two-element approach to 
identify the scope of the customary prohibition of the use of force. As this is highly 
problematic, Chapter Two applies an alternative approach to determine whether the 
customary and Charter rules are identical, by analysing how and when the customary rule 
arose and whether the customary and Charter rules have subsequently diverged. Having 
determined that the content of the prohibition of the use of force is presently identical under 
both sources of law, Chapter Three then looks at the relationship between the customary 
and Charter rules, and works out which source one should interpret or apply to determine the 
scope and content of a prohibited ‘use of force’ between States under international law. This 
chapter concludes that the primary method should be one of treaty interpretation due to the 
way that the two rules developed and their relationship to one another. Chapter Four sets 
out the method of treaty interpretation that will be applied in this work. The question of 
whether the prohibition of the use of force is jus cogens and the implications of this for the 
interpretation of the prohibition are also considered.  
 
Part II of this work applies the treaty interpretation method discussed in the preceding Part 
to article 2(4) of the UN Charter, by examining the ordinary meaning of the terms in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose. The focus of this Part is on textual 
interpretation and subsequent agreements. Chapter Five carries out a textual interpretation of 
the terms of article 2(4) apart from ‘use of force’, with a particular focus on the term 
‘international relations’. The key point of this chapter is to lay out the contours of the 
prohibition and its context. Chapters Six and Seven focus on the textual interpretation of the 
term ‘use of force’ in article 2(4) including subsequent agreements. Chapter Six examines 
the ordinary meaning of this term, before delving into the element of means. In particular, it 
will examine whether ‘use of force’ refers to physical/armed force only, and if kinetic means 
or the use of particular types of weapon is required. Chapter Seven continues the analysis of 
the elements of a prohibited ‘use of force’ by examining its required effects, the object or 
target of a ‘use of force’, gravity and intention. This chapter discusses the type of effects that 
may be relevant to the characterisation of an act as a ‘use of force’ under article 2(4), namely, 
whether a (potential) physical effect is required; if such effect should be permanent; the 
required object or target that must experience the effect; the required level of directness 
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between the means employed and these effects; if a hostile intent is required, and if there is a 
lower threshold of gravity of effects below which a forcible act will not fall within the scope 
of article 2(4) of the UN Charter.  
 
Having laid out the range of interpretive possibilities of a prohibited ‘use of force’ under 
article 2(4) and its potential elements in Part II, Part III challenges the previously accepted 
paradigm of a ‘use of force’ as a coherent concept and presents an alternative framework for 
understanding an unlawful ‘use of force’. This Part supplements the textual analysis carried 
out in Part II by incorporating the perspectives of subsequent State practice. Chapter Eight 
considers anomalous examples of ‘use of force’ and non-‘use of force’ that do not correspond 
with the standard definition, and suggests some possible explanations. Chapter Nine 
proposes the idea that a prohibited ‘use of force’ is a type (in German: Typus) rather than a 
concept; that is, rather than consisting of a checklist of necessary elements for the definition 
of a ‘use of force’ to be met, an unlawful ‘use of force’ is characterised by a basket of 
elements which must not all be present and which must be weighed and balanced to 
determine whether the threshold for the definition is met. A framework for an unlawful ‘use 
of force’ under article 2(4), bringing together each of the elements of that provision, is then 
proposed.  
 
Finally, the Conclusion sums up the above analysis and briefly sets out the findings and 
conclusions of this research into the meaning of a prohibited ‘use of force’ between States 
under international law. 
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Part I: The prohibition of the use of 
force in treaty and custom 
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Introduction 
Disagreements about the content of international law, particularly in the field of jus contra 
bellum, often begin due to differently held assumptions about the legitimate process for 
identifying the content of the law.1 ‘Method, far from being a theoretical preoccupation, lays 
down the framework in which practice takes place.’2 The purpose of this part is to set out the 
theoretical foundation and method for determining the meaning of a prohibited ‘use of force’ 
between States in international law that will be applied in the main part of this work. The 
starting point is that the prohibition enshrined in article 2(4) of the UN Charter is also a rule 
of customary international law. Since the prohibition is enshrined in treaty (the UN Charter) 
and custom, should one interpret the treaty, identify the scope of the customary rule, or both, 
in order to ascertain the meaning of a prohibited use of force under international law? This 
depends on whether the prohibitions of the use of force under custom and treaty are identical, 
as well as how the customary rule arose and the relationship between the two. This part will 
explore these issues, as well as look at whether the prohibition of the use of force is a 
peremptory norm (jus cogens), and the ramifications of this for interpreting the meaning of an 
unlawful ‘use of force’.  
 
Part I is divided into four chapters. Chapters One and Two will analyse whether the content 
of the prohibition is identical under article 2(4) of the UN Charter and customary 
international law. Chapter One will firstly discuss the issues with applying the two-element 
approach to the identification of the customary prohibition of the use of force. Chapter Two 
will then propose a pragmatic alternative for identifying the customary rule and its scope and 
content, based on the way that the customary rule arose. Chapter Three will examine the 
relationship between the two legal sources of the prohibition under the UN Charter and 
custom, and on the basis of this analysis, will conclude whether to apply a process of treaty 
interpretation or of identifying the customary rule to ascertain the scope and meaning of the 
prohibition. Finally, Chapter Four will briefly set out the method that will be used to 
determine the meaning of a prohibited ‘use of force’ between States under international law. 
 
1 See Andrea Bianchi, ‘The International Regulation of the Use of Force: The Politics of Interpretive Method’ 
Leiden Journal of International Law 22, no. 04 (December 2009): 651–676, 653 ff, who argues: ‘The 
fundamental contention is that to agree on method could cure much of the current divergence of views about the 
content and scope of application of some of the international rules regulating the use of force.’ See also Olivier 
Corten, ‘Chapter 1: Methodological Approach’, in The Law against War : The Prohibition on the Use of Force 
in Contemporary International Law (Oxford: Hart, 2010). 
2 Bianchi, ibid., 676. 
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Chapter One: Are the treaty and 
customary rules identical, Part I: 
Applying the two-element approach to 
identify the scope of the customary rule 
Introduction 
The prohibition of the use of force exists under two main sources of law: customary 
international law and treaty (article 2(4) of the UN Charter). It is usually claimed that these 
rules exist in parallel and that the scope and interpretation of the prohibition under each 
source of law are identical. If that is the case, which source of law should one interpret or 
apply to determine the meaning of a prohibited ‘use of force’ between States under 
international law – article 2(4) of the UN Charter, customary international law, or both? This 
question raises several fundamental issues. Firstly, are the scope and content of the 
prohibition of the use of force under article 2(4) of the UN Charter and customary 
international law really identical? It must also be considered how to adduce the content of the 
customary rule separately to the treaty rule. Chapters One and Two will focus on these two 
related questions. Chapter Three will then examine the relationship between the customary 
and the treaty rules in order to decide whether to interpret article 2(4) of the UN Charter 
and/or to identify the scope of the customary rule to ascertain the meaning of a prohibited 
‘use of force’ between States under international law. 
 
This chapter will initially establish that the prohibition of the use of force is enshrined both in 
article 2(4) of the UN Charter and as a rule of customary international law. It will then 
discuss the decision of the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) in the Nicaragua case. Since 
this decision does not explicitly hold that the prohibition under each source of law was 
actually identical, this chapter will attempt to verify whether they are or not. The key 
contribution of this chapter is an in-depth analysis of whether one can separately adduce the 
content of the customary prohibition of the use of force by applying the two-element 
approach to the identification of a customary rule (namely, State practice and opinio juris). 
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The prohibition is a rule of customary international 
law 
Customary international law is referred to in article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute as ‘evidence 
of a general practice accepted as law’. Although this definition is for the purposes of setting 
out the sources of international law that the ICJ shall apply, it has come to be widely accepted 
as a general definition of this legal concept.1 Unlike treaty rules, which govern only the 
parties to the treaty in their mutual relations, rules of customary international law are binding 
on all States except persistent objectors (States that have ‘objected to a rule of customary law 
while that rule was in the process of formation’, and have clearly expressed the objection to 
other States and maintained it persistently)2 and particular customary international law rules 
which apply only between a limited number of States.3 
 
It is not seriously disputed that a customary international law on the use of force exists in 
parallel to the UN Charter. Special Rapporteur Humphrey Waldock observed: ‘Whatever may 
be their opinions about the state of the law prior to the establishment of the United Nations, 
the great majority of international lawyers consider that Article 2, paragraph 4, together with 
other provisions of the Charter, authoritatively declares the modern customary law regarding 
the threat or use of force.’4 There are ample instances of States indicating their widespread 
belief that the prohibition of the use of force is also a binding rule of customary international 
law (detailed further below). UN General Assembly resolutions such as the 1970 Friendly 
Relations Declaration5 and 1987 Resolution 42/226 support the argument that the opinio juris 
of States is that the prohibition set out in article 2(4) extends to all States under customary 
international law. Finally, as Andrea Bianchi notes, ‘[t]he answer to the rhetorical question of 
whether there is a customary law on the use of force ought to be in the affirmative if one 
takes the findings of the ICJ in Nicaragua as an authoritative determination of the state of 
international law on the matter’.7  
 
 
1 Michael Wood, ‘First Report on Formation and Evidence of Customary International Law’ (A/CN.4/663, ILC, 
17 May 2013) (‘Wood First Report’), 96 
2 Michael Wood, ‘Third Report on Identification of Customary International Law’ (A/CN.4/682, ILC, 27 March 
2015) (‘Wood Third Report’), 70, draft conclusion 15. 
3 See ILC draft conclusion 16(1): ‘1. A rule of particular customary international law, whether regional, local or 
other, is a rule of customary international law that applies only among a limited number of States.’ (Ibid, 70). 
4 ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Eighteenth Session, 4 May-19 July 1966 
[UN Doc A/CN.4/191, UN Doc A/6309/Rev.1], Chapter II Law of Treaties’, 20, para. 7. See also International 
Law Commission, ‘Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1966, Vol. II’ (A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.l, 
1966), 247; Tom Ruys, ‘Armed Attack’ and Article 51 of the UN Charter (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 
18 with further citations. 
5 UN General Assembly, Resolution 2625, ‘Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations’. 
6 UN General Assembly, Resolution 42/22 ‘Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the 
Principle of Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations’, 18 November 1987. 
7 Andrea Bianchi, ‘The International Regulation of the Use of Force: The Politics of Interpretive Method’ 
(2009) 22(04) Leiden Journal of International Law 651, 661, para. 3, footnote omitted. 
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In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ found that it had jurisdiction to determine the dispute on the 
basis of customary international law only, and not the UN Charter due to a US reservation to 
the Court’s jurisdiction. In its Jurisdiction and Admissibility Judgment of 26 November 1984, 
the Court held that  
 
‘Principles such as those of the non-use of force, non-intervention, respect for the 
independence and territorial integrity of States, and the freedom of navigation, continue to 
be binding as part of customary international law, despite the operation of provisions of 
conventional law in which they have been incorporated.’8 
 
In its judgment on the merits in the Nicaragua case, the Court indicated its view that the 
principles of the non-use of force and of the right to self-defence were already present in 
customary international law before the Charter, and that these parallel (and largely identical) 
customary rules ‘developed under the influence of the Charter’. The Court held:  
 
‘so far from having constituted a marked departure from a customary international law 
which still exists unmodified, the Charter gave expression in this field to principles 
already present in customary international law, and that law has in the subsequent four 
decades developed under the influence of the Charter, to such an extent that a number of 
rules contained in the Charter have acquired a status independent of it. The essential 
consideration is that both the Charter and the customary international law flow from a 
common fundamental principle outlawing the use of force in international relations.’9 
 
Despite deficiencies in the judgment that will be briefly discussed in the following section, 
States did not protest against the Court’s finding that the prohibition of the use of force 
between States is a binding rule of customary international law existing in parallel to the UN 
Charter, and it is overwhelmingly accepted by States and international law scholars that the 
prohibition of the use of force is indeed a rule of customary international law. 
Are the content of the treaty and customary 
prohibitions of the use of force identical? 
Since the prohibition of the use of force is enshrined in both treaty (article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter) and customary international law, the next question is whether the content of the 
treaty and customary rules are identical or if they differ in some way. This section will first 
 
8 Case concerning Military and Paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of 
America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment 1984 ICJ Reports 392, para. 73. (‘Nicaragua Case’). 
9 Ibid., para. 181. Judge Schwebel in his Dissenting Opinion in the Nicaragua case also acknowledged that ‘it is 
generally accepted … that Charter restrictions on the use of force have been incorporated into the body of 
customary international law, so that such States as Switzerland, the Koreas, and diminutive States are bound by 
the principles of Article 2 of the Charter even though they are non-members’ (para. 95), although he disagreed 
with the position that member States of the UN should be treated as being bound only by customary 
international law when in fact the UN Charter applied between them. 
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look at whether the Nicaragua judgment assists in answering the question. In that case, the 
ICJ did not explicitly hold that the prohibition under each source of law was identical, and its 
analysis of whether the prohibition is a customary rule identical in content to article 2(4) of 
the UN Charter has been rightly criticised. 
 
The Court was rather obtuse about whether the prohibition of the use of force in article 2(4) is 
exactly the same in customary international law. It stated that: 
  
‘The Court does not consider that, in the areas of law relevant to the present dispute, it 
can be claimed that all the customary rules which may be invoked have a content exactly 
identical to that of the rules contained in the treaties which cannot be applied by virtue of 
the United States reservation. On a number of points, the areas governed by the two 
sources of law do not exactly overlap, and the substantive rules in which they are framed 
are not identical in content.’10 
 
Thus, the Court holds, ‘[t]he areas governed by the two sources of law thus do not overlap 
exactly, and the rules do not have the same content.’11  
 
Claus Kreß argues that despite the ICJ’s statements, subsequent parts of the judgment show 
that the ICJ has interpreted customary international law and article 2(4) ‘in a largely identical 
manner’.12 Since in the Armed Activities case, the ICJ referred to the ‘principle’ of the non-
use of force in international relations without citing its source,13 Kreß concludes that it is 
based on ‘essentially identical rules of treaty and customary law existing alongside each 
other’.14 However, this finding was far from explicit, and other scholars have noted that the 
ICJ seems to treat the two as identical in substance without much analysis.15 
 
The way that the Court reached its conclusion in the Nicaragua case, that there is a 
customary international law prohibition of the use of force in parallel with the UN Charter, 
has also been criticised. The ICJ in Nicaragua failed to distinguish in its reasoning between 
acts in the application of the treaty versus custom. Oscar Schachter observes that: ‘Just how 
the Court could tell whether practice since 1945 by the treaty parties relative to the use of 
force was “customary” rather than treaty is not made clear.’16 It claimed to determine the 
 
10 Above n.8, para. 175. 
11 Ibid., para. 176. 
12 ‘The International Court of Justice and the Non-Use of Force’ in Marc Weller (ed), The Oxford Handbook of 
the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2015) 561, 568, citing the Nicaragua case, 
paras. 181, 188. 
13 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda) (2005) ICJ 
Reports 168, para.345(1). 
14 Above n.12, 569, though he notes the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Jennings, 530–1 in the Nicaragua case, 
which disputes this view. 
15 See, e.g. Albrecht Randelzhofer and Oliver Dörr, ‘Article 2(4)’ in Bruno Simma et al (eds), The Charter of 
the United Nations: A commentary (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed., 2012) 200, 230 MN65. 
16 Oscar Schachter, ‘Entangled Treaty and Custom’ in Yoram Dinstein (ed), International Law at a Time of 
Perplexity: Essays in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989) 717, 719. 
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applicable rule of customary international law by ‘direct[ing] its attention to the practice and 
opinio juris of States’, observing that:  
 
‘“It is of course axiomatic that the material of customary international law is to be looked 
for primarily in the actual practice and opinio juris of States, even though multilateral 
conventions may have an important role to play in recording and defining rules deriving 
from custom, or indeed in developing them.” (Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab 
Jarnahiriyu/Malta), I.C.J. Reports 1985, pp. 29-30, para. 27.)  
 
… Although the Court has no jurisdiction to determine whether the conduct of the United 
States constitutes a breach of [the Charter of the United Nations and that of the 
Organization of American States], it can and must take them into account in ascertaining 
the content of the customary international law which the United States is also alleged to 
have infringed’.17 
 
In other words, the Court took into account the role of the UN Charter and the Charter of the 
Organization of American States in ‘recording and defining rules deriving from custom’ or 
‘in developing them’. However, it did not explain how it did so. For instance, the Court noted 
that Nicaragua and the USA argued that the principles regarding the use of force in the UN 
Charter ‘correspond, in essentials, to those found in customary international law’, and thus 
both took ‘the view that the fundamental principle in this area is expressed in the terms 
employed in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter’. The Court went on to 
state: ‘They therefore accept a treaty-law obligation to refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.’18 The 
Court correctly held that it ‘has however to be satisfied that there exists in customary 
international law an opinio juris as to the binding character of such abstention’.19 But the 
Court did not explain how it could derive opinio juris as to the binding character of 
obligations set out in the UN Charter under customary international law, given that the 
provision in question (article 2(4)) is nearly universal, and States parties to the treaty are 
presumably acting in accordance with their treaty obligations.  
 
Furthermore, despite its frequent references to the need to evaluate the existence of a general 
practice accepted as law in order to identify a rule of customary international law, and its 
holding that ‘[t]he Court must satisfy itself that the existence of the rule in the opinio juris of 
States is confirmed by practice’,20 Christine Gray notes that ‘[the Court] was criticized for 
inferring opinio juris from General Assembly resolutions and for not undertaking a wide 
 
17 Para. 183. 
18 Para. 188. 
19 Para. 188. 
20 Para. 184. 
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survey of practice’.21 Whatever the justification, the Court did not set out its process of 
reasoning that the prohibition is also a customary rule in parallel to the Charter prohibition. 
More crucially, the ICJ left open whether the customary and UN Charter prohibitions of the 
use of force are actually identical. 
Applying the two-element approach to identify the 
scope of the customary prohibition of the use of 
force 
Since whether the prohibition of the use of force under custom and article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter are identical is decisive to the matter of how to determine the meaning of a prohibited 
‘use of force’ under international law, it is crucial to examine the evidence to determine 
whether the content of the prohibition under both sources of law are really identical. The 
purpose of this is to determine which method to apply to ascertain the meaning of a 
prohibited ‘use of force’: whether to identify the scope and content of the customary rule, or 
apply a process of treaty interpretation to article 2(4) of the UN Charter, or both. This section 
will set out and apply the two-element approach to identifying the scope of a rule of 
customary international law, and will show why this is particularly challenging with respect 
to the prohibition of the use of force. 
 
The dominant approach to establishing the existence and content of a rule of customary 
international law is the two constituent element approach: a general practice that is accepted 
as law.22 This was the approach of the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, when it 
held that:  
 
‘two conditions must be fulfilled. Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled 
practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a 
belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring 
it. The need for such a belief, i.e., the existence of a subjective element, is implicit in the 
very notion of the opinio juris sive necessitatis. The States concerned must therefore feel 
that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation.’23 
 
 
21 International Law and the Use of Force (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed., 2008), 8-9, footnote 30. However, 
she notes that ‘as the Court said, the parties were in agreement that Article 2(4) was customary law. It was not 
surprising that the Court's inquiry into customary international law was relatively brief.’ 
22 See Michael Wood, ‘Fourth Report on Identification of Customary International Law’ (A/CN.4/695, ILC, 6 
March 2016) (‘Wood Fourth Report’), 5, para. 15. Although other approaches have been proposed by scholars, 
eg. Bin Cheng’s argument that ‘international customary law has in reality only one constitutive element, the 
opinio juris’, ‘United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: “Instant” International Customary Law?’, (1965) 5 
Indian Journal of International Law 36. 
23 North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of 
Germany/Netherlands) Judgment (1969) ICJ Reports 3, para.77; affirmed in the Nicaragua case, above n.8, 
para. 207. 
  19 
The two-element approach has also been adopted by the International Law Commission 
(‘ILC’) Committee on the Formation and Evidence of Customary International Law, whose 
draft conclusions provisionally adopted by the drafting committee provide that: ‘To 
determine the existence and content of a rule of customary international law, it is necessary to 
ascertain whether there is a general practice that is accepted as law (opinio juris).’24 The ILC 
Committee stated that each element must be separately ascertained by assessing the evidence 
for each element.25 The ILC Committee Chairman clarified that ‘the existence of one element 
cannot be deduced from the existence of the other’.26 
 
So can one apply the two-element approach to identify the scope of the customary prohibition 
of the use of force and to verify whether it is actually identical to the prohibition set out in 
article 2(4) of the UN Charter? As this chapter will show, it is extremely complex and 
difficult to do so. The main issue is whether there is sufficient relevant State practice and 
opinio juris to satisfy the two-element approach for the identification of a rule of customary 
international law. This depends primarily on the extent to which conduct connected with a 
treaty counts as relevant State practice or serves as evidence of an opinio juris. It also 
depends on the significance of verbal acts (including silence) and inaction as ‘practice’, and 
of UN General Assembly resolutions as evidence of opinio juris. Finally, it depends on the 
relative weight to be given to practice versus opinio juris. These factors taken together render 
it a highly fraught and complicated exercise to determine the scope of the customary 
prohibition of the use of force separately to applying and interpreting article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter, as the answer depends on a number of theoretical issues that remain unsettled or 
over which significant controversy exists. This chapter will address each of these issues in 
turn, before presenting, in the next chapter, an alternative method of determining whether the 
customary and Charter prohibitions of the use of force are identical in content. 
Non-treaty	practice	
The first issue in determining the scope of the customary prohibition of the use of force is 
that there is insufficient relevant State practice outside the UN Charter with respect to the 
prohibition of the use of force. Although usually ‘the conduct of parties to a treaty in relation 
to non-parties is not practice under the treaty, and therefore counts towards the formation of 
customary law’,27 article 2(4) of the UN Charter not only prohibits Member States of the 
United Nations from using force against each other, but against any State, including non-
Member States. This means that the only relevant practice outside the UN Charter is that of 
 
24 Michael Wood, ‘Second Report on Identification of Customary International Law’ (A/CN.4/672, ILC, 22 
May 2014) (‘Wood Second Report’), 65, draft conclusion 2. 
25 Ibid., draft conclusion 3(2). 
26 International Law Commission, ‘Identification of Customary International Law Statement of the Chairman of 
the Drafting Committee, Mr. Mathias Forteau’ (ILC, 29 July 2015) (2015 Statement of Chairman), 3. 
27 International Law Association Committee on Formation of Customary (General) International Law, ‘Final 
Report of the Committee: Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary 
International Law’ (ILA, 2000). (‘ILA 2000 Report’), 47, commentary to section 24. See also Wood Third 
Report, above n.22, para. 41. 
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non-UN Member States. The International Law Association Committee on Formation of 
Customary (General) International Law suggests that new customary international law was 
generated through extension via replication in the practice of non-States parties of the treaty 
obligations in articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter.28 However, this seems to contradict 
what it wrote elsewhere in the same report about the customary rule arising out of the impact 
of the Charter, and the report does not state what that practice outside the treaty consisted of. 
 
It is true that there is some potentially relevant practice by non-UN Member States. For 
instance, prior to becoming members of the United Nations (i.e. before the UN Charter 
became directly binding on them), some States have declared their acceptance of the 
principles of the UN Charter including the prohibition of the use of force in article 2(4). Prior 
to becoming a member of the United Nations in 1956, in 1951 Japan ‘declar[ed] its intention 
… in all circumstances to conform to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations’ and 
‘accept[ed] the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, in 
particular the obligations … to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations’.29 Prior to their membership of 
the United Nations, the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic 
also both agreed to settle their disputes exclusively by peaceful means and to refrain from the 
threat or use of force in accordance with the UN Charter.30 Similarly, Switzerland accepted 
the obligations in the UN Charter prior to becoming a member of the United Nations in 
September 2002.31 To this may be added instances of non-UN Member States refraining from 
the threat or use of force. The legal relevance of silence and inaction to the identification of a 
customary rule is discussed below.  
 
However, there are two problems with concluding that the conduct of non-States parties to 
the UN Charter (i.e. States that are not Members of the United Nations) consistent with the 
obligation in article 2(4) is evidence of the existence of the rule in customary international 
law. Firstly, such conduct must still be accompanied by an opinio juris. The ICJ in the North 
Sea Continental Shelf cases held that no inference could be drawn from State practice by non-
parties to a convention which was consistent with a principle set out in it, since it did not in 
itself constitute evidence of an opinio juris.32 But the second and main problem is that there is 
hardly any such relevant practice due to the nearly universal nature of the UN Charter. This 
renders difficult the identification of relevant practice by non-parties to the UN Charter, 
which in any case due to their relatively small number could hardly be described as a ‘general 
 
28 ILA 2000 Report, ibid., 46, commentary (a) to section 24. 
29 Treaty of Peace with Japan, signed at San Francisco on 8 September 1951, entered into force 28 April 1952, 
1952 UNTS 46, preamble and article 5(ii). 
30 Treaty on the Basis of Relations Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic 
Republic (Grundlagenvertrag) and Supplementary Documents, Signed at Berlin, December 21, 1972, art. 3. 
31 Letter dated 20 June 2002 from the President and the Chancellor of the Swiss Confederation on behalf of the 
Swiss Federal Council addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/56/1009–S/2002/801. Switzerland 
accepted these obligations a few months before joining the United Nations. 
32 Above n.23, para. 76. 
  21 
practice’. Although UN membership is always stated to be practically universal, in reality, 
since 2011 there are 193 member States. There are two non-member observer States (the 
Holy See and the State of Palestine). In addition, Taiwan and Kosovo are not member States, 
and approximately 50 other territories and dependencies are not members (e.g. American 
Samoa, Cook Islands, Falkland Islands/Malvinas, Hong Kong). Since UN membership has 
grown over time, there have been periods in which there were a considerable number of 
States (including newly independent States) not yet members.33 But it is not their practice that 
is usually cited in support of the argument that the prohibition has formed a rule of customary 
international law due to widespread practice and opinio juris. As noted by Judge Sir Robert 
Jennings in his Dissenting Opinion in the Nicaragua case,  
 
‘there are obvious difficulties about extracting even a scintilla of relevant “practice” on 
these matters from the behaviour of those few States which are not parties to the Charter ; 
and the behaviour of all the rest, and the opinio juris which it might otherwise evidence, 
is surely explained by their being bound by the Charter itself’.34 
 
This was the paradox identified by RR Baxter:  
 
‘the proof of a consistent pattern of conduct by non-parties becomes more difficult as the 
number of parties to the instrument increases. The number of participants in the process 
of creating customary law may become so small that the evidence of their practice will be 
minimal or altogether lacking. Hence the paradox that as the number of parties to a treaty 
increases, it becomes more difficult to demonstrate what is the state of customary 
international law dehors the treaty’.35 
 
Clearly, the ICJ in the Nicaragua case (decided subsequent to Baxter’s famous 
pronouncement) ‘did not accept this reasoning, although it did not indicate how conduct 
relating to a treaty rule and to an identical customary law rule can be differentiated’.36 James 
Crawford has also noted that ‘State practice requires that the Baxter paradox hold – that is, 
that treaty participation is not enough. Custom is more than treaty, more even than a 
generally accepted treaty ... [yet] the coexistence of custom and treaty suggests that the 
Baxter paradox is not actually a genuine paradox.’37 Hugh Thirlway also argues that Baxter’s 
paradox is not really a paradox but ‘[i]t has merely a counter-intuitive element: one would 
expect that the more States show allegiance to a developing rule of law, by ratifying a treaty 
embodying it, the more easily it could be shown to have become a general customary rule. It 
states, or represents, in dramatic form a fact which is inconvenient for the development of 
international law, and its consistent application. There is no need to seek a “solution” to the 
 
33 See http://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/growth-united-nations-membership-1945-
present/index.html (last accessed 31 October 2018). 
34 Above n.8, 532, footnote omitted. 
35 ‘Treaties and Customs’ (1970) 129 Recueil des cours : collected courses of the Hague Academy of 
International Law 25, 64. 
36 Schachter, above n.16, 726-7. 
37 Chance, Order, Change (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013), 107, 110. 
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paradox, but rather a way of palliating that inconvenience.’38 He proposes two ways of doing 
so: firstly, ensuring ‘the factual basis … is not overstated’, including that one may also count 
the practice of States parties to a treaty or States that later accede to a treaty. The second is 
‘de lege ferenda – one may introduce some adjustments into the classic analysis of custom-
making: thus Crawford proposes, as we have seen, the adoption of a presumption of opinio 
juris from the simple fact of widespread participation in a law-making convention, and that 
account be taken of the attitude towards the relevant rule adopted by States who are 
committed to it in its convention form.’39 In a similar vein, Nikolas Stürchler argues that with 
respect to the prohibition of the use of force, ‘the basic condition of opinio juris ... is already 
fulfilled’.40 He dismisses the relevance of Baxter’s paradox to article 2(4) by stating that 
‘[p]ost-treaty practice and opinion do not suffer from the problem that states cannot act on 
either of them outside their treaty obligations’.41  
 
But these views step aside the question: de lege lata, how can one identify the scope of a 
parallel customary obligation separately to the treaty? Relatedly, how did the post-treaty 
practice regarding the prohibition of the use of force become a customary obligation if the 
original source of the obligation is the treaty? This depends on the extent to which treaty 
ratification, frequent repetition of a rule in multiple treaties and conduct by States parties to a 
treaty consistent with the treaty obligations counts as State practice and opinio juris for the 
purpose of identification of a rule of customary international law. These issues are examined 
below. 
Conduct	referable	to	the	treaty		
Since there is virtually no potentially relevant State practice with respect to the prohibition of 
the use of force completely outside the UN Charter (essentially, only the practice of non-UN 
Member States, which we have seen above is extremely limited), the next problems are 
firstly, whether State practice in compliance with a treaty obligation may count as relevant 
practice for the purpose of identifying a rule of customary international law; the second 
problem is whether and how to determine if such practice in compliance with a treaty 
obligation is motivated by a belief in legal obligation outside the treaty.  
Does	conduct	consistent	with	treaty	obligations	count	as	practice?	
Since the majority of potentially relevant State practice in this area is referable to States’ 
obligations under article 2(4) of the UN Charter, this raises the question of whether conduct 
consistent with States’ treaty obligations counts as ‘practice’ for the purposes of identifying a 
 
38 HWA Thirlway, ‘Professor Baxter’s Legacy: Still Paradoxical?’ (2017) 6 ESIL Reflection <http://www.esil-
sedi.eu/node/1713>  (accessed 24 March 2017.) 
39 Ibid. 
40 The Threat of Force in International Law (Cambridge University Press, Paperback ed., 2009) 106, footnote 
58. 
41 Ibid., 106, footnote 58. 
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rule of customary international law. The International Law Commission has relied on treaty 
practice in assessing State practice for the purpose of identifying a rule of customary 
international law.42 However, the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases43 confirmed 
that State practice consistent with the treaty by States parties should not be given weight. In 
that case, the ICJ discounted practice consistent with the treaty by States parties, even before 
the treaty entered into effect since they were presumably ‘acting actually or potentially in the 
application of the Convention’. With respect to State practice consistent with treaty 
obligations, ‘[c]onduct which is wholly referable to the treaty itself does not count for this 
purpose as practice’;44 ‘in principle … what States do in pursuance of their treaty obligations 
is prima facie referable only to the treaty, and therefore does not count towards the formation 
of a customary rule’.45 Conduct referable to the treaty is not relevant ‘practice’ unless 
accompanied by an opinio juris outside the treaty, since on its own it does not provide 
evidence that a State is applying customary international law. It will require something 
additional to show that the conduct is not merely referable to the treaty but indicates that 
State’s belief about a customary legal obligation – this would usually require a verbal 
statement to show the State was not merely applying the treaty.  
Are	acts	in	compliance	with	treaty	obligations	evidence	of	opinio	juris?	
Treating conduct of States parties to a treaty that is consistent with the treaty as evidence of 
opinio juris for the existence of a customary rule is also problematic for the same reason 
explained above, namely, that on its own, State conduct that is in compliance with a treaty 
obligation is not evidence of a belief that the conduct is required by customary international 
law, since the conduct is referable to the treaty. 
Treaty	ratification	and	repetition	of	a	rule	in	multiple	treaties		
In addition to the above forms of practice, a plethora of multilateral treaties affirm the 
obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force, such as the UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, which provides in article 301 that ‘[i]n exercising their rights and performing their 
duties under this Convention, States Parties shall refrain from any threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United 
Nations’.46 Does treaty ratification and repetition of a rule in multiple treaties count as opinio 
juris? The International Law Commission has relied upon a State’s treaty practice and 
multilateral treaty practice in assessing the subjective element for the purpose of identifying a 
 
42 International Law Commission, ‘Formation and Evidence of Customary International Law - Elements in the 
Previous Work of the International Law Commission That Could Be Particularly Relevant to the Topic - 
Memorandum by the Secretariat’ (A/CN.4/659, 14 March 2013) (‘ILC Memorandum by the Secretariat’) 14, 
commentary to Observation 7, para. 23. 
43 Above n.23, para. 76. 
44 ILA 2000 Report’, above n.27, 46. 
45 Ibid. See also Wood Third Report, above n.2, para. 41 with further references. 
46 Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (1994 UNTS) 397 (‘UNCLOS’). 
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rule of customary international law.47 One example of multilateral treaty practice relied on by 
the International Law Commission as evidence of opinio juris for the purpose of identifying a 
rule of customary international law, was paragraphs (1) and (5) of the commentary to draft 
article 49 on the law of treaties, referring to the prohibition of the use of force in article 2(4) 
of the UN Charter.48 The ILC ‘has found that the frequent enunciation of a provision in 
international treaties did not necessarily indicate that the provision had developed into a rule 
of customary international law.’49 Similarly, draft conclusion 11, paragraph 2 of the ILC 
Committee on the Formation and Evidence of Customary International Law provides that 
‘[t]he fact that a rule is set forth in a number of treaties may, but does not necessarily, 
indicate that the treaty rule reflects a rule of customary international law’.50 However, ‘in 
some cases it may be that frequent repetition in widely accepted treaties evinces a recognition 
by the international community as a whole that a rule is one of general, and not just 
particular, law. … But the test remains qualitative rather than quantitative.’51  
 
Christian Tams notes that ‘[a]s regards the context, the Court has been unwilling to 
compartmentalise State conduct as belonging to one particular source of law only. Notably … 
it has regularly relied on the participation of States in treaties.’52 Tams notes that ‘[a]ccording 
to Pellet, this in fact “might be the most important and frequent aspect of practice”’.53 The 
Court in the Nicaragua case considered the actual treaty commitments to a rule prohibiting 
the use of force as themselves evidence of the parties expressing recognition of the validity of 
the rule as binding under customary international law:  
 
‘In the present dispute, the Court, while exercising its jurisdiction only in respect of the 
application of the customary rules of non-use of force and non-intervention, cannot 
disregard the fact that the Parties are bound by these rules as a matter of treaty law and of 
customary international law. Furthermore, in the present case, apart from the treaty 
commitments binding the Parties to the rules in question, there are various instances of 
their having expressed recognition of the validity thereof as customary international law 
in other ways.’54 
 
For instance, the Court held that the US ratification of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on 
Rights and Duties of States, ‘Article 11 of which imposes the obligation not to recognize 
territorial acquisitions or special advantages which have been obtained by force’ was 
 
47 See ILC Memorandum by the Secretariat, 14, commentary to Observation 7, para. 23 and 21-2, commentary 
to Observation 12, para. 29, with extensive examples cited in footnotes. 
48 Yearbook of the ILC 1966, vol. II, p. 246, cited in footnote 85 of ILC Secretariat Memorandum, above n.26, 
22. 
49 Ibid., 33-34, footnote omitted. See also ILA 2000 Report, above n.28, principle 25. 
50 ILC Committee provisionally adopted draft conclusions, set out in 2015 Statement of Chairman, above n.26. 
51 ILA 2000 Report, above n.27, 48, commentary to section 25. 
52 Meta-Custom and the Court: A Study in Judicial Law-Making’ (2015) 14(1) The Law and Practice of 
International Courts and Tribunals 51, 68, footnote omitted. 
53 Ibid., 68, footnote 90. 
54 Para. 185, emphasis added. 
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evidence of the US’ opinio juris.55 In other words, the Court viewed the ratification of a 
treaty containing the obligation to refrain from the use of force in international relations as 
evidence that the ratifying State accepted that such obligations in the treaty were already 
binding as a matter of customary international law. 
 
However, it is problematic to consider treaty ratification, or the repetition of a treaty 
provision in a number of treaties as evidence of opinio juris regarding the existence of a 
customary rule without further evidence that the States parties to the treaty believe that the 
treaty provision is also a customary rule. If it were already a binding rule under customary 
international law, why would States repeat it in a treaty unless the treaty is expressly intended 
to codify custom? By ratifying a treaty, the parties to the treaty intend to accept a treaty 
obligation.56 
Verbal	acts		
Verbal	acts	as	practice	
If acts connected with a treaty when carried out by States parties to that treaty do not carry 
weight in terms of State practice for the purpose of identifying a rule of customary 
international law, are verbal acts by States a sufficient form of ‘general practice’? Particularly 
regarding the prohibition of the use of force between States in international law, most forms 
of practice are verbal acts – statements, declarations, exchange of claims and counter-claims 
– rather than physical acts such as the actual employment of inter-State force.57 Unlike 
physical acts, many verbal acts explicitly refer to the customary nature of the rule. For 
example: 
 
• The 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration, in which the UN General Assembly 
proclaimed that ‘[e]very State has the duty to refrain in its international relations from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United 
Nations. Such a threat or use of force constitutes a violation of international law and 
the Charter of the United Nations and shall never be employed as a means of settling 
international issues’.58 The reference to ‘every State’ and that such a use of force is a 
violation of international law in addition to the UN Charter are strong evidence of an 
opinio juris that the prohibition of the use of force is a rule of customary international 
law which is binding on all States, and not only members of the United Nations. 
 
 
55 Para. 189. 
56 For scholarly views for and against this position, see Wood Second Report, above n.24, 25. 
57 This point is also made by the ILA Committee in general about customary international law: ILA 2000 
Report, above n.27, 14. 
58 Above n.4, para. 1(1). 
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• 1975 Helsinki Final Act (declaration on principles governing the mutual relations of 
States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe). The 
ICJ in the Nicaragua case described the effects of the Act as follows: ‘the 
participating States undertake to “refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their 
international relations in general,” … from the threat or use of force. Acceptance of a 
text in these terms confirms the existence of an opinio juris of the participating States 
prohibiting the use of force in international relations.’59 The Pact of Bogota (the 
American Treaty on Pacific Settlement) also requires the contracting parties to 
‘refrain from the threat or the use of force, or from any other means of coercion for 
the settlement of their controversies …’;60 
 
• Representations by States before the ICJ have asserted the customary international 
law nature of the prohibition, notably, for example, Nicaragua and the USA in the 
Nicaragua case;61 
 
• 1987 General Assembly Resolution 42/22, Declaration on the Enhancement of the 
Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in 
International Relations (adopted without a vote), held that ‘[e]very State has the duty 
to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or from acting in any other 
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Such a threat or use of 
force constitutes a violation of international law and of the Charter of the United 
Nations and entails international responsibility.’62 The latter sentence implies that the 
prohibition is a rule of customary international law in addition to a treaty rule in the 
Charter. The resolution went on to declare that ‘[t]he principle of refraining from the 
threat or use of force in international relations is universal in character and is binding, 
regardless of each State's political, economic, social or cultural system or relations of 
alliance’.63 
 
• In the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, participating countries, ‘[i]n 
accordance with [their] obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and 
commitments under the Helsinki Final Act, … renew[ed] [their] pledge to refrain 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any State, or from acting in any other manner inconsistent with the principles or 
purposes of those documents’.64 
 
 
59 Above n.8, para. 189. 
60 Cited in Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry in Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, 
Advisory Opinion 1996 ICJ Rep 226 (‘Nuclear Weapons’), 525. 
61 Above n.8, paras. 187-188. 
62 Above n.6, para. 1, emphasis added. 
63 Ibid., para. 2. 
64 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 21 November 1990, 5. 
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Despite early debates about whether verbal acts count as State practice as well as physical 
acts,65 it is the dominant view in scholarship and jurisprudence that verbal acts do indeed 
count as State practice.66 The ILC acknowledges that ‘[p]ractice may take a wide range of 
forms. It includes both physical and verbal acts. It may, under certain circumstances, include 
inaction.’67 According to draft conclusion 6, paragraph 2: ‘Forms of State practice include, 
but are not limited to: diplomatic acts and correspondence; conduct in connection with 
resolutions adopted by an international organization or at an intergovernmental conference; 
conduct in connection with treaties; executive conduct, including operational conduct “on the 
ground”; legislative and administrative acts; and decisions of national courts.’68 
 
The ILA Committee on Formation of Customary (General) International Law in its 2000 
report also acknowledged that ‘[v]erbal acts, and not only physical acts, of States count as 
State practice.’69 The ILA Committee argued that ‘[t]here is no inherent reason why verbal 
acts should not count as practice, whilst physical acts (such as arresting individuals or ships) 
should. For voluntarists, this must necessarily be so: both forms of conduct are manifestations 
of State will.’70 Verbal acts recognised by the ILA Committee as forms of State practice were 
extensive: 
 
‘Diplomatic statements (including protests), policy statements, press releases, official 
manuals (e.g. on military law), instructions to armed forces, comments by governments 
on draft treaties, legislation, decisions of national courts and executive authorities, 
pleadings before international tribunals, statements in international organizations and the 
resolutions these bodies adopt – all of which are frequently cited as examples of State 
practice – are all forms of speech-act.’ 71 
 
Although it is recognised that verbal acts constitute a form of State practice, it is still 
‘necessary to take account of the distinction between what conduct counts as State practice, 
and the weight to be given to it’.72 Some argue that verbal acts carry more weight (e.g. the 
position explained by ILA), while others argue that physical acts carry more weight (‘talk is 
cheap’).73 The weight to be given to verbal versus physical acts will depend on the 
circumstances of the case. Furthermore, the weight to be given to any particular conduct, 
whether verbal or physical, is arguably less a matter of weight in terms of the objective 
element of customary international law, but goes towards the strength of evidence of an 
accompanying opinio juris. This is the underlying objection to accepting verbal acts as State 
practice, because verbal acts may not demonstrate the same commitment of the State to a 
 
65 See Wood Second Report, above n.24, 19, footnote 84 for extensive references to scholarship. 
66 Ibid, 20. 
67 Ibid., draft conclusion 6, para 1. 
68 Ibid. 
69 ILA 2000 Report, above n.27, 14. 
70 Ibid, 14, citation omitted. 
71 Ibid., 14, footnote omitted. 
72 Ibid., 13. 
73 Ibid., 13 for a discussion and critique of this view. 
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position regarding the legality of an act under customary international law – a matter of 
opinio juris. 
 
There is some debate as to whether double counting of verbal practice is permitted – i.e. 
whether the same verbal acts may count as both State practice and as evidence of opinio 
juris,74 but it is widely accepted that this is permitted so long as both elements (State practice 
and opinio juris) are found to be present. ‘In order to ascertain separately the existence of 
each element there must be an assessment of evidence for each element – most often different 
evidence. … [I]n assessing the existence of a general practice or acceptance as law, it should 
not be excluded that, in some cases, the same material might be used to ascertain practice and 
opinio juris; but the important point remains that, even in such cases, the material will be 
examined for different purposes.’75 This approach is advantageous, since ‘verbal acts 
generally provide explicit evidence of opinio juris unlike physical acts’,76 given that a belief 
underlying a physical act may need to be inferred.77 ‘It cannot be assumed that the 
implication of a state’s physical acts is a belief that the act is lawful’.78 Since verbal acts may 
be intended to promote a State’s preferred direction of legal developments (lex ferenda) 
rather than reflect its belief as to the actual state of the law (lex lata), caution is required 
when assessing verbal acts as evidence of an opinio juris.79 
Do	UN	General	Assembly	resolutions	count	as	evidence	of	opinio	juris?	
One form of verbal act has particular relevance for our enquiry into the customary 
international law status of the prohibition of the use of force, and its scope: UN General 
Assembly resolutions. UN General Assembly resolutions and other ‘resolution[s] adopted by 
an international organization or at an intergovernmental conference may provide evidence for 
establishing the existence and content of a rule of customary international law, or contribute 
to its development’.80 
 
In the Nicaragua case, the sources that the Court considered were evidence of an opinio juris 
that the prohibition of the use of force is a rule of customary international law were primarily 
General Assembly resolutions, and in particular the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration: 
 
74 See, e.g., Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, ‘Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A 
Reconciliation’ (2001) 95(4) The American Journal of International Law 757. 
75 2015 Statement of Chairman, above n.26, 4. For a different view, see the ILA 2000 Report, above n.27, 7; 
Mary Ellen O’Connell, ‘Taking Opinio Juris Seriously, A Classical Approach to International Law on the Use 
of Force’ in Enzo Cannizzaro and Paolo Palechetti (eds), Customary International Law on the Use of Force: A 
Methodological Approach (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005) 9, 16. 
76 O’Connell, ibid., 15. 
77 ILA 2000 Report, above n.27, 14. 
78 O’Connell, above n.75, 15 
79 Ibid., 16. 
80 ILC Committee provisionally adopted conclusions, Draft conclusion 12[13]; The ILA Committee in its 2000 
Report, above n.27, 55, para. 28 also takes the position that ‘resolutions of the United Nations General 
Assembly may in some instances constitute evidence of the existence customary international law; help to 
crystallize emerging customary law; or contribute to the formation of new customary law. But as a general rule, 
and subject to Section 32, they do not ipso facto create new rules of customary law.’ 
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‘The effect of consent to the text of such resolutions cannot be understood as merely that 
of a “reiteration or elucidation” of the treaty commitment undertaken in the Charter. On 
the contrary, it may be understood as an acceptance of the validity of the rule or set of 
rules declared by the resolution by themselves. The principle of non-use of force, for 
example, may thus be regarded as a principle of customary international law, not as such 
conditioned by provisions relating to collective security, or to the facilities or armed 
contingents to be provided under Article 43 of the Charter. It would therefore seem 
apparent that the attitude referred to expresses an opinio juris respecting such rule (or set 
of rules), to be thenceforth treated separately from the provisions, especially those of an 
institutional kind, to which it is subject on the treaty-law plane of the Charter.’81 
 
However, Judge Roberto Ago in that case criticised the Court’s approach to identification of 
customary international law, stating: ‘There are, similarly, doubts which I feel bound to 
express regarding the idea which occasionally surfaces in the Judgment (paras. 191, 192, 202 
and 203) that the acceptance of certain resolutions or declarations drawn up in the framework 
of the United Nations or the Organization of American States, as well as in another context, 
can be seen as proof conclusive of the existence among the States concerned of a concordant 
opinio juris possessing all the force of a rule of customary international law.’82 
 
In the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, the Court noted the necessity of examining 
whether an opinio juris exists with respect to the normative character of the resolution: 
 
‘General Assembly resolutions, even if they are not binding, may sometimes have 
normative value. They can, in certain circumstances, provide evidence important for 
establishing the existence of a rule or the emergence of an opinio juris. To establish 
whether this is true of a given General Assembly resolution, it is necessary to look at its 
content and the conditions of its adoption; it is also necessary to see whether an opinio 
juris exists as to its normative character. Or a series of resolutions may show the gradual 
evolution of the opinio juris required for the establishment of a new rule.’83 
 
This highlights that there is no automatic equating reason for a State voting in favour of a 
resolution with that State’s belief in the normative character of the resolution. States may 
have other (especially political) reasons for voting the way that they do. ‘Importantly, “[a]s 
with any declaration by a state, it is always necessary to consider what states actually mean 
when they vote for or against certain resolutions in international fora”. As States themselves 
often stress, the General Assembly is a political organ in which it is often far from clear that 
their acts carry juridical significance.’84  
 
 
81 Above n.8, para. 188. 
82 Ibid., Separate Opinion of Judge Ago, para. 7. 
83 Para. 70. 
84 Wood Third Report, above n.2, 33, footnotes with extensive citations omitted. 
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Furthermore, it is important to take into account that unless the language of the resolution 
makes clear otherwise, such resolutions are usually non-binding.85 However, with the 
appropriate caution, UN General Assembly resolutions may indeed provide important 
evidence of opinio juris when the context, content and language of the resolution justify such 
a conclusion. Especially since the General Assembly is ‘a forum of near universal 
participation’,86 resolutions that are unanimous or passed by consensus are a particularly 
important source of evidence of opinio juris regarding the state of international law on a 
given topic, provided that they are not merely taken at face value, but analysed with due care 
to identify whether the reasons for voting reflect a belief in the normative character of the 
resolution.  
 
One particular example of a UN General Assembly resolution that serves as strong evidence 
of opinio juris regarding the customary prohibition of the use of force and its content as 
identical to article 2(4) of the UN Charter is the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration. 
Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 1970, the Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations (‘Friendly Relations Declaration’) was adopted on 24 October 1970 by 
consensus by the UN General Assembly on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of 
the United Nations. Principle 1 of the Declaration proclaims: 
 
The principle that States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations 
 
In addition to comprising subsequent agreement of UN Member States on the interpretation 
of article 2(4), as noted above, the ICJ relied on the Friendly Relations Declaration in the 
Nicaragua case as an indication of States’ opinio juris on the existence and content of the 
customary prohibition of the use of force87 due to its references to ‘all States’;88 ‘principle’;89 
‘every State’;90 ‘a violation of international law and the Charter’91 and the statement that 
‘[t]he principles of the Charter which are embodied in this Declaration constitute basic 
principles of international law’.92  
 
The 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration is therefore strong evidence of opinio juris 
regarding the customary prohibition of the use of force and its content. However, although 
 
85 See, e.g., M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument 
(Cambridge University Press, 2005), 434-435, cited in Wood Third Report, ibid., footnote 117. 
86 See, e.g. Wood Third Report, ibid., 9, para. 25, noting that this was suggested in the Sixth Committee and 
concurring. 
87 Above n.8, para. 191. 
88 Above n.5, 10th preambular paragraph 
89 Ibid., principle 1. 
90 Ibid., principle 1. 
91 Ibid., principle 1, para. 1. 
92 Ibid., para. 3 of Declaration. 
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the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration and the other verbal acts set out above refer to and 
confirm the customary nature of the prohibition of the use of force, they are less useful for 
identifying the precise scope of the customary rule and if it is identical to article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter. This is because the type of verbal acts that refer explicitly to customary 
international law are general and abstract, rather than in response to specific incidents. 
Silence	and	inaction	as	State	practice	and	evidence	of	opinio	juris	
A final category of potentially relevant practice for the identification of the scope and content 
of a customary international law rule prohibiting the use of force is silence and inaction. 
Much State practice that may be relevant is that of omission: refraining from the use of force 
in particular situations, refraining from characterising an act by another State as a use of 
force, lack of protest. What is the significance of silence and inaction for the identification of 
a rule of customary international law? Is it relevant that States seem to refrain from making 
claims about ‘marginal’ forcible actions under the jus contra bellum framework? Is it enough 
that States generally refrain from using force against each other (inaction as relevant 
practice), coupled with an opinio juris? A note on terminology: Tom Ruys refers to 
‘omission’;93 Olivier Corten discusses the significance of ‘silence’94 and Sir Michael Wood 
uses the term ‘inaction’ in his reports, but notes that inaction is ‘also referred to as passive 
practice, abstention from acting, silence or omission’.95 This work will use the overarching 
category of ‘omission’ to describe both inaction and silence. Within this broad category, one 
may distil two different types of omission. The first type is omission which may constitute 
State practice. The second type is omission in response to another State’s conduct, which 
may constitute evidence of opinio juris regarding the legality of the other State’s conduct 
through acquiescence.  
 
Collecting examples of inaction is senseless without an idea of what type of conduct is in fact 
being abstained from, and the categories of inaction are limited only by the imagination of 
the person identifying such examples. As such, to narrow the universe of all forms of State 
inaction to something meaningful for a legal analysis, the types of inaction that may be 
relevant State practice likely fall into the following categories: inaction accompanied by 
explicit verbal statements that such conduct would be unlawful; abstention from types of 
forcible conduct whose legality is disputed; and inaction in circumstances where the  
expectation or possibility is raised for a particular State to act, such as where it is called on to 
do so or has previously asserted a right to so act, or where some States have taken that type of 
action but similar conduct is not adopted by other States. Collecting data relating to omission 
as potential evidence of opinio juris regarding the prohibition of the use of force under 
customary international law is more straightforward, since such silence or inaction will be in 
 
93 Tom Ruys, ‘The Meaning of “Force” and the Boundaries of the Jus Ad Bellum: Are “Minimal” Uses of Force 
Excluded from UN Charter Article 2 (4)?’ (2014) 108(2) American Journal of International Law 159, 167-171. 
94 Olivier Corten, The Law against War : The Prohibition on the Use of Force in Contemporary International 
Law (Hart, 2010), 35-8. 
95 Wood Third Report, above n.2, para. 19. 
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response to conduct of another State – either through a potential or actual threat or use of 
force, or official claims regarding the legality of certain conduct. For this category, one 
would need to identify forcible acts by States as well as verbal practice asserting the legality 
of forcible conduct and examine the response (or non-response) of third States.  
 
Under certain circumstances discussed in this part, inaction and silence may constitute State 
practice and evidence of opinio juris for the purposes of identifying a rule of customary 
international law. However, due to the nature of inaction and silence, they are often 
ambiguous and will require something more in order to be construed as evidence of such. In 
assessing whether inaction or silence in the face of forcible conduct or legal claims is 
evidence of an opinio juris regarding the legality of the conduct in question, one should 
consider whether the silent/inactive State had knowledge of the conduct, the capacity to 
respond, whether its interests are affected and if there is any evidence regarding the reasons 
for its silence or inaction.96 
Omission	as	State	practice	
Omission may count as State practice when inaction comprises abstention from conduct 
(such as the use of force) or silence in the form of refraining from asserting legal claims. 
According to Wood, this is a form of relevant State practice for the purpose of identifying a 
rule of customary international law, as long as it is accompanied by an opinio juris.97 
Omission as State practice is distinguished from omission as evidence of opinio juris in that 
the former comprises abstention from asserting original legal claims to act in a particular 
manner under customary international law, whereas the latter is in response to another State’s 
conduct and may be interpreted as acquiescence in the legality of such.  
Inaction	as	practice	
Inaction (in the sense of abstaining from physical action) has been variously characterised as 
a potential form of State practice, or as evidence of opinio juris.98 For inaction to count as 
relevant State practice giving rise to a rule of customary international law, it must be general 
and accompanied by an opinio juris.99 Examples of inaction that have been accepted as State 
practice include ‘refraining from exercising protection in favour of certain naturalized 
persons; abstaining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any State; and abstaining from instituting criminal proceedings in certain 
circumstances’.100  
 
 
96 2015 Chairman’s Statement, above n.26, 10; Wood Third Report, above n.2, 8, para. 22. 
97 Wood Third Report, ibid., para. 20. 
98 Wood Second Report, above n.24, para. 42 (with extensive further references at footnote 124); ILA 2000 
Report, above n.27, 15. 
99 Wood Third Report, above n.2, para. 20. 
100 Ibid., para. 20, footnotes omitted. 
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In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the ICJ cited and followed the Lotus case,101 in 
which the Permanent Court of International Justice (‘PCIJ’) held: 
 
‘Even if the rarity of the judicial decisions to be found ... were sufficient to prove ...the 
circumstance alleged ..., it would merely show that States had often, in practice, abstained 
from instituting criminal proceedings, and not that they recognized themselves as being 
obliged to do so; for only if such abstention were based on their being conscious of 
having a duty to abstain would it be possible to speak of an international custom. The 
alleged fact does not allow one to infer that States have been conscious of having such a 
duty; on the other hand, ... there are other circumstances calculated to show that the 
contrary is true.’102 
 
The clear problem is that in certain cases (such as the PCIJ Lotus decision), mere abstention 
can be too ambiguous to be treated as ‘a precedent capable of contributing to the formation of 
a customary rule’.103 The ILA Committee states in its commentary that when conduct ‘is not 
clearly referable to an existing or potential legal rule’ (such as ambiguous omission) it should 
not count as a precedent unless there is additional evidence explaining that it occurred due to 
an opinio juris that the conduct abstained from would be unlawful under customary 
international law (as distinguished from other reasons for a State to abstain from conduct 
such as ‘lack of jurisdiction under municipal law; lack of interest; or a belief that a court of 
the flag State is a more convenient forum’).104 
Silence	as	practice	
Just as inaction may be a form of practice if accompanied by the required opinio juris, silence 
in certain circumstances can also be a form of State practice if it is ‘general’. The forms of 
silence referred to here are those that are not in response to the acts or claims of other States, 
since that is rather evidence of opinio juris (see below). One example is given in Wood’s 
Second Report: that of the dissenting opinion of Judge Read in the Interpretation of Peace 
Treaties case (‘The fact that no State has adopted this position [that a State party to a dispute 
may prevent its arbitration by the expedient of refraining from appointing a representative on 
the Commission] is the strongest confirmation of the international usage or practice in 
matters of arbitration which is set forth above)105 – although Wood lists this as an example of 
inaction as evidence of opinio juris, it seems to in fact comprise an instance of State practice 
through omission, rather than acquiescence in the practice of other States. 
 
101 Above n.23, para. 77-78 
102 Lotus case (P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 10, 1927, 28. 
103 ILA 2000 Report, above n.27, 15-16, Section 17(iv). 
104 Ibid., 36-37. 
105 Wood Second Report, above n.24, footnote 279, citing Interpretation of Peace Treaties (second phase), 
Advisory Opinion, 1950 ICJ Reports, 221, 242. 
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Omission	as	opinio	juris	
The second type of omission is inaction in response to the conduct of another State, or silence 
in the form of lack of verbal protest (which could include a failure to invoke a violation of 
article 2(4), or a failure to invoke a right to use force in self-defence in response to the 
original act). Such silence may be evidence of an opinio juris that the act does not fall within 
the scope of the prohibition of the use of force, such as acquiescence in the legal claims made 
by another State through that other State’s practice (including verbal practice). Wood goes so 
far as to note that ‘[i]naction by States may be central to the development and ascertainment 
of rules of customary international law, in particular when it qualifies (or is perceived) as 
acquiescence’.106 Drawing this conclusion with respect to particular incidents requires the 
same caution as mentioned above, since silence in itself is also ambiguous. Hence the often 
stated requirement of the State failing to act, or remaining silent, in the face of an expectation 
that it act or in other circumstances that indicate an opinio juris.  
Inaction	as	opinio	juris	
The ILC’s draft conclusion 10(3) on forms of evidence of acceptance as law (opinio juris) 
provides that:  
 
‘Failure to react over time to a practice may serve as evidence of acceptance as law 
(opinio juris), provided that States were in a position to react and the circumstances called 
for some reaction.’107 
 
The accompanying statement of the Committee Chairman108 explains as follows: 
 
‘The first condition is temporal. To be considered as expressing opinio juris, the failure to 
react needs to be maintained over a sufficient period of time, assessed in light of the 
particular circumstances. This condition is referred to by the expression “over time”. 
Second, paragraph 3 indicates that, in order for inaction to qualify as acceptance as law, 
the State must be in a “position to react”. This formulation is broad enough to cover the 
need for knowledge of the practice in question, but also other situations that might 
prevent a State from reacting, such as political pressures. Thirdly, it is also necessary that 
the circumstances called for some reaction. The Drafting Committee shared the view that 
States could not be expected to react to each instance of practice by other States. 
Attention is drawn to the circumstances surrounding the failure to react in order to 
establish that these circumstances indicate that the State choosing not to act considers 
such practice to be consistent with customary international law.’  
 
The main point is that inaction (failure to take action or to make verbal statements) in 
response to the acts of other States may be interpreted in certain circumstances as 
 
106 Wood Second Report, ibid., para. 42, footnote omitted. 
107 Reproduced in 2015 Statement of Chairman, above n.26. 
108 2015 Statement of Chairman, ibid., 10. 
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acquiescence in the practice of those other States – in other words, as giving rise to 
something similar to estoppel, so that the other States rely on the position apparently taken by 
the silent State vis-a-vis the act that it did not respond to. It is taken as given that the silent 
State has accepted the (implicit) assertion of legality of the acts taken by the first State, which 
position may subsequently be relied on by that State as well as other States. This complies 
with the consent model of customary international law. Hence the requirements that the silent 
State must have been aware of the conduct that it has not responded to, and that there should 
be a reasonable expectation that it respond to that conduct, for example, that its interests are 
affected.  
Silence	as	evidence	of	opinio	juris		
Both inaction and silence through failure to respond to acts by other States may be a form of 
acquiescence. Under certain circumstances, silence in response to forcible acts by other 
States may be evidence of an opinio juris that those acts are not unlawful. There must either 
be evidence that the silence was actually motivated by an opinio juris, or else the silence 
must have been in circumstances that give rise to an inference that the silent State acquiesces 
in the active State’s legal claims/actions. In the former case (of an opinio juris), the question 
is whether the silent State had an opinio juris that the relevant conduct was lawful. A factor 
that may indicate this is that the conduct affected its interests.109 In the latter case (of 
acquiescence), it is relevant to ask: did the silent State act in a way calculated to or that does 
reasonably give rise to the perception that it was acquiescing in the relevant conduct?110 In 
both cases, these factors will be relevant: firstly, the silent State must have knowledge of the 
conduct of the other State; and secondly, the silence must not be mainly motivated by extra-
legal considerations.111 
 
In sum, this chapter has espoused the following dichotomy: ‘original’ inaction or silence as 
State practice (i.e. not in direct response to conduct or claims by another State) if general and 
accompanied by an opinio juris that such inaction/silence is either required or not prohibited 
by customary international law as the case may be; and silence and inaction in response to 
acts of other States as evidence of an opinio juris that such acts are lawful, i.e. acquiescence. 
Ultimately, just as with other (i.e. active) conduct with respect to the prohibition of the use of 
force, in the absence of an explicit statement that a State is applying the customary rule, it 
will be hard or even impossible to discern whether the silence or inaction is referable to 
article 2(4) of the UN Charter. In other words, even if one determines that a particular State’s 
 
109 Bianchi, above n.7, 664: ‘It would be but logical to think that states would react to acts affecting their own 
interests … All the more so in the light of the erga omnes character of the prohibition of the use of force.’ 
110 In his study of the prohibition of the threat of force, (The Threat of Force in International Law (Cambridge 
University Press, Paperback ed., 2009)), Nikolas Stürchler does not treat silence as either approval or protest, 
since it could reflect ‘indifference, neutrality or indecision.’ (110, footnote omitted) Stürchler argues that most 
States do not react by filing protests or conveying approval of potential violations of the UN Charter. ‘It turns 
out that, at least in threat-related cases, the assumption that silence equals approval is empirically false.’ (257, 
footnote omitted.) 
111 See Ruys (2014), above n.93, 167-171. 
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inaction (abstention from conduct including the assertion of legal claims) or silence 
(acquiescence in the conduct or legal claims of another State) has legal significance as 
practice with respect to the prohibition of the use of force, such conduct may be explained as 
compliance with the treaty obligation in article 2(4) of the UN Charter (and therefore relevant 
as subsequent practice in the application of the treaty112 rather than evidence of the rule of 
custom or of an opinio juris. Therefore, on their own, silence and inaction, as well as active 
conduct that is in compliance with a State’s obligations under article 2(4) of the UN Charter 
are insufficient to separately identify the existence and scope of the customary prohibition of 
the use of force. 
Conclusion 
In the face of a lack of States directly invoking the customary prohibition of the use of force 
in their practice, the main evidence that establishes the existence of the customary prohibition 
falls into the following categories: treaty-related practice (which may include inaction), and 
verbal acts including UN General Assembly resolutions. In particular, the 1970 Friendly 
Relations Declaration is strong evidence of opinio juris regarding the customary prohibition 
of the use of force and its content. To determine whether such evidence ‘counts’ towards 
establishing a general practice established as law raises several fundamental issues, which 
have been highlighted above. These factors taken together render it a fraught and challenging 
exercise to determine the scope of the customary prohibition of the use of force separately to 
applying and interpreting article 2(4) of the UN Charter, since the answer depends on a 
number of theoretical issues that remain unsettled, especially the extent to which conduct 
connected with a treaty counts as relevant State practice or serves as evidence of an opinio 
juris and whether treaty ratification and repetition of a rule in multiple treaties count as 
opinio juris. Fortunately, there is a simpler way to determine whether the customary and 
treaty prohibition of the use of force is identical, which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
112 See Chapter Four on subsequent practice. 
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Chapter Two: Are the treaty and 
customary rules identical, Part II: An 
alternative approach  
Introduction 
Fortunately, it is not necessary here to answer the question whether the treaty and customary 
international law rules are identical in scope by actually attempting to resolve the complex 
issues identified in the preceding chapter and then applying the two-step analysis there 
discussed, since the result can be gained in a more pragmatic way. Firstly, the way the 
customary prohibition arose makes it very likely that it was identical to article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter since approximately 1945. Secondly, the treaty rule in article 2(4) continues to apply 
in parallel to the customary rule prohibiting the use of force. Thirdly, the scope of the 
customary international law prohibition has not diverged from the scope of the article 2(4) 
prohibition. This is because States do not actually differentiate between the treaty and 
customary prohibitions in practice, so have therefore not asserted an expanded or restricted 
customary right to use force. The conclusions drawn in this chapter about the way that 
customary rule arose and its identical content to the article 2(4) prohibition are crucial to 
understanding the relationship between the two and therefore which source to apply when 
determining the meaning of a prohibited ‘use of force’ between States under international 
law.  This relationship will be examined in Chapter Three. 
 
Step One: How the customary rule arose 
The way that the customary international law rule prohibiting the use of force between States 
came into existence plays a role in its relationship to the rule in article 2(4) of the UN Charter 
and its current content – whether the content of the rules are presently identical (the subject 
of this chapter) and the relationship between the two and which to interpret or apply to 
determine the meaning of a prohibited ‘use of force’ (the subject of Chapter Three). 
However, how the customary rule actually arose and its precise content, are less than clear. 
This chapter will explore how the customary international law rule prohibiting the use of 
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force between States arose, and will argue that the way the customary prohibition arose 
makes it very likely that it was identical to article 2(4) since approximately 1945. There are 
four possibilities for how and when the current customary prohibition of the use of force 
between States arose.1 The first possibility is that the customary rule developed prior to the 
UN Charter, and that article 2(4) was declaratory of that pre-existing custom. The second 
possibility is that article 2(4) crystallised a rule of customary international law that was by 
1945 already in the process of formation. The third possibility is that article 2(4) gave rise to 
a new rule of customary international law in the usual way, that is, through subsequent State 
practice and opinio juris (the two-element approach). The fourth possibility is that article 2(4) 
gave rise to a new rule of custom from its own impact, due to its ‘fundamentally norm-
creating character’ ‘accepted as such by the opinio juris’ and a sufficient number of 
ratifications and accessions to imply a ‘positive acceptance of its principles’ and ‘extensive 
and virtually uniform’ State practice.2 This following discussion will canvass these different 
possibilities and draw the conclusion that the customary prohibition of the use of force in its 
current form arose after 1945 due to article 2(4) of the UN Charter, either in the standard way 
(two-element approach) or from the ‘own impact’ of the Charter. The remainder of this 
chapter will then use this argument to demonstrate that the content of the customary and UN 
Charter prohibition of the use of force are currently identical. 
1.	Article	2(4)	as	declaratory	of	pre-existing	customary	international	
law		
The first possibility is that article 2(4) was declaratory of a customary international law rule 
prohibiting the use of force between States that pre-dated the 1945 UN Charter. If article 2(4) 
was merely declaratory of such a customary rule, then the customary rule would continue to 
be in force alongside the Charter. For a pre-existing rule of customary international law 
prohibiting the use of force in the same terms as article 2(4) to have arisen prior to 1945, the 
requirements of a general practice accepted as law must have been present prior to that date. 
This was not the case. Rather, article 2(4) of the UN Charter was a significant new legal 
development. 
Pre-Charter	era	
Prior to 1945, there were legal developments restricting the right to resort to war between 
States, but this fell short of outlawing ‘use of force’. The historical trajectory of the 
prohibition of the use of force has, broadly speaking, traced a liberal attitude towards war, in 
which rulers were absolutely free to resort to war, to the development of a moral discourse on 
 
1 This work takes the position that any pre-existing custom that was inconsistent with the later treaty provision 
in article 2(4) of the UN Charter was thereby superseded, at least with respect to the parties to that treaty, which 
in this case, is nearly all States. 
2 North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of 
Germany/Netherlands) Judgment 1969 ICJ Reports 3 (‘North Sea Continental Shelf Cases’). See discussion 
below. 
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war in the form of just war theory, which gave an account of the conditions under which 
resort to war was righteous.3 Just war doctrine has its roots in Roman law and the early 
writings of Saint Augustine, and came to fruition during the Middle Ages.4 Prior to the 
twentieth century, there was no international legal regulation of the use of force between 
States.5 The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 were the first attempts to restrict 
such freedom to resort to force, and included modest restrictions.6  
 
During the inter-war period (November 1918 to September 1939), efforts to restrict legal 
resort to war between States intensified. The two most notable international instruments 
during this period were the Covenant of the League of Nations,7 and the 1928 Kellogg-Briand 
Pact (General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy).8 The 
Covenant of the League of Nations required peaceful dispute settlement between States and 
provided for a system of collective security and sanctions.9 The League Covenant of 1919 
contained exceptional qualifications on the right to resort to war. ‘Resort to war in violation 
of the Covenant was illegal but the content of the illegality was prima facie the violation of a 
treaty obligation’.10 However, the Covenant did not prohibit war if dispute settlement was 
unsuccessful, after a cooling off period, and ‘it did not restrict use of force other than war and 
aggression’.11 From 1919, there were a number of international instruments variously 
declaring aggressive war / wars of aggression as an international crime (e.g .the Draft Treaty 
of Mutual Assistance, which never entered into force; 1925 Sixth Assembly resolution: ‘war 
of aggression’ is ‘an international crime’; 1927 Eight Assembly resolution: ‘wars of 
aggression are ... prohibited’). But this ‘just affirmed existing international law’ and ‘did not 
go beyond the [League] Covenant’.12 The 1928 Resolution of the Sixth International 
Conference of American States also considered and resolved that aggression is ‘illicit and as 
such declared as prohibited’, but there remained the problem of a lack of definition. The 
turning point which galvanised the emerging international law prohibiting recourse to war 
 
3 For an early comprehensive account of the prohibition of the use of force, see Ian Brownlie, International Law 
and the Use of Force by States (Clarendon, 1963). For a concise overview of the historical development of the 
outlawing of war, critiquing the overly simplified treatment of this development by many scholars, see Randall 
Lesaffer, ‘Too Much History: From War as Sanction to the Sanctioning of War’ in Marc Weller (ed), The 
Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2015) 35, who argues that 
the just war tradition continued to influence the law in the modern era and explains how many features of the 
current jus contra bellum have a basis in the just war tradition. 
4 Lesaffer, ibid., 37. 
5 Albrecht Randelzhofer and Oliver Dörr, ‘Article 2(4)’ in Bruno Simma et al (eds), The Charter of the United 
Nations: A commentary (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed., 2012) 200, 204, MN4. 
6 Ibid., 204, MN5. 
7 Covenant of the League of Nations 1919. 
8 Treaty Between the United States and Other Powers Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument 
of National Policy (Concluded 27 August 1929, Entered into Force 24 July 1929) 94 LNTS 57 (‘Kellogg-Briand 
Pact’). 
9 Arts. 10, 12, 13 and 15. 
10 Brownlie, above n.3, 66). 
11 Lessafer, above n.3, 52 with extensive footnotes. See also Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A 
Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems (Stevens, 1950). 708: ‘The Covenant of the League of Nations 
did not forbid war under all circumstances. The Members of the League were allowed to resort to war against 
one another under certain circumstances, but only "for the maintenance of right and justice.”’ 
12 Brownlie, above n.3 73. 
  40 
was the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact: the General Treaty for Renunciation of War. The parties 
to the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact ‘condemne[d] recourse to war for the solution of 
international controversies, and renounce[d] it, as an instrument of national policy in their 
relations with one another.’13 ‘[W]ar in violation of the Paris Pact was equated to aggression, 
triggering the obligations of third states under Article 10 of the Covenant.’14 The Pact did not 
provide for sanctions, though violation did have consequences, for example, liability for 
damages, right of intervention and no rights arising from a war in violation of the Pact.15 Ian 
Brownlie notes, ‘[t]he treaty was of almost universal obligation since only four states in 
international society as it existed before the Second World War were not bound by its 
provisions.’16  
 
It is controversial whether these legal developments amounted to the creation of a customary 
rule prohibiting force that was merely replicated later in article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 
Brownlie took the position that these multilateral treaties, together with a multitude of 
bilateral treaties during this time period reflecting similar provisions, various statements by 
States demonstrating an acceptance of the legal nature of the obligation to refrain from 
recourse to force in international relations (though it seems that these statements really 
emphasize that the legal obligation stems from the Pact and the League Covenant) and State 
practice support the conclusion that at least by 1939, resort to war was illegal unless in self-
defence.17 However, he acknowledges that ‘[t]here was no general agreement on the precise 
meaning of the terms used in instruments and diplomatic practice relating to the use of force. 
This still creates serious difficulty but it is absurd to suggest that because there is a certain 
degree of controversy the basic obligation does not apply to the more obvious instances of 
illegality.’18  
 
Many of the legal developments referred to above did not explicitly prohibit ‘force’, but 
‘war’, which may have been a broader term. ‘Whether “war” in the Pact was used in its 
technical meaning and all other uses of force were excluded was and remains a matter of 
contention among international lawyers.’19 Brownlie argues that '[t]he subsequent practice of 
parties to the Kellogg-Briand Pact leaves little room for doubt that it was understood to 
prohibit any substantial use of armed force.’20  Randall Lessafer believes that Brownlie’s 
 
13 Article 1. 
14 Lessafer, above n.3, 53, footnote omitted. 
15 Ibid., 52, citing Neff. 
16 Above n.3, 75, footnote omitted. 
17 Brownlie, ibid., 110. 
18 Ibid., 111. 
19 Lessafer, above n.3, 53, citing Brownlie, Use of Force 84-92. See Carrie McDougall, ‘The Crimes Against 
Peace Precedent’ in Claus Kreß and Stefan Barriga (eds), Commentary on the Crime of Aggression (Cambridge 
University Press, 2015), 49, 55-58 for a discussion of the pre-WWII legal understanding of ‘war’ according to 
Brownlie, and an analysis of the interpretation of ‘war of aggression’ by the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals: 
‘at the very least it can be said that in the pre-war era there were multiple meanings of the term “war”, not all of 
which had an agreed definition.’ 
20 Brownlie, above n.3, 88, emphasis added and footnote omitted. Cf Kelsen, above n.11, 708, who argued that 
‘The Briand-Kellogg Pact outlawed war as an instrument of national policy; consequently, war as an instrument 
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view is too ‘rosy’ a picture, since State practice post-WWII ‘indicates that states still 
considered themselves to have a right to resort to war and formally declare war in the case of 
prior aggression by an enemy. Moreover, the Covenant and the [Kellogg-Briand] Pact had 
left the door wide open for an alternative strategy to resort to force rather than war, primarily 
in the guise of self-defence.’21 
The	UN	Charter	era	
After the conclusion of World War II, a new era of international law was ushered in with the 
advent of the United Nations Charter in 1945, and in particular, its cornerstone provision in 
article 2(4) prohibiting the ‘use of force’ between States. As Kelsen notes, ‘[t]he Charter of 
the United Nations goes much farther than its predecessors. It obligates the Members of the 
United Nations not only not to resort to war against each other but to refrain from the threat 
or use of force and to settle their disputes by peaceful means (Article 2, paragraphs 3 and 
4).’22 The prohibition of a ‘use of force’ in article 2(4) was therefore a significant legal 
development in comparison to earlier international law existing at that time, which prohibited 
resort to ‘war’.23 
 
This view is also supported by statements made during the drafting of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, with respect to draft article 36, which dealt with the invalidity of a 
treaty concluded as a result of the coercion of a State by the threat or use of force. The draft 
article entitled ‘coercion of a State by the threat or use of force’ provided that: ‘A treaty is 
void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations.’ In the discussion of the draft provision, the 
Netherlands and the United States raised the question of its retroactive applicability. The 
United States noted that:  
 
‘The traditional doctrine prior to the League Covenant was that the validity of a treaty 
was not affected by the fact that it had been entered into under the threat or use of force. 
With the Covenant and the Pact of Paris, this traditional doctrine came under attack; with 
the Charter it was overturned. In the view of the United States Government, it was 
therefore only with the coming into effect of the Charter that the concept of the 
illegitimacy of threats or uses of force in violation of the territorial integrity or political 
 
of international policy and especially a war waged by one state against a state which has violated the Pact was 
not forbidden.' 
21 Lessafer, above n.3, 53-4. 
22 Above n.11, 708. 
23 Judge Jennings took this position in his Dissenting Opinion in Case concerning Military and Paramilitary 
activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), Merits, Judgment 1986 ICJ Reports 
14 (‘Nicaragua Case’), 520: ‘It could hardly be contended that these provisions of the Charter [articles 2(4) and 
51] were merely a codification of the existing customary law. The literature is replete with statements that 
Article 2, paragraph 4, –for example in speaking of “force” rather than war, and providing that even a "threat of 
force" may be unlawful –represented an important innovation in the law.’ 
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independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the 
United Nations, was accepted.’24 
 
This view was affirmed by Sir Humphrey Waldock and cited by Judge Jennings in the 
Nicaragua case: ‘The illegality of recourse to armed reprisals or other forms of armed 
intervention not amounting to war was not established beyond all doubt by the law of the 
League, or by the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials. That was brought about by the law of the 
Charter…’25  
Conclusion	
In light of the above, the position one takes regarding what exactly the Kellogg-Briand Pact 
outlawed is decisive for determining whether the state of customary international law 
immediately prior to the UN Charter in 1945 prohibited any recourse to force between States 
outside of self-defence. On balance, this author is inclined to agree with Kelsen’s assessment 
that the Kellogg-Briand Pact did not go so far as that. Hence, article 2(4) of the UN Charter 
did not merely codify an existing customary prohibition of the use of force, but was rather a 
significant legal development which went beyond the existing laws of the time in order to 
found a new international legal order in the aftermath of the Second World War. In terms of 
how this position squares with the pronouncements of the majority judgment in the Nicaragua 
case, it must be recalled that the Court did not state that a rule of customary international law 
pre-existed the Charter, but rather that the customary international law principle pre-existed 
the Charter and subsequently developed into a rule of customary international law under the 
Charter’s influence. Although it is not clear what legal meaning a customary international 
law ‘principle’ has given that this category is not recognised in article 38(1) of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’), if it is understood as meaning that a legal zeitgeist 
was developing towards a stricter regulation of the use of force between States culminating in 
the prohibition set out in article 2(4) of the UN Charter, this is consistent with the historical 
narrative of the interwar period outlined above. 
2.	Article	2(4)	as	crystallising	a	rule	of	customary	international	law	in	
the	process	of	formation	
Another possibility for the formation of the customary prohibition on the use of force is that 
it was starting to emerge prior to the UN Charter and crystallised as a result of the 
negotiation and drafting of article 2(4). The process of crystallization of a customary rule 
occurs when ‘the law evolve[s] through the practice of States on the basis of the debates and 
near-agreements’ revealing ‘general consensus’ during the treaty negotiation process that the 
 
24 International Law Commission, ‘Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1966, Vol. II’ 
(A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.l, 1966), Observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur, 16. 
25 Dissenting Opinion, above n.23, 520, citing Waldock, 106 Collected Courses, Academy of International Law, 
The Hague (1962-II), p. 231. 
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that the rule in question is of a customary nature.26 This process of ‘State practice … 
developing in parallel with the drafting of the treaty’ is more likely to occur when the treaty 
negotiations and drafting take place over a long period of time,27 as occurred with the new 
concept of the exclusive economic zone developed during the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea (1973 – 1982) and its acceptance by States as customary 
international law prior to the adoption and entry into force of the 1982 UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea in 1994.28   
 
However, article 2(4) of the Charter arguably did not ‘crystallise’ a rule of customary 
international law in the process of formation, because any pre-existing customary limitations 
on the recourse to force were significantly broadened with the advent of article 2(4), and the 
process of drafting was not accompanied by meaningful State practice ‘developing in parallel 
with’ this radical change in the law. First of all, the relevant period for crystallisation of a 
customary rule – the period of treaty negotiation and drafting prior to signing of the UN 
Charter – was extremely brief ‘due to the special circumstances occasioned by the war’.29 
‘The constitutive instrument of the UN was conceived, negotiated, drafted, signed, and 
ratified in four phases, corresponding closely with events of the war … it was only towards 
the end of the first phase and at the beginning of the second phase [the summer of 1944] that 
a diplomatic exchange of ideas was set in motion’.30 The UN Charter was then adopted on 25 
June 1945 and entered into force on 24 October of the same year.  
 
Furthermore, the term ‘use of force’ in article 2(4) was deliberately chosen by the drafters of 
the UN Charter to go beyond the earlier (failed) attempts to outlaw ‘war’ in the League 
Covenant and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which had left open the possibility for States to claim 
that no war had been formally declared or officially recognised and that forcible measures fell 
short of war and were therefore permissible.31 Of course, this gap between the pre-Charter 
prohibition of war and the prohibition of ‘use of force’ in article 2(4) is not itself an obstacle 
to crystallization of any nascent customary prohibition, but it brings into stark relief that State 
practice (i.e. ‘the reactions of Governments to the negotiations and consultations during the 
 
26 Fisheries Jurisdiction (UK v Iceland), Merits, Judgment 1974 ICJ Reports 3, para. 52.  
27 International Law Association Committee on Formation of Customary (General) International Law, ‘Final 
Report of the Committee: Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary 
International Law’ (ILA, 2000), 49. 
28 Wood, Michael, ‘Third Report on Identification of Customary International Law’ (A/CN.4/682, ILC, 27 
March 2015) (‘Wood Third Report’), para. 38. In the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), 
Judgment 1985 ICJ Reports 13, para. 34, the ICJ recognized that ‘the institution of the exclusive economic zone, 
with its rule on entitlement by reason of distance, is shown by the practice of States to have become a part of 
customary law.’  
29 Wilhelm G Grewe and Daniel-Erasmus Khan, ‘Drafting History’ in Bruno Simma et al (eds), The Charter of 
the United Nations: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2002) vol I, 1, MN 3.  
30 Ibid., MN3, 4 and 6. 
31 See Robert Hildebrand, Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar 
Security (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1990) regarding the intention of Charter drafters 
to ‘settle the discussion on the extent of the prohibition of “war”’ by changing term ‘resort to war' to threat or 
use of force, cited in Lessafer, above n.3, 54. 
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work in progress’32 or ‘repeated practice by the States concerned’33) did not parallel this 
radical legal development in the treaty during the brief negotiation process.  
 
In particular, the reaction of States to article 2(6) of the UN Charter during the drafting 
process clearly illustrates that they did not already accept the rule in article 2(4) as a binding 
rule of customary international law during the period of drafting and negotiation. As 
discussed above, article 2(6) provides that the United Nations ‘shall ensure that states which 
are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with [the Principles in article 2] so 
far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security’. The travaux 
préparatoires for this provision indicate that the delegates did not believe that they were 
imposing a customary obligation onto non-Members, but rather that they were seeking a way 
to impose treaty obligations on non-treaty parties for the purpose of maintaining international 
peace and security as part of the new international order. The Report of the Rapporteur of the 
relevant Subcommittee of the San Francisco Conference stated:  
 
‘The vote was taken on the understanding that the association of the United Nations, 
representing the major expression of the international legal community, is entitled to act 
in a manner which will insure the effective co-operation of non-Member states with it, so 
far as that is necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.’34  
Furthermore, as Kelsen highlights: 
‘[i]n the discussion of this paragraph at the 12th meeting of Committee I/I (U.N.C.I.O. 
Doc. 810, I/I/30, p.7) “The Delegate of Uruguay asked for a clarification of the meaning 
of this paragraph. He asked how a non-Member could be brought within the sphere of the 
Organisation and how the Organisation could impose duties upon non-Members. The 
Rapporteur replied that the paragraph was intended to provide a justification for 
extending the power of the Organisation to apply to the actions of non-Members, but that 
the wording might have to be reconsidered if it were not clear. … The Australian Delegate 
agreed that this was a difficult provision to enforce but that it was an essential one. The 
Organisation would have to see that everything possible would be done to suppress an 
aggressor.”’35 
 
 
32 Yoram Dinstein, ‘The Interaction between Customary International Law and Treaties’ (2006) 322 Recueil des 
Cours : Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law 243, 358. 
33 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment 1982 ICJ Reports 18, Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Oda, para. 23: ‘It is however possible that, before the draft of a multilateral treaty becomes effective and 
binding upon the States Parties in accordance with its final clause, some of its provisions will have become 
customary international law through repeated practice by the States concerned’. But note the caution in the 
North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of 
Germany/Netherlands) Judgment9 1969 ICJ Reports 3, para. 76 that practice consistent with a treaty by States 
parties before a treaty enters into effect is not necessarily evidence that the rule in question is a customary norm, 
since those States are presumably ‘acting actually or potentially in the application of the Convention’. Further 
on this point, see the discussion in Chapter One. 
34 Report of Rapporteur of Subcommittee I/I/A to Committee I/I of the San Francisco Conference  (U.N.C.I.O. 
Doc. 739, I/I/A/19 (a), p.6), cited in Kelsen, above n.11, 110, footnote 9. 
35 Ibid. 
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During the discussions regarding article 2(6), States did not refer to a customary obligation to 
refrain from the use of force, but to the contrary, showed consternation about the legal basis 
for imposing this obligation from the UN Charter onto non-Member States. This could only 
be the case if States did not already accept that it was a binding rule of customary 
international law at the time of drafting the UN Charter. This weighs strongly against any 
crystallisation of a customary prohibition of the use of force in statu nascendi during the 
drafting and conclusion of article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Although the travaux préparatoires 
relating to article 2(6) are evidence that at the time of drafting and negotiation of the UN 
Charter, the prohibition of the use of force in article 2(4) was not accepted as a customary 
rule by States, it is evidence that States sought to establish a new customary rule through the 
impact of the UN Charter. This nuanced distinction illustrates that although crystallisation of 
an emerging customary rule and the development of a new customary rule triggered by a new 
treaty rule are ‘distinct processes, in a given case, they may shade into one another’.36 The 
significance of article 2(6) to the generation of the customary prohibition of the use of force 
is discussed further below. 
Subsequently	developing	customary	international	law	
Since the UN Charter was more restrictive than pre-existing customary international law, the 
Charter was not declaratory of pre-existing customary international law. For the reasons set 
out above, nor did it crystallise customary international law in the process of formation. 
Therefore, the customary rule prohibiting the recourse to force between States must have 
arisen after the Charter entered into force. This is consistent with the finding of the ICJ in the 
Nicaragua case, as the Court did not posit that article 2(4) was declaratory of pre-existing 
customary international law, but that the principle of the prohibition already existed under 
customary international law and subsequently developed under the influence of the Charter. 
There are two possibilities for the way this process occurred: either the new rule of customary 
international law developed in the normal way (State practice accompanied by an opinio 
juris), or article 2(4) gave rise to a new rule of customary international law through its own 
impact. These possibilities are discussed below. 
3.	Article	2(4)	gave	rise	to	a	new	rule	of	customary	international	law	through	
subsequent	State	practice	coupled	with	opinio	juris	
As explained in Chapter One, there are clear difficulties with this regarding the prohibition of 
the use of force due to the parallel near-universal treaty rule. In light of this, applying the 
conventional view of the requirements for identifying a rule of customary international law,37 
there are issues with identifying sufficient relevant State practice with respect to the 
prohibition of the use of force that is not referable to the UN Charter in order to meet the 
threshold of ‘a general practice accepted as law’. There is an alternative approach to the 
 
36 Wood Third Report, above n.28, para. 35.  
37 See Chapter One. 
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identification of custom that could support the position that the prohibition of the use of force 
in article 2(4) of the UN Charter formed a rule of customary international law subsequent to 
the entry in to force of the Charter: a sliding scale of State practice and opinio juris, such that 
‘a clearly demonstrated and strong opinio juris reduces (or even eliminates) the need to show 
general practice.’38 Oscar Schachter argues that ‘issues of proof of custom involve an inverse 
(and some might say, a dialectical) relation between evidence of State practice and of opinio 
juris’,39 i.e. if one accepts UN General Assembly declarations as sufficient opinio juris, 
together with the ‘general practice’ of abstention from the use of force between States. In 
relation to lack of uniform State practice and frequent violations in the area of the use of 
force, Schachter argues that the higher normative status of the rules explains the continuity of 
the rule as custom, and that since this is an area of international law where breach is likely, 
this is a reason to lower the requirements of uniform practice.40 However, due to the problem 
with identifying a general practice outside the treaty itself as outlined in Chapter One, it is not 
on solid ground to argue that the customary rule prohibiting the use of force between States 
has formed in the usual way (the two-element approach). 
4.	Article	2(4)	gave	rise	to	new	rule	of	customary	international	law	from	its	
own	impact	
Another possible way for the prohibition in article 2(4) to have given rise to a rule of 
customary international law is through the UN Charter’s ‘own impact’.41 This process is an 
‘exceptional case’ in which ‘it may be possible for a multilateral treaty to give rise to new 
customary rules (or to assist in their creation) “of its own impact” if it is widely adopted by 
States and it is the clear intention of the parties to create new customary law’.42 The ICJ in 
 
38 Oscar Schachter, ‘Entangled Treaty and Custom’ in Yoram Dinstein (ed), International Law at a time of 
perplexity: Essays in honour of Shabtai Rosenne (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989) 717, 733. 
39 Ibid., 731. 
40 Ibid., 732-5. A related argument is set forward by Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, ‘Traditional and Modern 
Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation’ (2001) 95(4) The American Journal of 
International Law 757, referring to a sliding scale that takes into consideration the moral importance of the 
norm. 
41 Interestingly, Thirlway does not mention this ‘own impact’ argument: Hugh WA Thirlway, The Sources of 
International Law (Oxford University Press, 1. ed., 2014). The ILC’s draft conclusions on the identification of a 
rule of customary international law also do not mention this possibility. The draft conclusions simply set out the 
2-element approach, and merely state that ‘A rule set forth in a treaty may reflect a rule of customary 
international law if it is established that the treaty rule … has given rise to a general practice that is accepted as 
law (opinio juris), thus generating a new rule of customary international law.’ (Michael Wood, ‘Second Report 
on Identification of Customary International Law’ (A/CN.4/672, ILC, 22 May 2014), 63, Draft conclusion 
11(1)(c)). The Statement of the Chairman accompanying the draft conclusions states that ‘The term “may 
reflect” is essential to make clear that treaties can neither, in and of themselves, create customary international 
law nor conclusively attest to it – the rule must find support in external instances of practice coupled with 
acceptance as law. As indicated in the third report, they may however offer valuable evidence of the existence 
and content of such rules, and do so in a number of different ways.’ (International Law Commission, 
‘Identification of Customary International Law Statement of the Chairman of the Drafting Committee, Mr. 
Mathias Forteau’ (ILC, 29 July 2015), 11). 
42 International Law Association Committee on Formation of Customary (General) International Law, ‘Final 
Report of the Committee: Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary 
International Law’ (2000) (‘ILA 2000 Report’), 50, rule 27.  
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the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases considered the possibility for a rule of customary 
international law to arise from the ‘own impact’ of a treaty, noting that: 
 
‘it clearly involves treating that Article as a norm-creating provision which has constituted 
the foundation of, or has generated a rule which, while only conventional or contractual in its 
origin, has since passed into the general corpus of international law, and is now accepted as 
such by the opinio juris, so as to have become binding even for countries which have never, 
and do not, become parties to the Convention. There is no doubt that this process is a 
perfectly possible one and does from time to time occur: it constitutes indeed one of the 
recognized methods by which new rules of customary international law may be formed. At 
the same time this result is not lightly to be regarded as having been attained.’43 
 
The ILA Committee on Formation of Customary Law in its 2000 Report offered the 
following justification for the Court’s pronouncement: 
 
‘the consent of States to a rule of customary law, whilst not a necessary condition of their 
being bound, is a sufficient condition. In other words, if States indicate by any means that 
they intend to be bound as a matter of customary law, being bound will be the 
consequence, so long as their intention is clear. They can evince that intention by a public 
statement, for instance. That being so, there is no a priori reason why they cannot instead 
evince it through, in conjunction with, or subsequent to, the conclusion of a treaty, 
provided that it is their clear intention to accept more than a merely convention norm.’44 
 
This way of creating custom is to be distinguished from the ordinary customary process 
triggered by a new treaty rule, because the latter entails ‘a gradual build-up of customary law 
through the “traditional” process whereby the pool of States engaging or acquiescing in a 
practice gradually widens’,45 whereas under the ‘own impact’ process, the treaty itself 
generates the customary rule because States manifest their clear intention for it to do so. This 
also overcomes the problems discussed in Chapter One with treating conduct connected with 
the treaty as relevant State practice or evidence of an opinio juris for the purposes of the two-
element approach to the identification of a customary rule. The ILA Committee 2000 Report 
states that the prohibition of the threat or use of force in article 2(4) is a rare example of a 
treaty giving rise to a new customary rule of its own impact.46  
 
In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the ICJ set out the following requirements for this 
process to occur. Firstly, the treaty provision must be ‘of a fundamentally norm-creating 
character such as could be regarded as forming the basis of a general rule of law’.47 The 
prohibition in article 2(4) can clearly be considered to meet this requirement given that it has 
 
43 Above n.2, para. 71. 
44 ILA 2000 Report, above n.42, 51-52. 
45 Ibid., 53-4. 
46 Ibid., 52. 
47 Ibid., para. 72, emphasis added. 
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been recognised as the ‘cornerstone’ of the international legal order and is widely regarded as 
a norm of jus cogens (discussed in Chapter Four). In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, 
the ICJ found that the article in question was not of a fundamentally norm-creating character 
for three reasons, namely, that the rule was subject to a ‘primary obligation’; that it was 
subject to a legally uncertain exception of ‘special circumstances’ and ‘the very considerable, 
still unresolved controversies as to the exact meaning and scope of this notion, must raise 
further doubts as to the potentially norm-creating character of the rule’; and thirdly, the treaty 
permitted reservations to the article in question.48 The problems identified by the Court in 
that case with the provision in question apply somewhat to article 2(4): it is subject to an 
exception of article 51 self-defence and Chapter VII enforcement measures, and there are 
‘very considerable, still unresolved controversies as to the exact meaning and scope’ of the 
prohibition and its exceptions.49 However, unlike that provision, it is not permitted to make 
reservations to article 2(4) and it is not subject to other primary obligations. Furthermore, the 
UN Charter itself is designed as a fundamentally important legal document aimed at universal 
adherence, and article 2(4) holds a central place within it. The rule in article 2(4) can 
therefore be considered to meet this requirement. 
 
Secondly, the treaty provision must be ‘accepted as such by the opinio juris’ – i.e. accepted 
that it is of a fundamentally norm-creating character. As set out above, there is ample 
evidence of an opinio juris that the prohibition of the use of force set out in article 2(4) is 
binding on all States as a matter of customary international law. Article 2(6) of the UN 
Charter, which extends the obligations in article 2 to non–UN Member States, could also be 
viewed as evidence of an opinio juris that the obligation in article 2(4) that States intended to 
create a new rule of customary international law binding on all States. Kelsen writes that:  
 
‘Article 2, paragraph 6, of the Charter authorises the Organisation to “ensure that states 
which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with the Principles laid 
down in the Charter so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace 
and security.” Principle 2 prescribes fulfilment of all obligations imposed upon the 
Members. Hence, the provision of Article 2, paragraph 6, may be interpreted to mean that 
the Charter imposes at least the most important obligations of the Members also upon 
non-members, and that means that the Charter claims to have the character of general 
international law.’50 
 
According to Hans Kelsen, if article 2(6) is interpreted to mean that members may impose 
sanctions e.g. Chapter VII on non-members for certain behaviour, 'it establishes a true 
 
48 Ibid., para. 72. The Court stated that ‘the faculty of making reservations to Article 6, while it might not of 
itself prevent the equidistance principle being eventually received as general law, does add considerably to the 
difficulty of regarding this result as having been brought about (or being potentially possible) on the basis of the 
Convention’. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Kelsen, above n.11, 75-6. 
  49 
obligation of non-Members to observe the contrary behaviour.’51 Further, ‘[i]t is certainly the 
main purpose of Article 2, paragraph 6, to extend the most important function of the 
Organisation: to maintain peace by taking 'effective collective measures' to the relation 
between Members and non-members as well as to the relation between non-members and 
thus to impose upon them the obligation stipulated in Article 2, paragraph 4.’52 Hence, ‘[i]n 
Article 2, paragraph 6, the Charter shows the tendency to be the law not only of the United 
Nations but also of the whole international community, that is to say, to be general, not only 
particular, international law.’53 
 
Since the obligation in article 2(4) was not already a rule of customary international law at 
the time of the establishment of the UN Charter (as argued above), then article 2(6) appears 
to create a treaty obligation for non-parties.54 Kelsen recognised this when he stated that 
‘[f]rom the point of view of existing international law, the attempt of the Charter to apply to 
states which are not contracting parties to it must be characterised as revolutionary.’55 Of 
course it is problematic to take the position that treaty parties could create obligations for 
non-parties without their consent,56 but as Stefan Talmon notes, ‘[t]he controversy has largely 
been mitigated by the fact that the principles enunciated in Art. 2(1) to (4) are today generally 
accepted as forming part of customary international law and some, such as the principle on 
the prohibition of the use of force in Art 2 (4), are even considered ius cogens and, as such, 
are binding on members and non-members alike.’57 The controversy is also avoided if it is 
considered that rather than directly seeking to impose a treaty obligation on non-treaty 
parties, the inclusion of article 2(6) in the UN Charter may indicate an opinio juris that the 
parties wished to create more than a conventional obligation through the establishment of the 
UN Charter. This position holds that non-members are bound by the prohibition only 
indirectly through the UN Charter (since they could be subject to enforcement 
action/sanctions for failing to comply with the relevant principles), but the source of their 
legal obligation is customary international law. Regardless of the significance attributed to 
article 2(6) of the Charter, at any rate at least by the time of the 1970 Friendly Relations 
Declaration which declared the obligation in article 2(4) as applying to all States, an opinio 
juris was shared among States that the prohibition of the use of force was a rule applicable to 
all States and not only to UN Member States, i.e. as a matter of customary international law. 
 
 
51 Ibid., 106-7. 
52 Ibid., 108. 
53 Ibid., 109. 
54 Interestingly, draft article 59 of 1966 draft VCLT (treaties providing for obligations for third States) does not 
mention article 2(6) of the UN Charter: International Law Commission, ‘Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission 1966, Vol. II’ (A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.l, 1966), 68. 
55 Kelsen, above n.11, 110. This was referred to by Judge Jennings in his Dissenting Opinion in the Nicaragua 
case (above n.23, 532, footnote omitted): ‘Kelsen would hardly have used the word “revolutionary” if he had 
thought of it as depending upon a development of customary law.’ 
56 See VCLT, arts. 34 and 35. 
57 Stefan Talmon, ‘Article 2 (6)’ in Bruno Simma et al (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 
(Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2012) vol I, 252, 255, MN6, footnote omitted. 
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Thirdly, there must be a sufficient number of ratifications and accessions to imply a 
‘positive acceptance of its principles’: ‘a very widespread and representative participation in 
the convention might suffice of itself, provided it included that of States whose interests were 
specially affected.’58 This suggests that the Court views participation in the convention 
through ratifications and accessions as a form of State practice for the purpose of identifying 
a rule of customary international law, which appears problematic, since without more, the 
parties by ratifying or acceding to the treaty are only accepting a conventional obligation and 
it does not indicate a belief that the rules expressed in the treaty are legally binding under 
customary international law.59 In any case, the UN Charter was signed by fifty-one founding 
member States in 1945 and presently enjoys near-universal ratification, and accordingly 
meets this criteria.  
 
Fourthly, ‘State practice, including that of States whose interests are specially affected, 
should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision 
invoked; – and should moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a general 
recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved.’60 This is also problematic 
because as explained in Chapter One above, mere compliance with a treaty obligation does 
not provide evidence of an opinio juris that the obligation is also one of customary 
international law. However, it appears that this requirement is directed at ensuring the 
practice is ‘sufficiently widespread and representative’.61 It is difficult to apply this criteria to 
an obligation to refrain from conduct (i.e. the ‘use of force’), and it is unfortunately true that 
there have been many instances of States resorting to force against one another since 1945. 
However, States resorting to force in violation of article 2(4) do not usually acknowledge this 
but rather justify their conduct by appealing to exceptions such as the right of self-defence in 
article 51. As the ICJ recognised in the Nicaragua case, perfect compliance is unnecessary 
for a rule to be established as customary, and that ‘[i]f a State acts in a way prima facie 
incompatible with a recognized rule, but defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or 
justifications contained within the rule itself, then whether or not the State's conduct is in fact 
justifiable on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to confirm rather than to weaken 
the rule.’62 Furthermore, as set out above, the obligation to refrain from the use of force has 
since been reproduced in many multilateral and bilateral treaties, resolutions of the UN 
General Assembly and other international organisations, accepted unilaterally by States who 
were not at the time members of the United Nations and is frequently recognised as a 
cornerstone of the international legal system. 
 
Therefore, the fundamentally norm-creating character of the treaty obligation in article 2(4), 
its acceptance as such in the opinio juris (including possibly due to the effect of article 2(6)), 
 
58 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, above n.2, para. 73. 
59 See discussion in Chapter One. 
60 Above n.2, para. 74. 
61 ILA 2000 Report, above n.42, 53-4 on the point regarding a treaty giving rise to customary international law 
of its own impact. 
62 Above n.23, para. 186. 
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the near-universality of the UN Charter and the extensive and virtually uniform State practice 
with respect to the prohibition of the use of force set out in that article may be considered to 
fulfil the criteria set out by the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases for a treaty 
provision to give rise to a new rule of customary international law ‘of its own impact.’ 
Conclusion		
In summary, either as a result of the normal process for the creation of a new rule of 
customary international law (with the caveats set out above) or exceptionally from the impact 
of the UN Charter, the prohibition of the use of force between States in their international 
relations set out in article 2(4) of the UN Charter gave rise to a rule of customary 
international law. If article 2(4) were declaratory of a pre-existing customary prohibition of 
the use of force, or if article 2(4) crystallised customary international law in the process of 
formation, they would have been identical in 1945. If article 2(4) lead to the formation of 
customary international law through State practice and opinio juris (which in this author’s 
view is unlikely given Baxter’s paradox), they are not necessarily identical and there may be 
some differences between the two prohibitions under each source of law. But if it is accepted 
that article 2(4) created customary international law of its own impact, the treaty and 
customary rules were identical in 1945. 
Step Two: The treaty rule in article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter continues to apply in parallel to the 
customary rule 
In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ affirmed that when the content of treaty and customary rules 
are identical, they both continue to exist and apply.63 Green similarly notes that: ‘Given that 
the UN Charter has been almost universally ratified, it would be difficult to see an alternate 
customary regime concerning the use of force as overriding the Charter provisions, though it 
may help to interpret them or augment them with provisions not provided for in the document 
(such as the requirements of necessity and proportionality).’64 The relationship between 
article 2(4) and the parallel customary rule is explored further in Chapter Three. 
 
63 Ibid., paras. 177 and 179. 
64 James A Green, The International Court of Justice and Self-Defence in International Law (Hart Publishing, 
2009), 132-3, footnote omitted. 
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Step Three: The content of the customary 
prohibition has not diverged from article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter 
The previous sections have argued that due to the way the customary rule arose, it was 
identical in content to the prohibition of the use of force in article 2(4) of the UN Charter at 
its inception and the two rules continue to exist in parallel. This part will examine and debunk 
arguments that the prohibition is not identical under customary international law and the UN 
Charter, and argue that States do not differentiate between the content or application of the 
prohibition under both sources of law. As a result, the content of the prohibition of the use of 
force under customary international law and article 2(4) of the UN Charter remains identical 
and has not diverged.65  
 
One argument in support of the position that the content of the customary prohibition is 
narrower is the fact that article 2(4) refers to other provisions of the Charter that are not 
themselves necessarily customary international law rules, for example, the Purposes of the 
United Nations. According to this view, the customary prohibition is narrower because it 
does not contain an obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations, except insofar as those purposes are also principles of 
customary international law or general international law (i.e. logically inherent to the 
international legal system itself). On the other hand, the Friendly Relations Declaration and 
other documents mentioned in Chapter One regarding the prohibition constituting customary 
international law also mention the Principles and Purposes of the UN Charter, which seems to 
indicate that a use of force inconsistent with those Purposes and Principles is also a violation 
of customary international law. In any case, it is difficult to conceive of a use of force 
inconsistent with such Purposes but not against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of another State, rendering this possible difference moot.  
 
Another way that the UN Charter provisions could be broader than the customary prohibition 
would be if the procedural limitations to the self-defence exception to the prohibition set out 
in article 51 do not apply (or do not apply to the same degree) under customary law. For 
example, it is possible that at least non-UN member States have a right of self-defence under 
 
65 Even if the content is identical, the scope of application of the customary prohibition could differ from article 
2(4) in respect of the subjects of the rule. It has been argued by Randezlhofer and Dörr, above n.5, 213, MN30-
31 that unlike article 2(4) of the UN Charter which only applies between States, under customary international 
law, international organisations (‘IOs’) capable of conducting military operations are also bound by the 
prohibition, such as NATO, the EU, ECOWAS and the United Nations, and that many IOs already state this in 
their own constituting documents and ad hoc declarations, although this does not extend to individuals or 
groups. This author is not aware of any State practice that has adopted the interpretation that non-State entities 
are directly bound by the prohibition of the use of force under customary international law and article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter from such IO declarations, although it is not excluded that the law could in future develop in this 
direction. An in-depth study of this question is beyond the scope of the present research. 
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customary international law which is not procedurally curtailed by the UN Security Council 
reporting requirement and the limit imposed on the right to self-defence ‘until the Security 
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security’ set out in 
article 51, with the result that there may be greater scope to use force under customary law 
than under the UN Charter. But this does not affect the finding that the content of the 
prohibition of the use of force under custom and article 2(4) of the UN Charter are identical, 
because the self-defence exception to the prohibition of the use of force (either under article 
51 or custom) is better understood for this purpose not as a carve-out clause that affects the 
scope of the prohibition itself, but a circumstance precluding wrongfulness of acts that would 
otherwise fall within its scope. 
 
Furthermore, States have not modified the customary prohibition by asserting claims that it is 
either narrower or broader than article 2(4). There are no statements to the effect that States 
differentiate between the application of the customary international law and article 2(4) treaty 
rule that this author is aware of. Since States seem not to differentiate between the prohibition 
under these two sources of law, then a plausible interpretation is that States are 
simultaneously complying with identical obligations under customary international law and 
the UN Charter. Therefore, any assertion of an expanded right to resort to force by a State 
will likely count both as practice in the application of the treaty (and therefore be relevant to 
determining whether such practice is evidence of agreement between the parties regarding its 
interpretation in this new manner) and as an evolution of customary practice. 
Conclusion 
Just as with the chicken and egg problem, it is complex and difficult to determine the causal 
relationship between the treaty and customary rule prohibiting the use of force, but the 
question is open to scientific enquiry and the answer is capable of being ascertained.66 In 
summary, since the ICJ did not explicitly hold that the content of the prohibition under each 
source of law was actually identical and it made its finding that there is a customary 
prohibition of the use of force parallel to article 2(4) with little explanation or analysis of 
State practice, one cannot simply rely on the judgment in the Nicaragua case to answer the 
question of whether the customary prohibition of the use of force is identical in scope to 
article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Applying the two-element approach to the prohibition of the 
use of force is arduous and theoretically and practically fraught due to Baxter's paradox. But 
there is an alternative way to determine if they are identical, which this chapter has applied. 
This chapter has argued that because of the way that the customary prohibition arose, it was 
likely identical to article 2(4) at its emergence and has developed in parallel to it. The article 
2(4) prohibition continues to apply. States do not differentiate in practice between applying 
 
66 According to evolutionary biology, the egg came first: Merrill Fabry, 'Now You Know: Which Came First, 
the Chicken or the Egg?', Time (21 September, 2016), available at http://time.com/4475048/which-came-first-
chicken-egg/ (accessed 22 October 2018). 
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article 2(4) or the customary prohibition. Therefore, on the basis of the foregoing analysis, 
the prohibition of the use of force in article 2(4) of the UN Charter and under customary 
international law are likely to be presently identical in scope, although the possibility remains 
for future divergence. The next chapter will look at the consequences of this for the 
relationship between the treaty and customary rule, and then determine whether to apply a 
process of treaty interpretation, or identify the scope of the customary prohibition to identify 
the meaning of a prohibited ‘use of force’ under international law. 
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Chapter Three: The relationship 
between the customary and treaty 
prohibition of the use of force, and 
which to interpret or apply 
Introduction   
The previous chapter concluded that article 2(4) of the UN Charter is the origin of the 
customary international law prohibition of the use of force, and that the prohibition under 
both sources of law are identical in content. There is no hierarchy between these different 
sources of law,1 and even if the content of the rule under each source of law is currently 
identical, there are important differences in the application and interpretation of the two 
different sources of law that may lead to different results. Given that there are parallel 
identical rules prohibiting the use of force under article 2(4) of the UN Charter and customary 
international law, what is the effect of the customary rule on the treaty rule, and vice versa? 
Should we interpret the treaty (the UN Charter) or apply the process for identification of 
customary international law to determine the content of the rule, or both? And why does it 
matter – what is the difference in practice between applying these different methods of legal 
interpretation or identification? This chapter will address these three questions and conclude 
that because of the relationship between the UN Charter and customary international law 
prohibitions, we should apply a method of treaty interpretation to article 2(4) to determine the 
meaning of a prohibited ‘use of force’ between States under international law. 
 
1 Hugh WA Thirlway, The Sources of International Law (Oxford University Press, 1. ed., 2014), 136. 
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General consequences of parallel customary 
international law prohibition and difference in 
application 
The general consequences of parallel rules in custom and treaty are that the customary rule 
binds non-treaty parties (which also means that treaty parties remain bound by the customary 
rule even if they withdraw from the treaty), direct incorporation into some dualist national 
legal systems (in contrast to treaties, which usually require legislative action before they may 
be applied by domestic courts), and that it facilitates the erga omnes character of the rule.2 
Although the fundamental distinction between the bindingness of conventional (treaty) law 
and customary international law may appear less relevant to the prohibition of the use of 
force given that nearly all States are parties to the UN Charter, it is nevertheless important for 
the following reasons. Firstly, it is potentially relevant to jurisdiction, in the event that an 
international tribunal does not have jurisdiction to apply the UN Charter but does have 
jurisdiction to apply customary international law (as in the Nicaragua case). Secondly, there 
are important differences in approach to legal interpretation under customary international 
law and treaty. Even if the current content of each rule is identical, it is important to 
determine whether to interpret article 2(4) of the UN Charter or identify the scope and 
content of the customary rule, because there are significant differences between these two 
methods in practice:  
 
• Relevance of State practice: The relevance of State practice differs according to the 
method being applied. State practice may be relevant firstly to identification of 
customary international law (when accompanied by an opinio juris); secondly, as 
subsequent practice of the parties in the application of the treaty under article 31 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘VCLT’) which establishes their 
agreement regarding its interpretation; and thirdly, as other subsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty as a supplementary means of interpretation under article 32 of 
the VCLT.3 
 
• Relevant State practice: Georg Nolte notes that ‘[i]t is … not always easy to 
distinguish subsequent agreements and subsequent practice from subsequent “other 
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties” 
(article 31 (3) (c)). It appears that the most important distinguishing factor is whether 
an agreement is made “regarding the interpretation” of a treaty.’4 Accordingly, the 
 
2 Oscar Schachter, ‘Entangled Treaty and Custom’ in Yoram Dinstein (ed), International Law at a time of 
perplexity: Essays in honour of Shabtai Rosenne (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989) 717, 727-8, citing Meron. 
3 See Chapter Four regarding subsequent agreement and subsequent practice. 
4 Georg Nolte, ‘First Report on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to Treaty 
Interpretation’ (A/CN.4/660, International Law Commission, 19 March 2013), para. 115; cf Michael Wood, 
‘First Report on Formation and Evidence of Customary International Law’ (A/CN.4/663, ILC, 17 May 2013), 
  57 
main difference in method is to identify whether the State practice is in the 
application of article 2(4) of the UN Charter and whether such practice (in 
combination with other instances of State practice) establishes the agreement of the 
treaty parties regarding its interpretation.  
 
• Opinio juris: Unlike the identification of the scope of the customary prohibition of the 
use of force, examining the interpretation of article 2(4) through subsequent practice 
does not require an analysis of whether acts or omissions are accompanied by an 
opinio juris, but only whether it is in the application of the UN Charter and if it 
establishes agreement of UN Member States regarding its interpretation. 
 
• Required density of practice: The quantitative standard is probably higher for 
identifying whether subsequent practice in the application of the treaty evidences 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation, as this will likely require 
unanimity or near-unanimous agreement of all treaty parties.5 
 
Thirdly, and most importantly for our purposes, the most significant impacts of a parallel 
customary and treaty prohibition are in respect of interpretation: the effect of the parallel 
customary rule on the interpretation of article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and vice versa.6 This is 
the subject of this chapter. 
What is their relationship? 
Effect	of	parallel	treaty	rule	on	identification	of	custom	
The effect of article 2(4) on the customary international law prohibition after the emergence 
of the latter is more straightforward than the role of the customary rule in interpreting article 
2(4). In essence, the scope of article 2(4) acts as a restraining force on the contraction of the 
customary international law rule (i.e. it makes it more difficult to assert that the customary 
international law rule has changed to become more permissive/less prohibitive than the 
article 2(4) prohibition). Albrecht Randelzhofer and Oliver Dörr argue that disagreements 
between States over the correct interpretation of article 2(4) are relevant to the substance of 
the prohibition under customary international law since it will be confined to a smaller core 
 
para. 17, which states that ‘the dividing lines’ between the areas of identification of customary international law 
and subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties ‘are reasonably 
clear’. 
5 1966 Yearbook of the ILC vol. 1 part II: Summary records of the 18th session, 4 May –19 July 1966, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1966, 165, para. 17, intervention of Mr Tunkin with respect to draft article 68. 
6 ILC Rapporteurs Sir Michael Wood and Georg Nolte delineate the effect of treaties on the formation of 
customary international law (as part of the topic of identification of customary international law) from the role 
of customary international law in the interpretation of treaties (as part of the topic of subsequent agreement and 
subsequent practice in relation to treaty interpretation): Nolte (2013), above n.4, para. 7. 
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area that is generally recognised.7 However, this analysis conflates subsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty showing the parties’ agreement regarding the interpretation of a 
provision of a treaty (article 2(4) of the UN Charter) with State practice motivated by an 
opinio juris. As will be explained further below, these two processes of interpreting and 
applying treaty provisions and identifying customary international law rules should not be 
conflated.  
Effect	 of	 parallel	 customary	 international	 law	 rule	 on	 treaty	
interpretation		
In terms of the effect of custom on treaty interpretation, customary international law rules 
may be used to supplement treaty interpretation by filling in gaps in the treaty.8 The legal 
basis for doing so is article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT. This rule provides that, together with the 
context, ‘any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties’ ‘shall be taken into account’. Such relevant rules include customary international law 
and treaty.9 The use of customary international law rules to supplement treaty interpretation 
may take the form of a static interpretation (using customary international law rules existing 
at the time the treaty entered into force) or dynamic interpretation (using subsequently 
developing customary international law rules). One may take into account subsequent legal 
developments when interpreting a treaty if it was the intention of the parties at the time of 
concluding the treaty, taking into account the text, object and purpose of the treaty, and the 
travaux préparatoires.10 There is a presumption that this is the case for certain texts where 
they are open-ended or set out general obligations, and International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) 
jurisprudence also supports this.11 This section will argue that since the rule in article 2(4) is 
the origin of the customary prohibition of the use of force, it is not appropriate to use pre-
existing or subsequently developing customary international law to fill gaps in interpretation 
of article 2(4), nor to use subsequently developing customary international law to modify 
article 2(4).  
1.	Use	of	pre-existing	customary	international	law	to	fill	gaps	
Since a customary international law rule prohibiting force did not pre-exist the UN Charter 
but developed as a consequence of it and is currently identical to it, it is arguably not sensible 
to fill gaps in the interpretation of article 2(4) such as the term ‘use of force’ by looking to 
custom. This is the key difference between the interpretation of article 2(4) and article 51 of 
the UN Charter, and means that the reasoning behind turning to customary international law 
to supplement the interpretation of the provision does not apply in the same way to article 
 
7 ‘Article 2(4)’ in Bruno Simma et al (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A commentary (Oxford 
University Press, 3rd ed., 2012) 200, 231, MN66. 
8 Wood (2013), above n.4, para. 35, with further extensive references: ‘Rules of customary international law 
may also fill possible lacunae in treaties, and assist in their interpretation.’ 
9 Tom Ruys, ‘Armed Attack’ and Article 51 of the UN Charter (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 20. 
10 Ruys (2010), ibid., 21. 
11 Ibid. 
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2(4) as it does to article 51. As pointed out by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case, since article 51 
refers to an inherent right of self-defence, it must therefore be a pre-existing right under 
customary international law which arises when an ‘armed attack’ occurs. Although there is 
debate regarding whether article 51 of the UN Charter confers a treaty right or merely 
recognises the pre-existing customary right,12 it is not controversial that a right to self-
defence pre-existed the UN Charter. Accordingly, it is sensible to look to the content of that 
right under customary international law to fill gaps in the interpretation of article 51, such as 
the requirements of necessity and proportionality.13  
 
Unlike article 51, which refers to a pre-existing customary rule (the right to self-defence), 
article 2(4) introduced a new rule (the prohibition of the ‘use of force’, as opposed to the 
prohibition of recourse to war). As Chapter Two explained, the new rule enshrined in article 
2(4), though influenced by the pre-existing broader customary prohibition of the recourse to 
war as an instrument of national policy, led to the emergence of a new customary rule. The 
term ‘use of force’ was not a legal term of art enshrined in customary international law prior 
to the UN Charter. It therefore does not make sense to look to the content of the customary 
prohibition of the use of force in order to interpret the treaty rule, since unlike the case of the 
right to use force in self-defence, the treaty provision in article 2(4) is itself the origin of the 
customary rule. 
Potential	divergence		
The potential effect of the customary rule on the interpretation of article 2(4) is therefore best 
elucidated by turning to the issue of divergence between the customary rule and article 2(4). 
Though currently identical in scope, it is of course possible for the customary and treaty rule 
to diverge in the future. As the ICJ noted in the Nicaragua case, ‘such divergencies could 
result from different methods of interpretation and application appropriate for each 
category’.14 It appears however that the most plausible way the prohibition could change 
under custom and not the UN Charter, is if the prohibition is extended in a way that is clearly 
not covered by the terms of article 2(4), for example, to cover uses of force by non-State 
entities, or uses of force by a State within its own territory in a civil war, because then that 
conduct and opinio juris cannot be referable to the treaty provision.15  
 
12 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion 1996 ICJ Rep 226 (‘Nuclear Weapons’), 
para. 40. 
13 James A Green, The International Court of Justice and Self-Defence in International Law (Hart Publishing, 
2009), 131. Green looks at the issue from the perspective of two ‘conceptions’ of the law of self-defence, on the 
one hand ‘armed attack as a grave use of force’, which comes from article 51, and on the other hand one based 
on necessity and proportionality, which comes from customary international law. He asks whether the law on 
self-defence therefore stems from two distinct ‘conceptions’ with roots in two different formal sources of 
international law (p129). He interprets the Nicaragua case as the Court perceiving two distinct conceptions of 
the law on self-defence deriving from different sources, which are not identical but which are merged. (P130) 
The Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion also suggests in his view that ‘both conventional and customary 
international law are required to understand the right’ (p130), since the Court stated that some constraints on the 
resort to self-defence were inherent in the very concept of self-defence and others specified in article 51. 
14 Schachter, above n.2, 728, footnote omitted. 
15 See Chapter Two, ‘Step Three’. 
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However, although it is possible, it is unlikely that divergence would occur in the case of 
quasi-universal treaties. The main reason is that ‘[i]t is most unlikely in these cases that 
practice and opinio juris among the same States would distinguish conduct under the treaty 
from conduct in implementation of an identical rule of customary law’.16 Hugh Thirlway also 
notes that ‘the way in which customary law is formed theoretically involves awareness of, 
and lack of objection to, developments in the field on the part of the whole international 
community’.17 For our purposes, this means that developments in the customary prohibition 
of the use of force are at least accepted implicitly by the whole international community, 
most of the members of which are parties to the UN Charter, and accordingly, the customary 
international law rule is unlikely to develop in a way that would directly conflict with their 
Charter obligations.18 
 
Notwithstanding this, if divergence were to occur in future, it would lead to three possible 
interpretive outcomes.  Firstly, it would result in separate rules from different legal sources 
simultaneously binding States.19 Secondly, the development of a new customary rule with 
respect to the prohibition of the use of force could be used as an element of interpretation of 
article 2(4). And thirdly, the subsequent emergence of a new customary rule could be used as 
an element modifying the operation of article 2(4).20 As the following discussion illustrates, 
these latter two possibilities – interpretation and modification – are not applicable with 
respect to the prohibition of the use of force in article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 
2.	Use	of	subsequently	developing	customary	international	law	to	fill	gaps	or	
modify	article	2(4)	
It is arguably not sensible to interpret gaps in article 2(4) by referring to the parallel 
customary rule since that rule is itself a product of and arose from the impact of article 2(4). 
But if the customary international law rule subsequently develops in a way that diverges from 
the article 2(4) rule, then it could make sense for the new customary international law rule to 
be used as an interpretive element for article 2(4), since it would be a rule of international law 
with a distinct content from article 2(4) applicable between the parties. It is common practice 
amongst scholars to interpret treaties using subsequent customary international law 
 
16 Schachter, above n.2, 728, cf. Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (Cambridge University 
Press, 5th ed., 2011), 100, footnotes omitted: ‘Although present-day customary international law can be looked 
upon essentially as a replica of Article 2(4), it is hard to believe that the exact correlation of the two will 
“freeze” indefinitely. … Nonetheless, the present author cannot share the view that contemporary customary law 
has already changed – or is in the process of changing – to the point that the jus ad bellum is on the cusp of 
becoming “protean” in nature.’ 
17 Thirlway, above n.1, 140-141. 
18 See discussion in Chapter Two. 
19 See Schachter, above n.2. 
20 See observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur from 1966 ILC Yearbook, vol. Ii, 88, para. 1: ‘the 
three matters in question – a subsequent treaty, a subsequent practice of the parties in the application of the 
treaty and the subsequent emergence of a new rule of customary law – may have effects either as elements of 
interpretation or as elements modifying the operation of a treaty.’ 
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developments rather than analysing subsequent practice of the parties in the application of the 
treaty. This is done by examining ‘the evolution of the rule through custom’.21 According to 
this approach, since the customary international law rule is largely or completely identical to 
the article 2(4) prohibition, there is no need to apply the two-element approach to identify the 
existence of the rule or its content under customary international law. What is relevant is to 
determine whether the customary international law rule has subsequently diverged from the 
existing scope of article 2(4), firstly, to see if the customary rule has itself evolved, and 
secondly, in order to interpret article 2(4) by taking into account the subsequently-developed 
rule of customary international law as a ‘relevant rule of international law applicable between 
the parties’.22 For instance, Olivier Corten’s approach is that ‘reliance on a novel right (A), 
supposedly accepted by all other States (B), would be both a customary evolution of the rule 
and a practice subsequently followed by the parties to the UN Charter and indicative of their 
agreement on the interpretation of the text’.23 James Green applies similar reasoning when he 
states that: ‘It may well be that a new interpretation of the meaning of “force” will evolve in 
the future to take into account the growing threat of cyberwarfare. Such a change would not 
require any alteration of Article 2(4), of course, just a reinterpretation of its terminology in 
customary international law, based on state practice and opinio juris in the usual way.’24 
 
For reasons explained above, it is arguably not sensible to use pre-existing or subsequently 
evolving customary international law to fill gaps in the interpretation of article 2(4), since the 
treaty provision is itself the source of the customary rule. It is also not appropriate to use 
subsequently evolving customary international law (which has evolved beyond the original 
scope of the article 2(4) rule) to modify the interpretation of article 2(4) by automatically 
applying those new developments in the customary rule to the treaty. In the first place, this is 
unlikely to occur since, as noted above in the discussion of potential divergence between the 
customary prohibition of the use of force and article 2(4) of the UN Charter, it is unlikely that 
the customary rule is changing to diverge from the treaty rule since States do not assert a new 
customary right or prohibition to use force in isolation. For the reasons explained above, the 
assertion of a new customary rule would require that States explicitly refer to a customary 
law justification for their acts. But there does not seem to be any evidence that States have 
already done this; when States make any reference to a source of the prohibition in their 
direct practice (claims and counterclaims attaching to actual uses of force), it is invariably 
also to the UN Charter.  
 
Secondly, use of subsequently evolving customary international law (which has evolved 
beyond the original scope of the article 2(4) rule) to modify the interpretation of article 2(4) 
is problematic because it conflates changes in the customary international law rule with 
 
21 Olivier Corten, The Law against War : The Prohibition on the Use of Force in Contemporary International 
Law (Hart, 2010), 29. 
22 VCLT, art. 31(3)(c). 
23 Corten, above n.21, 29, footnotes omitted. 
24 James A Green, ‘Questioning the Peremptory Status of the Prohibition of the Use of Force’ (2010) 32 
Michigan Journal of International Law 215, 241. 
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changes in the interpretation of the treaty rule. To be fair, those scholars who adopt this 
approach to determining the content of the prohibition under article 2(4) through the lens of 
custom also acknowledge the treaty interpretation process and that the relevant State practice 
they examine for evidence of a change in the customary rule must also count for subsequent 
practice to have an effect on the interpretation of the treaty provision. For example, Corten 
writes that ‘[f]rom the standpoint of the “restrictive approach” described above which is 
sometimes characterised as “classical”, we shall focus here on the evolution of the rule 
through custom. It is understood that, given the treaty-based character of the prohibition of 
the use of force, such an evolution presupposes compliance with the interpretative principles 
set forth in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.’25 But Corten argues that ‘the UN 
Charter itself cannot be understood without an awareness of the manner in which the parties 
to it construe it (article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties), which brings 
us back to the interpretation of the customary rule.’26 The problem is that though this 
recognises that the treaty interpretation process is distinct from identifying evolutions of the 
customary rule, the method applied is actually a form of substitution since it only examines 
evolutions in the customary rule and does not take account of the requirements for identifying 
whether there is subsequent State practice in the application of the treaty that evidences the 
agreement of the parties to the treaty to the new interpretation. As noted by Roberto Ago in 
the International Law Commission (‘ILC’) debates on the 1966 draft Convention on the Law 
of Treaties, this approach does not sufficiently distinguish between the distinct modes of 
interpretation and application of customary law and treaty law.27 Ago’s interventions on the 
ILC regarding the draft 1966 VCLT support the position that we must differentiate between 
these separate processes: subsequent agreement and subsequent practice as an element of 
treaty interpretation, and subsequently developing customary international law as an element 
of treaty interpretation. In other words, no automatic treaty modification follows from a 
subsequently developing customary rule.  
 
Furthermore, informal modification of the UN Charter is problematic because it circumvents 
the formal mechanism for amendment set out in the Charter and thus potentially usurps the 
consent of the treaty parties. Directly applying the changes in custom as the new 
interpretation of the treaty itself without ensuring that there is also subsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty showing agreement of the parties regarding this new interpretation is 
a backdoor way of modifying the treaty. The use of rules of customary international law that 
developed subsequent to the treaty with the effect of so altering the interpretation of the treaty 
from its original terms does not fill in gaps pursuant to article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT, but 
rather amounts to an informal modification of the treaty. For example, Corten writes: ‘In the 
context of a treaty law, an evolution of the rule prohibiting the use of force would require 
ratification by at least two thirds of the States parties, including all permanent members of the 
 
25 Corten, above n.21, 29, footnote omitted. 
26 Ibid., 16-7. 
27 1966 Yearbook of the ILC vol. 1 part II: Summary records of the 18th session, 4 May –19 July 1966, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1966, 167, paras. 48-49. 
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Security Council, pursuant to articles 108 and 109 of the UN Charter. By definition this 
onerous procedure is not applicable in the realm of custom.’28 This illustrates that a change in 
the customary rule would not automatically satisfy the conditions to formally modify the 
interpretation of the treaty provision. Therefore, if one takes the approach of identifying 
changes in the customary rule in order to interpret article 2(4) (without the extra step of 
determining if that subsequent practice is in the application of the treaty and demonstrates the 
parties’ agreement regarding the treaty interpretation) this assumes that changes in custom 
would also informally modify the treaty – but this is a controversial point that even the ILC 
did not venture into. 
 
The ILC ‘has alluded to the possibility that the emergence of a new rule of customary 
international law may modify a treaty, depending on the particular circumstances and the 
intentions of the parties to the treaty’.29 However, the draft article 68(c) in the 1966 draft 
VCLT proposing that the operation of a treaty may be modified ‘[b]y the subsequent 
emergence of a new rule of customary law relating to matters dealt with in the treaty and 
binding upon all the parties’30 gave rise to objections by States, extensive discussions in the 
Commission, and was ultimately deleted on the recommendation of the Special Rapporteur, 
Sir Waldock. The basis for the objections related to the complex relationship between custom 
and treaty law including priority of sources, the problem of inter-temporal law and the 
objection ‘to the idea that a new customary norm should necessarily over-ride a treaty 
provision regardless of the will of the parties’.31 Roberto Ago noted that the provision 
conflated two issues, namely, the subsequent practice of the parties in the application of the 
treaty evidencing their agreement to extend or modify its operation, and a subsequently 
developing rule of customary international law.32 In essence, the Special Rapporteur observed 
that paragraph (c) ‘concern[s] the impact on a treaty of acts done outside and not in relation 
to it’.33 
 
In the event that the customary international law prohibition of the use of force subsequently 
evolved, this would not automatically change the interpretation of article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter. In practice, the scope of article 2(4) and the customary prohibition would diverge 
unless the change in the customary rule was accompanied by subsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty evidencing the agreement of (‘all, or nearly all’ of)34 the parties to a 
 
28 Above n.21, 34-5. 
29 International Law Commission, ‘Formation and Evidence of Customary International Law - Elements in the 
Previous Work of the International Law Commission That Could Be Particularly Relevant to the Topic - 
Memorandum by the Secretariat’ (A/CN.4/659, 14 March 2013), 34, Observation 27, footnote omitted. 
30 1966 Yearbook of the ILC vol. 1 part II: Summary records of the 18th session, 4 May –19 July 1966, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1966, 163. 
31 The latter was raised by the UK Government, see ibid., vol 2, 90, para. 12. 
32 1966 Yearbook of the ILC vol. 1 part II: Summary records of the 18th session, 4 May –19 July 1966, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1966, 167, paras 48-49. 
33 Ibid., vol 2, 91, para. 14. 
34 1966 Yearbook of the ILC vol. 1 part II: Summary records of the 18th session, 4 May –19 July 1966, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1966, 165, para. 17, intervention of Mr Tunkin with respect to draft article 68. 
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new interpretation of article 2(4) in line with the new customary international law rule, and 
even then only to the extent that an informal modification of a substantive (as opposed to 
procedural35) rule in the UN Charter is permissible.  
 
Informal modification of a treaty is generally problematic, since treaties usually contain 
formal requirements regarding modification or amendment.36 The evolution and modification 
of treaties through subsequent practice is discussed further in Chapter Four. Informal 
modification of a treaty through a new customary rule is especially problematic for the 
reasons set out above, and also because it would mean that the practice and opinio juris of 
non-parties to a treaty could alter the interpretation of the treaty, although this is not very 
relevant to the UN Charter considering its near-universal membership. In addition, there will 
be difficulty in determining whether the State practice is in the application of the treaty (for 
treaty parties) versus in the application of customary international law (for both parties and 
non-parties) (see discussion of this in Chapter Two). Furthermore, informal modification of 
article 2(4) of the UN Charter presents particular obstacles due to the potential jus cogens 
nature of the prohibition enshrined in that provision. Jus cogens and the prohibition of the use 
of force is discussed further in Chapter Four. 
Which source to interpret or apply? 
As explained above, approaches based on analysing State practice and opinio juris in order to 
determine whether and how the prohibition of the use of force in article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter has evolved or been modified are flawed. Furthermore, since the two rules are 
identical in content, States do not differentiate between the two in their application of the 
prohibition and most importantly, the rule in article 2(4) is itself the source of the customary 
rule.  It is not appropriate to use customary international law to fill gaps in interpretation of 
article 2(4). The preferable approach then to interpret the meaning and lower boundary of a 
prohibited use of force under international law is to focus on interpreting the treaty. As 
Andrea Bianchi notes, ‘there are good reasons for considering the provisions of the Charter as 
the starting point of the inquiry on the international legal regulation of the use of force. The 
first obvious reason is that there is widespread social consensus on this proposition. In most 
of the debates before the Security Council, in which issues of the use of force are discussed, 
reference is primarily made to the law of the Charter. Also in other fora the “official 
discourse” on the use of force relies heavily on the central character of the Charter 
provisions.’37 This analysis will therefore start with the UN Charter and focus on the 
subsequent agreement of the parties as well as other practice in the application of the Charter 
as a supplementary means of interpretation, rather than seeking to identify State practice and 
 
35 For example, the practice of UN Security Council abstention votes under article 27(3) of the UN Charter: see 
Chapter Four. 
36 Ruys (2010), above n.9, 24-8. 
37 Andrea Bianchi, ‘The International Regulation of the Use of Force: The Politics of Interpretive Method’ 
(2009) 22(04) Leiden Journal of International Law 651, 658. 
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opinio juris for the purpose of deriving the content of the rule under customary international 
law.  
 
There are several implications of choosing to focus on treaty interpretation to discern the 
meaning and content of a prohibited ‘use of force’ between States. This approach has the 
advantage of avoiding the problems associated with trying to identify an evolution in the 
customary rule that have been identified by other scholars, such as ‘profound divergences’ 
over method,38 and legal debates regarding the appropriate equilibrium ‘not only between 
“words” and “deeds”, but also between “abstract” and “concrete” statements; between the 
various aspects of density of State practice (uniformity, extensiveness and duration); between 
the (relatively more influential) practice of powerful States and that of other members of the 
international community; or between the practice of the Security Council and that of the 
General Assembly’.39 A consequence of this approach is that it does not give greater weight 
to the practice of more militarily powerful States. However, the practice of those more 
powerful States is more likely to play an influential role as a form of ‘other subsequent 
practice’,40 since those States tend to be more active in the actual use of force and exchange 
of claims about the use of force, and therefore generate more relevant practice which could 
play a subsidiary role in interpretation (though one still needs to consider whether such 
practice indicates how those parties interpret the treaty). Finally, taking the Charter 
provisions as the starting point imposes certain textual constraints on the interpreter41 and 
restricts the range of interpretive possibilities to what is offered by the text. 
Conclusion 
Even if the content of the customary prohibition of the use of force and the prohibition of the 
use of force in article 2(4) of the UN Charter are currently identical, as this chapter has 
emphasized, each source of law has a different method of interpretation and application. In 
order to understand which source to interpret or apply to discover the meaning of a prohibited 
‘use of force’ between States under international law, this chapter has explored the 
relationship between the treaty and customary prohibitions of the use of force (i.e. the effect 
of the parallel customary rule on the interpretation of article 2(4) and vice versa). With 
respect to the effect of customary international law rule on interpretation of article 2(4), it has 
argued that it is not appropriate to use the customary prohibition to fill gaps in the 
 
38 For example, Corten notes: ‘On one side of those debates in the extensive approach; it consists in interpreting 
the rule in the most flexible manner possible. … On the other side is what can be categorised as the restrictive 
approach; it advocates a much stricter interpretation of the prohibition so making it much likely that new 
exceptions will be viewed as acceptable. Beyond the validity of the basic arguments advanced by both sides, a 
review of scholarship reveals that the debate is also, and perhaps above all, about method. The most profound 
divergences arise over the status and interpretation of the customary prohibition on the use of force.’ Above 
n.21, 5, footnotes omitted. 
39 Ruys (2010), above n.9, 51. 
40 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 32. 
41 Bianchi, above n.37, 659 ff. 
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interpretation of article 2(4) for three reasons. Firstly, the scope of the customary rule and 
article 2(4) are identical; secondly, the treaty rule does not enshrine pre-existing customary 
international law (unlike article 51 and the right to self-defence), but rather the customary 
rule reflects the pre-existing treaty rule; and thirdly, States do not differentiate between the 
two in their application of the prohibition. Applying an approach to customary international 
law identification to interpret the meaning of a prohibited ‘use of force’ in article 2(4) by 
looking at State practice and opinio juris conflates treaty interpretation with the identification 
of customary international law by directly applying changes in custom as the new 
interpretation of the treaty itself without ensuring there is also subsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty showing agreement of the parties regarding this interpretation. 
Furthermore, informal modification of the UN Charter via subsequently evolving customary 
international law is problematic, particularly with respect to a peremptory norm of 
international law (which would require another jus cogens norm to become modified to be 
less restrictive). This chapter has therefore argued that the preferable approach is to focus on 
interpreting the UN Charter to determine the meaning of a prohibited ‘use of force’ under 
international law. This work will therefore apply the method of treaty interpretation set out in 
the following chapter. 
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Chapter Four: Method of interpretation 
of article 2(4) of the UN Charter 
Introduction 
Before the remainder of this work goes on to determine the range of possible interpretations 
of the term ‘use of force’ in article 2(4) of the UN Charter, this chapter will first briefly set 
out the general rules and means of treaty interpretation. This chapter will also address the 
significance of practice of the UN Security Council and General Assembly to the 
interpretation of the UN Charter. In addition, it will also consider whether the meaning of the 
terms of the UN Charter change over time, and the extent to which subsequent practice of 
States may contribute to modification of the interpretation of article 2(4). In this context, it 
will briefly discuss whether the prohibition of the use of force is jus cogens and the 
implications this has for the interpretation of article 2(4). Finally, these principles will be 
applied to outline the approach of this thesis to the interpretation of article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter. 
Method of treaty interpretation 
Some argue that due to the special nature of the UN Charter, different rules should apply to 
its interpretation than to other treaties.1 However, whatever its unique character within the 
international legal system, the UN Charter is a multilateral treaty, ‘and as such subject to the 
general law of treaties’.2 Article 5 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(‘VCLT’) confirms that ‘[t]he present Convention applies to any treaty which is the 
constituent instrument of an international organization and to any treaty adopted within an 
international organization without prejudice to any relevant rules of the organization’. This 
approach was confirmed by the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) in the Nuclear Weapons 
 
1 See e.g., Stefan Kadelbach, ‘Interpretation of the Charter’ in Bruno Simma et al (eds), The Charter of the 
United Nations: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2012) vol I, 7, 73-74, who identifies four 
approaches to interpreting the UN Charter: classical positivism, international constitutionalism, critical approach 
challenging the first two approaches, and a pragmatic approach combining aspects of positivism with 
constitutionalism and critical approach 
2 Georg Witschel, ‘Article 108’ in Bruno Simma et al (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 
(Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2012) vol I, 2199, 2204, MN8, footnote omitted. 
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Advisory Opinion, in which it held that: ‘From a formal standpoint, the constituent 
instruments of international organizations are multilateral treaties, to which the well-
established rules of treaty interpretation apply.’3 The ICJ has held more specifically with 
respect to the UN Charter that ‘[o]n the previous occasions when the Court has had to 
interpret the Charter of the United Nations, it has followed the principles and rules applicable 
in general to the interpretation of treaties, since it has recognized that the Charter is a 
multilateral treaty, albeit a treaty having certain special characteristics’.4 Article 5 of the 
VCLT is considered to reflect customary international law, although the evidence to support 
this is limited and the ICJ has not yet pronounced itself on this question.5 However, ‘it has 
been generally recognized that the rules of the Vienna Convention regarding treaty 
interpretation are applicable to constituent instruments of international organizations, but 
always “without prejudice to any relevant rules of the organization” … If it is understood in 
this broad and flexible sense it is clear that article 5 does reflect customary international 
law.’6  
 
The starting point for interpreting article 2(4) of the UN Charter is therefore to apply the 
process set out in the VCLT. The general rule of interpretation and the rule on supplementary 
means of interpretation are set out in articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT, which both apply as 
rules of customary international law.7 Article 31 of the VCLT sets out the general rule of 
interpretation as follows: 
 
‘1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to 
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.  
 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition 
to the text, including its preamble and annexes:  
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty;  
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the 
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the 
treaty.  
 
3 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion 1996 ICJ Rep 226 (‘Nuclear Weapons’), 
para. 19. 
4 Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Charter), Advisory Opinion [1962] ICJ 
Reports 151, 157; see also Georg Nolte, ‘Third Report on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in 
Relation to the Interpretation of Treaties’ (A/CN.4/683, International Law Commission, 7 April 2015) (‘Nolte 
Third Report’), 9. 
5 See Nolte Third Report, ibid., 32-3, paras. 83-85. 
6 Nolte Third Report, ibid., 32-3, para. 85. 
7 International Law Commission, ‘Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to the 
Interpretation of Treaties Text of Draft Conclusions 1–5 Provisionally Adopted by the Drafting Committee at 
the Sixty-Fifth Session of the International Law Commission,’ UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.813, May 24, 2013; 
Georg Nolte, ‘First Report on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to Treaty 
Interpretation.’ International Law Commission, 19 March 2013 (‘Nolte First Report’), 6, para. 8, footnotes 
omitted. 
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3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:  
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the 
treaty or the application of its provisions;  
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;  
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 
 
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so 
intended.’  
 
The International Law Commission (‘ILC’) defines a ‘subsequent agreement’ under article 
31(3)(a) of the VCLT as ‘an agreement between the parties, reached after the conclusion of a 
treaty, regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions’.8 
‘Subsequent practice’ under article 31(3)(b) of the VCLT is defined by the ILC as ‘conduct in 
the application of a treaty, after its conclusion, which establishes the agreement of the parties 
regarding the interpretation of the treaty’.9 Such conduct includes tacit consent and 
pronouncements such as declarations and other official statements. The same term was 
deliberately employed as that in article 2 of the Articles on State Responsibility.10 The ILC’s 
draft conclusion 2 states that ‘[s]ubsequent agreements and subsequent practice under article 
31 (3) (a) and (b), being objective evidence of the understanding of the parties as to the 
meaning of the treaty, are authentic means of interpretation, in the application of the general 
rule of treaty interpretation reflected in article 31 [of the VCLT]’.11 Nolte notes that 
‘[s]ubsequent agreements and subsequent practice have been used as an important means of 
interpretation of the Charter of the United Nations’.12 Decisions by a court or tribunal on the 
interpretation of a treaty (such as the ICJ interpreting the UN Charter) do not count as 
‘subsequent practice’ for the purpose of treaty interpretation and instead ‘constitute special 
means for the interpretation of the treaty in subsequent cases, as indicated, in particular, by 
article 38 (1) (d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice’.13 
 
Under article 32 of the VCLT, ‘[r]ecourse may be had to supplementary means of 
interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its 
 
8 ILC (2013), ibid., Draft conclusion 4, para. 1. 
9 Ibid., Draft conclusion 4, para. 2. 
10 International Law Commission, ‘Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to the 
Interpretation of Treaties - Statement of the Chairman of the Drafting Committee, Mr. Dire Tladi’, 31 May 2013 
(‘First Statement of Chairman’), 11. 
11 Nolte First Report, above n.7, draft conclusion 2. See also Yearbook of the International Law Commission 
(1966), vol. II, p. 221, para. 15, cited in Nolte First Report, 14, para. 29. See also Stuart Ford, ‘Legal Processes 
of Change: Article 2(4) and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’ (1999) 4(1) Journal of Conflict and 
Security Law 75, 78 with further references. 
12 Nolte First Report, ibid., 22, para. 52, citing Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) 2004 ICJ Reports 136, 149, para 27. 
13 Nolte Third Report, above n.6, 7, para. 17. 
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conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to 
determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:  
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or  
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.’ 
 
Supplementary means of interpretation under article 32 include other subsequent practice in 
the application of the treaty.14 Other subsequent practice is ‘subsequent practice which does 
not establish the agreement of the parties concerning the interpretation of a treaty’.15 
According to the ILC draft conclusions, ‘[o]ther “subsequent practice” as a supplementary 
means of interpretation under article 32 consists of conduct by one or more parties in the 
application of the treaty, after its conclusion’.16 The statement of the ILC Committee 
Chairman accompanying the draft conclusions notes that the phrase ‘by one or more parties’ 
‘indicates that, in order to serve as a subsidiary means of interpretation, a subsequent practice 
need not involve all parties to the treaty nor establish an agreement between all parties 
regarding its interpretation’.17 Furthermore, it is not required that ‘the relevant practice be 
“regarding the interpretation” of the treaty … any practice in the application of the treaty that 
may provide some indications as to the manner in which the parties involved in that practice 
interpret the treaty may be relevant as a supplementary means of interpretation’.18  
 
Subsequent practice under both articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT ‘may consist of any conduct 
in the application of a treaty which is attributable to a party to the treaty under international 
law’.19 To be relevant, the conduct must actually play a role in interpreting and applying the 
treaty.20 The ILC Committee on subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to 
treaty interpretation provisionally adopted draft conclusion 1, paragraph 5 notes that ‘[t]he 
interpretation of a treaty consists of a single combined operation, which places appropriate 
emphasis on the various means of interpretation indicated, respectively, in articles 31 and 
32’.21 
 
Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice may contribute to clarifying the meaning of 
the treaty22 and its object and purpose.23 This may be done by: 
 
14 International Law Commission. ‘Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to the 
Interpretation of Treaties Text of Draft Conclusions 1–5 Provisionally Adopted by the Drafting Committee at 
the Sixty-Fifth Session of the International Law Commission,’ UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.813, 24 May 2013, Draft 
conclusion 1, para. 4. 
15 First statement of Chairman, above n.10, 5. 
16 ILC (2013), above n.7, Draft conclusion 4, para. 3. 
17 First statement of Chairman, above n.10, 13. 
18 Ibid., 13. 
19 ILC (2013) above n.7, Draft conclusion 5, para. 1. 
20 First statement of Chairman, above n.10, 15. 
21 Nolte First Report, above n.4, 6. 
22 Georg Nolte, ‘Second Report on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to the 
Interpretation of Treaties’ (A/CN.4/671, International Law Commission, 26 March 2014) (‘Nolte Second 
Report’), 15, para. 30. 
23 Nolte Second Report, ibid., 14 para. 27. 
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• determining whether a special meaning was intended by the treaty parties, and if so, 
what it is;24 
 
• after determining the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the terms of a treaty, subsequent 
agreements and subsequent practice may be consulted to determine ‘whether such 
conduct confirms or modifies the preliminary result arrived at by the initial textual 
interpretation or by other means of interpretation’;25 and 
 
• contributing, ‘in their interaction with other means of interpretation, to the 
clarification of the meaning of a treaty. This may result in narrowing, widening, or 
otherwise determining the range of possible interpretations, including any scope for 
the exercise of discretion which the treaty accords to the parties’.26 
 
The weight to be accorded to subsequent agreements and subsequent practice as a means of 
interpretation depends on the extent to which such subsequent agreements and subsequent 
practice ‘demonstrate the common understanding of the parties as to the meaning of the terms 
of a treaty’.27 Accordingly, ‘[t]he weight of a subsequent agreement or subsequent practice as 
a means of interpretation under article 31, paragraph 3, depends, inter alia, on its clarity and 
specificity’,28 i.e. ‘[t]he degree to which the subsequent agreement or subsequent practice 
relates to the treaty concerned’.29 ‘The weight of subsequent practice under article 31, 
paragraph 3 (b), depends, in addition, on whether and how it is repeated.’30 With respect to 
‘other subsequent practice’ as a supplementary means of interpretation under article 32 of the 
VCLT, its weight may also depend inter alia on its clarity, specificity and repetition.31 
 
24 Ibid., 12, para. 21. 
25 Ibid., 12, para. 21 citation omitted. 
26 International Law Commission, ‘Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to the 
Interpretation of Treaties Texts and Titles of Draft Conclusions 6 to 10 Provisionally Adopted by the Drafting 
Committee on 27 and 28 May and on 2 and 3 June 2014,’ UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.833, 3 June 2014, Draft 
conclusion 7. 
27 International Law Commission, ‘Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to the 
Interpretation of Treaties Statement of the Chairman of the Drafting Committee, Mr. Gilberto Vergne Saboia,’ 5 
June 2014 (‘Second Statement of Chairman’), 8. 
28 ILC (2014), above n.26, Draft conclusion 8, para. 1. 
29 Second Statement of Chairman, above n.27, 8. 
30 ILC (2014), above n.27, Draft conclusion 8, para. 2. 
31 Ibid., Draft conclusion 8, para. 3. This distinction is to be clarified in the Commentary to the draft 
conclusions. 
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Significance of practice of the UN Security Council 
and UN General Assembly in the interpretation of 
the UN Charter 
The ICJ has recognised three types of practice that may bear on the interpretation of a 
constituent instrument of an international organisation (such as the UN Charter):  
 
‘(a) the subsequent practice of the parties to constituent instruments of international 
organizations under articles 31 (3) (b) and 32 of the Vienna Convention; (b) the practice 
of organs of an international organization; (c) a combination of practice of organs of the 
international organization of subsequent practice of the parties.’32  
 
There is debate over whether an international organisation’s ‘own practice’ should be 
characterised as a form of subsequent agreement and practice under article 31(3) of the 
VCLT.33 The practice of organs of the international organisation may have a different weight 
with respect to interpretation than the practice of the parties to the constituent instrument 
themselves.34 With respect to (b) above, the jurisprudence of the ICJ shows that practice of 
organs of the United Nations such as the General Assembly and the Security Council in the 
application of the Charter may be relevant as a form of other subsequent practice under 
article 32 of the VCLT (i.e. as a supplementary means of interpretation), independently of the 
practice or acceptance of all parties to the UN Charter.35 However, such resolutions will carry 
more weight when they deal with an area for which the burden of obligation falls on those 
bodies, such as the Security Council determining what is an act of aggression under article 39 
of the Charter. But since that is a political rather than a legal determination, it does not have a 
direct bearing on the interpretation of the term ‘use of force’ in article 2(4) of the UN Charter.  
 
An example of the practice referred to in (c) above is the practice of the UN Security Council 
and UN General Assembly in the application of the UN Charter that is generally accepted by 
UN Member States. For example, when a UN Security Council resolution is passed without 
dissenting votes and is accompanied by the general acceptance of UN Member States, then 
this may be considered as potentially relevant subsequent conduct confirmed by the practice 
of the parties demonstrating their agreement regarding the interpretation of the UN Charter 
 
32 Nolte Third Report, above n.4, 12, paras. 31 and 32. 
33 See Nolte Third Report, ibid., 26-28, paras. 69 –73. 
34 See further Nolte Third Report, ibid., 29-30, paras. 76-78. 
35 Nolte Third Report, ibid., 16-19, paras. 43-51; see especially Certain Expenses Advisory Opinion, above 
n.4,168: ‘Proposals made during the drafting of the Charter to place the ultimate authority to interpret the 
Charter in the International Court of Justice were not accepted; the opinion which the Court is in course of 
rendering is an advisory opinion. As anticipated in 1945, therefore, each organ must, in the first place at least, 
determine its own jurisdiction. If the Security Council, for example, adopts a resolution purportedly for the 
maintenance of international peace and security and if, in accordance with a mandate or authorization in such 
resolution, the Secretary-General incurs financial obligations, these amounts must be presumed to constitute 
“expenses of the Organization”.’ 
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under article 31(3)(b) of the VCLT. Nolte observes that the ICJ applied this approach in its 
Namibia Advisory Opinion, where the Court interpreted the term ‘concurring votes’ in article 
27(3) of the UN Charter as including voluntary abstentions ‘primarily by relying on the 
practice of the organ concerned in combination with the fact that it was then “generally 
accepted” by member States’.36 Nolte notes that ‘“[g]eneral acceptance” requires “at a 
minimum” acquiescence’.37 If the UN General Assembly or UN Security Council pass a 
resolution with dissenting votes, this may constitute other subsequent practice as a 
supplementary means of interpretation under article 32 of the VCLT, but not as practice 
establishing the agreement of the parties regarding the interpretation of the UN Charter under 
article 31(3) of the VCLT.38 
 
The decisions of plenary bodies, such as resolutions of the UN General Assembly (‘GA’), 
may also be characterised in certain circumstances as a form of subsequent agreement 
regarding the interpretation of the constituent instrument.39 Thus, when a UN General 
Assembly resolution is passed without dissent (for example, by acclamation) then this may be 
considered in certain circumstances as a form of subsequent agreement regarding the 
interpretation of the UN Charter. The ICJ has considered UN General Assembly resolutions 
when interpreting provisions of the UN Charter, but has made clear that mere adoption is not 
sufficient and has taken into account the attitudes of States towards such resolutions.40 Since 
subsequent agreement between the parties is a means of authentic interpretation of the treaty 
under article 31(3)(a) of the VCLT because it demonstrates the shared understanding of the 
parties regarding the interpretation of a treaty, UN General Assembly resolutions may be 
valued as evidence of such a shared understanding when they are passed without objection 
(i.e. unanimously or by consensus). This is the case with, for example, the 1970 Friendly 
Relations Declaration and the 1974 GA Resolution on the Definition of Aggression 
(discussed in Chapter Six). 
Evolution vs. modification 
Can	the	meaning	of	terms	in	the	UN	Charter	change	over	time?	
The terms of a treaty may either be interpreted in accordance with the circumstances 
prevailing at the time of its conclusion (contemporaneous interpretation) or in accordance 
with circumstances prevailing at the time of its application (evolutive interpretation).41 
Whether the interpretation of terms in a treaty changes over time depends on ‘whether or not 
 
36 Nolte Third Report, ibid., 19, para. 52 
37 Ibid., 30, para. 80, footnote omitted. 
38 Ibid., 30, para. 79. 
39 Nolte Third Report, ibid., 24-6, para. 67, with extensive further references. 
40 Ibid., 24-6, para. 67. 
41 Nolte First Report, above n.7, 23, para. 54. 
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the presumed intention of the parties upon the conclusion of the treaty was to give a term 
used a meaning which is capable of evolving over time’.42 Indications of the parties’ intention 
at the time of concluding the treaty that the interpretation of terms change over time include 
the language used in the treaty. For example, ‘(a) Use of a term in the treaty which is “not 
static but evolutionary”. … (b) The description of obligations in very general terms, thus 
operating a kind of renvoi to the State of the law at the time of its application. …’43 In other 
words, the use of a term ‘whose meaning is inherently more context-dependent’44 supports a 
conclusion that an evolutive interpretation was intended by the treaty parties at the time of its 
conclusion. The use of ‘generic’ terms or ‘the fact that the treaty is designed to be “of 
continuing duration”,’45 may also indicate an evolutive interpretation was intended.46 The 
subsequent agreements and practice of UN Member States under articles 31 and 32 also assist 
with determining the presumed intention of the treaty parties upon the conclusion of the 
treaty that the meaning of a term used in the treaty be capable of evolving over time.47 
 
An evolutive interpretation of the Charter is justified by the drafters’ intention. The UN 
Charter was designed to be of continuing duration and to govern changing international 
circumstances. ‘The practical quality of the UN Charter as the constitution of the UN and the 
international community at large provides additional support for considering the Charter to be 
a “living instrument” which must be “capable of growth and development over time to meet 
new social, political and historical realities often unimagined by its framers.”’48 Absent 
evidence to the contrary, this provides grounds to conclude that the term ‘use of force’ was 
intended to be subjected to evolutive interpretation in order to regulate changing 
circumstances and new uses of force which were not anticipated in 1945. This conclusion is 
supported by the approach of the ICJ in the Nicaragua case, which ‘apparently regarded the 
Charter provisions as dynamic rather than fixed, and thus as capable of change over time 
through state practice’.49 As Thilo Rensmann argues: ‘The prevailing view today is that the 
Charter must be interpreted in a purposive-dynamic rather than an originalist-static 
manner.’50 In particular, the term ‘use of force’ in article 2(4) of the UN Charter is very 
general and must be context dependent since such usages will change over time with, for 
example, technological developments. An evolutive interpretation of this provision is also 
supported by the drafter’s intention that the prohibition be all-encompassing. Accordingly, 
when interpreting the term ‘use of force’ in article 2(4) of the UN Charter, this work will also 
 
42 ILC (2013), above n.7, Draft conclusion 3. 
43 Nolte First Report, above n.7, 23-24, para. 56, citing Final report of Chair of Study Group on fragmentation 
(Martii Koskenniemi). 
44 Nolte First Report, ibid., 26, para. 61. 
45 Ibid., 26, para. 61, footnote omitted. 
46 Nolte First Report, ibid., 26, para. 61. 
47 ILC (2013), above n.7, Draft conclusion 3. 
48 Thilo Rensmann, ‘Reform’ in Bruno Simma et al (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 
(Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2012) vol I, 25, 31-32, MN20, footnotes omitted. 
49 Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed., 2008), 9. 
50 Above n.48, 31-32, MN20, footnote omitted. 
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examine how the term is currently applied, taking into consideration the current context, not 
only the original interpretation at the conclusion of the UN Charter in 1945.  
Evolutive	interpretation	vs.	treaty	modification	
However, one must be careful to distinguish between the following two concepts. The first 
concept is an evolutive interpretation of the terms of a treaty justified by the drafter’s 
intention that its interpretation may change over time, which would allow consideration of, 
inter alia, subsequent agreements and practice that interpret the terms in a way different to 
the original interpretation at the time of conclusion of the treaty but still within the scope of 
potential natural meanings attaching to particular terms. A second and markedly different 
concept is the use of subsequent practice to amend or modify the terms of a treaty beyond the 
scope intended by the parties to the treaty at the time of its conclusion. The difference is that 
an evolutive interpretation, including one arrived at through the effect of subsequent practice 
in the application of the treaty, is the result of the application of the process of treaty 
interpretation and clarifies the meaning of the terms of the treaty within the scope intended by 
the parties at the time of the treaty’s conclusion. In contrast, an amendment or modification 
of the terms of a treaty by subsequent practice – outside the VCLT rules on treaty amendment 
and modification – alters the treaty terms beyond any potential scope for discretion afforded 
to the parties by the treaty.51 The ILC Committee on Subsequent Agreement and Subsequent 
Practice in Relation to the Interpretation of Treaties has stated that ‘[t]he possibility of 
amending or modifying a treaty by subsequent practice of the parties has not been generally 
recognized’.52 The possibility of treaty modification through subsequent practice was not 
recognised by States at the Vienna Conference, and may even be considered to have been 
rejected with the deletion of draft article 38, which had included this possibility. In practice, 
the line between evolutive interpretation and modification may, however, be a fine 
distinction,53 and the ICJ has not set out criteria for making such a distinction.54 Nolte 
concludes that: ‘[t]he most reasonable approach seems to be that the line between 
interpretation and modification cannot be determined by abstract criteria but must rather be 
derived, in the first place, from the treaty itself, the character of the specific treaty provision 
at hand, and the legal context within which the treaty operates, and the specific circumstances 
of the case….’55 
 
In addition to the limits on treaty modification via subsequent agreement or practice (which 
remains highly controversial), there are further limitations on the modification of article 2(4) 
of the UN Charter through subsequent agreement or practice. These arise from the formal 
amendment procedure set out in the UN Charter itself, and the potential jus cogens nature of 
 
51 See ILC (2014), above n.26, Draft conclusion 7, para. 3. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Nolte Second Report, above n.22, 51, para. 116 with extensive further references at footnote 245. For 
discussion, see 50 ff. 
54 Ibid., 68, para. 165. 
55 Ibid., 68, para. 165. 
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the norm. The formal amendment procedure for the UN Charter has a very high procedural 
threshold that is set out in articles 108 and 109(2) and is rarely used.56 These rules for formal 
modification supersede rules of formal treaty amendment or inter se modification set out in 
articles 40 and 41 of the VCLT.57 It is controversial whether the UN Charter may be amended 
by means other than the formal procedure set out in articles 108 and 109, such as through 
subsequent practice.58 Modification of the UN Charter through a subsequent agreement 
outside of the procedure set out in the UN Charter is problematic due to article 103 of the 
Charter, which provides that ‘[i]n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the 
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any 
other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail’.59 
However, maintaining a strict constitutional view that permits only formal amendments to the 
UN Charter risks delegitimising the United Nations since ‘the UN operates on the basis of a 
number of informally accepted rules’ differing from the original framework.60 ‘In 
consequence the prevailing view assumes that under exceptional circumstances the member 
States possess the power to override the procedural restraints set forth in Arts 108 and 109’.61 
For example, ‘the replacement of the former Soviet Union and the Republic of China 
(Taiwan) by the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China without amendment 
to Art. 23 (1) of the Charter. Counting abstentions as well as affirmative votes as concurring 
votes under Art. 27 (3) may also be seen as an informal modification.’62 But these examples 
relate to the procedural rules of the UN itself, and not to fundamental rules of the 
international legal order established by the UN Charter, such as the prohibition of the use of 
force in article 2(4).  
 
In conclusion, using subsequent practice to interpret the UN Charter in a way that amounts to 
informal modification of its terms remains a controversial point, and it is on more solid 
ground to adhere to the draft conclusion of the ILC Committee on Subsequent Agreement 
and Subsequent Practice in Relation to the Interpretation of Treaties on this point: ‘It is 
presumed that the parties to a treaty, by an agreement subsequently arrived at or a practice in 
the application of the treaty, intend to interpret the treaty, not to amend or to modify it.’63 
 
 
56 Rensmann, above n.48, 30, MN14. 
57 Witschel, above n.2, 2204, MN 8. 
58 Rensmann, above n.48, 32, MN24. 
59 See Ford, above n.11, 85. 
60 Rensmann, above n.48, 33, MN 25-26. 
61 Ibid., 33, MN27-28, footnote omitted. 
62 Witschel, above n.2, 661, MN28: ‘In this respect see the interesting remarks by the representative of the 
Secretary-General of the UN, Mr Stavropoulos, “The constant practice of the Security Council of not treating 
the voluntary abstention of a permanent member of the Security Council as a vote against a substantive draft 
resolution before the Council is customary law... Even if the development relating to voluntary abstentions is 
looked upon as an interpretation of the Charter by subsequent practice, the result cannot be different and the 
practice must be recognized as being authoritative” (Oral Statement of Mr Stavropoulos, Legal Consequences 
for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security 
Council Resolution 276 (1970), ICJ, Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents, II, 39).’ 
63 ILC (2014), above n.26, Draft conclusion 7(3). See Nolte Second Report, above n.22, 51-2 for an outline of 
the controversial debate to which this provision gave rise. 
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Finally, if the prohibition of the use of force in article 2(4) is a norm of jus cogens, this sets 
further limits on modification of the rule through subsequent practice, subsequent treaties or 
the subsequent development of customary international law. This is discussed in the 
following section. 
Jus cogens and the prohibition of the use of force 
Whether the prohibition of the use of force is a norm of jus cogens affects the modification 
standard of the norm. Definitively answering the question of whether or to what extent the 
prohibition of the use of force is a peremptory norm of international law is well beyond the 
scope of this work; however, unless the jus cogens status of the norm is decisive for 
determining the lower boundaries of its content through modification, then it is not necessary 
to conclude here whether the prohibition is actually jus cogens. This section will therefore 
confine itself to explaining the key issues and what it means for the interpretation of article 
2(4). It will firstly explain the relevance of jus cogens to the interpretation of the prohibition 
of the use of force. Secondly, this part will explain how the modification standard for an 
evolutive interpretation of article 2(4) and the evolution of the customary prohibition are 
affected by the potential peremptory status of the norm. Thirdly, it will briefly outline the 
main arguments for and against the peremptory status of the prohibition of the use of force. 
Finally, it will sum up by reiterating how this affects the interpretation of an unlawful ‘use of 
force’ between States under international law. 
Relevance	of	jus	cogens	to	the	prohibition	of	the	use	of	force	
Jus cogens norms are peremptory norms of international law, defined in the VCLT as ‘a norm 
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from 
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of 
general international law having the same character’.64 The Special Rapporteur of the ILC 
Committee on the Formation and Identification of Customary International Law, Sir Michael 
Wood, noted that: ‘The definition in the Vienna Convention is of general application’.65 
Although the existence of jus cogens norms is now generally accepted,66 the substantive 
content and source of jus cogens norms remain subject to debate.67 The distinguishing feature 
of jus cogens norms are their hierarchical superiority (as they override inconsistent customary 
international law and treaty), that they are not subject to derogation and that States cannot be 
opted out as a persistent objector.68 This is sometimes justified on the basis of the moral force 
 
64 VCLT, art. 53. 
65 Michael Wood, ‘First Report on Formation and Evidence of Customary International Law’ (A/CN.4/663, 
ILC, 17 May 2013) (‘Wood First Report’), footnote 43, referring to para. (5) of the commentary to article 26 of 
the Articles on State Responsibility, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, vol. II, p. 85. 
66 Ibid., para. 25 with further references. 
67 Ibid., para. 25 with further extensive footnotes. 
68 See discussion in Chapter One. 
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of the value that the norm protects.69 Others such as Hugh Thirlway70 emphasise the non-
derogable nature of the norm as a means of identifying norms of jus cogens through State 
practice. 
 
Whether or not the prohibition of the use of force in article 2(4) and customary international 
law is a peremptory norm of international law is relevant for several reasons. Firstly, it is 
relevant to the modification standard for both the treaty and the customary prohibition of the 
use of force. This is the focus of this section and is discussed further below. The second 
reason is that the legal consequences for violation are more stringent if the prohibition of the 
use of force is jus cogens. In addition to the consequences for a threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace or act of aggression set out in Chapter VII of the UN Charter, under customary 
international law, a prohibited use of force gives rise to international State responsibility and 
the obligation to cease the unlawful act,71 make reparation72 and the right of the victim State 
to take non-forcible countermeasures.73 There are additional consequences if a use of force in 
violation of article 2(4) is considered to be a peremptory norm, namely, that other States shall 
cooperate using lawful means to bring the violation to an end, shall not recognise the 
situation as lawful and shall not render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation.74 If the 
entire prohibition of the use of force is jus cogens, then even uses of force at a lower 
boundary of the prohibition in terms of intensity or effects would also be a breach of a 
peremptory norm, giving rise to these corresponding consequences. Finally, States cannot 
legally conclude treaties that are the result of a prohibited threat or use of force or enter into 
legally binding treaties that conflict with peremptory norms of international law. Under 
article 52 of the VCLT, ‘[a] treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or 
use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the 
United Nations’. This was held by the ICJ in the Fisheries Jurisdiction (UK v Iceland) case to 
reflect customary international law.75 Regarding the second point, article 53 of the VCLT 
provides that if at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, it conflicts with a jus cogens norm, 
then the treaty is void ab initio. One practical example of this is a treaty purporting to provide 
‘prospective consent to authorize the use of force by one state against another, irrespective or 
against its will at the moment when force is being used’. If the prohibition of the use of force 
is jus cogens, then this ‘constitutes a derogation from the prohibition … Such consent 
embodied in a treaty or in a unilateral act would be void for its conflict with jus cogens on the 
basis of Article 53 VCLT and general international law.’76 This could conceivably encompass 
 
69 E.g. Alexander Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2006), 50. 
70 Hugh WA Thirlway, The Sources of International Law (Oxford University Press, 1. ed., 2014), 154 ff. 
71 ILC, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of State for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, in 
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session’ (A/56/10, 2001), art. 30. 
72 Ibid., art. 31. 
73 Ibid., art. 22. 
74 Ibid., art. 41. 
75 Jurisdiction, 1973 ICJ Reports 3, para. 14. 
76 Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘Changing Jus Cogens Through State Practice? The Case of the Prohibition of the 
Use of Force and Its Exceptions’ in Marc Weller (ed), The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in 
International Law (Oxford University Press, 2015) 157, 167, citations omitted. 
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standing authorisations under regional collective security, such as article 4(h) of the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union,77 which recognises ‘the right of the Union to intervene 
in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, 
namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’.78 
 
The International Law Commission noted ‘a certain overlap in the application of the jus 
cogens provisions of … the draft articles and Article 103 of the Charter because certain 
provisions of the Charter, notably those of Article 2, paragraph 4, are of a jus cogens 
character’.79 Due to the operation of article 103 of the Charter, the obligations in article 2(4) 
would prevail over the obligations of UN Member States under any other international 
agreement in the event of a conflict between the obligations. As noted by the ILC,80 the 
difference is that if article 2(4) is jus cogens, then a conflicting treaty will be completely void, 
not merely that the obligation under the UN Charter would prevail over the conflicting 
obligation. In any case, if the prohibition of the use of force is in fact jus cogens, then as 
Thirlway notes,81 it is unlikely that States would enter into a treaty that conflicts with this 
obligation and then later seek to denounce it as void on this basis.  
Modification	standard	of	the	prohibition	of	the	use	of	force	if	it	is	jus	
cogens	
As noted above, the primary relevance of jus cogens for determining the meaning of a 
prohibited use of force under article 2(4) and customary international law relates to the 
modification standard. If the prohibition of the use of force is a peremptory norm of 
international law, then there will be a higher standard applicable for determining whether 
subsequent State practice (for treaty interpretation) or State practice and opinio juris (for 
customary international law) has modified the scope or content of the norm. This is because a 
peremptory norm ‘can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law 
having the same character’.82 As explained earlier in this chapter, the modification standard 
(i.e. jus cogens status of the norm) is only relevant to attempts to make the rule less 
restrictive, either through interpreting the rule in a way that results in a narrower scope, or 
through new derogations or exceptions to the rule. Making the rule narrower would be 
 
77 Organisation of African Unity (adopted 1 July 2000, entered into force 26 May 2001). 
78 On 11 July 2003, a Protocol on the Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union was adopted, 
which amended article 4(h) to include ‘a serious threat to legitimate order’, however the Protocol has not 
entered into force. 
79 International Law Commission, ‘Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1966, Vol. II’ 
(A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.l, 1966), Commentary of Special Rapporteur Waldock on the draft convention on the 
law of treaties, regarding draft article 37: treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international 
law (jus cogens), 24. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Above n.70, 154. 
82 VCLT, art. 53. The ILC has observed that ‘at the present time, a modification of a rule of jus cogens would 
most probably be effected through a general multilateral treaty’: International Law Commission, ‘Formation and 
Evidence of Customary International Law - Elements in the Previous Work of the International Law 
Commission That Could Be Particularly Relevant to the Topic - Memorandum by the Secretariat’ (A/CN.4/659, 
14 March 2013), 31, observation 24, footnote omitted. 
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inconsistent with the original (peremptory) rule, which means that the new narrow 
interpretation would also have to be a jus cogens rule to override the original broader 
interpretation.83 
 
Conversely, making the rule broader does not contravene the original jus cogens norm; the 
‘new’ rule would preserve the original jus cogens ‘core’ of the norm and extend it under 
either the treaty (through an evolutive interpretation of article 2(4)) or custom (through 
evolving custom). In order for the part of the rule that extends beyond the original scope to 
also comprise jus cogens, it would have to separately meet the requirements for the 
development of a jus cogens norm; that is, it must also be ‘a norm accepted and recognized 
by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is 
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law 
having the same character’.84 Of course, it is not necessary for an extended scope of the 
prohibition of the use of force to be jus cogens; it is entirely possible for only the original 
core to be jus cogens and for the ‘new’ part to be an ordinary treaty or customary rule. If the 
evolved (expanded) interpretation of the prohibition of the use of force did comprise jus 
cogens, then ‘any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and 
terminates’.85 
Is	the	prohibition	of	the	use	of	force	jus	cogens?	 	
The prohibition of the use of force is considered by many to be jus cogens,86 but there is no 
ICJ ruling directly on this point.87 The ILC stated in its commentary on the Draft Articles on 
the Law of Treaties that ‘the law of the Charter concerning the prohibition of the use of force’ 
is ‘a conspicuous example’ of a peremptory norm.88 The ICJ in the Nicaragua case referred 
to the ILC’s statement,89 which some argue ‘may indicate an inclination itself to move in that 
direction, but it does not constitute a determination to that effect’.90 Various ICJ judges in 
their separate and dissenting opinions have declared that the prohibition of the use of force is 
 
83 Cf Olivier Corten, The Law against War : The Prohibition on the Use of Force in Contemporary International 
Law (Hart, 2010), 210-11, who argues that under article 53 of the VCLT, the only relevant practice is 
subsequent treaties departing from the peremptory rule, since subsequent state practice that claims an exception 
or justification ‘can influence only the interpretation of the rule, not its status as jus cogens’. Corten points out 
that there is no treaty seeking to derogate from article 2(4), and there are many treaties with saving clauses of 
the rights and responsibilities under the UN Charter. 
84 VCLT, art. 53. 
85 VCLT, art. 64. 
86 Article 2(4) is ‘usually acknowledged’ as jus cogens: Albrecht Randelzhofer and Oliver Dörr, ‘Article 2(4)’ in 
Bruno Simma et al (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A commentary (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed., 
2012) 200, 231-2, MN67-8. See footnote 182 for list of further references in support. 
87 Claus Kreß, ‘The International Court of Justice and the Non-Use of Force’ in Marc Weller (ed), The Oxford 
Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2015) 561, 571. 
88 International Law Commission, ‘Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1966, Vol. II’ 
(A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.l, 1966), 247, commentary on article 50, para. 1. 
89 Above n., para. 190.  
90 Kreß (2015), above n.87, 571. 
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a peremptory norm.91 Scholars arguing in favour of the prohibition of the use of force as a 
peremptory norm run the gamut between the position that the entire jus contra bellum is jus 
cogens;92 that all of article 2(4) is jus cogens;93 that only the prohibition of the use of force 
(as opposed to threats of force) in article 2(4) is jus cogens;94 to those who take the view that 
only a narrow core of the prohibition (i.e. aggression) is jus cogens.95 
 
James Green has criticized the tendency for uncritical conclusions that the prohibition of the 
use of force is jus cogens and pointed out key issues with characterising the prohibition of the 
use of force as a peremptory norm.96 There are two main bases for his critique. The first issue 
concerns the flexibility and uncertain nature of the scope and content of the jus contra 
bellum. Green notes that the content and scope of a peremptory norm on the use of force is 
very difficult to determine and that, as set out above, a wide range of possibilities have been 
put forward by scholars.97 This is due to the nature of the prohibition of the use of force and 
its scope: article 2(4) sets out two prohibitions (on the threat and use of force) and is subject 
to two exceptions set out in the UN Charter (article 51 and Chapter VII Security Council 
authorisation) as well as the ‘exception’ of valid consent. Not all of the concepts are treated 
in the same way in the legal discourse and practice of States – for example, the difference in 
treatment of threats of force and uses of force has led some scholars to argue that the 
prohibition of the threat of force is not even a customary norm, let alone a peremptory one.98 
In addition, each of these concepts is in turn subject to areas of uncertainty and is informed 
by or has its origin in different sources of international law. For example, there is continuing 
uncertainty over the content of the customary international law requirements of necessity and 
proportionality of self-defence measures,99 and contested areas of the jus contra bellum such 
 
91 E.g. Case concerning Military and Paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United 
States of America), Merits, Judgment 1986 ICJ Reports 14 (‘Nicaragua Case’), Separate Opinion of President 
Nagendra Singh, 153, Separate Opinion of Judge Sette-Camara, 189; Oil Platforms case, Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Elarby, para 1.1; Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America), Judgment 2003 ICJ 
Reports 161 (‘Oil Platforms’), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Al-Khasawneh, para. 9, Separate Opinion of Judge 
Simma, para. 6; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
(Advisory Opinion) 2004 ICJ Reports 136, Separate Opinion of Judge Elarby, para 3.1. 
92 ‘[I]f the very prohibition of the use of force is peremptory, then every principle specifying the limits on the 
entitlement of States to use force is also peremptory’: Orakhelashvili (2006), above n.69, 50. 
93 Nikolas Stürchler, The Threat of Force in International Law (Cambridge University Press, Paperback ed., 
2009), 91: the no-threat rule enjoys peremptory status like the rest of article 2(4); Tom Ruys, ‘Armed Attack’ 
and Article 51 of the UN Charter (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 27, footnote omitted: ‘it appears 
plausible that both Article 2(4) and Article 51 form part of ius cogens.’ 
94 Corten, above n.83, 200-212. 
95 E.g. Lauri Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in International Law (Lakimiesliiton Kustannus, 
1988), 354-5. 
96 James A Green, ‘Questioning the Peremptory Status of the Prohibition of the Use of Force’ (2010) 32 
Michigan Journal of International Law 215. 
97 Ibid., 226. 
98 Romana Sadurska, ‘Threats of Force’ (1988) 82(2) The American Journal of International Law 239, 249 
argues that ‘it seems unnecessary for all practical purposes and theoretically dubious to characterize the 
prohibition of the threat of force as a rule of customary international law’.; Green, ibid., 230. Cf Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Weeramantry in Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, above n. 3, 525, who quotes numerous 
resolutions and international law documents confirming that threats of force are unlawful under international 
law. 
99 Green, above n.96, 235. 
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as whether there is the right to anticipatory self-defence.100 This does not necessarily prevent 
the prohibition of the use of force from having peremptory status, but requires either that the 
norm be framed in a broad way to include either the entire jus contra bellum101 or exceptions 
to the prohibition of the use of force, or that the jus cogens norm be construed restrictively to 
confine it to the most certain areas (generally, the core of ‘aggression’). James Green points 
out that: 
 
‘Ultimately, to provide a sufficiently detailed rule, it is necessary to articulate a norm so 
lengthy that it is unwieldy to the point of losing worth. Take, for example: The use of 
armed force directed against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state 
or which is in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the U.N. is prohibited 
other than when it is employed in a necessary and proportional manner in response to an 
armed attack by another state against a member of the U.N. or when authorized by the 
Security Council under Article 42 of the U.N. Charter, following a threat to the peace and 
breach of the peace or an act of aggression as determined by the Security Council. A norm 
of this kind is obviously unclear by simple virtue of its length and the number of clauses 
and sub-clauses that form it. These difficulties are compounded when it is considered that 
there is no single source for such a norm. Instead it is compiled by reference to Article 
2(4), Article 51, Article 42, Article 39, and, of course, customary international law. The 
lack of clarity here is surely undesirable for a “fundamental” peremptory norm.’102 
 
Green argues that ‘the inherent uncertainty and flexibility of the prohibition would not seem 
to be compatible with the conception of peremptory norms as set out in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties’.103  
 
The second issue is ‘whether there is enough evidence to establish that the prohibition of the 
use of force is peremptory in nature’.104 Green argues for a positivist approach to the 
identification of jus cogens norms by examining State practice.105 This accords with the 
ILC’s indication that ‘peremptory norms are formed as a result of a process of widespread 
acceptance and recognition of such norms as peremptory by the international community as a 
whole’.106 Green canvasses a range of such practice that does not necessarily bear out the 
peremptory status of the prohibition of the use of force, observing that ‘in notable instances 
where states have had the opportunity to explicitly affirm the peremptory status of the 
prohibition, and might reasonably have been expected to do so, there has been a trend toward 
 
100 Ibid., 236. 
101 Ibid., 231. 
102 Ibid., 235. 
103 Ibid., 226. 
104 Ibid., 218. 
105 Thirlway sets out an even more stringent test, noting that ‘only a court decision could authoritatively 
invalidate an agreement between States as contrary to jus cogens, and thus demonstrate that the category of jus 
cogens exists.’ Above n.70, 154, footnote omitted. 
106 International Law Commission, ‘Formation and Evidence of Customary International Law - Elements in the 
Previous Work of the International Law Commission That Could Be Particularly Relevant to the Topic - 
Memorandum by the Secretariat’ (A/CN.4/659, 14 March 2013), 30, observation 23, emphasis added, footnote 
omitted. 
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silence on the issue’.107 Although most States stayed silent on this point during relevant 
debates in treaty negotiations, the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly and the UN 
Security Council, very rarely has any State actually rejected the jus cogens status of the 
prohibition of the use of force, with nearly all explicit statements on this issue arguing in 
favour of the peremptory status of the prohibition. ‘As such, one may point to a cumulative 
effect of acceptance across these examples’108 and the argument could be made that the 
majority of States have not explicitly affirmed the jus cogens nature of the prohibition since it 
is ‘self-evident’ or for political reasons.109 However, Green questions ‘whether silence is 
enough to bestow supernorm status on a rule’.110  
 
Green identifies the further issue that the jus cogens status of the norm regarding the 
prohibition of the use of force does not correspond to its flexible development in practice, 
and also that characterising the jus contra bellum rules as jus cogens would limit the ability 
of States to flexibly adapt the law to meet new security challenges, such as cyber attacks and 
attacks by non-State actors, by making the existing law static.111 However, it is worth noting 
that for the reasons set out earlier, adapting the interpretation of article 2(4) to include new 
forms of uses of force such as cyber attacks is not problematic even if the existing 
interpretation of the prohibition of the use of force in article 2(4) is a peremptory norm 
because it expands the prohibition and does not contradict it; the new areas of the scope of 
article 2(4) do not need to achieve peremptory status in order to be binding under the treaty 
(the same applies to customary international law mutatis mutandis). 
 
In conclusion, there are a wide range of scholarly views and differing interpretations of State 
practice as to whether the prohibition of the use of force is or is not jus cogens. The majority 
position appears to be that the prohibition (or at least a small core of it) is a peremptory norm, 
however as noted above, this position is also subject to powerful critiques. Ultimately, as 
Green notes, ‘[t]he only way to reach a firm conclusion on this question is through an 
extensive and systematic survey of state practice’.112 For the purpose of identifying the 
meaning of a prohibited ‘use of force’ under international law, the jus cogens nature of the 
norm is relevant to the standard of modification: specifically, the issue is relevant only if the 
subsequent practice of the States parties to the UN Charter demonstrates their agreement to 
interpret article 2(4) in a way that departs from the text by making its scope narrower. 
 
107 Green, above n.96, 246. 
108 Ibid., 253, footnote omitted. 
109 Ibid., 254. 
110 Ibid., 255. 
111 Ibid., 238-242. 
112 Ibid., 256. 
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Conclusion 
In sum, this work will apply the following principles to the interpretation of a prohibited ‘use 
of force’ under article 2(4) of the UN Charter:  
 
• focus on a textual interpretation of article 2(4) by looking at the ‘ordinary meaning to 
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose’;113 
 
• take into account ‘subsequent agreements between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions’ and ‘subsequent 
practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties 
regarding its interpretation’, together with ‘any relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties’;114 
 
• where appropriate, consider preparatory work of the UN Charter and ‘other 
subsequent practice’ as a supplementary means of interpretation;115 and 
 
• examine how the term ‘use of force’ is currently interpreted and applied.  
 
Part II will apply these principles and carry out a textual analysis of article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter to ascertain the scope and context of this provision and the range of interpretive 
possibilities of an unlawful ‘use of force’ between States under international law. 
 
113 VLCT, art. 31(1). 
114 VCLT, art. 31(3). 
115 VCLT, art. 32. 
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Part II: Elements of article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter 
  86 
Introduction 
Part II will apply the principles outlined in the previous part to a textual analysis of article 
2(4), including subsequent agreements of States, to determine the scope and context of article 
2(4), the range of interpretations of a prohibited 'use of force' and its elements. The textual 
interpretation of article 2(4) has been broken down into three chapters. Chapter Five gives a 
textual interpretation of the terms of article 2(4) apart from the terms ‘threat or use of force’. 
These are the contextual elements that are required for a ‘use of force’ to fall within the scope 
of article 2(4). This chapter will focus in particular on the meaning of ‘international 
relations’. The textual interpretation of ‘use of force’ in article 2(4) has been split into two 
chapters which identify and analyse different elements of a prohibited ‘use of force’. Chapter 
Six will examine the ordinary meaning of the term, and the required means of a ‘use of 
force’. Chapter Seven examines the required effects of a prohibited ‘use of force’, and if 
gravity and intent are required elements of a ‘use of force’ under article 2(4). 
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Chapter Five: Contextual elements 
Introduction 
The text of article 2(4) reads as follows: 
 
‘The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act 
in accordance with the following Principles. 
   
(4) All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.’ 
    
This chapter will carry out a textual analysis of the terms of article 2(4) of the UN Charter 
other than ‘threat or use of force’,1 in order to delineate the context and scope of the 
prohibition. These terms – ‘all Members’, ‘international relations’ and ‘against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations’ – are fundamental, contextual elements that must be present 
in order for a ‘use of force’ to fall within the scope of article 2(4). This chapter will briefly 
examine each of these terms in turn to understand how they delineate the scope and context 
of a prohibited ‘use of force’. 
‘All Members’ 
States	only	
In the first place, the prohibition in article 2(4) binds only States, as confirmed by State 
practice and case law.2 With respect to the parallel customary rule, it is an interesting 
 
1 ‘Threat’ of force is discussed in Chapter Seven with respect to intention. 
2 Claus Kreß, ‘The State Conduct Element’ in Claus Kreß and Stefan Barriga (eds), The Crime of Aggression: A 
Commentary (Cambridge University Press, 2017) 412, with further references; cf Tarcisio Gazzini, The 
Changing Rules on the Use of Force in International Law (Manchester University Press, 2005), 188, who notes 
that ‘It has been suggested, in particular, that Art. 2(4) of the Charter should be read as imposing the prohibition 
on threat or use of force not only on States but also on individuals’ (citing A-M Slaughter and W Burke-White, 
‘An International Constitutional Moment’, 43 HILJ (2002) 1, 2), although he does not adopt a position on this 
issue. 
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question whether the customary prohibition also applies only to States or if it also binds non-
State actors, international organisations or individuals.3 
Member	States	only	
As a treaty, the provisions of the UN Charter are clearly binding on its parties, i.e. the 
Member States of the United Nations. Non-Member States are bound by the prohibition only 
indirectly through the UN Charter (since they could be subject to enforcement 
action/sanctions for failing to comply with the relevant principles),4 but the source of their 
legal obligation is customary international law.  
Use	of	force	by	non-State	armed	groups	
In certain circumstances, State support or involvement in forcible acts of other States, or in 
forcible acts of non-State actors against another State will violate the prohibition of the use of 
force.5 However, this is relevant not to who are the addressees of the prohibition (States) but 
to what acts or level of support will result in attribution to a State or amount to an indirect 
‘use of force’ in violation of article 2(4). With respect to attribution, the general principles of 
State responsibility apply, as set out in articles 4 to 11 of the International Law Commission 
(‘ILC’) Articles on State Responsibility. In particular, article 8 of the ILC Articles on State 
Responsibility provides that: 
 
Conduct directed or controlled by a State  
 
‘The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under 
international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, 
or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct.’ 
 
The International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) had applied a similar standard of attribution in the 
Nicaragua case, in which it held that:  
 
‘For this conduct to give rise to legal responsibility of the United States, it would in 
principle have to be proved that that State had effective control of the military or 
paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged violations were committed.’6 
 
 
3 It has been argued that unlike article 2(4) of the UN Charter which only applies between States, under 
customary international law, international organisations capable of conducting military operations are also 
bound by the prohibition, such as NATO, the EU, ECOWAS and United Nations, and that many already state 
this in their own constituting documents and ad hoc declarations, although this does not extend to individuals or 
groups: Albrecht Randelzhofer and Oliver Dörr, ‘Article 2(4)’ in Bruno Simma et al (eds), The Charter of the 
United Nations: A commentary (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed., 2012) 200, 213, MN 30-31. 
4 See Chapter Two for a discussion of article 2(6). 
5 See Chapter Six. 
6 Merits, Judgment 1986 ICJ Reports 14, para. 115, emphasis added. The ICJ later applied the test in article 8 of 
the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility in the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda) (2005) ICJ Reports 168, para. 160. 
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Another possibility is for the relationship between the non-State armed group and the State to 
be such that the former is legally equated with an organ of the latter. In the Nicaragua case, 
the ICJ held that this required ‘dependence of the one side and control on the other’.7 In the 
Genocide case, the ICJ increased this standard to one of ‘“complete dependence” on the 
State’.8 Although the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the Tadic 
case applied a different test for attribution of ‘overall control’,9 this has been criticised by 
both the ILC10 and the ICJ, which declined to adopt this standard.11 Other forms of support 
that do not meet the standard for attribution of the conduct of the non-State armed group to a 
State may nevertheless also constitute an indirect ‘use of force’ by a State under article 2(4) 
of the UN Charter. Indirect force is discussed further in Chapter Six.  
 
‘Shall refrain … from’  
This is obligatory language that reflects the binding legal obligation set out in article 2(4). 
‘in their international relations’ 
The confinement of the prohibition of the threat or use of force by States to those ‘in their 
international relations’ ‘continues the tradition of article I of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which 
confines the scope of application of the prohibition of the recourse to war as an instrument of 
national policy to the realm of the “solution of international controversies”’.12 This section 
will discuss the meaning of the term ‘international relations’ and whether it requires that the 
object of a prohibited use of force be another State, as well as looking at the types of acts that 
fall within and outside the scope of this term. 
Another	State?	
The wording of article 2(4), in particular the terms ‘international relations’ and ‘in any other 
manner’, does not explicitly require the damage to be to another State.13 The reference to 
‘international relations’ implies that a prohibited use of force must affect the relations 
between the State using force and another State. This leaves open the possibility that the 
actual damage is not to a State, but affects inter-State relations. With respect to the phrase, ‘in 
 
7 Case concerning Military and Paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of 
America), Merits, Judgment 1986 ICJ Reports 14 (‘Nicaragua Case’), para. 109. 
8 Case concerning application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment [2007] ICJ Reports 43 (‘Genocide case’), para. 
392 
9 Prosecutor v. Duško Tadic, ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgment of 15 July 1999, IT-94-1-A, para. 120 ff.  
10 Commentary to draft articles, commentary to draft article 8 at para 5. 
11 Genocide case, above n.8, para. 403. 
12 Kreß (2017), above n.2, 432, footnote 93, citing K Sellars, Crimes Against Peace and International Law 
(CUP, 2013), 25. 
13 Kreß (2017), ibid., 434-5: ‘the text of article 2(4) does not unambiguously require a use of force against 
another state. As a matter of textual interpretation, the words “international relations” can be construed so as to 
cover any use of force by a state outside its territory.’ 
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any other manner’, the second half of article 2(4) was introduced to prevent loopholes in 
interpretation (see discussion of this term further below). Thus, interpreting the term 
‘international relations’ to prohibit another type of use of force (in addition to uses of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of a State) would comply with this 
intended purpose of making the prohibition more expansive. Furthermore, a natural reading 
of the second part of article 2(4) is to read the listed elements conjunctively (i.e. as 
alternatives). This would result in the following categories of prohibited conduct: firstly, uses 
of force in the international relations of Members against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any State; and secondly, uses of force in the international relations of 
Members in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.14 
 
This interpretation would potentially encompass a use of force that is in ‘international 
relations’ outside the context of State damage, such as damage to terra nullius. Claus Kreß 
notes that ‘[i]t is an unsettled question whether the use of force by a state … on terra nullius 
occurs in international relations and thus within the meaning of article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter’.15 Since there are hardly any areas of terra nullius (rare examples include Bir Tawil 
between Egypt and Sudan, an area that neither claims, and parts of Antarctica), this issue is 
unlikely to be raised in practice. However, both on Earth (with respect to the high seas)16 as 
well as in outer space (with respect to celestial bodies),17 there are vast areas which do not 
form part of the territory of any State and are not subject to claims of sovereignty, so it is 
conceivable that a ‘use of force’ could be directed against these environments (for instance, 
as part of a malicious attack, or in the process of exploiting natural resources located in these 
environments), thus raising the question of whether such an act occurs in ‘international 
relations’ even though no State suffers direct damage.  
Object	and	purpose	
The object and purpose of the UN Charter and in particular article 2(4) is also relevant to 
determining whether the range of interpretive possibilities of the term ‘international relations’ 
 
14 Kelsen supports this interpretation (Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its 
Fundamental Problems, (London: Stevens, 1950), 726-7): ‘The phrase “or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Purposes of the United Nations” is an addition to the words “against the territorial integrity, etc.” The 
meaning is: the Members shall refrain from the threat or use of force not only against the territorial integrity and 
political independence of any state; they shall refrain from the threat or use of force also in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, that is to say: with the provisions of Article I of the 
Charter.’ Kreß (2017, above n.2, 432-435) has also argued that the term ‘in any other manner’ leaves open the 
possibility that the use of force does not actually have to be directed against another State.  
15 (2017), above n.2, 434, footnote omitted.  
16 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1994 UNTS 397 (concluded 10 December 1982, 
entered into force 16 November 1994), article 89 provides that ‘No State may validly purport to subject any part 
of the high seas to its sovereignty.’ 
17 With respect to celestial bodies, the Outer Space Treaty provides that ‘Outer space, including the Moon and 
other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or 
occupation, or by any other means.’(Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (entered into force 10 October 1967), 
610 UNTS 205, article II). 
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includes damage to objects without nexus to another State.18 Subsequent agreements with 
respect to article 2(4) of the UN Charter demonstrate the agreement of Member States that 
the primary purposes of that provision are international peace and security and the sovereign 
equality of States.19 The Friendly Relations Declaration emphasises international peace and 
security as among the fundamental purposes of the UN Charter20 and sets out related 
principles that are ‘interrelated with’21 the prohibition of the use of force, including the 
obligation to settle international disputes by peaceful means22 and the principle of sovereign 
equality of States.23 Resolution 42/22 (1987) also notes that the principle of peaceful 
settlement of disputes ‘is inseparable from the principle of refraining from the threat or use of 
force in their international relations’.24 Resolution 42/22 explicitly reaffirms the purpose of 
article 2(4) in the ‘establishment of lasting peace and security for all States’.25 In the 2005 
World Summit Outcome Document (adopted by consensus), the UN General Assembly 
emphasised the purposes of the UN Charter as international peace and security and sovereign 
equality of States. In that document, the UN General Assembly ‘reaffirm[ed] that the 
purposes and principles guiding the United Nations are, inter alia, to maintain international 
peace and security, to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the 
principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and to take other appropriate 
measures to strengthen universal peace’.26  
 
These two primary values protected by article 2(4) – international peace and security and the 
sovereign equality of States – give rise to arguments for and against including uses of force 
that are not against a State, depending on which purpose is emphasized, as discussed below. 
State	sovereignty	
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter protects sovereign equality by prohibiting the use of force to 
settle international disputes. The term ‘of any state’ suggests that the protected object of 
article 2(4) is States, and in particular their ‘territorial integrity’ and ‘political independence’. 
This is also supported by the Friendly Relations Declaration, which holds that the principle of 
sovereign equality of States includes the inviolability of the territorial integrity and political 
independence of the State.27 (The protected interest of State sovereignty in article 2(4) read 
together with articles 2(3) and 2(7) also support an interpretation of a ‘use of force’ as 
requiring a coercive intent – this is discussed further in Chapter Seven.) The protected object 
 
18 VCLT, art. 1. 
19 For a discussion of subsequent agreements regarding article 2(4) of the UN Charter, see Chapter Six. 
20 First preambular paragraph. 
21 Para. 2. 
22 Principle 2. 
23 Principle 5. 
24 Para. 16 
25 Preambular para. 21. 
26 Para. 77. 
27 Friendly Relations Declaration, Principle 1(d). Another possibility is to construe the protected value of State 
sovereignty to include the right of a State’s people and the protection of their common life: see Claus Kreß 
(2017), above n.2, 418 ff. 
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of State sovereignty tends to exclude the use of force against objects with no sufficient nexus 
to another State from the scope of article 2(4).  
International	peace	and	security	
However, the second and arguably main purpose of article 2(4), the maintenance of 
international peace and security, may concern damage to non-State objects (objects with no 
sufficient nexus to another State) under certain circumstances. This possibility is supported 
firstly by the Purposes of the United Nations, and secondly by reading article 2(4) in the 
context of the collective security framework provided for in the Charter.28 The Purposes are 
referred to in the chapeau of article 2, which provides: ‘The Organization and its Members, 
in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following 
Principles’ (one of which is of course the principle of the prohibition of the use of force in 
article 2(4)). The first of the Purposes set out in Article 1 in paragraph 1 is  
 
‘To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective 
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression 
of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful 
means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment 
or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the 
peace’. 
 
The Preamble of the UN Charter (which according to article 31(2) of the VCLT comprises 
part of the context for the purpose of treaty interpretation) further supports this as the primary 
value of article 2(4). The Preamble states in its opening lines, ‘[w]e the peoples of the United 
Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war’. In the first 
meeting of Commission 1 (responsible for drafting the general provisions of the UN Charter 
including the preamble, Purposes and Principles) at the San Francisco Conference, the 
President of the Commission, Mr Rolin of Belgium, stated with respect to the ‘first object’ of 
the maintenance of peace: ‘We are not state worshippers, and when we speak of the 
prevention of war we have, of course, in mind only what sufferings war is causing to 
humanity’.29 Rüdiger Wolfrum has argued that with respect to the priority of the Purposes set 
out in the UN Charter and how to resolve any potential conflict between them, ‘[t]he ICJ 
stated in the Advisory Opinion on Certain Expenses that “[t]he primary place ascribed to 
international peace and security is natural, since the fulfilment of the other purposes will be 
dependent upon the attainment of that basic condition.”’30 
 
The primary purpose of article 2(4) as the maintenance of international peace and security is 
also supported by the context of the collective security framework provided for in the 
 
28 Kelsen, above n.14, 13. 
29 UNCIO vol VI, Doc. 1006 I/6 (15 June 1945), 12. 
30 Rüdiger Wolfrum, ‘Article 1’ in Bruno Simma et al (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 
(Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2012) vol I, 107, 109 at MN5, citing para. 168 of the judgment. 
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Charter.31 The UN Charter sets out two exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force, 
namely, self-defence in response to an armed attack under article 51, and the authorisation of 
force by the UN Security Council acting under Chapter VII. These provisions (article 2(4), 
article 51 and Chapter VII) together comprise the collective security system of the United 
Nations; under international law in the post-Charter era, States do not have a right to 
unilaterally use force, but must settle their international disputes by peaceful means. This 
system is supplemented by the customary international law duty of non-intervention (in 
recognition of the sovereign equality of States). The context of article 2(4) and its 
relationship with other Charter provisions illuminates the interpretation of article 2(4) by 
emphasising its primary aim of maintaining international peace and security. In this light, the 
purpose of maintaining international peace and security points towards the inclusion of 
forcible acts against non-State objects within the scope of the prohibition, when those acts 
affect the international relations between States and therefore endanger international peace 
and security. 
Conclusion	
In sum, the text of article 2(4) and its object and purpose do not exclude an interpretation of 
that provision that encompasses a use of force that is in ‘international relations’ outside the 
context of State damage, such as damage to an International Organization or damage to the 
space environment as terra nullius. The text of article 2(4) does not unambiguously require 
that a State be the object or target of a ‘use of force’, and the primary value protected by 
article 2(4) of international peace and security supports a broad interpretation. During the 
drafting of the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration, ‘[t]hose who discussed the point 
generally agreed that the term had the effect of limiting the prohibition in Article 2, 
paragraph 4, to disputes between States’.32 However, this does not constitute a ‘subsequent 
agreement’ within the meaning of article 31(3) of the VCLT, and such an interpretation 
remains to be either confirmed or rejected through the subsequent agreement and subsequent 
practice of States. So far this author is not aware of any State practice seeking to extend the 
interpretation of article 2(4) beyond damage to States. In the end, whether article 2(4) is 
interpreted to cover damage to a non-State object such as an International Organisation or the 
space environment will depend on State practice when/if this situation arises, and States do 
not often actually invoke the language of article 2(4) outside of an armed attack. Therefore, at 
this point, while a broader interpretation is textually open, it is on more solid ground to take 
the position that article 2(4) protects States’ sovereignty and territorial integrity, and that the 
object of a ‘use of force’ must therefore have a certain nexus with a State. 
 
31 For a historical account of the Dumbarton Oaks conference (where the four Great Powers met to lay out the 
framework for the future UN, prior to the San Fransisco conference), see Robert C Hilderbrand, Dumbarton 
Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar Security (University of North Carolina 
Press, 1990) explaining the factors that lead to the Great Powers establishing the UN with a watered-down 
power and authority, and what the objectives and motives of the drafters were. 
32 First Report, Friendly Relations Special Committee, UN Doc A/5746, 16 November 1964, para. 36. 
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Required	nexus		
With respect to forcible acts against non-State objects such as nationals of a State, individuals 
present within the territory of a State or private property such as private and merchant vessels 
or aircraft registered to a State, a certain nexus with the State will therefore be required for 
the act to fall within the scope of article 2(4). In some cases, attacks on individuals due to 
their nationality have also been regarded as armed attacks (and therefore uses of force under 
article 2(4)) against the State of nationality, such as the Entebbe incident, where all hostages 
were released apart from those of Israeli nationality.33 In certain circumstances article 2(4) 
applies to uses of force by a State against private vessels and aircraft registered to another 
State. This results from article 3(g) of the Annex to 1974 General Assembly Resolution 3314 
which lists as an act of aggression an ‘attack by the armed forces of a State on the . . . marine 
and air fleets of another State’. The issue of required nexus to another State is of particular 
relevance to emerging forms of practice in disputed maritime zones such as in the South 
China Sea, firstly with respect to ‘[t]he use of Coast Guard and other maritime law 
enforcement agency vessels and officials, and indeed merchant vessels and fishing vessels 
under obvious governmental orders, to enforce presence and to employ force in disputed 
maritime areas’ and secondly, to ‘the use of private citizens – especially fishermen – to assert 
claims, act as state proxies in confrontation situations, or to provoke harassment which is 
then used to justify escalated intervention by more formal state forces such as Coast Guard 
vessels’.34 For non-State objects/targets that do not have a close association with a State, 
more will be required to bring the act within the scope of article 2(4), such as the presence of 
other factors including possibly the gravity of the (potential) effects, a pre-existing dispute 
between States, or a coercive or hostile intent against a State. The interplay of the various 
elements of a ‘use of force’ is discussed in further detail in Chapter Nine. 
Political	context	
Clearly, the political context in which a ‘use of force’ occurs is relevant to the element of 
‘international relations’ in article 2(4). If there is a pre-existing dispute between the States 
concerned, such as contested territory, this may bring the use of force within the realm of 
‘international relations’ and thus within the scope of the jus contra bellum.35 A ‘use of force’ 
in the context of an existing international dispute may also relate to whether the act is ‘in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations’ (the second part of article 
2(4)), since such a use of force is inconsistent with the Purpose to maintain international 
peace and security through the peaceful settlement of international disputes (Article 1(1), UN 
Charter). Furthermore, the political context may be relevant to whether the act itself 
constitutes a ‘use of force’, since it may increase the gravity of the act and indicate a hostile 
 
33 See Claus Kreß and Benjamin K Nußberger, ‘The Entebbe Raid – 1976’ in Tom Ruys and Olivier Corten 
(eds), The Use of Force in International Law: A Case-Based Approach (Oxford University Press, 2018) 220. 
34 Rob McLaughlin, ‘Some Contributions from Asia to the Development of LOAC’ (2016). 
35 Tom Ruys, ‘The Meaning of “Force” and the Boundaries of the Jus Ad Bellum: Are “Minimal” Uses of Force 
Excluded from UN Charter Article 2 (4)?’ (2014) 108(2) American Journal of International Law 159, 206. 
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or coercive intention. A pre-existing dispute between States or otherwise hostile relations 
could thus explain why friendly States do not view certain acts as an unlawful ‘use of force’, 
which, if committed by an unfriendly State, would be so regarded. The State experiencing the 
forcible act (the ‘victim’ State) will interpret the intention or motivation of the forcible act 
and the perceived threat to its security (gravity) taking into account this political context; 
thus, the interpretation of the situation/facts is influenced by this context, meaning that the 
State could in fact be applying the same criteria for a ‘use of force’ but to differently viewed 
‘facts’. For example, when on 1 March 2007, 170 Swiss Army infantry troops armed with 
rifles lost their bearings and crossed the border into Liechtenstein, the incursion did not 
provoke any official protest.36 It is easy to imagine that the response and legal 
characterisation of such an incursion would be vastly different if it occurred between States 
with heightened tensions or pre-existing disputes, such as India/Pakistan, Russia/Ukraine or 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea/South Korea. The relationship between intention, 
gravity and international relations is explored further in Chapter Nine. 
 
The remainder of this section will look at particular categories of acts falling within and 
outside the scope of the term ‘international relations’. 
Extra-territorial	sovereign	manifestations	of	a	State	
The classic paradigm is a use of force by a State on the territory of another State,37 but 
‘international relations’ also covers a use of force against an extraterritorial sovereign 
manifestation of a State including on the high seas or on the territory of the State using force, 
such as armed forces or embassies.38 
Disputed	territory	and	armistice	lines	
In the case of disputed territory that is claimed by more than one State, the prohibition of the 
use of force acts in favour of the State in de facto control of the territory even against the 
State holding the sovereign title.39 This is an example of a use of force against another State 
that does not violate its territorial integrity. Kreß suggests that what is being protected by the 
prohibition in such a case is ‘the peaceful common life on the disputed territory and the 
maintenance of international peace and security’.40 However, this interpretation is without 
prejudice to the right of a victim State to act in self-defence against a State that has 
established military occupation over its territory as a result of an armed attack under article 
51;41 a State may not use force against a State in de facto control of its territory unless it is in 
 
36 Peter Stamm, ‘Switzerland Invades Liechtenstein’, The New York Times (13 March 2007), sec. Opinion. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/13/opinion/13iht-edstamm.4893796.html (accessed 16 August 2018). 
37 Kreß (2017), above n., 2432. 
38 Kreß, ibid., 433. 
39 Kreß, ibid., 433, citing article 2(3); Olivier Corten, The Law against War : The Prohibition on the Use of 
Force in Contemporary International Law (Hart, 2010), 149-50. 
40 Ibid., 432. 
41 Kreß, above n.2, 433. 
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self-defence or with UN Security Council authorisation.42 A ‘use of force’ is also in 
‘international relations’ and falls within the scope of article 2(4) if it ‘“violate[s] international 
lines of demarcation, such as armistice lines, established by or pursuant to an international 
agreement to which it is a party or which it is otherwise bound to respect”, provided that 
these lines run between two states.’ ‘This constitutes another exceptional case in which 
international law subordinates the protection of territorial sovereignty to the protection of a 
peaceful common life on a certain piece of territory and the maintenance of international 
peace and security.’43 
 
Kreß argues that in the case of disputed territory and armistice lines, ‘international law 
subordinates the protection of territorial sovereignty to the protection of a peaceful common 
life on a certain piece of territory and the maintenance of international peace and security’.44 
With respect to entities whose statehood is disputed, (e.g. North and South Vietnam during 
the Vietnam War; North and South Korea during the Korean War; Taiwan; Kosovo; 
Abkhazia; South Ossetia), the situation is more complicated. The jus contra bellum does not 
require all States to recognise the statehood of the entity in question, and it is an open 
question if force violating an ‘international demarcation line delimiting the territory of a non-
State political entity is covered by’ article 2(4).45 
Use	of	force	by	a	State	within	its	own	territory	
An interesting question is raised as to whether and when a use of force by a State within its 
own territory is in ‘international relations’ and falls within the scope of article 2(4). Differing 
views were expressed on the inclusion of the use of force within a State within the scope of 
the prohibition during the drafting of the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration. In the 1966 
meeting of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States (‘Special Committee’), one representative 
suggested the Special Committee include a statement that ‘the prohibition on the threat or use 
of force did not in any way affect the use of force within a State’.46 In the 1970 meeting of 
the Special Committee, ‘[t]he Italian delegation reiterated, with respect to the prohibition of 
the threat or use of force, its firm opinion that that prohibition was, according to the Charter, 
a general prohibition which must be complied with under any circumstances other than the 
exceptions contemplated in the Charter … including, inter alia, the high seas, outer space 
and, as his delegation had stressed at the Committee’s eighty-ninth meeting in 1968 … even 
 
42 Corten, above n.39, 149-50. Tomohiro Mikanagi, ‘Establishing a Military Presence in a Disputed Territory: 
Interpretation of Article 2(3) and (4) of the UN Charter’ (2018) 67(4) International & Comparative Law 
Quarterly 1021 
43 Kreß, above n.2, 433, citing first sentence of para. 5 Friendly Relations Declaration, footnotes omitted. 
44 Kreß, ibid., 433. 
45 Corten, above n.39, 152. 
46 Second Report (Report of the 1966 Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States), Document A/6230, 27 June 1966, Para 54. 
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the very territory of the States to which the prohibition was addressed.’47 However, this point 
was not further discussed and does not appear in the text of the Friendly Relations 
Declaration. 
 
The use of force within a State’s own territory can be further broken down into several types 
of incident, namely, a use of force by a State in its own territory: (a) against its own 
population, (b) against territorial incursion by the armed forces of another State, and (c) 
against foreign private actors such as individuals, merchant vessels or civilian aircraft. These 
are briefly dealt with in turn below. 
A.	Use	of	force	within	a	State’s	own	territory	against	its	own	population	
The Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion can be interpreted as excluding uses of force by a 
State ‘within its own boundaries’ from the scope of the prohibition in article 2(4)48 since the 
Court decided not to deal with this issue. However the contrary interpretation is also possible, 
since the ICJ stated that ‘[t]he terms of the question put to the Court by the General Assembly 
in resolution 49175K (‘Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted 
under international law?’) could in principle also cover a threat or use of nuclear weapons by 
a State within its own boundaries’, and decided that it was not called upon to deal with an 
internal use of nuclear weapons because no State addressing the Court raised this issue.49 
Kreß notes that ‘it would probably overstate the significance’ of the Court’s statement to 
conclude that the Court would totally exclude all uses of force by a State within its territory 
from the prohibition,50 but he does note that it is uncontroversial that a use of force by a State 
against its own population within its territory would not fall within the scope of the 
prohibition51 although this may well violate other norms of international law including 
international human rights and humanitarian law. 
B.	 Legal	 basis	 for	 forceful	 response	 by	 a	 State	 to	 small-scale	 territorial	
incursions	by	armed	forces	of	another	State	
It is controversial whether a use of force by a State within its own territory against small-
scale intruding police or military units of another State (including ships and aircraft) falls 
within the scope of the prohibition of the use of force in article 2(4). The crux of the debate is 
the legal basis for a forcible response by a State to low-scale incursions within its own 
territory, with some arguing that the legal basis is law enforcement based on the exercise of 
 
47 Sixth Report: Report of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation Among States, Doc A/8018 (1970), Para 136. 
48 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion 1996 ICJ Rep 226 (‘Nuclear Weapons’), 
para. 50. 
49 Ibid., para. 50. 
50 Above n.2, 432. 
51 Ibid., 432. 
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sovereign jurisdiction,52 and others arguing that the legal basis is the jus contra bellum as it 
engages international relations (and that it is therefore restricted with respect to territorial 
incursion falling short of armed attack).53 
 
Ian Brownlie argued that forcible response to aerial trespass (but not maritime trespass)54 is a 
justified exception to the prohibition of the use of force, separate from self-defence. He sets 
out some specific requirements that must be met for the exception to apply: 
 
‘In respect of intrusion by aircraft present practice seems to be that the territorial 
sovereign may give orders to the intruder to land or to make an exit on an approved 
course, failing which force may be used proportionate to the risk to security constituted 
by the presence of the aircraft. However, the materials are often equivocal and do not 
make a clear distinction between the problem of self-defence against a use of force and 
the different question of apprehending trespassers. In general the practice seems to be that 
there is no right to shoot down trespassers unless they refuse or appear to refuse to land. 
However, if the penetration is by unidentified fast aircraft which persist in a deliberate 
and deep penetration of airspace, it may be that, in view of the destructive power of even 
a single nuclear weapon carried by an aircraft, the territorial sovereign is justified in 
taking without any warning violent and immediate preventive measures.’55 
 
He argued that ‘[t]his is a rare instance in which a use of force may be justified although no 
actual attack has occurred.’56  
 
Judge Stephen Schwebel in his dissenting opinion in the Nicaragua case argued that 
‘contemporary international law recognizes that a third State is entitled to exert measures of 
force against the aggressor on its own territory and against its own armed forces and military 
resources’.57 Judge Schwebel quotes the Thirteen Powers draft definition of aggression,58 
which specified that ‘[w]hen a State is a victim in its own territory of subversive and/or 
terrorist acts by irregular, volunteer or armed bands organized or supported by another State, 
it may take all reasonable and adequate steps to safeguard its existence and its institutions, 
without having recourse to the right of individual or collective self-defence against the other 
State under Article 51 of the Charter’. Olivier Corten and Mary Ellen O’Connell also argue 
that the basis for forcible response to territorial incursions falling short of armed attack is law 
enforcement. Corten argues that ‘the State has sovereign rights over its territory, authorising 
 
52 E.g. Albrecht Randelzhofer and Oliver Dörr, ‘Article 2(4)’ in Bruno Simma et al (eds), The Charter of the 
United Nations: A commentary (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed., 2012) 200, 215, MN34, with footnote listing 
concurring scholars 
53 E.g. Ruys, above n.35. 
54 Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (Clarendon, 1963), 374, emphasis added. 
55 Ibid, 373-4, footnotes omitted. 
56 Ibid., 374. 
57 Nicaragua case, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel, above n.7 para. 176. 
58 Ibid., para. 163 . 
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it to deploy military forces there without having to appeal to any rule creating an exception 
whatsoever, whether self-defence or not.’59  
 
Tom Ruys disagrees that minimal uses of force within a State’s own territory are justified by 
law enforcement rights under other legal regimes for land/sea/air, because none of the other 
legal frameworks cited ‘provide[] a legal basis for forcible action against unlawful territorial 
incursions by military or police forces of another state’.60 He makes the argument that 
forcible response to small-scale incursions falls within the scope of article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter, but frames the argument in terms of the gravity threshold for a ‘use of force’, rather 
than in terms of ‘international relations’. He notes that there are theoretical reasons against 
the idea that there is a gravity threshold for article 2(4), including that armed confrontations 
between police/military of two States involves ‘international relations’, and the law 
enforcement paradigm is hierarchical and therefore not suited to equal sovereigns.61 
According to Ruys, the way States treat these confrontations in their legal discourse shows 
that even when they use force within their own territory in response to an unlawful incursion, 
this falls within the jus contra bellum, and therefore, no de minimis gravity threshold exists.62 
 
The wording of the text of article 2(4) leaves the interpretation of ‘international relations’ in 
this respect uncertain. As can be seen from the discussion above, a use of force by a State in 
response to small-scale territorial, maritime or aerial incursion raise several intertwined 
issues, such as the gap between ‘use of force’ and an ‘armed attack’ giving rise to a right of 
self-defence, the relationship of the jus contra bellum and other applicable legal frameworks 
such as law of the sea and law enforcement, whether there is a gravity threshold for a ‘use of 
force’ under article 2(4) and if a hostile or coercive intention is required to enliven article 
2(4). But arguably, the main legal issue with respect to whether such incidents fall within the 
scope of the prohibition of the use of force under article 2(4) is the ‘international relations’ 
element. As Christian Henderson notes, it is not a matter of ‘quantifying the use of force’ in 
terms of its gravity, but rather determining whether ‘international relations’ are engaged, at 
which point the prohibition of the use of force becomes applicable.63 The relationship 
between ‘international relations’, gravity and intention is discussed further in Chapter Nine. 
 
 
59 Ibid., 405. 
60 Above n.35, 181. 
61 Ibid., 180. 
62 Ruys, above n.35, 170ff; See also Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (Cambridge University 
Press, 5th ed., 2011), 213, footnote 130 on the basis for forcible response by territorial state against small-scale 
incursion: 'It has been suggested that the problem may be solved by excluding from the 'proscribed categories of 
article 2(4)' of the Charter the enforcement by a State of its territorial rights against an illegal incursion 
(Schachter, supra note 517, at 1626). But, in the present writer's opinion, the span of the prohibition of the use 
of inter-State force, as articulated in Article 2(4), is subject to no exception other than self-defence and 
collective security (see supra 244). When one State uses force unilaterally against another, even within its own 
territory, this must be based on the exercise of self-defence against an armed attack.’ 
63 Christian Henderson, The Use of Force and International Law (Cambridge University Press, 1 edition, 2018), 
68. 
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C.	 Law	 enforcement	 against	 foreign	 private	 actors	 within	 or	 outside	 own	
territory	
There is greater agreement among scholars that law enforcement by a State against foreign 
private actors within its territory does not usually fall within the scope of article 2(4) as it is 
not in ‘international relations’.64 Ruys draws a distinction between the previous example 
discussed (use of force by a State within its own territory in response to incursions by armed 
forces of another State) and law enforcement against foreign individuals, merchant vessels 
and civilian aircraft. He argues this is different to the previous categories, because there is a 
clear legal basis in other legal frameworks such as law of the sea, air law and the UN Basic 
Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials.65 Since States 
must be able to take enforcement measures within their jurisdiction, it does not engage 
international relations.66 States generally do not invoke use of force language for measures 
taken under those regimes, even if they go beyond what is lawful.67 However, such acts could 
be a prohibited ‘use of force’ if it ‘directly arises from a dispute between sovereign states’68 
since law enforcement is hierarchical so it cannot apply between sovereign States and 
international relations are engaged.69  
 
However, as discussed in further detail in the case study on excessive or unlawful maritime 
law enforcement and ‘use of force’ in Chapter Nine, the issue is not so straightforward. There 
is mixed State practice regarding these types of incidents. Whether purported law 
enforcement against foreign private actors is characterised by States as an unlawful ‘use of 
force’ in ‘international relations’ under article 2(4) depends on a number of factors, including 
the gravity of the physical means or effects, intention, nexus of the object of the use of force 
and another State and if there is a political dispute between the States concerned. Such 
incidents highlight the complex relationship between these different elements of a prohibited 
‘use of force’. This is explored further in Chapter Nine. 
Conclusion		
In sum, it is generally agreed that the following uses of force by a State are usually in its 
‘international relations’ and therefore fall within the scope of article 2(4): 
 
• Use of force on the territory of another State or against its extraterritorial sovereign 
manifestations. 
 
• Use of force to reclaim disputed territory not within de facto control. 
 
64 Kreß (2017), above n.2, 434. 
65 Above n.35, 201 ff. 
66 Ibid., 202. 
67 Ibid., 203. 
68 Ibid., 209. 
69 Ruys, above n.35, 201. 
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• Use of force in violation of international demarcation lines. 
 
• Use of force directly arising from a political dispute between States. 
 
It is also generally accepted that the following uses of force by a State are not in its 
‘international relations’ and therefore usually fall outside the scope of article 2(4): 
 
• Use of force by a State within its own territory against its own population. 
 
• Use of force by a State in the exercise of its law enforcement jurisdiction against 
private foreign actors absent other factors (such as an existing international dispute, 
excessive force, coercive intent, or lack of sufficient connection to law enforcement 
jurisdiction).  
 
• Use of force by a State against objects with no close association with another State. 
For non-State objects/targets that do not have a close association with a State, more 
will be required to bring the act within the scope of article 2(4), such as the presence 
of other factors including possibly the gravity of the (potential) effects, a pre-existing 
dispute between States, or a coercive intent against a State. The interplay of the 
various elements of a ‘use of force’ is discussed in more detail in Chapter Nine. 
 
It is controversial whether or under what circumstances the following uses of force by a State 
are in its ‘international relations’ and therefore fall within the scope of article 2(4): 
 
• Use of force against entities falling short of Statehood. 
 
• Use of force with no nexus to another State, such as against an international 
organisation or on terra nullius.  
 
• Use of force within a State’s own territory against small-scale incursions by armed 
forces of another State. 
 
• Use of force by a State in the exercise of its law enforcement jurisdiction against 
private foreign actors in the presence of additional factors. This is discussed further in 
Chapter Seven. 
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‘against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state or in any other manner  
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations’  
against	the	territorial	integrity...	
Despite the arguments by some scholars that these terms permit uses of force for a benign 
purpose,70 the second part of article 2(4) was introduced to ensure the prohibition was all-
encompassing. This is made clear in the travaux préparatoires. For instance, at the San 
Francisco Conference, ‘[t]he Delegate of the United States made it clear that the intention of 
the authors of the original text was to state in the broadest terms an absolute all-inclusive 
prohibition; the phrase “or in any other manner” was designed to insure that there should be 
no loopholes’.71 This view was later confirmed during the drafting of the 1970 Friendly 
Relations Declaration. In the 1964 meeting of the Friendly Relations Special Committee, 
representatives who commented on the term ‘against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any State’ said that this term ‘did not limit or circumscribe the prohibition 
on the threat or use of force contained in the same Article. It had been inserted at the United 
Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, in order to guarantee the 
territorial integrity and political independence of small and weak States, and was not intended 
to mean that one State could use force against another on the pretext that it had no designs on 
the latter’s territorial integrity or political independence but sought to maintain the 
established constitutional order or to protect a minority, or on any other pretext.’72 
Furthermore, the notion of a permissible use of force for a benign purpose is not supported by 
State practice, was implicitly rejected by the ICJ73 and is overwhelmingly rejected by 
scholars.74 Therefore, an otherwise prohibited use of force cannot be legally justified by 
arguing that it has a limited purpose. 
 
70 Kreß, above n.2, 431: ‘For an early exposition of this view, see Stone, supra note 6, at 95–96; for a prominent 
later version, see W. M. Reisman, ‘Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter Article 2(4)’, 
American Journal of International Law, 78 (1984), 642–45.’ 
71 Vol VI, 335. See also Brownlie, above n.54, 267, who draws the same conclusion that the travaux 
préparatoires support a broad reading of this provision: 'The conclusion warranted by the travaux préparatoires 
is that the phrase under discussion was not intended to be restrictive but, on the contrary, to give more specific 
guarantees to small states and that it cannot be interpreted as having a qualifying effect.’ (Footnote omitted). 
72 Doc A/5746, 16 November 1964, para. 37. 
73 In the Corfu Channel case, in response to the UK’s justification of its minesweeping operation in Albanian 
territorial waters, ICJ held that: ‘The Court can only regard the alleged right of intervention as the manifestation 
of a policy of force, such as has, in the past, given rise to the most serious abuses and such as cannot, whatever 
be the present defects in international organization, find a place in international law.’ (Corfu Channel, Merits, 
Judgment 1949 ICJ Reports 4, 35). For a legal analysis of this finding arguing that the Court thereby implicitly 
rejected the argument that a use of force for a benign purpose falls outside the scope of article 2(4), see Claus 
Kreß, ‘The International Court of Justice and the Non-Use of Force’ in Marc Weller (ed), The Oxford Handbook 
of the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2015) 561, 573-574. 
74 Kreß (2017), above n.2. 431. See Kreß for an overview of the different positions on these issues with 
extensive references. Note that Kreß’s analysis is referring to the slightly different formulation that was used in 
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Consent	
This wording of article 2(4) does carve out an explicit exclusion from the prohibition in the 
case of military intervention by consent, which is not a circumstance precluding 
wrongfulness but forms an intrinsic part of the primary rule itself.75 According to the 
International Law Commission:  
 
‘the consent of the State must be valid in international law, clearly established, really 
expressed (which precludes merely presumed consent), internationally attributable to the 
State and anterior to the commission of the act to which it refers. Moreover, consent can 
be invoked as precluding the wrongfulness of an act by another State only within the 
limits which the State expressing the consent intends with respect to its scope and 
duration.’76 
Conclusion 
The factors discussed in this chapter delineate the scope and context of the prohibition of the 
use of force in article 2(4). In other words, they are fundamental contextual elements which 
must be present in order for a ‘use of force’ to fall within the scope of article 2(4) and be 
unlawful under that provision. Accordingly, a ‘use of force’ must take place within the 
context of the following fundamental requirements to fall within the scope of article 2(4): 
 
• Two or more States (including that the object / target of the ‘use of force’ have a 
sufficient nexus to another State). 
 
• International relations. 
 
 
the definition of the crime of aggression in article 8 bis(2) of the Rome Statute, which itself is taken from the 
language used in article 1 of the 1974 Definition of Aggression. That formulation is ‘against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Charter of the United Nations’. So it mentions ‘sovereignty’ and is slightly broader by including uses of force 
‘in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations’ (emphasis added) rather than only the 
Purposes of the United Nations. 
75 James Crawford, Second Report on State Responsibility, 30 April 1999, UN Doc. A/CN.4/498/Add.2, 12-13, 
para. 240(b). See also ILA Committee on the Use of Force, ‘Final Report on Aggression and  the Use of Force’ 
(2018), 18-20. 
76 (1979) Yearbook of International Law Commission, vol. 2, Part II, 112. See further Corten, above n.39, 250 
ff, who looks at the conditions for lawful military intervention by consent. A matter of some controversy is 
whether a State may lawfully militarily intervene in an internal conflict within another State at the invitation of 
the government of that State. This controversy raises two potential issues: the identity of the legitimate 
government, and whether it is permitted to intervene in such a conflict even with the consent of the central 
authorities. On these points, see Corten, 276-7, 280-1, 284, 287. The purpose of a government’s invitation to 
another State to military intervene on its territory has been argued to be potentially relevant with respect to two 
contexts: firstly, an internal conflict engaging the right to self-determination, and secondly, a government which 
is massively violating the human rights of its own population. For further exposition of these issues, see Kreß 
(2017), above n.2, 429-431. 
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• ‘Against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations’.  
 
From the above analysis of these terms, the following can be concluded regarding acts that 
fall within and outside the scope of article 2(4): 
 
Uses of force falling outside the scope of article 2(4): 
 
• Use of force by non-UN Member States (although they are bound by the identical 
customary international law prohibition of the use of force – see Chapter One). 
 
• Uses of force that are not committed by a State (including indirectly – see discussion 
of indirect force in Chapter Six), and are not attributable to a State. 
 
• Uses of force not in international relations. It is generally accepted that the following 
uses of force by a State are not in its ‘international relations’ and therefore usually fall 
outside the scope of article 2(4): 
 
1. Use of force by a State within its own territory against its own population. 
2. Use of force by a State in the exercise of its law enforcement jurisdiction 
against private foreign actors absent other factors (such as an existing 
international dispute, excessive force, coercive intent, or lack of sufficient 
connection to law enforcement jurisdiction). 
 
• Use of force falling within an exception to the prohibition recognised in the UN 
Charter, namely, forcible acts in lawful self-defence or validly authorised by the UN 
Security Council. 
 
• Use of force that is validly consented to. 
 
Uses of force falling within the scope of article 2(4): 
 
• Use of force on the territory of another State or against its extraterritorial sovereign 
manifestations. 
 
• Use of force to reclaim disputed territory not within de facto control. 
 
• Use of force in violation of international demarcation lines. 
 
• Use of force directly arising from a political dispute between States. 
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• Use of force for a benign purpose, provided the other requirements of article 2(4) are 
met. The limited purpose of the use of force does not exclude it from the scope of this 
provision.  
 
Uses of force for which it is unclear if they fall within scope of article 2(4): 
 
It is controversial whether or under what circumstances the following uses of force by a State 
are in its ‘international relations’ and therefore fall within the scope of article 2(4): 
 
• Use of force against entities falling short of Statehood 
 
• Use of force with no nexus to another State, such as against an international 
organisation or on terra nullius 
 
• Use of force by a State within its own territory against small-scale incursions by 
armed forces of another State 
 
• Use of force by a State in the exercise of its law enforcement jurisdiction against 
private foreign actors in the presence of other factors (such as an existing international 
dispute, excessive force, coercive intent, or lack of sufficient connection to law 
enforcement jurisdiction) 
 
The next two chapters will apply a textual analysis to the term ‘use of force’ in article 2(4) 
and will discuss the range of interpretive possibilities for this provision and identify its 
constituent elements. 
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Chapter Six: Elements of ‘use of force’ 
– Means  
Introduction 
Having interpreted the meaning of the contextual elements of article 2(4) of the UN Charter, 
the following two chapters will apply a process of textual interpretation to the term ‘use of 
force’ in that article. As there are no statements in the travaux preparatoires that a special 
meaning of the term ‘use of force’ was intended by the parties under article 31(4) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘VCLT’), Chapters Six and Seven will examine 
the ordinary meaning of this term. Chapter Six will firstly set out subsequent agreements 
regarding article 2(4), and then examine whether ‘use of force’ means physical/armed force 
only, and if a particular type of means is required. Chapter Seven will look at the required 
effects of an unlawful 'use of force', and if gravity and intent are required elements of a ‘use 
of force’ under article 2(4). 
Subsequent agreements regarding article 2(4) 
As set out in Chapter Four, ‘any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions’ shall be taken into account in 
the interpretation of a treaty1 and ‘being objective evidence of the understanding of the 
parties as to the meaning of the treaty, are authentic means of interpretation, in the application 
of the general rule of treaty interpretation reflected in article 31 [of the VCLT].’2 Subsequent 
agreements on the interpretation of the prohibition of the use of force in article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter include Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 1970, the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (‘Friendly Relations Declaration’), 1970 
Friendly Relations Declaration, the General Assembly’s 1974 Definition of Aggression,3 
1987 Resolution 42/22 and the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document. 
 
1 VCLT, art 31(3)(a). 
2 Georg Nolte, ‘First Report on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to Treaty 
Interpretation’ (A/CN.4/660, International Law Commission, 19 March 2013), draft conclusion 2. 
3 UN General Assembly, ‘Definition of Aggression’, 14 December 1974, GA Res. 3314 (XXIX). 
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1970	Friendly	Relations	Declaration	
The most important and comprehensive subsequent agreement of UN Member States on the 
interpretation of article 2(4) of the UN Charter is the Friendly Relations Declaration, which 
was adopted on 24 October 1970 by consensus by the UN General Assembly on the occasion 
of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations. Principle 1 of the Declaration 
proclaims: 
 
The principle that States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations 
 
In the elaboration of this principle, UN Member States took a clear position on the 
interpretation of article 2(4) with respect to its scope of application to include the following: 
international boundaries, international lines of demarcation such as armistice lines;4 forcible 
acts of reprisal;5 using force to deprive peoples of the right to self-determination;6 indirect 
uses of force; certain forms of interference in civil strife or terrorist acts in another State;7 and 
military occupation or territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force.8 With 
respect to indirect force, the Friendly Relations Declaration provides that: ‘Every State has 
the duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging the organization of irregular forces or 
armed bands, including mercenaries, for incursion into the territory of another State.’9 
Indirect force is discussed in more detail below. In addition to comprising subsequent 
agreement of UN Member States on the interpretation of article 2(4), the International Court 
of Justice (‘ICJ’) relied on the Friendly Relations Declaration in the Nicaragua case as an 
indication of States’ opinio juris on the existence and content of the customary prohibition of 
 
4 ‘Every State has the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force to violate the existing international 
boundaries of another State or as a means of solving international disputes, including territorial disputes and 
problems concerning frontiers of States.’ Principle 1, para 4; ‘Every State likewise has the duty to refrain from 
the threat or use of force to violate international lines of demarcation, such as armistice lines, established by or 
pursuant to an international agreement to which it is a party or which it is otherwise bound to respect. Nothing 
in the foregoing shall be construed as prejudicing the positions of the parties concerned with regard to the status 
and effects of such lines under their special régimes or as affecting their temporary character.’ Principle 1, para. 
5. 
5 ‘States have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force.’ Principle 1, para. 6. 
6 ‘Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples referred to in the 
elaboration of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of their right to self-determination and 
freedom and independence.’ Principle 1, para. 7. 
7 ‘Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife 
or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the 
commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or use of force.’ 
Principle 1, para. 9. 
8 ‘The territory of a State shall not be the object of military occupation resulting from the use of force in 
contravention of the provisions of the Charter. The territory of a State shall not be the object of acquisition by 
another State resulting from the threat or use of force. No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use 
of force shall be recognized as legal. …’ Principle 1, para. 10. 
9 Principle 1, para. 8. See discussion in Chapter Eight of 1974 Definition para. 3(g) regarding ‘sending’. 
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the use of force10 due to its references to ‘all States’;11 ‘principle’;12 ‘States’; ‘every State’;13 
‘a violation of international law and the Charter’14 and the statement that ‘[t]he principles of 
the Charter which are embodied in this Declaration constitute basic principles of international 
law’.15 
1974	Definition	of	Aggression	
1974 General Assembly (‘GA’) Resolution 3314 annexing the Definition of Aggression was 
adopted by acclamation (consensus), and was the first time that the international community 
agreed on a definition of aggression.16 Despite the significance of the 1974 Definition of 
Aggression, one should be careful about characterising the 1974 Definition as a ‘subsequent 
agreement’ regarding the interpretation of article 2(4), since it is actually defining aggression 
as a guideline for the UN Security Council’s political determination. Thomas Bruha argues 
that because of the politically negotiated nature of the 1974 Definition and its constructive 
ambiguity, the Definition must be read as a whole and in its context. One cannot extract 
elements of the 'definition' without taking this into account (as Bruha argues the ICJ did in 
the Nicaragua decision). But given the wording in the Definition itself which refers to uses of 
force, and the relationship between use of force and aggression – the annex to 1974 GA 
Resolution 3314 itself notes that ‘aggression is the most serious and dangerous form of the 
illegal use of force’17 – then it is sound to infer a shared agreement or understanding that 
those acts listed in the Definition constitute ‘use of force’ under article 2(4)). 
1987	Resolution	42/22	
GA Resolution 42/22 (1987) (adopted by consensus) was a Declaration on the Enhancement 
of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in 
International Relations. This resolution reflects provisions of the 1970 Friendly Relations 
Declaration regarding non-intervention.18 Like the Friendly Relations Declaration, Resolution 
 
10 Case concerning Military and Paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of 
America), Merits, Judgment 1986 ICJ Reports 14, para. 191. 
11 10th preambular paragraph. 
12 Principle 1. 
13 Principle 1. 
14 Principle 1, para. 1. 
15 Para. 3 of Declaration. 
16 See Thomas Bruha, ‘The General Assembly’s Definition of the Act of Aggression’ in Claus Kreß and Stefan 
Barriga (eds), Commentary on the Crime of Aggression (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 142 for an in-depth 
analysis of the 1974 Definition of Aggression, including the negotiations leading up to it. Bruha notes the 
purpose of the 1974 Definition, which began with three groups (non-aligned, pushing for an extensive, legal 
definition to protect their interests as newly independent states); Western, seeking to make the definition a 
discretionary guideline for the UN Security Council's political determination of aggression; and the Soviet 
Union which was in between the two). 
17 Fifth preambular para. 
18 ‘Reaffirming the duty of States to refrain in their international relations from military, political, economic or 
any other form of coercion aimed against the political independence or territorial integrity of any 
State,’(preambular para 18); Para. (6). ‘States shall fulfil their obligations under international law to refrain from 
organizing, instigating, or assisting or participating in paramilitary, terrorist or subversive acts, including acts of 
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42/22 confirms States’ view that the prohibition of the threat or use of force is universal and 
binding, referring to the prohibition as a ‘principle’19 holding that ‘[e]very State’ has the duty 
to comply with the prohibition20 and explicitly stating that ‘[t]he principle of refraining from 
the threat or use of force in international relations is universal in character and is binding, 
regardless of each State's political, economic, social or cultural system or relations of 
alliance’.21  
2005	World	Summit	Outcome	Document	
The 2005 World Summit at the United Nations Headquarters in New York was attended by 
over 170 Heads of State and Government. This summit produced and adopted by consensus 
the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, which is historically and symbolically 
important, as a united stand by UN Member States to reaffirm their commitment to the UN 
Charter and its purposes and principles in the face of modern challenges to the international 
order and human security. The principal importance of the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
Document for our purposes is that in it, the Member States of the UN ‘reaffirm that the 
relevant provisions of the Charter are sufficient to address the full range of threats to 
international peace and security’.22 This affirms States’ view of the continued relevance of 
the collective security framework of the UN Charter. The Outcome Document abridges the 
wording of article 2(4) in a way that makes it broader, by leaving out reference to ‘against 
territorial integrity or political independence of any State’,23 and replacing reference to 
‘against the Purposes’ of the Charter with the threat or use of force ‘inconsistent with the 
Charter’.24 The document states25 ‘[w]e rededicate ourselves to … refrain in our international 
relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations’. Although the earlier parts of the sentence which mention 
upholding the sovereign equality of States and respecting their territorial integrity and 
political independence could probably be said to implicitly cover the other parts of article 
2(4), it is not clear what, if anything, this shows about the way that States interpret article 
2(4). 
 
mercenaries, in other States, or acquiescing in organized activities within their territory directed towards the 
commission of such acts.’; Para. (7).‘States have the duty to abstain from armed intervention and all other forms 
of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and 
cultural elements.’ Para (8). ‘No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of 
measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign 
rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind.’. 
19 Annex, preambular para. 1 and para. 1(2). 
20 Annex, para. 1(1). 
21 Annex, para. 1(2). 
22 Para 79. 
23 Paras. 5 and 77. 
24 Para. 77. 
25 Para. 5, emphasis added. 
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Listed	'uses	of	force'	in	subsequent	agreements	
The above UN General Assembly Resolutions passed by acclamation (consensus) show that 
UN Member States have taken a position regarding the interpretation of article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter with respect to its primary purposes and certain acts which fall within its scope. 
In particular, the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration and the 1974 GA Definition of 
Aggression clearly demonstrate UN Member States’ subsequent agreement that the 
prohibition of the use of force in article 2(4) includes the following specific acts listed in 
those documents: 
  
• The ‘use of force to violate the existing international boundaries or another State or as 
a means of solving international disputes, including territorial disputes and problems 
concerning frontiers of States’;26 
 
• The ‘use of force to violate international lines of demarcation, such as armistice lines, 
established by or pursuant to an international agreement to which it is a party or 
which it is otherwise bound to respect.’27  
 
• Forcible acts of reprisal;28  
 
• ‘[A]ny forcible action which deprives peoples referred to in the elaboration of the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of their right to self-determination and 
freedom and independence.’29  
 
•  ‘[O]rganizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist 
acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed 
towards the commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the present 
paragraph involve a threat or use of force.’30 
 
• ‘[M]ilitary occupation resulting from the use of force in contravention of the 
provisions of the Charter’;31 
 
• Territorial acquisition of the territory of a State resulting from the threat or use of 
force;32 
 
 
26 Friendly Relations Declaration, Principle 1, para. 4. 
27 Friendly Relations Declaration Principle 1, para. 5. 
28 Friendly Relations Declaration Principle 1, para. 6. 
29 Friendly Relations Declaration Principle 1, para. 7. 
30 Friendly Relations Declaration Principle 1, para. 9. 
31 Friendly Relations Declaration, Principle 1, para. 10. 
32 Friendly Relations Declaration, Principle 1, para. 10. 
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• ‘The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, 
or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or 
attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part 
thereof,’33 
 
• ‘Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State or 
the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State;’34 
 
• ‘The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State;’35 
 
• ‘An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and 
air fleets of another State;’36 
 
• ‘The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another State 
with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided 
for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the 
termination of the agreement;’37 
 
• The following forms of indirect uses of force are also prohibited: 
 
⁃ ‘[O]rganizing or encouraging the organization of irregular forces or armed 
bands, including mercenaries, for incursion into the territory of another 
State.’38 
 
⁃ ‘The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or 
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such 
gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement 
therein.39 
 
⁃ ‘The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the 
disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act 
of aggression against a third State;’40 
 
The 1974 Definition of Aggression shows that UN Member States interpret the concept of 
‘armed force’ quite broadly. However, these subsequent agreements of UN Member States 
 
33 1974 Definition of Aggression, article 3(a). 
34 1974 Definition of Aggression, article 3(b). 
35 1974 Definition of Aggression, article 3(c). 
36 1974 Definition of Aggression, article 3(d). 
37 1974 Definition of Aggression, article 3(e). 
38 Friendly Relations Declaration, Principle 1, para 8. 
39 1974 Definition of Aggression, article 3(g). 
40 1974 Definition of Aggression, article 3(f). 
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leave unclear whether article 2(4) prohibits ‘armed’ force only, and what the elements of a 
prohibited ‘use of force’ are. Accordingly, the meaning of ‘use of force’ is explored in further 
detail in the rest of this chapter and in the following chapter. 
Ordinary meaning 
According to article 111 of the UN Charter, the Chinese,41 French,42 Russian,43 English44 and 
Spanish45 texts are equally authentic. However, all of these language versions employ the 
same terms for ‘use of force’ and do not appear to add any further connotations to this term 
which could assist with shedding light on its interpretation.46 
 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary (OED), the noun ‘use’ means ‘[t]he act of 
putting something to work, or employing or applying a thing, for any (esp. a beneficial or 
productive) purpose; the fact, state, or condition of being put to work, employed, or applied 
in this way; utilization or appropriation, esp. in order to achieve an end or pursue one's 
purpose.’47 The following definition of ‘force’ in the OED most closely corresponds to the 
way this term is employed in article 2(4): 
 
 
41各会员国在其国际关系上不得使用威胁或武力，或以与联合国宗旨不符之任何其他方法，侵害任何会
员国或国家之领土完整或政治独立。 
42 Les Membres de l'Organisation s'abstiennent, dans leurs relations internationales, de recourir à la menace ou à 
l'emploi de la force, soit contre l'intégrité territoriale ou l'indépendance politique de tout État, soit de toute autre 
manière incompatible avec les buts des Nations Unies. 
43 Все Члены Организации Объединенных Наций воздерживаются в их международных отношениях от 
угрозы силой или ее применения как против территориальной неприкосновенности или политической 
независимости любого государства, так и каким-либо другим образом, несовместимым с Целями 
Объединенных Наций; 
44 All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations. 
45 Los Miembros de la Organización, en sus relaciones internacionales, se abstendrán de recurrir a la amenaza o 
al uso de la fuerza contra la integridad territorial o la independencia política de cualquier Estado, o en cualquier 
otra forma incompatible con los Propósitos de las Naciones Unidas. 
46 Interestingly, the Russian language version of article 2(4) does appear to slightly differ from the others in two 
senses. The very essence of article 2(4), ‘threat or use of force’ is quite strangely formulated in the Russian 
version, which reads: … от угрозы силой или ее применения… – ‘threat of force or its use’. If we are more 
precise: ‘threat of force or “her” use’, as both words, ‘force’ as well as ‘threat’, are of feminine gender in 
Russian. So, reading the passage very carefully, one cannot precisely determine to which word (‘force’ or 
‘threat’) the pronoun ‘her’ is related to. The text could therefore mean literally either ‘use of force’ or ‘use of 
threat of force’, and therefore in an extreme case one could exclude the possibility of meaning ‘use of force’ 
from the text. However, since there is no meaningful distinction between a prohibition of a ‘threat of force’ and 
‘a use of threat of force’, and read together with the other authentic language versions of article 2(4), the 
meaning is clearly the same as in those other versions. The second difference in the Russian text is with respect 
to the term ‘against the territorial integrity’: против территориальной неприкосновенности. 
Неприкосновенность. Here, the translation for ‘integrity’ would mean ‘inviolability’. This carries a different 
connotation, as the term ‘territorial integrity’ indicates unity or wholeness of the territory rather than only 
‘inviolability’ of State borders. (I am indebted to Nino Burdiladze for her translation of the Russian text and 
these observations). 
47 “Use, N.” OED Online. Oxford University Press. Accessed February 26, 2018. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/220635. 
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‘5. a. Physical strength or power exerted upon an object; esp. the use of physical strength 
to constrain the action of persons; violence or physical coercion.’ 
 
‘b. esp. in phr. by force = by employing violence, by violent means, also †under 
compulsion. †Formerly also through, with, of force’ 
 
‘c. spec. in Law: Unlawful violence offered to persons or things’.48 
 
This naturally leads to the question of whether the term ‘force’ in article 2(4) is confined to 
this ‘ordinary meaning’ of physical/violent means only, and whether it requires certain types 
of physical effects. 
Means 
This section will discuss whether ‘force’ in article 2(4) of the UN Charter is restricted to 
particular means, namely, if ‘force’ means physical/armed force only, if a weapon must be 
employed, what is considered a ‘weapon’ and if a release of kinetic energy is required for an 
act to qualify as a prohibited ‘use of force’. 
 
Physical/armed	 force	 only,	 or	 also	 other	 forms	 of	 non-armed	
coercion?		
The role of article 2(4) in the UN collective security system and its primary objective of the 
maintenance of international peace and security supports interpreting the term ‘use of force’ 
as confined to armed/physical force only. This is because forms of non-physical coercion do 
not directly concern international peace and security but relate more to sovereign equality and 
the non-intervention principle. Some scholars such as Nikolas Stürchler have argued that the 
latter (i.e. freedom of choice for States) is not the primary concern of article 2(4). This 
understanding of article 2(4) excludes non-forcible forms of intervention from the scope of 
the prohibition of the use of force. This interpretation is further borne out by the following 
factors: firstly, the choice of the drafters to employ the term ‘use of force’ to overcome the 
problems associated with the term ‘war’; secondly, references to ‘force’ elsewhere in the UN 
Charter refer to ‘armed force’; and thirdly, that economic coercion was explicitly rejected by 
the drafters as a form of ‘force’ falling under article 2(4).  
 
Regarding the choice of term ‘use of force’, as discussed earlier, the historical context of 
article 2(4) was intended to address the problems of the Covenant of the League of Nations 
and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which used the restrictive notion of ‘war’.49  
 
48 “Force, n.1.” OED Online. Oxford University Press. Accessed 26 February 2018. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/72847#eid4006249. 
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References to ‘armed force’ in the UN Charter further support this interpretation of force 
(referred to below). In particular, preambular paragraph 7 of the Charter refers to armed 
force, stating one of the goals of the Charter is ‘to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and 
the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest’. 
With respect to other forms of non-forcible coercion such as economic coercion, the proposal 
of the Brazilian delegate to the San Francisco conference to include ‘the threat or use of 
economic measures’ under article 2(4) was rejected by the drafting committee.50 The counter-
argument interpretation, that the explicit reference to ‘armed force’ in other parts of the UN 
Charter might indicate that the absence of the qualifier ‘armed’ in article 2(4) shows that the 
drafters did not intend to restrict the term ‘force’ in this way, is less plausible if the latter 
provision is read in its historical context and in the light of the exclusion of economic 
coercion. It is then far more persuasive to hold that ‘force’ in article 2(4) only refers to armed 
force.  
 
The question of whether article 2(4) extends to other forms of coercion was re-opened and 
subject to extensive debates in the drafting of the Friendly Relations Declaration, but there 
was ultimately no subsequent agreement overturning the drafter’s clear intent on this point. In 
each session of the Special Committee,51 delegates debated this issue and could not reach 
agreement about the definition of ‘force’ in article 2(4) and in particular, whether it included 
armed force only, or also other forms of pressure threatening the territorial integrity or 
political independence of a State, such as economic coercion. Many (mostly newly 
independent and developing) States were in favour of a broad interpretation of ‘force’ to 
include not only armed force but also economic, political and other forms of pressure or 
coercion.52 Several proposals included provisions to the effect that the term ‘force’ should be 
 
49 See Chapter Two discussion of how the customary international law rule arose. See also Rüdiger Wolfrum, 
‘Preamble’ in Bruno Simma et al (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (Oxford University 
Press, 3rd ed, 2012) vol I, 45. See Olivier Corten, The Law against War : The Prohibition on the Use of Force in 
Contemporary International Law (Hart, 2010), 52, footnote 13 for a list of statements by States in the debates in 
the UN General Assembly preceding votes on major resolutions on the boundaries of the prohibition, 
reaffirming that article 2(4) prohibits all measures ‘short of war’. 
50 UNCIO vol VI, UN Doc. 784/I/1/27 (5 June 1945), 335. But note, UNCIO vol VI p400, Doc. 885/I/1/34 (9 
June 1945), Report of the Rapporteur of Committee 1 to Commission I, regarding article 2(4): ‘The Committee 
likes it to be stated in view of the Norwegian amendment to the same paragraph that the unilateral use of force 
or similar coercive measures is not authorized or admitted. The use of arms in legitimate self-defense remains 
admitted and unimpaired. The use of force, therefore, remains legitimate only to back up the decisions of the 
Organization at the start of a controversy or during its solution in the way that the Organization itself ordains. 
The intention of the Norwegian amendment is thus covered by the present text.’ 
51 In particular, the 1967 session of the Special Committee extensively discussed ‘economic, political and other 
forms of pressure of coercion’: Third Report of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States, UN Doc A/6799, 26 September 1967 (‘Third 
Report’), see para. 51 ff for summary of debate. 
52 See First Report of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations 
and Co-operation Among States, UN Doc A/5746, 16 November 1964 (‘First Report’), Annex B, p99 section D: 
‘India (SR.3, pp. 7, 8, SR.17, p4), Czechoslovakia (SR.4, p6, SR.8, pp.4-6), Yugoslavia (SR.4, p.9, SR.9, pp.20-
21, SR.17, pp.5-9) Nigeria, (SR.4, p.10, SR.7, p.23), Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (SR.5, p.8, SR.14, 
pp.10-11), Ghana (SR.5, p.17, SR.10, p.14), Romania (SR.7, p.17, SR.16, pp.4-5), United Arab Republic (SR.8, 
p.9), Poland (SR.9, p.8), Madagascar (SR.9, p.17), and Burma (SR.9, pp.18-19). Fifth Report of the Special 
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interpreted broadly to cover not only armed force but also economic, political and other 
forces of pressure,53 particularly those which ‘had the effect of undermining the territorial 
integrity or political independence of a State’.54 Some States in favour of a broad 
interpretation of the term ‘force’ beyond armed force were nevertheless cautious about 
including other forms of coercion within the concept ‘in order to avoid enlarging the scope of 
self-defence’.55 
 
Textual arguments in favour of a broad interpretation of ‘force’ included the terms ‘in any 
other manner’ in article 2(4) of the UN Charter,56 and the fact that since other provisions of 
the UN Charter refer to ‘armed force’ (the Preamble and articles 41, 42, 43, 44 and 46) it is to 
be presumed that the drafters of Charter did not intend to limit the term ‘force’ in article 2(4) 
this way.57 The newly independent States emerging after the process of decolonisation noted 
that they had not had a chance to shape the interpretation of article 2(4) during the San 
Francisco Conference, and argued that ‘economic and political forms of pressure were 
sometimes even more dangerous than armed force, particularly for developing countries’.58 
‘Many representatives emphasized the need to interpret the term “force” in the light of 
developments subsequent to the drafting of the Charter.’59 Reference was made to the fact 
that various international declarations, resolutions and treaties had included a broad 
understanding of ‘force’ and recognised the duty of States to refrain from undue pressure, 
including economic or other forms of pressure, such as the Bandung, Belgrade and Cairo 
Declarations, UN General Assembly resolutions 2131 (xx) and 2160 (xxi), the Charter of the 
Organization of African Unity and article 51 VCLT and the Declaration on the Prohibition of 
Military, Political or Economic Coercion adopted by the Vienna Conference on the Law of 
Treaties.60 ‘The developing and newly independent countries could not forget that such forms 
of pressure had long been used to coerce them, against their will. Proof of that was to be 
 
Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States, 
UN Doc A/7619 (1969) (‘Fifth Report’), para. 124 (Nigeria); Sixth Report of the Special Committee on 
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States, Doc A/8018 
(1970) (‘Sixth Report’) para. 114 (Venezuela), 120 (Romania), para. 182 (Nigeria), para. 194 (Czechoslovakia). 
53 E.g., in the Second Report of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation Among States, UN Doc. A/6230, 27 June 1966 (‘Second Report’) at para. 64, it was 
noted that Chile’s proposal included provisions ‘to the effect that the principle under consideration should be 
formulated in the light of the practice of States and of the United Nations during the past twenty years and that 
the term “force” should be broadly understood to cover not only armed force, but also all forms of political, 
economic or other pressure.’; Third Report, Doc A/6799, 26 September 1967, Para 51: paragraph 5 of the 1966 
proposal of Czechosolvakia and paragraph 2 (b) of the proposal of Algeria, Cameroon, Ghana, India, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Nigeria, Syria, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia  … contained provisions to the effect that 
economic, political and other forms of pressure against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
State were prohibited uses of force.’ 
54 Fourth Report of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation Among States, UN Doc A/7326 (1968) (‘Fourth Report’) para. 50. 
55 E.g. First Report, above n.52, Annex B, 99, section D ‘Mexico (SR.9, pp.14-15); Fourth Report, ibid., para. 
127 (Chile); Second Report, above n.53, para. 70. 
56 Fifth Report, above n.52, para. 90. 
57 Second Report, above n.53, para. 66. 
58 Fourth Report, above n.54, para. 52. 
59 Second Report, above n.53, para. 71. 
60 Second Report, ibid., para. 73; Fifth Report, above n. 52, paras. 52 and 91.
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found, for example, in the records of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development: economic exploitation, political interference, threats to withdraw technical 
assistance – all those means had been employed to compromise the sovereignty of the 
developing States. … In the contemporary world the importance of economic relations 
among States was so great that economic pressures could often have a serious impact on 
States, and powerful States could strangle weaker States to the point of threatening their 
political independence and territorial integrity.’61 
 
The third report of the Special Committee sums up ‘the arguments advanced during the 
debate in favour of a broad interpretation of the term ‘force’ in formulating the principle of 
the prohibition of the threat or use of force’: 
 
‘(a) a considerable number of delegations, both in the Special Committee and in the 
General Assembly, had expressed themselves in favour of a broad interpretation of the 
term “force”; (b) that interpretation was supported by a large sector of opinion and by 
many writers; (c) that interpretation was recognized in recent international documents 
such as the Programme for Peace and International Co-operation adopted by the Second 
Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held at Cairo in 
1964; (d) it was necessary to take into account the purposes aimed at in drafting the 
principle, so that the wording adopted could be made appropriate and useful by taking 
into account the practices and possibilities of international relations as they exited in 
reality; (e) it would not be realistic to limit the formulation of the principle to an 
examination of the provisions of the Charter, in an effort to make a distinction between 
lex lata and lex ferenda; (f) economic and political forms of pressure were sometimes as 
dangerous as armed force, particularly for developing countries, new States and peoples 
under colonial domination, and could accomplish the same illicit results; they constituted 
a violation of international law and a threat to the maintenance of international peace and 
co-operation; (g) the existence of international relations based on the free consent of 
independent sovereign States necessarily implied prohibition both of armed force and of 
other forms of pressure and coercion; (h) the authors of the Charter, in drafting Article 2, 
paragraph 4, had used the generic term “force” without any qualification, and 
consequently a broad interpretation of that term was perfectly compatible with the text of 
that provision; (i) there was nothing in the travaux préparatoires of the San Francisco 
Conference to preclude a broad interpretation of “force” in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the 
Charter; (j) the very fact that the San Francisco Conference had rejected a Brazilian 
amendment that a reference to economic forms of pressure be added was proof that such a 
reference was not considered necessary in view of the broad meaning of the term “force” 
in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter; (k) the notion and conditions of self-defence had 
not yet been clearly defined, and hence no argument for the exclusion of the various 
forms of pressure could be based on that notion.’’62 
 
 
61 Second Report, above n.53, para. 72. 
62 Third Report, above n.51, para. 55. 
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On the other hand, many States strongly maintained that ‘force’ within the meaning of article 
2(4) was confined to armed force.63 Delegates of these States opposed the inclusion of 
economic, political and other forms of coercion within the scope of article 2(4). The third 
report of the Special Committee sums up their arguments as follows: 
 
‘In their turn, those representatives who considered that the term “force” in Article 2, 
paragraph 4, of the Charter meant only armed force put forward the following arguments: 
(a) the intention of the authors of the Charter was clearly to limit the term “force” to 
armed force; (b) the travaux préparatoires of the Charter argued against those who held 
that, because the term “force” in Article 2, paragraph 4, was not qualified by the adjective 
“armed”, that term should be given a broad interpretation which covered other forms of 
pressure; (c) the San Francisco Conference rejected a Brazilian amendment designed to 
broaden the prohibition laid down in Article 2, paragraph 4, by adding the words “and the 
threat or use of economic measures”; (d) the very fact that Brazil had found it necessary 
to submit its amendment was proof, and the rejection of that amendment conclusive proof 
of the meaning which should be given to the word “force” in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the 
Charter; (e) in Article 44 of the Charter the term “force” was also used without any 
qualification, and there was no doubt that it referred exclusively to armed force; (f) if 
Article 2, paragraph 4, was analysed in the context of the other provisions of the Charter, 
the legal conclusion reached was that the term “force” used in that paragraph could be 
interpreted only to mean armed force; (g) a broad interpretation of the term “force” in 
Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter would completely alter the existing relationship 
between that Article and the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter; (h) a broad 
interpretation of the term “force” in Article 2, paragraph 4 would also imply a broader 
interpretation of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence provided for in 
Article 51 of the Charter, although it was obvious that the protection established in that 
Article was intended to operate solely in the case of the threat or illegitimate use of force 
and until such time as the Security Council had taken the necessary steps to maintain 
international peace and security; (I) a broad interpretation of the term “force” would 
undermine the integrity of the Charter as a legal instrument –an outcome which could not 
be accepted on the pretext of progressive development; (j) any attempt to amend the 
Charter must be made in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 108; (h) 
most writers supported a limitative interpretation of the term “force” in Article 2, 
paragraph 4, of the Charter.’64 It was also argued that ‘apart from basic legal objections to 
 
63 See e.g. First Report, above n.52, Annex B, 99, section D: ‘Argentina (S.R., p.11), United States of America 
(SR.3, p.12, SR.15, pp.17-18), United Kingdom (SR.5, pp.12-13, SR.16, p.12), France (SR.6, pp.5-6), Italy 
(SR.7, p6), Netherlands (SR.7, p.8), Lebanon (SR.7, p.14), Australia (SR.10, p.7, SR.17, p.12), Sweden (SR.10, 
p.10), Guatemala (SR.14, p7) and Venezuela (SR.16, p.16). Fourth Report, above n. 52: para. 114 (USA, 
stressing that ‘the term “force” in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter related exclusively to armed or military 
force and did not cover non-military acts, even of a coercive character’.); para. 117 (Canada –‘use of force’ with 
respect to acts of reprisal means exclusively ‘armed force’); para. 119 (UK); para. 131 (Australia). Fifth Report, 
above n.52, para. 128 (Italy); Sixth Report, above n.52, para. 106 (Argentina), para. 227 (The United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), para. 256 (USA). 
64 Third Report, above n.51, para. 56. For further elaboration of arguments, see also Second Report, above n.53, 
paras. 67–69; Fourth Report, above n.54, para, 51; Fifth Report, above n.52, para. 92. 
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the inclusion of economic and political pressures in the definition of force, there was no 
legally satisfactory definition of economic and political pressures.’65 
 
The Friendly Relations Declaration left open the issues of whether a prohibited use of force 
must be ‘armed’, and whether coercion falls within the scope of the prohibition. Although the 
1970 Friendly Relations Declaration was adopted by acclamation (consensus), seventy-nine 
delegations made statements on the formulation of the draft declaration at the time of its 
adoption,66 and the Rapporteur of the Sixth Committee, Mr Owada, noted that ‘the text of the 
declaration should be read in conjunction with the statements made for the record which are 
included in the relevant part of the summary records of the Sixth Committee, contained in 
documents A/C.6/SR.1178 to 1184.’67 The delegate for the UK, Sir Vincent Evants, drew 
‘attention to the statements summarized in paragraphs 90 to 273 of the Special Committee’s 
report [A/8018] and in the summary records of the 1178th to 1184th meetings of the Sixth 
Committee. Individual delegations have made it clear that the acceptance of the declaration 
by their Governments is subject to the views and positions there expressed and the 
declaration must consequently be read in conjunction with the records to which I have 
referred.’68 In particular, the delegate for Nigeria, Mr Shittabey, on behalf of the African 
Group of States expressed regret over ‘the Committee’s failure to accept the legitimate notion 
that expression “force” as employed in the principle of the non-use of force denotes 
economic and political pressures as well as every kind of armed force’.69 
 
In the text of the adopted Declaration, the prohibition of coercion is mentioned twice, firstly 
in the ninth preambular paragraph which ‘[r]ecall[s] the duty of States to refrain in their 
international relations from military, political, economic or any other form of coercion aimed 
against the political independence or territorial integrity of any State’ (emphasis added). The 
prohibition of coercion is also included with respect to the principle of the duty of non-
intervention.70 However, the Special Committee reached no ultimate agreement on the issue 
of whether the prohibition of the use of force includes the prohibition of other forms of 
coercion.71 Some delegations expressed their understanding that ‘[t]he forms of coercion 
referred to in [preambular paragraph 9] were examples of unlawful forms of the threat or use 
 
65 Second Report, above n.53, para. 75. 
66 General Assembly, verbatim record of plenary meeting no. 1860 , 6 October 1970, A/PV.1860, para. 24. 
Thomas Bruha observes that these interpretive declarations were ‘a kind of substitute for votes’: ‘The General 
Assembly’s Definition of the Act of Aggression’ in Claus Kreß and Stefan Barriga (eds), Commentary on the 
Crime of Aggression (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 142, 151. 
67 General Assembly, verbatim record of plenary meeting no. 1860 , 6 October 1970, A/PV.1860, para. 25. 
68 General Assembly, verbatim record of plenary meeting no. 1860 , 6 October 1970, A/PV.1860, para. 83. 
69 General Assembly, verbatim record of plenary meeting no. 1860 , 6 October 1970, A/PV.1860, para. 60. 
70 Para. 2: ‘No State may use or encourage the use of economic political or any other type of measures to coerce 
another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure 
from it advantages of any kind.’ 
71 First Report, above n.52, para. 42: ‘the Special Committee was unable to arrive at a consensus on a 
comprehensive definition of “force” in view, inter alia, of a disagreement as to whether the term embraced 
political, economic and other forms of pressure’. 
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of force, which was prohibited under the Charter’,72 while others criticised the fact that ‘the 
principle concerning the prohibition of political, economic and other forms of coercion’ was 
‘covered only in the preamble and not in the operative part’ and considered that it should 
have been placed in the principle concerning the non-use of force or in the general part of the 
declaration.73  
 
Ultimately the lack of agreement regarding the definition of ‘force’ with respect to the 
principle of the non-use of force in the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration was left 
unresolved. Accordingly, the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration does not constitute a 
subsequent agreement regarding whether or not ‘force’ in article 2(4) refers to 
physical/armed force only.  
 
Another potential subsequent agreement regarding whether ‘force’ in article 2(4) refers to 
armed/physical force only is the 1974 Definition of Aggression. Article 1 of the 1974 
Definition provides that: 
 
‘Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition.’74  
 
The introduction of the qualifier ‘armed’ before ‘force’ is the most significant difference to 
the text of article 2(4).75 On first glance, the use of the term ‘armed’ tends to bolster the view 
that article 2(4) of the UN Charter is directed at armed force only, since that article forms part 
of the collective security framework of the UN (which is also the context of the Definition of 
Aggression, for the purposes of providing guidance to the UN Security Council in making a 
determination under article 39 of the Charter). As discussed, the debates leading up to the 
Friendly Relations Declaration did not resolve the disagreements between States about 
whether article 2(4) was confined to armed force only, so the use of the qualifier ‘armed’ in 
 
72 E.g. Sixth Report, above n.52, para. 120, Romania. 
73 Sixth Report, ibid., para. 194, Czechoslovakia. 
74 The Explanatory note: provides that ‘in this Definition the term “State”: 
(A) is used without prejudice to questions of recognition or to whether a State is a member of the United 
Nations; 
(B) includes the concept of a “group of States” where appropriate.’ 
75 Bruha, above n.16, 159 sets out the differences between article 1 of the 1974 Definition and article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter (footnote omitted):  
‘The other deviations from article 2(4) of the UN Charter concern the following: explicit mention of the use of 
‘armed’ force; the added reference to ‘sovereignty’; the replacement of ‘any’ state by ‘another’ state; the clause 
‘inconsistent with the Charter’ instead of ‘inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations’; and the final 
clause ‘as set out in this definition’. Whereas the last two variations are to be seen as additional escape clauses 
to defend one’s own military actions against the accusation of aggression, the others are less significant or of 
more historical importance: (i) the adjective ‘armed’ before force ended the discussion on ‘economic’ or 
‘ideological’ aggression, which had lost much of its significance in the atmosphere of détente looming at that 
time; (ii) the inclusion of the word ‘sovereignty’ met the respective ‘sensibility’ of the newly established states 
of the South, and was considered harmless by the other groups; (iii) likewise, the replacement of ‘any’ by 
‘another’ state, as already contained in the Soviet and non-aligned countries drafts, was also considered to have 
no practical impact.’ 
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article 1 of the Definition of Aggression could be viewed as a progressive development of 
international law through the subsequent agreement of the parties regarding the interpretation 
of article 2(4). Bruha argues that the use of this adjective ‘ended the discussion on 
‘economic’ or ‘ideological’ aggression, which had lost much of its significance in the 
atmosphere of detente looming at that time’.76 However, since article 1 is defining 
aggression, the most serious form of illegal use of force, it does not follow that all illegal 
uses of force involve armed force. Hence, article 1 of the Definition of the Aggression does 
not unequivocally indicate agreement of the UN Member States regarding the interpretation 
of article 2(4) as referring to armed force only.77 
 
In absence of a subsequent agreement regarding the interpretation of ‘force’ in article 2(4), 
according to article 32 of the VCLT: 
 
‘Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the 
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm 
the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning 
when the interpretation according to article 31:  
 
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure …’ 
 
Accordingly, given the ambiguity of the text of article 2(4) regarding the meaning of ‘force’ 
and in the absence of a subsequent agreement regarding its interpretation, one should revert 
to the clear drafter’s intent expressed in San Francisco by the rejection of the Brazilian 
proposal to include economic coercion, that ‘force’ does not extend to other forms of non-
armed/non-physical coercion. Despite some earlier scholarly views,78 the position that ‘force’ 
in article 2(4) includes only armed/physical force and excludes other forms of non-armed 
coercion is today overwhelmingly supported by scholars.79 Of recent scholars who have 
 
76 Ibid., 159. 
77 For a discussion of whether economic coercion is otherwise unlawful under international law, see Antonios 
Tzanakopoulos, ‘The Right to Be Free from Economic Coercion’, (2015) 4 Cambridge Journal of International 
and Comparative Law 616.  
78 E.g., In the negotiations of the Friendly Relations Special Committee during the discussion on the meaning of 
‘force’ in article 2(4), it was noted that Kelsen ‘supported the view that the use of force under Article 2, 
paragraph 4, of the Charter included both use of arms and violations of international law which involved an 
exercise of power in the territorial domain of other States without the use of arms.’ Second Report, above n.53, 
para. 66, citing Kelsen, The Law of Nations, New York, Praeger, 1950, emphasis added by author. However, 
Brownlie (Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (Clarendon, 1963)) argued in 
response to Kelsen that: 'It is true that the travaux préparatoires do not indicate that the phrase applied only to 
armed force but there is no evidence either in the discussions at San Francisco or in state or United Nations 
practice that it bears the meaning suggested by Kelsen. Indeed, in view of the predominant view of aggression 
and the use of force in the previous twenty years it is very doubtful if it was intended to have such a meaning.’ 
(361 ff, citation omitted.) But interestingly, Brownlie argued that although ‘it is very doubtful if [article 2(4)] 
applies to economic measures of a coercive nature’, ‘it is correct to assume that paragraph 4 applies to force 
other than armed force’ (footnotes omitted). 
79 E.g. Robert Kolb, Ius contra bellum : le droit international relatif au maintien de la paix : précis (Helbing & 
Lichtenhahn, 2e éd., 2009), 246; Tom Ruys, ‘The Meaning of “Force” and the Boundaries of the Jus Ad 
Bellum: Are “Minimal” Uses of Force Excluded from UN Charter Article 2 (4)?’ (2014) 108(2) American 
Journal of International Law 159, 163; Albrecht Randelzhofer and Oliver Dörr, ‘Article 2(4)’ in Bruno Simma 
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analysed the concept of ‘force’ in article 2(4), Corten refrains from stating an opinion about 
whether the concept of ‘force’ extends further than armed force, deliberately leaving the 
question open.80  
Weapons	
The ICJ has confirmed that article 2(4) does ‘not refer to specific weapons’; articles 2(4), 51 
and 42 of the UN Charter ‘apply to any use of force regardless of the weapons employed’.81 
The ICJ’s view has been affirmed by States in the comment to article 3(b) of the 1974 
Definition of Aggression. Article 3(b) 1974 Definition of Aggression lists as an act of 
aggression: ‘Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another 
State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State’ (emphasis 
added). The comment annotated to article 3(b) refers to paragraph 20 of the 1974 GA Special 
Committee report, which states: ‘the Special Committee agreed that the expression “any 
weapons” is used without making a distinction between conventional weapons, weapons of 
mass destruction and any other kind of weapon.’ This makes clear States’ agreement that at 
least with respect to aggression (and there is no apparent reason it should not extend to all 
illegal uses of force), the type of weapon used does not affect the lawfulness of the use of 
force under the jus contra bellum. Although explicitly referring to use of weapons, this term 
is broadly understood in the annotated comment of the Special Committee. It could also 
further be argued that as article 3(b) of the 1974 Definition is referring to the most serious 
uses of force (i.e. aggression), it is not necessary that all uses of force (those below the 
threshold of an act of aggression) should require the employment of a weapon. In any event, 
the ICJ’s well-known statement does not explicitly state that a weapon must be employed for 
an act to fall under article 2(4) of the UN Charter, merely that no specific weapon is referred 
to by article 2(4), and that article 2(4) applies ‘to any use of force regardless of the weapons 
employed.’ Although this does imply that some kind of weapon should be employed, it is not 
explicitly stated. Apparently, then, the type of weapon is not relevant to whether an act falls 
under the scope of article 2(4). But this still leaves the question: is the use of a weapon 
required at all for an act to fall under the prohibition of the use of force in article 2(4), and if 
so, what is a ‘weapon’? 
 
et al (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A commentary (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed., 2012) 200, 208, 
MN16; Claus Kreß, ‘The State Conduct Element’ in Claus Kreß and Stefan Barriga (eds), The Crime of 
Aggression: A Commentary (Cambridge University Press, 2017) 412; Mary Ellen O’Connell, ‘The Prohibition 
of the Use of Force’ in Nigel D White and Christian Henderson (eds), Research Handbook on International 
Conflict and Security Law : jus ad bellum, jus in bello and jus post bellum (Elgar, 2013) 89, 101; Christian 
Henderson, The Use of Force and International Law (Cambridge University Press, 1 edition, 2018), 55: the 
travaux préparatoires of the UN Charter, subsequent resolutions and subsequent State practice 'would seem to 
confirm that the prohibition is targeted towards armed force, to the exclusion of the other types of force.' 
80 Instead, he focuses on whether there is a threshold for conduct to qualify as a ‘use of force’ as opposed to a 
‘simple police measure’, arguing in the affirmative. Olivier Corten, The Law against War : The Prohibition on 
the Use of Force in Contemporary International Law (Hart, 2010), 52-55. 
81 Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, Advisory Opinion 1996 ICJ Rep 226 (‘Nuclear Weapons’), 
para. 39. 
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Is	use	of	a	‘weapon’	required	by	article	2(4)?		
The question of whether a ‘weapon’ is required by article 2(4) and the definition of ‘weapon’ 
is particularly relevant to new forms of technology that may be used to commit acts of 
violence or create a military effect, such as cyber operations (for example, to attack satellite 
systems by spoofing telemetry data,82 the use of radio frequencies (for jamming and 
disrupting space systems including satellite signals – discussed further below), or an 
electromagnetic pulse to damage electrical power and control systems, which could lead to 
the meltdown of a nuclear reactor.83 Could these means be considered ‘weapons’, and is the 
use of a weapon required at all by article 2(4)? Of course, textually, in article 2(4) there is no 
mention of weapons. Any requirement for a ‘use of force’ to be effected by a ‘weapon’ must 
therefore derive from the interpretation of the term ‘use of force’ in that provision. As seen 
above, the ordinary meaning of the term also does not require the use of weapons, but merely 
‘physical strength or power exerted upon an object; esp. the use of physical strength to 
constrain the action of persons; violence or physical coercion’ and ‘violent means’.84 
What	is	a	‘weapon’?	
The answer to whether a ‘use of force’ requires the use of a weapon is made clearer when one 
considers what a ‘weapon’ is. Some objects (conventional weapons, weapons of mass 
destruction) are clearly understood to be weapons because they are created, designed and 
employed to achieve physical damage. But almost anything can achieve physical damage 
depending on how it is used – so it is either its employed function (which could entail an 
element of hostile intent) and/or its effect (the harm or damage caused) that determines its 
character as a ‘weapon’. As Christian Henderson notes, ‘[t]he design of an object as a 
weapon does not appear to be the determining factor as to whether an action constitutes 
'force'; rather a weapon is instead "a thing designed or used for inflicting bodily harm or 
physical damage”.’85 Take the example of an unarmed ballistic missile, such as the Hwasong-
12 ballistic missiles that it is believed North Korea launched on 28 August and 15 September 
2017 over Hokkaido, Japan.86 These appear to be single-stage intermediate-range ballistic 
missile designed to deliver a payload of a single (conventional or nuclear) warhead.87 An 
 
82 Kazuto Suzuki, ‘A Japanese Perspective on Space Deterrence and the Role of the U.S.-Japan Alliance and 
Deterrence in Outer Space’ (RAND Corporation, 2017) 91-97: ‘Spoofing is a technique to provide false 
information about a satellite’s location, position, and health (in this case, its mechanical condition). It can be 
done by either hacking satellite frequencies or providing false signals to ground station networks. , which ‘can 
direct the satellite onto a collision course with another satellite’. 
83 This possibility was mentioned by the ICJ in its Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, above n.81, para. 35, 
though in the context of the electromagnetic pulse generated by nuclear weapons. 
84 “Force, n.1.” OED Online. Oxford University Press. Accessed February 26, 2018. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/72847#eid4006249. 
85 Above n.79, 56, citing the OED with emphasis added and Black's Law Dictionary for the definition of 
‘weapon’. He also notes the Stuxnet attack and that 'a computer may be used as a weapon for inflicting physical 
damage.' 57, citation omitted. 
86 Arms Control Association, ‘Chronology of US-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy’ (2018), 
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron, accessed 29 October 2018. 
87 38 North, ‘A Quick Technical Analysis of the Hwasong-12’ (19 May 2017), 
http://www.38north.org/2017/05/hwasong051917/, accessed 29 October 2018. 
  123 
intermediate or long-range ballistic missile is a large, high-speed rocket-fuel propelled 
projectile and so, even unarmed, could be employed as a ‘weapon’. On the other hand, the 
unarmed missiles themselves are weapons delivery systems that do not actually carry 
weapons. In other words, an unarmed missile does not belong to the category of conventional 
weapon, but it has features that allow it to be employed in a way that will achieve the same 
effect as conventional weapons if it strikes a target (namely, the kinetic energy of the missile 
will be transferred to the object that it strikes, the friction will ignite the rocket fuel and the 
missile will explode). Therefore, to be employed as a weapon, an unarmed ballistic missile 
must have a physical effect, which it would only have by actually striking a target (as 
opposed to its usual function and effect of describing a ballistic trajectory and landing in 
water).88 Therefore it is submitted that it is not helpful to speak of ‘weapons’, since in the 
discussion of what is a ‘weapon’ and whether use of a ‘weapon’ is required, ‘weapons’ is 
really a symbol/signifier standing for other potential requirements for an act to constitute a 
prohibited use of force under article 2(4), namely, kinetic/physical means; kinetic/physical 
effects; type/object of harm; directness of harm and possibly, hostile intent and gravity. These 
elements will now be considered. 
Kinetic/physical	means	
‘Kinetic’ is defined as ‘[p]roducing or causing motion’.89 Although the scholarly literature 
often refers to ‘kinetic force’, it is more accurate to speak of kinetic energy and the transfer or 
release of kinetic energy to other objects. In conventional weapons, the transfer of kinetic 
energy occurs when, for example, when a bullet that is discharged from a firearm strikes an 
object and transfers its kinetic energy to that object in the form of kinetic energy and heat, 
causing physical damage. Examples that may fall under the category of forcible act through 
employing means other than the release of kinetic energy may include cyber operations,90 
certain types of interference with space systems including satellite systems such as 
‘deliberate interference and “soft kill” techniques, such as laser dazzling and radio frequency 
jamming’91 or spoofing,92 non-conventional weapons such as chemical, biological or nuclear 
weapons,93 use of the environment as a weapon94 such as diverting a river or spreading a fire 
 
88 In the absence of any physical effect, in this author’s view, the missile passing through airspace would not 
violate article 2(4) because there is no use of armed/physical force. It is more likely that an unarmed ballistic 
missile passing through another State’s airspace would be denounced as a violation of UN Security Council 
resolutions (in the case of North Korea), a violation of sovereignty and possibly responded to as an imminent 
armed attack (i.e. shot down). If the missile does not land or hit any target within the State it is overflying, then 
in the absence of physical effect then arguably it would not be a violation of the prohibition of the use of force 
in article 2(4). 
89 “Kinetic, Adj. and N.” OED Online. Oxford University Press. Accessed February 26, 2018. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/103498. 
90 For an overview, see Marco Roscini, Cyber Operations and the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2014). 
91 Dean Cheng, ‘Space Deterrence, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and Asian Security: A U.S. Perspective’ (RAND 
Corporation, 2017) 74, 78. 
92 Suzuki, above n.82, 97. 
93 On the characteristics and effects of nuclear weapons, see Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, above n.81, 
para. 35: ‘The Court has noted the definitions of nuclear weapons contained in various treaties and accords. It 
  124
across a border, and other measures such as contaminating a water source, releasing harmful 
substances into the air, and expulsion of populations.95  
 
Not all of these examples are necessarily ‘uses of force’ within the meaning of article 2(4) –
this is merely to illustrate the different means through which it is possible to create physical 
effects without the kinetic release of energy typically associated with a conventional weapon. 
One factor that may contribute to characterisation of some these non-‘kinetic’ means as a 
‘use of force’ is indeed their effect. In sum, it appears justified to take the position that 
physical means are not essential for an act to be characterised as a ‘use of force’ within the 
meaning of article 2(4), but rather a certain physical effect. Henderson argues that ‘a 
consideration of the effects of the action takes on a greater importance the further one moves 
away from what we might consider to be conventional weapons’.96 This approach also 
coincides with the Tallinn Manual’s commentary on the definition of the use of force with 
respect to cyber operations, which sets out indicative factors for whether a cyber operation is 
a ‘use of force’, focusing on its effects rather than its means.97 
Indirect	use	of	force	
In addition, with respect to means, the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration and the 1974 GA 
Definition of Aggression clearly demonstrate UN Member States’ subsequent agreement that 
the prohibition of the use of force in article 2(4) includes the following forms of indirect uses 
of force: ‘The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of 
another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a 
third State;’98 ‘The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or 
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to 
 
also notes that nuclear weapons are explosive devices whose energy results from the fusion or fission of the 
atom. By its very nature, that process, in nuclear weapons as they exist today, releases not only immense 
quantities of heat and energy, but also powerful and prolonged radiation. According to the material before the 
Court, the first two causes of damage are vastly more powerful than the damage caused by other weapons, while 
the phenomenon of radiation is said to be peculiar to nuclear weapons. These characteristics render the nuclear 
weapon potentially catastrophic. The destructive power of nuclear weapons cannot be contained in either space 
or time. They have the potential to destroy all civilization and the entire ecosystem of the planet. The radiation 
released by a nuclear explosion would affect health, agriculture, natural resources and demography over a very 
wide area. Further, the use of nuclear weapons would be a serious danger to future generations. Ionizing 
radiation has the potential to damage the future environment, food and marine ecosystem, and to cause genetic 
defects and illness in future generations.’ See also the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, 468. 
94 On ecological aggression, see Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry in Nuclear Weapons Advisory 
Opinion, ibid.,, 503. 
95 Brownlie, above n.78, 362-3, footnotes omitted: ‘More difficult to regard as a use of force are deliberate and 
forcible expulsion of population over a frontier, release of large quantities of water down a valley, and the 
spreading of fire through a built up area or woodland across a frontier.’ See also UN Security Council debates, 
1606th meeting, 4 December 1971, para. 161 in which India claimed that mass expulsions (India/Bangladesh) 
were a use of force. 
96 Above n.79, 59, e.g. cyber attacks and the arguments of some scholars that the physical effects are what 
count. 
97 Michael N. Schmitt (ed), Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), Commentary to rule 11, para. 9. 
98 1974 Definition of Aggression, article 3(f)). 
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amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein’;99 and ‘organizing or 
encouraging the organization of irregular armed forces or armed bands, including 
mercenaries, for incursion into the territory of another State’.100 These refer to indirectness of 
means, rather than of effects, and are discussed further in Chapter Eight (anomalous 
examples of ‘use of force’). 
Conclusion 
The above textual analysis of article 2(4) of the UN Charter supports the following 
conclusions regarding the interpretation of the term ‘use of force’ with respect to its required 
means: 
 
• Means: 
⁃ Type of force: Article 2(4) refers to physical force only, not to other non-
physical forms of coercion.  
 
⁃ Type of weapon: It is not necessary that a ‘weapon’ be used; what counts are 
the (physical) effects.  
 
⁃ Kinetic energy: It is not required that kinetic energy be released. 
 
⁃ Physical means: This is not essential, as what counts are the physical effects.  
 
The following chapter will explore the required physical effects of a ‘use of force’, as well as 
whether a particular intention is required. 
 
99 1974 Definition of Aggression, article 3(g). 
100 Friendly Relations Declaration, para. 8 of principle 1 (duty to refrain from the threat or use of force). 
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Chapter Seven: Elements of ‘use of 
force’ – Effects, gravity and intention 
Introduction 
This chapter will carry on the analysis of the meaning of a ‘use of force’ in article 2(4) with 
respect to its required effects, whether there is a gravity threshold for an unlawful use of 
force, and if a particular intent is required to bring a forcible act within the scope of this 
provision. 
Effects 
Since the conclusion of the previous chapter was that physical means are not required for a 
‘use of force’, the primary argument advanced in this section is that it is the effects of a ‘use 
of force’ that are determinative of its characterisation as such, rather than the means.1 What 
then is the required effect for an act to fall within the scope of the prohibition of the use of 
force in article 2(4)? This section will discuss the type of effects that may result in an act 
being characterised as a ‘use of force’ under article 2(4), namely, whether a (potential) 
physical effect is required; if such effect should be permanent; the required object or target 
that must experience the effect and the required level of directness between the means 
employed and these effects. 
Physical	effects	only?		
Since the prohibition of the use of force in article 2(4) undoubtedly covers the use of 
chemical, biological and nuclear weapons,2 a kinetic release of energy is clearly not always 
 
1 For a different (policy- rather than legal-based) argument that the consequences (i.e. effects) of a ‘use of force’ 
are what count, see Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: 
Thoughts on a Normative Framework (1999) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law vol. 37, 1998-99, 900-23. 
2 Brownlie considers that with respect to the use of such ‘weapons which do not involve any explosive effect 
with shock waves and heat involves a use of force [such as] bacteriological, biological, and chemical devices 
such as poison gas and ‘nerve gases’, these could be regarded as a use of force on two grounds, firstly that they 
are ‘commonly referred to as “weapons”’, and secondly, ‘the fact that these weapons are employed for the 
destruction of life and property, and are often described as “weapons of mass destruction”.’ Ian Brownlie, 
International Law and the Use of Force by States (Clarendon, 1963), 362. 
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required for an act to fall within the scope of the prohibition. It is argued that relevant effects 
with respect to a prohibited ‘use of force’ are physical effects on certain kinds of targets, 
namely, human life and tangible objects (such as property).3 The question of the object of a 
use of force (i.e. the object that experiences the effects of the use of force) will be considered 
further below. First, why is a physical effect required? As established above, article 2(4) is 
interpreted as referring to physical force – not necessarily through a kinetic release of energy, 
but something with a physical effect causing (potential) harm. This is also why an unarmed 
missile passing through a State’s airspace is probably not a prohibited use of force (although 
depending on the circumstances, it may be perceived by the territorial State as an imminent 
armed attack), since there is no damaging physical effect but only the violation of sovereignty 
and territorial integrity. However, there are some notable exceptions to the requirement that a 
prohibited ‘use of force’ have a physical effect, such as an unresisted invasion, and 
potentially, certain forms of non-kinetic and indirect uses of force such as interfering with 
satellites and jamming or disrupting radio or television signals.4 These exceptions and their 
implications for the interpretation of a ‘use of force’ under article 2(4) are discussed in more 
detail in Part III below. In the meantime, suffice it to say that although a physical effect may 
not always be required in order for an act to constitute a prohibited ‘use of force’, non-
physical effects alone (such as psychological, economic or more abstract forms of harm) are 
not likely to be legally relevant to the determination of whether an act is a ‘use of force’. 
 
If it is accepted that a physical effect is (usually) required for an act to constitute a ‘use of 
force’ within the meaning of article 2(4) of the UN Charter, then the next question is the 
nature of the required physical effect. The next sections will evaluate this by discussing the 
following factors: if the object/target of a prohibited use of force is confined to persons or 
property only; the required level of directness between the act and its harmful effect; whether 
the effect should be permanent or if temporary effects will suffice and if the effect should 
actually ensue or if merely potential effects count. 
Physical	harm	to	persons	or	objects	
Although it is clear that a forcible act that directly results in physical harm to persons or 
property (and that meets the other requirements of article 2(4)) will be characterised as a ‘use 
of force’ under article 2(4)5 there is nothing explicit in the text of article 2(4) itself that 
restricts its scope to certain objects of harm. Henderson states ‘it may also be that humans are 
neither killed or injured, nor property damaged or destroyed, when the prohibition is 
 
3 For a discussion of whether uses of force against the natural environment not forming part of the territory of 
any State fall within the scope of article 2(4), see Chapter Five, ‘international relations’. 
4 See Chapter Six. 
5 Michael N. Schmitt (ed), Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), Commentary to rule 11, para. 8: '[a]cts that injure or kill persons or damage or destroy 
objects are unambiguously uses of force’. 
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engaged’.6 This is due to the emphasis in article 2(4) on territorial integrity or political 
independence, which does not require harm to persons or property. This is a similar argument 
to the one presented in Chapter Five with respect to the interpretation of ‘international 
relations’ and whether uses of force against objects with no nexus to another State fall within 
the scope of the prohibition. It is submitted that the object or target of the ‘use of force’ is 
therefore relevant to both elements: whether the act is in ‘international relations’, and 
whether it is in fact a ‘use of force’. A forcible act that causes damage to something other 
than a person or an object is likely to fall outside the scope of the prohibition on both counts. 
With respect to the second element (‘use of force’), during the 1964 meeting of the Friendly 
Relations Special Committee, ‘[i]t was … pointed out that force could not be exercised in the 
abstract; when used, it was directed against an international legal entity, including its political 
organization, population and territory’.7 More abstract forms of harm such as breaking a 
diplomatic bag8 or an unauthorised visit by a Head of State such as the visit by Turkish prime 
minister Ahmet Davutoglu to visit an Ottoman tomb within Syrian border on 10 May 2015, 
which the Syrian government called ‘a clear aggression’,9 are unlikely to be widely 
considered by States as a ‘use of force’, and will fall instead under other legal principles such 
as the principle of non-intervention. 
Directness	
The physical effect of a ‘use of force’ must be ‘sufficiently direct’.10 The commentary to rule 
11 in the Tallinn Manual (definition of ‘use of force’ with respect to cyber operations) 
suggests that the criterion of directness relates to States’ perception of the military nature of 
the act, since ‘[i]n armed actions … cause and effect are closely related’.11 Directness here 
refers not to the time elapsed between the use of force and its effect (since in the case of 
nuclear weapons12 or cyber operations13 for example, some or all of the most damaging 
 
6 Christian Henderson, The Use of Force and International Law (Cambridge University Press, 1 edition, 2018), 
59. 
7 UN Doc A/5746, 16 November 1964, para. 37. 
8 Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (Cambridge University Press, 5th ed., 2011), 208. 
9 Reuters, ‘Turkish Prime Minister’s Visit to Tomb in Syria Likely to Anger Damascus’ The Guardian, 11 May 
2015 <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/11/turkish-prime-ministers-visit-to-tomb-in-syria-likely-
to-anger-damascus>. 
10 Claus Kreß, ‘The State Conduct Element’ in Claus Kreß and Stefan Barriga (eds), The Crime of Aggression: 
A Commentary (Cambridge University Press, 2017) 412, 425. 
11 Para 9. 
12 It is noted by Judge Weeramantry in his dissenting opinion in the Legality of the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 ICJ Rep 226, 469 (citation omitted) that: ‘Unlike other weapons, whose direct 
impact is the most devastating part of the damage they cause, nuclear weapons can cause far greater damage by 
their delayed after-effects than by their direct effects. The detailed technical study, Environmental 
Consequences of Nuclear War, while referring to some uncertainties regarding the indirect effects of nuclear 
war, states: "What can be said with assurance, however, is that the Earth's human population has a much greater 
vulnerability to the indirect effects of nuclear war, especially mediated through impacts on food productivity 
and food availability, than to the direct effects of nuclear war itself."’ 
13 A main characteristic of cyber operations is ‘that they often produce the intended prejudicial effects indirectly 
as the consequence of the alteration, deletion, or corruption of data or software or the loss of functionality of 
infrastructure.’: Marco Roscini, Cyber Operations and the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2014) 49, citing Harrison Dinniss. 
  129 
effects may be delayed) but rather to proximity, i.e. the lack of intermediate steps between 
the action and its result. This means that the use of force should be the proximate cause of 
harm. This excludes non-physical ‘force’ such as cyber operations adversely affecting 
financial markets or the electricity grid. The problem with including such acts within the 
scope of article 2(4) is a lack of sufficient directness of the physical effects, rather than the 
effects themselves, since clearly interruptions to a power supply of, for instance, a nuclear 
power plant or a hospital can lead to physical harm to persons and property, or in the case of 
interruption of power supply or radio signals to a military facility, this could yield a military 
advantage to the attacking State. It is worth noting however that it is likely that such acts 
would not occur in isolation but would be combined with more conventional use of force, 
thereby rendering the question moot. 
Permanent	and	temporary	effects	
The text of article 2(4) does not reveal whether the effects of an act must be permanent or 
temporary for it to be characterised as a ‘use of force’. The Tallinn Manual does not explicitly 
list permanence of effects as a criteria for characterising a cyber operation as a ‘use of force’, 
but the application of its listed criteria (severity, immediacy, directness, invasiveness, 
measurability of effects, military character, State involvement and presumptive legality) 
would implicitly include certain cyber operations with only temporary effects, for example if 
there is a severe and immediate effect of a military character.14 Acts which do not cause 
permanent damage but which could potentially be regarded as a ‘use of force’ include cyber 
operations such as Denial of Service (‘The non-availability of computer resources to the 
intended or usual customers of a computer service, normally as a result of a cyber 
operation.’)15 and non-kinetic, non-cyber operations that interfere with satellites such as 
‘dazzling, the use of narrowly focused beams of energy, such as lasers or other types of light, 
to temporarily or permanently blind satellites’ and ‘use of rendezvous and docking 
technologies.’16  
 
For instance, Kazuto Suzuki notes that 
 
‘[j]amming space-based or terrestrial receivers of satellite signals by overwhelming them 
with energy is one way to interfere with space-based communication, GPS signals, and 
radio frequency sensors. In 2013, for example, North Korea directed a very strong radio 
frequency signal toward South Korea to disrupt GPS signals. This mass-scale jamming 
caused huge confusion for air traffic and other vital socioeconomic infrastructures’.17 
 
 
14 Commentary to rule 11, para 9. 
15 Tallinn Manual, above n.5, 212. 
16 ‘A Japanese Perspective on Space Deterrence and the Role of the U.S.-Japan Alliance and Deterrence in 
Outer Space’ (RAND Corporation, 2017) 91, 97. 
17 Ibid., 97. 
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It is important to note that it is not clear if these acts which cause temporary physical effects 
would be considered uses of force by States. For instance, in response to further GPS 
disruption by the DPRK in 2016, South Korea wrote in a letter to the UN Security Council 
that ‘[t]he GPS jamming by DPRK is an act of provocation that poses a threat to the security 
of the Republic of Korea’,18 but did not invoke the language of article 2(4) of the UN Charter 
or the right of self-defence under article 51. Uses of force which have only temporary effects 
are not excluded from a textual interpretation of article 2(4), but it remains to be seen whether 
subsequent practice of States will demonstrate their agreement regarding such an 
interpretation. Significant problems of attribution for these types of non-kinetic operations 
may complicate State’s response and legal characterisation of these acts.  
 
It is interesting to consider whether acts with temporary effects would require a higher 
gravity threshold (or some other factor) to qualify as a prohibited use of force – in the 
examples above of cyber attacks and interference with satellites, it is the gravity (e.g.  
military nature) of the effects or of the potential effects (e.g. in the case of GPS disruption, 
potential aviation disasters) that seems to be important rather than the actual direct 
(temporary) damage/disruption of function. However, answering this question would require 
a detailed analysis of subsequent State practice to determine if it demonstrates their 
agreement on whether uses of force with temporary effects suffice to fall within the scope of 
article 2(4) of the UN Charter. With increasing reliance by States on satellite technology (for 
instance, the reliance of the United States on satellite technology with respect to its military 
presence and potential military operations in geographically distant theatres such as the South 
China Sea19), it is entirely plausible that even acts with only a temporary effect of disabling 
or interfering with space systems may in future be treated by States as violating the 
prohibition of the use of force. 
Actual	or	potential	effects	
The wording of article 2(4) of the UN Charter with respect to the threat or use of force is 
distinguished from article 51 regarding temporality. The phrase ‘if an armed attack occurs’ 
has been the subject of much controversy and debate as to whether it limits the right of self-
defence to after an armed attack ‘occurs’.20 However, article 2(4) does not mention effects or 
temporality at all (which is sensible given that unlike article 51, it does not define conditions 
for the exercise of a right), but only refers to the terms ‘threat’ and ‘use’ of force. It is 
therefore textually ambiguous whether any physical effect (i.e. harm) must actually ensue 
 
18 Letter dated 5 April 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations 
addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2016/315, para. 2. 
19 Dean Cheng, ‘Space Deterrence, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and Asian Security: A U.S. Perspective’ (RAND 
Corporation, 2017) 74, 75. 
20 The International Law Association Committee on the Use of Force 2018 Report notes that ‘The ensuing 
debate over the legality of anticipatory self-defence has been one of the most hotly contested issues surrounding 
the right to self-defence under international law.’ 18 with further references 
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from such acts for them to fall within the scope of the prohibition of the use of force, or if it 
is sufficient if there is a potential for physical effects/harm to result. 
 
One recent incident which illustrates the difference between actual and potential effects of a 
forcible act is the alleged assassination attempt of the former Russian spy Sergei Skripal in 
Salisbury, UK on 4 March 2018. Mr Skripal and his daughter Yulia were found unconscious 
on a bench in Salisbury and later hospitalised in serious condition together with an attending 
police officer. Traces of the nerve agent Novichok were later discovered at nine sites around 
Salisbury, with the highest concentration on the doorknob of Mr Skripal’s home. The United 
Kingdom alleged that a military-grade Novichok nerve agent of a type developed by Russia 
was used in the attack and accused Russia of being responsible for carrying out the attack. 
The Russian government denied any involvement.21 In a statement to the House of Commons 
on 14 March 2018, UK Prime Minister Theresa May said that the UK government had given 
Russia one day to account for the incident, and stated: ‘Should there be no credible response, 
we will conclude that this action amounts to an unlawful use of force by the Russian State 
against the United Kingdom. … this attempted murder using a weapons-grade nerve agent in 
a British town was … an indiscriminate and reckless act against the United Kingdom, putting 
the lives of innocent civilians at risk.’22 On 14 March 2018, the UK Ambassador Jonathan 
Allen, in a briefing to the UN Security Council, stated that the UK ‘conclude[d] that the 
Russian State was responsible for the attempted murder of Mr Skripal and his daughter, and 
Police Officer Nick Bailey, and for threatening the lives of other British citizens in Salisbury’ 
and described it as ‘an unlawful use of force – a violation of article two of the United Nations 
charter, the basis of the international legal order.’23 
 
Although it was not taken up in those terms by any other State, one basis for such a 
characterisation is likely to be the potential effects which were emphasised by the UK in the 
Security Council, namely, that ‘British Police Officer Nick Bailey, was … exposed and 
remains in hospital in a serious condition. Hundreds of British citizens have been potentially 
exposed to this nerve agent in what was an indiscriminate and reckless act against the United 
Kingdom.’ Marc Weller argues that the UK’s position is implicitly that ‘any use of toxins 
would amount to a use of force, due to their potential (rather than actual) widespread and 
indiscriminate effects’.24 This incident therefore provides an illustration of how the type of 
 
21 ‘Russian Spy: What Happened to the Skripals?’ BBC News (18 April 2018) <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-
43643025> accessed 11 May 2018. 
22 ‘PM Commons Statement on Salisbury Incident Response: 14 March 2018’ (GOV.UK) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-commons-statement-on-salisbury-incident-response-14-march-
2018> accessed 9 May 2018. See also the UK’s briefing to the North Atlantic Council in which it described the 
incident as an ’indiscriminate and reckless attack against the United Kingdom, putting the lives of innocent 
civilians at risk.’: NATO, ‘Statement by the North Atlantic Council on the Use of a Nerve Agent in Salisbury’ 
(NATO) <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_152787.htm> accessed 9 May 2018. 
23 ‘The Russian State Was Responsible for the Attempted Murder...and for Threatening the Lives of Other 
British Citizens in Salisbury’ (GOV.UK) <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-russian-state-was-
responsible-for-the-attempted-murderand-for-threatening-the-lives-of-other-british-citizens-in-salisbury> 
accessed 9 May 2018. 
24 ‘An international use of force in Salisbury’, 14 March 2018, EJIL Talk. 
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weapon and potential harm may be considered significant factors determining 
characterisation or not as a ‘use of force’ under article 2(4) despite the low level of actual 
harm that actually resulted. However, the practice is mixed and insufficient to draw a definite 
conclusion regarding whether potential harmful effects would suffice to constitute a 
prohibited ‘use of force’ under article 2(4), since even though there are some notable 
examples of merely potential effects being treated as a ‘use of force’ and even an ‘armed 
attack’, such as the attempted assassination of former US President George Bush in Kuwait in 
1993 (discussed in Chapter Nine),25 of recent alleged State-sponsored assassinations and 
attempted assassinations involving the use of radioactive (Litvenenko) or chemical weapons 
(Skripal, and the assassination of Kim Jong-nam allegedly by North Korean agents in 
Malaysia on 13 February 2017 with XV nerve agent)), article 2(4) was only invoked in 
relation to the latter and only by one State (the UK).26 
 
In sum, it is unclear if potential effects would suffice to meet the requirements of article 2(4). 
It may be that acts with merely potential effects would only meet the threshold of a ‘use of 
force’ under article 2(4) if they occur in combination with other elements, such as a higher 
gravity of the potential effects (or possibly, higher gravity of character due to the use of a 
prohibited weapon), a clear hostile or coercive intention, or a particularly close connection 
between another State and the potential object/target of the act. Interestingly, these 
considerations may also (or instead) relate to the element of ‘international relations’, since 
the targeted (attempted) killing of an individual may rise to the level of an international 
incident due to the use of a prohibited weapon with serious potential effects for the 
population of the territorial State. The notion of a combined threshold of elements for an act 
to constitute a ‘use of force’ and the relationship between the elements of a ‘use of force’ and 
contextual elements such as ‘international relations’ is explored in more detail in Chapter 
Nine. 
Conclusion	
It is clear that forcible acts with direct (i.e. sufficiently proximate) physical effects on persons 
or objects may constitute a ‘use of force’ and fall within the scope of the prohibition of the 
use of force in article 2(4) if the other requirements of that provision are met. However, as 
noted above, there are some exceptions to this requirement for direct physical effects. These 
exceptions and their implications for the meaning of a prohibited ‘use of force’ under article 
2(4) are the subject of further analysis further below in Chapters Eight and Nine. With 
respect to those acts that do have a physical effect – it is submitted, the vast majority of acts 
which constitute a ‘use of force’ – it is textually unclear and remains to be seen through the 
subsequent practice of States if forcible acts with only temporary effects would fall within the 
 
25 Henderson observes in relation to this example that ‘mere attempts to use force by one state against another 
have been construed as armed attacks, and therefore by implication a use of force in breach of the prohibition.’ 
Above n.6, 59. 
26 Weller, above n.24. 
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scope of the prohibition in article 2(4). It is similarly legally uncertain if forcible acts with 
potential but unrealised effects would suffice to constitute a prohibited ‘use of force’ under 
article 2(4). It is likely that other elements of a ‘use of force’ will be decisive for determining 
whether such acts meet the definition of this term. The rest of this chapter will now consider 
if there is a requirement for a particular gravity or intention for a prohibited ‘use of force’. 
Gravity 
It is debated amongst legal scholars whether there is a ‘de minimis’ gravity threshold for a 
prohibited use of force under article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The concept of a gravity 
threshold for prohibited uses of force under article 2(4) of the UN Charter is a hotly contested 
topic in three respects: firstly, whether there is a lower gravity threshold that a forcible act 
must reach before it will constitute a ‘use of force’ and fall within the scope of article 2(4); 
secondly, if there is such a threshold, how high or low is it and how is it to be assessed; and 
thirdly, the implications of the previous two issues for the ‘gap conundrum’.  
 
This conundrum refers to the gap between the gravity threshold of an unlawful ‘use of force’ 
under article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and the gravity threshold of an ‘armed attack’ under 
article 51, which would permit a use of force in self-defence by the victim State. In the 
Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) found it ‘necessary to distinguish 
the most grave forms of the use of force (those constituting an armed attack) from other less 
grave forms’.27 The problem resulting from this approach was pointed out by Judge Jennings 
in that case:  
 
‘The original scheme of the United Nations Charter, whereby force would be deployed by 
the United Nations itself, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter, 
has never come into effect. Therefore an essential element in the Charter design is totally 
missing. In this situation it seems dangerous to define unnecessarily strictly the conditions 
for lawful self-defence, so as to leave a large area where both a forcible response to force 
is forbidden, and yet the United Nations employment of force, which was intended to fill 
that gap, is absent.’28  
 
Clearly then, the gravity threshold for prohibited uses of force is of utmost relevance to the 
permissibility question, with respect to acts falling below the threshold for an unlawful ‘use 
of force’ (and hence permissible under jus contra bellum) and with respect to acts above the 
threshold for a ‘use of force’ but not amounting to an ‘armed attack’ (in respect of which 
States are not permitted to respond using force under the jus contra bellum). It is a matter of 
controversy how high the gravity threshold for an ‘armed attack’ is.29 Notwithstanding where 
 
27 Case concerning Military and Paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of 
America), Merits, Judgment 1986 ICJ Reports 14 (‘Nicaragua Case’), para. 191. 
28 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Jennings, ibid., 533-534. 
29 See discussion in ILA Committee on the Use of Force 2018 Report, above n.20, 6. 
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the upper limit of the ‘gap’ between an unlawful ‘use of force’ under article 2(4) and an 
‘armed attack’ under article 51 falls, the lower limit of the gap – i.e. the lower threshold of a 
‘use of force’ – also affects the size of the gap between the two. A very low gravity threshold 
for an unlawful ‘use of force’ increases the size of the ‘gap’ and reduces the range of forcible 
measures lawfully available to States in their international relations, such as with respect to 
security measures. Conversely, a relatively high threshold of a prohibited ‘use of force’ 
reduces the size of the ‘gap’ but is also more permissive, since a wider range of forcible 
measures would be lawfully available to States before the prohibition in article 2(4) is 
engaged. Therefore, the view that one takes of a de minimis threshold for ‘use of force’ under 
article 2(4) is likely to be influenced by one’s position on the above matters, including one’s 
position on the appropriate balance between State security and international peace and 
security, which is liable to be affected by a more permissible regime of potentially escalatory 
forcible acts. The treatment of these matters by selected authors will be considered and 
analysed below.  
 
Ian Brownlie does not directly discuss the concept of a gravity threshold for article 2(4). He 
notes in relation to armed attack that  
 
‘[t]he real problem is to determine what is an attack or resort to force as a matter of law. A 
requirement stated by some writers is that the use of force must attain a certain gravity 
and that ‘frontier incidents’ are excluded. … from the point of view of assessing 
responsibility ex post facto, the distinction is only relevant in so far as the minor nature of 
an attack is prima facie evidence of absence of intention to attack, of honest mistake, or 
simply the limited objectives of an attack. When the justification of self-defence is raised 
the question becomes one of fact, viz., was the reaction proportionate to the apparent 
threat’.30 
 
This seems to indicate the view that the lower gravity intensity is an indicator of lack of 
intention, which is relevant to either whether it is actually an ‘armed attack’ (if intention is a 
criterion), or to the necessity of using force in self-defence. The relationship between gravity 
and intention is discussed in Chapter Nine. 
 
The more recent discussion by scholars including Olivier Corten,31 Tom Ruys32 and Mary 
Ellen O’Connell33 frames the question as to whether there is a ‘de minimis’ threshold for a 
use of force under article 2(4). A note on this terminology: in terms of legal doctrine, ‘de 
minimis’ is often short for ‘de minimis non curat lex’ – a common law principle available for 
 
30 Above n.2, 365-6, footnote omitted. 
31 Olivier Corten, The Law against War : The Prohibition on the Use of Force in Contemporary International 
Law (Hart, 2010). 
32 Tom Ruys, ‘The Meaning of “Force” and the Boundaries of the Jus Ad Bellum: Are “Minimal” Uses of Force 
Excluded from UN Charter Article 2 (4)?’ (2014) 108(2) American Journal of International Law 159. 
33 Mary Ellen O’Connell, ‘The Prohibition of the Use of Force’ in Nigel D White and Christian Henderson 
(eds), Research handbook on international conflict and security law : jus ad bellum, jus in bello and jus post 
bellum (Elgar, 2013) 89. 
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judges to apply to prevent the strict application of the law to trifles, but which does not render 
the conduct itself lawful.34 ‘The defence of de minimis does not mean that the act is justified; 
it remains unlawful, but on account of its triviality it goes unpunished.’35 It is an interesting 
question to consider whether this principle would even be applicable in proceedings before 
the ICJ regarding an article 2(4) violation claim. But it is interesting to consider the term’s 
origin and implications. For violations of the prohibition of the use of force, it is rare that 
legal claims are brought, and if we limit ourselves to those uses of force that are actually 
adjudicated, then we would probably find a much higher gravity threshold for uses of force 
since States are more likely to bring more grave cases with clearer evidence for adjudication 
given the risks, uncertainty and expense of litigation. However, the term ‘de minimis’ also 
can be used in the sense that it seems to be employed by Corten, Ruys and O’Connell. The 
Merriam-Webster dictionary defines ‘de minimis’ as ‘lacking significance or importance: so 
minor as to merit disregard’.36 It is in this latter sense that it is employed in the present 
discussion. 
 
The three scholars mentioned above devote considerable attention to the question of a de 
minimis threshold, and fundamentally disagree on this point. Corten and O’Connell take the 
position that the prohibition of the use of force contains a de minimis threshold; Ruys posits 
there is not. Corten argues that ‘it can be concluded that there is a threshold below which the 
use of force in international relations, while it may be contrary to certain rules of 
international law, cannot violate article 2(4). The conclusion holds not just on land but also at 
sea and in the air.’37 On land, he discusses hot pursuit, unlawful arrest and international 
abductions as police measures that fall outside the scope of law enforcement cooperation 
treaties as not being treated as violations of article 2(4).38 His discussion of police/military 
measures at sea makes a stronger distinction between police measures (hot pursuit, 
inspections, prevention of pollution) and the use of inter-State armed force.39 The discussion 
of measures in the air relate to illegal trespass and shooting down of airplanes as a police 
measure to guarantee air safety or in self-defence of individual aircraft (not the State).40 As to 
where to place the threshold, Corten argues that the factors determining this are: where the 
action took place (if within the State’s zone of jurisdiction or not –can it be considered as an 
enforcement measure within its jurisdiction?), and the context in which the action occurred 
(pre-existing inter-State tension or international dispute).41 
 
 
34 De Minimis Non Curat Lex Definition 
<http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/D/DeMinimisNonCuratLex.aspx>. 
35 2004 Supreme Court of Canada decision of Canadian Foundation for Youth v Attorney General, Justice B. 
Wilson, in dissent. 
36 De Minimis | Lacking Significance or Importance : So Minor as to Merit Disregard <http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/de minimis> accessed 29 October 2018. 
37 Above n.31, 55. 
38 Ibid., 53-5. 
39 Ibid., 55-60. 
40 Ibid., 60-7. 
41 Ibid., 73-4. 
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According to O’Connell, ‘under the best interpretation, Article 2(4) prohibits any use of 
armed force or armed force equivalent by a state against another state when the force 
involved is more than de minimis.’42 She excludes law/maritime enforcement, terrorist 
attacks by or attributable to States, limited force to rescue hostages, border incursions and 
serious violations of maritime space including submarines in territorial waters, shooting 
down planes (e.g. Gulf of Sidra incident) and cyber operations from the scope of article 2(4). 
‘[T]he type of force associated with law enforcement does not come within the Article 2(4) 
prohibition. Shooting across the bow of a ship, shooting at the legs of a person evading arrest 
and dropping a bomb on an oil tanker to prevent coastal pollution are all examples of such 
minimal or de minimis armed force.’43 She bases this conclusion on the interpretation of ICJ 
judgements (namely, the Corfu Channel case, Nicaragua case, Oil Platforms case, the Wall 
Advisory Opinion and the DRC v Uganda case)44 and examples from State practice which do 
not consider opinio juris, and acknowledges that ‘[t]here is no express authority on the 
point’.45 Examples of State practice that O’Connell provides include the 1981 Gulf of Sidra 
incident (in which the US shot down Libyan planes); the 31 March 1999 border incursion by 
three US soldiers into Serbia; Iranian detention of British sailors in 2007 during Iraq war; 
North Korean Navy submarines in Japanese territorial waters, and the 1982 Swedish attempt 
to bring a submarine to the surface with depth charges and mines. With respect to the latter, 
she states that ‘[p]lainly the use of depth charges and mines constitutes armed force, but in 
this case the use did not violate Article 2(4) because it was a minimal use to detain the 
submarine.’46 This example makes it seem though that it is not the amount or intensity of 
force or its (potential) effects that are relevant to determining whether the threshold is met, 
but its purpose. 
 
In contrast to Corten and O’Connell, Ruys argues there is no de mininis threshold for a ‘use 
of force’ under article 2(4). He disagrees with Corten that minimal uses of force within a 
State’s own territory are justified by law enforcement rights under other legal regimes for 
land/sea/air, because ‘[n]one of the conventions cited provides a legal basis for forcible 
action against unlawful territorial incursions by military or police forces of another state.’47 
He argues that there are theoretical reasons against the idea that there is a gravity threshold 
for article 2(4): armed confrontations between police/military of two States involve 
‘international relations’, and the law enforcement paradigm is hierarchical and therefore not 
suited to equal sovereigns.48 It also cannot be justified by reference to other legal 
frameworks. According to Ruys, Corten's arguments depend heavily on omission –States 
failing to protest or raise article 2(4)/article 51 as indicating their opinio juris that those 
provisions do not apply.  
 
42 Above n.33, 99. 
43 Ibid., 102, footnote omitted. 
44 Ibid., 102-104. 
45 Ibid., 102. 
46 Ibid., 106. 
47 Above n.32, 181. 
48 Ibid., 180. 
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Christian Henderson makes a more nuanced observation about a de minimis gravity 
threshold, noting ‘the de minimis threshold is normally based upon the distinction between 
law enforcement actions and uses of force’,49 and that this distinction is more complex than 
whether a certain gravity threshold is met.50 He observes that it is not a matter of ‘quantifying 
the use of force’51 in terms of its gravity, but rather determining whether ‘international 
relations’ are engaged, at which point the prohibition of the use of force becomes 
applicable.52 Henderson argues that 'the gravity of the use of force against such private actors 
does not by itself determine the applicability of the prohibition … Indeed, it is more a 
qualitative – state or private – as opposed to quantitative – small- or large-scale – distinction, 
making a clear de minimis threshold hard to discern' and that ‘when the "international 
relations" between states are engaged there is little state practice supportive of a de minimis 
threshold in the context of incidences involving armed force.’53  
 
This author takes a slightly different view to Henderson. It is submitted that with respect to 
the prohibition of the use of force, gravity of effects is relevant to two separate elements of 
article 2(4). Firstly, it is relevant to the contextual element of whether the act occurs in 
‘international relations’. For example, acts of a higher gravity are more likely to be perceived 
by States as of a military rather than, for instance, of a law enforcement nature, and thus as 
engaging their international relations (discussed in Chapter Nine). Also, acts of higher gravity 
may evince a hostile or coercive intention (discussed in the following section) with respect to 
another State and thus engage ‘international relations’ on that basis. The second point of 
relevance to gravity is to the question of whether the act constitutes a ‘use of force’ at all. 
Since, as Ruys convincingly argues, State practice makes clear that when ‘international 
relations’ are engaged, ‘any actual armed confrontation between two states, even if small-
scale or localized, comes within the ambit of the jus ad bellum’,54 it does appear that there is 
no de minimis gravity threshold. However, gravity of effects remains a relevant factor in the 
assessment of whether an act constitutes a ‘use of force’. As the preceding discussion of 
effects noted, gravity may be an especially relevant factor converting some types of acts into 
a ‘use of force’, such as when the act has only temporary effects, or merely potential but 
unrealised effects. The relationship between these different elements of a ‘use of force’ and 
the contextual elements of article 2(4) such as ‘international relations’ is the subject of 
Chapter Nine and is explored through case studies of subsequent State practice. 
 
A further consideration is that the (perceived) gravity of a use of force is strongly influenced 
by the domain in which it takes place, namely, land, sea, air and outer space. These domains 
differ in the following relevant ways: firstly, the type of acts that are possible or frequent in 
 
49 Above n.6, 69. 
50 Ibid., 68-9, 74. 
51 Ibid., 68. 
52 Ibid., 74. 
53 Ibid., 74. 
54 Above n.32, 209. 
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those domains (e.g. interdiction of vessels, satellite interference); secondly; the perceived or 
actual security threat to the State (i.e. potential effects and security interests at stake); and 
thirdly, the legal rights and obligations of States under other legal frameworks (e.g. different 
maritime spaces under the law of the sea). Within several of these domains, it may also be 
relevant whether the forcible act took place vis-a-vis the States concerned: 
 
• within a State’s own territory (land/air/sea –internal waters, territorial waters); 
• within territory of another State (land/air/sea); 
• within territory governed by special regime allocating rights and duties between States 
(Exclusive Economic Zone and contiguous zone, international straits, archipelagic 
waters, etc); 
• within a space beyond the territory of any State (international airspace/high 
seas/Antarctica/outer space, the Moon and other celestial bodies); 
• on movable objects: ships, submarines, aircraft, spacecraft, satellites and other man-
made space objects registered to a State; or 
• on extra-territorial manifestations of the State: e.g., embassies and diplomatic 
premises and warships. 
 
As noted by Judge Alejandro Alvarez in the Corfu Channel case: 
 
‘Sovereignty confers rights upon States and imposes obligations on them. These rights are 
not the same and are not exercised in the same way in every sphere of international law. I 
have in mind the four traditional spheres-terrestrial, maritime, fluvial and lacustrine–to 
which must be added three new ones-aerial, polar and floating (floating islands). The 
violation of these rights is not of equal gravity in all these different spheres.’55 
Conclusion	
Ultimately, the controversy regarding the gravity threshold of a ‘use of force’ under article 
2(4) is not solved by the text of that provision, which neither specifies nor excludes a gravity 
threshold for an act to constitute a ‘use of force’ and therefore fall within the scope of the 
prohibition. Accordingly, the matter is uncertain at the legal of textual interpretation. The 
issue of whether article 2(4) has a de minimis gravity threshold depends on the subsequent 
practice of States in their application of this provision. The analysis of subsequent practice by 
other scholars in relation to this issue, especially by Corten and Ruys, demonstrates that the 
interpretation of this practice and the conclusion of whether a ‘use of force’ has a gravity 
threshold is strongly influenced by the position one takes regarding the legal significance of 
silence and inaction. This author finds Ruys’ analysis of State practice on this matter 
convincing and agrees that there is no de minimis gravity threshold as such for a prohibited 
‘use of force’ under article 2(4). However, this section has argued that gravity is nonetheless 
 
55 Corfu Channel, Merits, Judgment 1949 ICJ Reports 4 (‘Corfu Channel case’), Separate Opinion of Judge 
Alvarez, 43. 
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a relevant factor to an assessment of whether an act violates article 2(4) on two bases: firstly, 
as a factor relevant to whether the act occurs in ‘international relations’ (e.g., as an indicator 
of intention), and secondly, as a relevant factor to whether the act constitutes a ‘use of force’ 
for acts that may otherwise not meet the required threshold of the definition, for instance, 
because its effects are temporary, or only potential. The complex relationship between 
‘international relations’ and of gravity and intention as elements of a ‘use of force’ is 
illustrated in further detail in Chapter Nine through an analysis of State practice. 
Intention 
Although intention is regarded by some as a requirement for an ‘armed attack’ under article 
51 of the UN Charter,56 this is disputed, since hostile intent is perhaps better considered in 
terms of whether a use of force in self-defence in necessary.57 The picture is even less clear 
when it comes to a ‘use of force’ under article 2(4). According to the commentary to the 
International Law Commission (‘ILC’) Draft Articles on State Responsibility, intention is not 
a necessary requirement for an act to be internationally wrongful; whether intention is 
necessary depends on the obligation in question.58 It is not clear from the text of article 2(4) 
of the UN Charter if a prohibited ‘use of force’ entails a particular intention. Whether a 
particular intention is an element of a prohibited ‘use of force’ under article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter is illuminated by examining the other prohibition in that provision which is more 
clearly associated with coercion, namely, the ‘threat … of force’. This section will firstly 
explain the meaning of a prohibited ‘threat of force’, then look at whether it requires a 
coercive intent, and finally, consider whether this means that a prohibited ‘use of force’ 
mirrors such a requirement of a coercive intent. It will then canvass scholarly views on 
whether intent is an element of a prohibited ‘use of force’ and then analyse what kind of 
intention may be required and problems of evidence and proof.  
Intention	and	‘threat	…	of	force’		
The prohibition of the threat of force in article 2(4) has received relatively little treatment in 
scholarship59 and jurisprudence.60 A comprehensive analysis of the meaning of ‘threat of 
 
56 See Tom Ruys, ‘Armed Attack’ and Article 51 of the UN Charter (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 29 for 
an overview of ICJ case law and State practice in support of this position. 
57 ILA Committee on the Use of Force, ‘Final Report on Aggression and the Use of Force’ (2018), 6-7. 
58 See ILC, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of State for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, in 
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session’ (A/56/10, 2001) (‘ILC 
Draft Articles’), commentary to article 2, at paras. 3 and 10. Para 10: ‘In the absence of any specific requirement 
of a mental element in terms of the primary obligation, it is only the act of a State that matters, independently of 
any intention.’ 
59 See Romana Sadurska, ‘Threats of Force’ (1988) 82(2) The American Journal of International Law 23; 
Nikolas Stürchler, The Threat of Force in International Law (Cambridge University Press, Paperback ed., 
2009); Olivier Corten, The Law against War : The Prohibition on the Use of Force in Contemporary 
International Law (Hart, 2010), 92-125; Nicholas Tsagourias, ‘The Prohibition of Threats of Force’ in Nigel D 
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force’ in article 2(4) is given by Nikolas Stürchler, who argues that the term is presently 
indeterminate but nevertheless capable of concrete meaning. Stürchler summarises his 
interpretation of ‘threat … of force’ in article 2(4) as follows:61 
 
‘In order for there to be a violation of article 2(4), a state must credibly communicate its 
readiness to use force in a particular dispute. … The form of communication is 
irrelevant; specifically, article 2(4) outlaws (1) explicit promises to resort to force and (2) 
demonstrations of force, the latter defined as any militarised act that reveals hostile intent; 
and (3) the use of force may also constitute a threat of force if the purpose of a military 
operation is to signal that more force may be forthcoming. In judging a specific case, it is 
imperative to examine whether the diagnosis of a prior threat of force by one side does or 
does not alter the overall legal appraisal.’ 
Is	coercion	required	for	a	prohibited	‘threat	of	force’	under	article	2(4)?		
ICJ jurisprudence does not make clear whether coercion is required for an unlawful ‘threat of 
force’. The Corfu Channel case could be interpreted this way, since in that case, the ICJ held 
that the UK was entitled to make threats if the purpose was to deter Albania from firing on its 
ships, but it was not entitled to make a demonstration of force ‘for the purpose of exercising 
political pressure’ on Albania.62 However, this case is of little precedential value in 
determining the meaning of article 2(4), because it is so ambiguous and has been cited in 
support of diametrically opposed positions.63 
 
Stürchler argues that coercion is not an essential element of a prohibited ‘threat of force’. He 
notes that freedom of choice for States is protected in international law through the principle 
of non-intervention, but that ‘the regulation of force is still not formally linked to the idea of 
free choice’.64 Despite article 2(7) of the Charter, which guarantees States freedom of choice, 
the primary purpose of the UN Charter is the prevention of war rather than freedom of choice 
(i.e. from coercion).65 He gives the example of a war-mongering State that is no longer trying 
to ensure compliance with anything – a threat or use of force by that State is thus not coercive 
(no compliance is sought), but it is still unlawful.66 But coercion could still be a ‘strong 
 
White and Christian Henderson (eds), Research handbook on international conflict and security law : jus ad 
bellum, jus in bello and jus post bellum (Elgar, 2013) 67. 
60 Corfu Channel case, above n.55; Nicaragua case, above n.27; Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, above 
n.12. 
61 Above n.59, 273-4. 
62 Corfu Channel, Merits, Judgment 1949 ICJ Reports 4, 35; Stürchler , above n.59, 90. 
63 See Claus Kreß, ‘The International Court of Justice and the Non-Use of Force’ in Marc Weller (ed), The 
Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2015) 561, 575 (footnotes 
with further references omitted): ‘While the use of the term “force” may be taken to suggest that the ICJ 
implicitly qualified Operation Retail as an unlawful use of force, it is also possible to interpret the Court’s 
avoidance of any explicit reference to Article 2(4) as implying the view that the threshold for a use of force in 
its technical legal meaning had not been reached.’ 
64 Ibid., 60. 
65 Ibid., 61. 
66 Ibid., 61. 
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indicator of unlawfulness’67 in determining the unlawfulness of threats under article 2(4), in 
which case what distinguishes unlawful threats from unlawful intervention is the ‘military 
dimension’.68 The relevance of coercion as a criterion is in showing ‘that the threat of force is 
not, when properly understood, the mere preparation for the use of force.’69 Rather, threats 
can be ends in themselves by ensuring compliance at a much lower cost than an actual use of 
force.  
 
Romana Sadurska agrees that the prohibition of threats of force is aimed at international 
security rather than the individual liberty of each State from external pressure, noting that:  
 
‘Respect for the political independence of states is not even included among [the purposes 
of the UN Charter]. It is a principle that should be observed to further the purposes of the 
Organization, but it is not a purpose in itself. The Charter prohibits the use of force in 
violation of the political independence and territorial integrity of a state because it may 
lead to international instability, breach of the peace and/or massive abuses of human 
rights.’70 
 
On the whole, coercion is a strong indicator of unlawfulness of threats of force, but it is 
uncertain whether it constitutes an essential ingredient of a prohibited threat of force. Even if 
coercion were a necessary element of a prohibited threat of force, it would be unclear what 
consequence this would have for whether coercion is required for a prohibited use of force, as 
the two prohibitions of ‘threat’ and ‘use’ of force may be regarded as distinct and not as a 
continuum.  
Relationship	of	‘threat’	to	‘use’	of	force	
This leads to the question of the precise relationship between threats and uses of force in 
international law, and more precisely, whether threats and uses of force form a continuum or 
whether they are separate but related prohibitions (and therefore distinct concepts). This is 
relevant to the scope of a prohibited use of force under article 2(4) because if the prohibitions 
are distinct, then elements required for a prohibited threat of force need not necessarily be 
present for an act to constitute a prohibited use of force – such as coercion. The relationship 
between threats and uses of force under article 2(4) depends on two factors: firstly, whether 
these two prohibitions are viewed as coupled or uncoupled and secondly, whether the two 
prohibitions form a continuum or are distinct prohibitions.  
 
67 Ibid., 61. 
68 Ibid., 60. 
69 Ibid., 61. 
70 Above n. 59, 249-50, footnote omitted. 
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Coupled	vs.	uncoupled	
Stürchler identifies three possibilities for the direct relationship between ‘threat’ and ‘use’ of 
force in article 2(4).71 The first and mainstream position is that threats are coupled to a use of 
force, so that if the force threatened would be unlawful, the threat is unlawful.72 ICJ 
jurisprudence and State practice tends to confirm that threats and use of force are coupled, 
and that the threat of force is justified in self-defence.73 According to the ICJ in the Nuclear 
Weapons Advisory Opinion, ‘the notions of “threat” and “use” of force ... stand together in 
the sense that if the use of force itself in a given case is illegal – for whatever reason – the 
threat to use such force will likewise be illegal’.74  
 
The other two (minority) possibilities are that the prohibition of the threat of force and the 
use of force are uncoupled. These two related though opposed possibilities are predicated on 
differing models of international conflict, namely, the spiral and deterrence models of 
conflict.75 The first ‘uncoupled’ option emphasises that threats can spiral into armed conflict, 
and takes the position that threats are unlawful under any circumstances, even if the force 
threatened would be lawful, such as the threat to use force in self-defence.76 The second 
option holds that threats can serve peace through deterrence and are more justifiable than 
uses of force since the consequences are lower and threats are more likely than actual uses of 
force to be proportionate. Therefore, according to this view, as propounded by Romana 
Sadurska, threats to use force may be lawful even if the force threatened would be unlawful.77 
The basic idea is that the rationale behind prohibiting threats or use of force differs in its 
application to those two concepts, since uses of force are destabilising to international peace 
and security, whereas threats of force do not always have destructive effects (lower gravity) 
and can sometimes help maintain international security (purposes of UN Charter).78 This 
asymmetry theory has been critiqued as inconsistent with the UN Charter drafters’ intention 
and with State practice,79 although Stürchler cogently argues that ‘States rely on these themes 
[of the deterrence and spiral models of conflict] in order to judge the permissibility or 
otherwise of countervailing threats,’ especially in the context of protracted conflict.80     
Continuum	versus	distinct	prohibitions	
The ICJ's above statement in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion appears to interpret 
threats and uses of force form a continuum, as concepts that share the same elements but are 
 
71 Ibid., 38-64. 
72 Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (Clarendon, 1963), 36: ‘If the promise is to 
resort to force in conditions in which no justification for the use of force exists, the threat itself is illegal.’ 
73 Stürchler, above n. 59, 91. 
74 Above n.12, para. 47. 
75 Stürchler, above n. 59, 45-47. 
76 Stürchler, ibid. 
77 See Sadurska, above n. 59, Corten, above n.31, 111 ff critiques the asymmetry theory between threats and 
force put forward by Romana Sadurska by setting out State practice that is inconsistent with this argument. 
78 Sadurska, ibid., 250. 
79 E.g. Corten, above n.31, 111 ff critiques the asymmetry theory between threats and force put forward by 
Romana Sadurska by setting out State practice that is inconsistent with this argument. 
80 Stürchler, above n. 59, 250. 
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differentiated merely in form (with threats as a potential but as yet unrealised ‘use’ of force). 
Stürchler takes a different view and asserts that threats of force are a separate though related 
prohibition to the prohibition of the use of force. According to Stürchler, threats do not fit 
easily into a forcible intervention > use of force continuum since threats can be broken down 
along two axes of method (words/actions) and motivation (compellence/deterrence) – i.e. not 
all threats are forcible since they may but do not necessarily involve demonstrations of force, 
and some uses of force are better characterized as threats of further force; ‘the actual use of 
force, too, may occasionally constitute a threat of force’.81 Furthermore, threats may but do 
not necessarily involve coercion, and can be ends in themselves and not a prelude to use of 
force. Stürchler concludes: ‘The dichotomy of threat and use, as suggested by the formulation 
of article 2(4), is misleading. Although the threat and use of force are conceptually different, 
that does not mean that they exclude each other in the field.’82 
 
As can be seen from the above discussion, there are different views that can be taken on 
whether a ‘threat of force’ requires a coercive intention, and even if it does, whether this 
necessarily means that a ‘use of force’ also requires a coercive intention.  
Intention	and	the	‘use	of	force’	
Scholars have differing views on whether intention forms part of the criteria for a prohibited 
‘use of force’. Ian Brownlie argues that intention is not part of the criteria of prohibited use of 
force and believes this is a good thing, because to hold otherwise would create unacceptable 
loopholes in the prohibition.83 In contrast to Brownlie, Corten argues that ‘[s]uch an intention 
appears to be an essential characteristic of the use of force under the Charter’.84 Henderson 
also argues that ‘it is clear that there must be an intention to use force, or an animus 
belligerandi, in order to breach the prohibition of the threat or use of force’.85 Ruys notes that 
‘state practice reveals that, when faced with territorial incursions ostensibly or allegedly 
lacking hostile intent, territorial states often refrain from invoking the language of Article 
2(4) or 51.’86 However, he notes that this does not necessary reflect a legal conviction and 
that State responsibility is ‘objective’ so does not require intent unless this forms part of the 
primary rule.87 For small-scale incursions, Ruys states that ‘the key is to determine whether 
they reflect a hostile intent’ to exclude unintentional or harmless acts.88 With respect to law 
enforcement within a State’s own territory, Ruys argues that manifest hostile intent is 
sufficient but not necessary for an act to be a ‘use of force’.89 
 
81 Stürchler, above n. 59, 262. 
82 Stürchler, ibid., 262. 
83 Above n.2, 377. 
84 Above n.31, 76. 
85 Above n.6, 75. 
86 Above n.32, 189. 
87 Ibid., 190-1. 
88 Ibid., 172-173. 
89 Ibid., 190-1. 
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What	is	a	relevant	hostile	intention?	
Obviously, to speak of a mental state of an abstract entity such a State is a fiction, since 
States have neither a physical body nor mind and can only act indirectly through individuals. 
Therefore, a mental element attaching to a State obligation (in this case, to refrain from the 
‘use of force’ under article 2(4) of the UN Charter) would be satisfied if it is held by a person 
whose conduct is attributable to the State under the rules set out in the ILC Articles on State 
Responsibility relating to attribution.90 This could be either the individual using force (e.g. a 
soldier) or directing the use of force (a military commander or government officials). With 
respect to what is meant by a hostile intention, at the very least, it requires ‘that the State in 
question is aware it is undertaking an action against another State’.91 However, a hostile 
intention may refer to an intended action, intended effects, or intended coercion. The 
scholarly literature is not consistent in the use of this term. The difference is significant, 
because it may capture or exclude different categories of forcible acts.  
 
If a hostile intent means intended action, this would rule out forcible acts that are accidental, 
but it would not necessarily rule out mistaken acts. Ruys argues that State practice shows 
there is a distinction between incursions that are accidental and ‘the accidental projection of 
armed force … across a border’ (for example, shots or shells fired). ‘In the latter scenario … 
the territorial state is not necessarily precluded from characterizing the act as a use of 
force’.92 The text of article 2(4) strongly indicates that an intended action is required, through 
the italicised words: ‘All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.’  
 
If a hostile intent means an intention to have a certain effect, this could rule out mistake, since 
the action itself is intended but the target, effect or the factual basis for taking action in the 
first place (e.g. motivation) may be mistaken. Corten notes that use of force in error was 
raised in the travaux préparatoires of the 1974 Definition and ‘States unanimously excluded 
the possibility of characterising an act committed by mistake as an aggression’.93 However, 
as Corten acknowledges, a problem with this analysis is that although intention may be a 
requirement for an act of aggression, a use of force may not necessarily amount to 
aggression. He goes on to argue that ‘a review of practice as a whole allows us to affirm that 
States consider an act, even of a military type, committed by mistake, does not constitute an 
aggression or even a use of force by one State against another contrary to article 2(4)’.94 Such 
practice includes instances of aerial incursion, incursion by South African police into 
Basutoland (then a British colony) on 26 August 1961, a mistaken attack by UAR on the 
Federation of South Arabia due to ‘pilot’s error’ on 15 July 1965, and a mistaken firing of 
 
90 ILC Draft Articles, above n.58, arts. 4 to 11. 
91 Corten, above n.31, 78, emphasis in original. 
92 Above n.32, 191. 
93 Above n.31, 79 and footnote 195 with extensive references. 
94 Ibid., 79. 
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five shells by Swiss artillery onto the territory of Liechtenstein during exercise on 14 October 
1968.95 In none of these cases did States invoke article 2(4) (although this does not exclude 
the characterisation of these incidents as internationally wrongful on other legal grounds, 
such as a violation of sovereignty).  
 
Defining a hostile intent for the purposes of article 2(4) as an intention to produce a particular 
effect could also rule out deliberate acts with no intention to have a forcible effect within 
another State. For example, Corten notes that ‘[d]uring the discussion before the adoption of 
General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX), Iraq’s representative raised the case of a 
regiment that crosses a State border, knowingly and without authorisation, to go sunbathing 
on a beach. No State characterised such a hypothesis as a use of force in the debates in the 
General Assembly, whether in the Sixth Commission or in the special committee on the 
definition of aggression.’96 Corten contrasts this situation with deliberate acts which do not 
directly target the territorial State but which nevertheless use force, for example, targeted 
operations such as rescue of nationals abroad and targeted killing. He argues that in respect of 
targeted operations, ‘[i]f the intervening State’s objective is not to challenge another State, 
and if consequently it uses very limited military means, article 2(4) will not be invoked (as in 
the Rainbow Warrior or 1990 Liberia precedents). If the military action is against another 
State that supposedly supports ‘terrorists’ or threatens nationals of the intervening State, the 
action will involve the rules on the prohibition of the use of force (as in the Mayaquez or 
Entebbe precedents).’97 The fundamental point is that: 
 
‘For the prohibition of the use of force to be applicable, it is necessary but sufficient for a 
State to decide to take action that it knows will involve defying another State, whether its 
central government, its agents, its population, its territory or its infrastructure. A clear 
distinction must be drawn, then, between the general motive for an operation –which 
motive may prove more or less legitimate in the eyes of international law, a point we shall 
not pronounce on here –and the intention, in achieving that objective, to defy a third 
State. If such an intention is found, article 2(4) will be applicable, regardless of any more 
general motive for the intervention.’98  
 
This point relates to coercion and is addressed further below.  
 
With respect to intended effects, there is nothing in the text of article 2(4) to indicate or to 
exclude this as necessary for a prohibited ‘use of force’. (There is also a question of whether 
the notion of hostile intent would require an intended harmful effect or if some other mental 
State would suffice, such as negligence, recklessness or reasonable foreseeability. But this is 
going even further beyond the text.) It will therefore depend upon the subsequent practice of 
 
95 Ibid., 80 with further references. 
96 Ibid., 84, footnote omitted. 
97 Ibid., 91. 
98 Ibid., 89-90. 
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States in their application of article 2(4). As set out above, there is practice indicating that 
States do not usually invoke article 2(4) in cases of mistake of fact. 
 
Finally, hostile intent may refer to a coercive intent. Corten argues that ‘[t]he only intention 
to be considered is that of forcing the will of another State’,99 i.e. intention of coercion. 
Corten sees this requirement as so essential that ‘when a State takes even limited military 
measures and admits that such measures are part of a policy conducted against one State, 
there is no doubt that article 2(4) is applicable’.100 The position that coercive intent is a 
requirement for a prohibited use of force finds some support in a textual interpretation of 
article 2(4), due to the relationship between the prohibition of threats and uses of force; the 
relationship of the non-intervention principle and the principle of the non-use of force; and 
the object and purpose of the prohibition of the use of force in article 2(4). However, such 
textual support is not definitive and the argument can be made both ways. 
 
Firstly, as discussed above, coercion is at least a strong indicator of unlawfulness of a threat 
of force. If the prohibition of the ‘threat’ and ‘use’ of force are regarded as a continuum 
rather than distinct prohibitions, then this would mean that coercion is also an element of a 
prohibited use of force. However, as explained above, each of these steps of the argument are 
uncertain, and the position of some scholars such as Stürchler and Sadurska is that article 
2(4) is aimed at protecting international peace and security (i.e. prevention of war) rather than 
sovereignty (freedom from coercion).101 
 
Secondly, on one view, the relationship between the non-intervention principle and the 
principle of the non-use of force means that the latter also entails a coercive intent. For 
example, Henderson argues that intention is necessary for a breach of the prohibition of the 
use of force in article 2(4) because ‘[f]orce ... is a particular kind of intervention’.102 He 
follows the ICJ's approach in Nicaragua, and views a ‘use of force’ as ‘a more specific form 
of intervention’ ‘involving physical coercion’.103 This is yet another continuum approach –
since intervention requires coercion and a use of force is a form of intervention, a use of force 
also requires coercion. The second reason that Henderson puts forward for the requirement of 
intention is that ‘it is arguable that the requirement for an intention to use force is implicit in 
the jurisprudence of the ICJ’.104 
 
 
99 Ibid., 76-7. 
100 Ibid., 78. 
101 Sadurska, above n.59, 249: ‘… the preoccupation of international law with the political independence of 
states is not inspired by the concern of individualist liberalism with the freedom of political elites, but rather by 
the need for peace and order among nations.’ 
102 Above n.6, 50. 
103 Ibid., 52. 
104 Ibid., 76, citing Niaragua case. 
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The principle of non-intervention is found in customary international law and is a ‘corollary 
of the sovereign equality of States’ set out in article 2(1) of the UN Charter.105 In the 
Nicaragua case, the ICJ defined the content of the principle of non-intervention (as it related 
to the dispute in question) as follows: 
 
‘the principle forbids all States or groups of States to intervene directly or indirectly in 
internal or external affairs of other States. A prohibited intervention must accordingly be 
one bearing on matters in which each State is permitted, by the principle of State 
sovereignty, to decide freely. One of these is the choice of a political, economic, social 
and cultural system, and the formulation of foreign policy. Intervention is wrongful when 
it uses methods of coercion in regard to such choices, which must remain free ones. The 
element of coercion, which defines, and indeed forms the very essence of, prohibited 
intervention, is particularly obvious in the case of an intervention which uses force, either 
in the direct form of military action, or in the indirect form of support for subversive or 
terrorist armed activities within another State. As noted above (paragraph 191). General 
Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) equates assistance of this kind with the use of force by 
the assisting State when the acts committed in another State "involve a threat or use of 
force". These forms of action are therefore wrongful in the light of both the principle of 
non-use of force, and that of non-intervention.’106 
 
However, it is not clear from the cited judgment whether a use of force must always be 
coercive. Just as an unlawful intervention can be forcible or non-forcible, it is arguable that a 
prohibited use of force can violate the principle of non-intervention or not. In other words, 
not all violation of the prohibition of the use of force in article 2(4) will necessarily comprise 
violations of the principle of non-intervention. For example, a non-combatant evacuation of 
nationals from a generalised situation of violence or civil unrest abroad is not aimed at 
coercing a choice ‘on matters in which each State is permitted, by the principle of State 
sovereignty, to decide freely’ such as ‘the choice of a political, economic, social and cultural 
system, and the formulation of foreign policy’,107 but may nevertheless constitute a use of 
force in the territory of another State. 
 
The third argument in support of an interpretation of ‘use of force’ that requires a coercive 
intent is based on the object and purpose of article 2(4). As discussed in Chapter Five, the 
main objects of article 2(4) are protecting State sovereignty (also protected by the non-
intervention principle), and the maintenance of international peace and security. The 
protection of State sovereignty by article 2(4) is further supported by the principles of 
sovereign equality and non-intervention set out in articles 2(3) and 2(7) (although it is 
important to note that article 2(7) does not actually prohibit intervention by States in the 
internal affairs of other States – as mentioned above, the non-intervention principle is found 
in customary international law and not directly in the UN Charter itself). Considering this 
 
105 Nicaragua case, above n.27, para. 202. 
106 Ibid., para. 205. 
107 Nicaragua case, ibid., para. 205. 
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purpose behind the prohibition in article 2(4), it would make sense to interpret it as 
prohibiting conduct that is employed to bring about coercion/interference with sovereign 
equality of States.  
 
With respect to the second object and purpose of article 2(4) – to maintain international peace 
and security – one of the propositions Stürchler tests is that article 2(4) can be read together 
with article 2(3) to imply a positive obligation to achieve peaceful settlement of disputes 
without recourse to threats to use force.108 This idea could be applied to the interpretation of a 
‘use of force’ in article 2(4) to argue that the prohibition of the use of force is directed 
towards uses of force in contradistinction to the obligation of peaceful settlement of disputes 
(which Stürchler notes was recognised by the ICJ as a positive obligation, in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases109). In other words, it could be argued that only those minimal uses of 
force that are used as a tool for foreign policy (i.e. accompanied or motivated by an element 
of coercion) would violate the prohibition. This would also reflect the notion of ‘use of force’ 
as a broader concept but in many ways a continuation of the old concept of ‘war’ from the 
preceding treaty, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which condemns ‘recourse to war for the solution 
of international controversies’ and embodies its renunciation ‘as an instrument of national 
policy110 …’ The Principle set out in the article 2(3) of the UN Charter that ‘All Members 
shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international 
peace and security, and justice, are not endangered’ is a continuation of this aim to prevent 
the settlement of international disputes by force.111 This also connects to the term 
‘international relations’ in article 2(4);112 as Chapter Nine will show, the elements of 
‘international relations’, gravity and intention are interrelated. 
Evidence	of	hostile	intent	
If a hostile intent is required for an act to be an unlawful ‘use of force’ under article 2(4), this 
raises questions of what evidence suffices and the required standard of proof. A problem with 
hostile intent is that intention is a subjective standard requiring a particular mental state, as 
opposed to an objective standard in which only the action or omission is relevant for the 
prohibition to be engaged.113 The problem of subjectivity is addressed by Ruys by adding the 
 
108 Above n.59, 53. 
109 (Germany v Denmark and the Netherlands), Merits, 1969 ICJ Rep. 3 (20 Feb 1969) at paras. 83-101. 
110 Article 1. 
111 Kreß (2017), above n.10, 432 footnote 93, citing K Sellars, Crimes Against Peace and International Law 
(CUP, 2013), 25. 
112 See discussion in Chapter Five. 
113 ILC Draft Articles, above n.58, commentary to article 2, at para. 3: ‘Whether there has been a breach of a 
rule may depend on the intention or knowledge of relevant State organs or agents and in that sense may be 
“subjective”. … In other cases, the standard for breach of an obligation may be “objective”, in the sense that the 
advertence or otherwise of relevant State organs or agents may be irrelevant. Whether responsibility is 
“objective” or “subjective” in this sense depends on the circumstances, including the content of the primary 
obligation in question. The articles lay down no general rule in that regard. The same is true of other standards, 
whether they involve some degree of fault, culpability, negligence or want of due diligence. Such standards vary 
from one context to another for reasons which essentially relate to the object and purpose of the treaty provision 
or other rule giving rise to the primary obligation. Nor do the articles lay down any presumption in this regard as 
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term ‘manifest’ to allow for an objective assessment of intention behind the act.114 But on 
another view, manifest hostile intent relates to an ‘armed attack’, for example, to determine 
necessity of using force in response.  
 
Indicators that have been suggested for a hostile intent include ‘the gravity or magnitude of 
the attack’;115 for less grave acts, States take into account other factors to determine intent, 
such as geopolitical context, repeated nature, location, nature of units, and specific 
indications related to weapons being fired up.116 Corten provides six criteria that indicate 
gravity and intention (which in his view are interrelated): 1) where the act was carried out; 2) 
the context; 3) who decided on it and who conducted it; 4) the target; 5) whether 'the military 
operation [has] given rise to confrontation between the agents of two States’; and 6) 'the 
scope of the means implemented by the intervening State'.117 The Independent International 
Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia also set out indicators of hostile intent:  
 
'[a]ccording to State practice … not all militarised acts amount to a demonstration of 
force and thus to a violation of Art. 2(4) of the UN Charter. Many are routine missions 
devoid of any hostile intent and are meaningless in the absence of a sizeable dispute. But 
as soon as they are non-routine, suspiciously timed, scaled up, intensified, geographically 
proximate, staged in the exact mode of a potential military clash, and easily attributable to 
a foreign-policy message, the hostile intent is considered present and the demonstration of 
force manifest.'118 
 
There thus appears to be a connection between these objective indicators of a subjective 
hostile intent and the elements of gravity and international relations. The relationship 
between these elements is explored further in Chapter Nine. 
Domains		
With respect to the location of the forcible act, as noted above (in the discussion about 
gravity), the domain in which it occurs may impact on the legal characterisation of the act 
due to the sovereign rights and applicable legal framework within that space as well as the 
different nature of the security threat. In particular, the element of intention may overlap with 
the boundary between the jus contra bellum and other legal frameworks applicable within a 
particular domain, such as law of the sea. Measures which may be governed by another legal 
framework (such as the exercise of law enforcement jurisdiction at sea) could fall within or 
outside the scope of article 2(4) of the UN Charter, depending on a number of factors, 
 
between the different possible standards. Establishing these is a matter for the interpretation and application of 
the primary rules engaged in the given case.’ 
114 Above n.32, 189. 
115 Henderson, above n.6, 78; Ruys, above n.32, 175. 
116 Ruys, ibid., 175-6. 
117 Above n.31, 91-2. 
118 ‘Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict on Georgia, Report’ (2009), available at 
<http://www.mpil.de/en/pub/publications/archive/independent_international_fact.cfm>, accessed 30 October 
2018, para. 232. 
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including the element of a hostile or coercive intention vis-a-vis another State (in this case, 
the flag State of the vessel), which may bring an act of purported maritime law enforcement 
within the realm of ‘international relations’ and thus a prohibited ‘use of force’ under article 
2(4) of the UN Charter. The relationship between intention, gravity and international 
relations with respect to maritime law enforcement versus ‘use of force’ will be explored 
further in Chapter Nine. 
Conclusion	
Ultimately, whether or not intention is required for a prohibited use of force under article 2(4) 
cannot be definitively resolved at the level of textual analysis. It is possible that hostile intent 
is an indicative factor that can turn a forcible act that would otherwise not meet various 
criteria, such as gravity or if the harm is only potential but unrealised, into a ‘use of force’. 
This discussion about the interrelationship between different elements of a ‘use of force’ is 
continued in Chapter Nine. 
Conclusion 
The above textual analysis of article 2(4) of the UN Charter supports the following 
conclusions regarding the interpretation of the term ‘use of force’: 
 
• Effects:  
 
⁃ Physical effects: Usually required, but with some notable exceptions 
(discussed in Chapter Eight). 
 
⁃ Object/target: There is nothing explicit in the text of article 2(4) itself that 
restricts its scope to certain objects of harm, i.e. harm to physical property or 
persons. However, abstract forms of harm are probably excluded from the 
scope of an unlawful ‘use of force’. 
 
⁃ Directness: The relevant harmful effects must have sufficient proximity to the 
application of force. This refers to the intermediate steps between the act and 
its result, not how long it takes for the harm to manifest. 
 
⁃ Permanent vs temporary: The text of article 2(4) is not conclusive on this 
point. More State practice is required to determine whether it will reveal their 
agreement regarding this interpretation. 
 
⁃ Actual vs potential: It is textually ambiguous whether any physical effect (i.e. 
harm) must actually ensue from such acts for them to fall within the scope of 
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the prohibition, or if it is sufficient if there is merely a potential for physical 
effects/harm to result.  
 
• Gravity of effects: Although this work takes the position that there is no de minimis 
gravity threshold for a ‘use of force’ under article 2(4), gravity is relevant to the 
contextual element of ‘international relations’ (e.g. as an indicator of intention), and is 
a relevant factor to whether the act constitutes a ‘use of force’ for acts that may 
otherwise not meet the required threshold of the definition, for instance, because its 
effects are temporary, or only potential. This concept will be explored further in 
Chapter Nine. 
 
• Hostile intent: The text of article 2(4) strongly indicates that at the very least, an 
intended action is required. The text does not explicitly require or exclude an intended 
effect, although State practice indicates that mistaken forcible acts are usually not 
treated as violating the prohibition of the use of force. There is textual support for the 
position that a coercive intent is required under article 2(4), due to the relationship 
between the prohibition of threats and uses of force, the relationship of the non-
intervention principle and the principle of the non-use of force, and the object and 
purpose of the prohibition of the use of force in article 2(4). However, such textual 
support is not definitive and the argument can be made both ways. It is possible that 
hostile intent is an indicative factor that can turn a forcible act that would otherwise 
not meet various criteria (such as gravity or if the harm is only potential but 
unrealised) into a ‘use of force’.  
 
However, it is clear that some ‘uses of force’ that are widely accepted as such, for instance an 
unopposed invasion or military occupation, do not contain some of the elements identified 
above, particularly physical means or a physical effect. These examples challenge the 
conventional understanding of a prohibited ‘use of force’ as displaying the elements 
identified in this and the preceding chapter. How are these accepted forms of ‘use of force’ to 
be reconciled with the above analysis? This is the subject of Part III. 
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Part III: Weighing the elements  
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Introduction 
The discussion in Part II has shown that a ‘use of force’ under article 2(4) of the UN Charter 
has a range of possible textual interpretations which may be selected from. In some cases, 
subsequent agreements and the subsequent practice of States in their application of this 
provision has narrowed this range of interpretive possibilities further. In any case, it can be 
seen that the meaning of a ‘use of force’ contains several elements, such as its means, effects, 
its object or target, gravity and intention. Further elements of the prohibition are supplied in 
the rest of article 2(4), such as the concept of ‘international relations’. In stark contrast to the 
concept of ‘armed attack’ in article 51 of the UN Charter with respect to the right of self-
defence, in the analysis and discussion among States and legal scholars of lower-level 
forcible incidents falling below this threshold, so far there is no shared framework of 
reference of the criteria for determining whether an act violates the prohibition of the use of 
force in article 2(4). Some of these criteria have been the subject of fairly extensive debate, 
such as whether ‘force’ means armed/physical force only.1 Others are subject to emerging or 
increasing debate, such as whether there is a de minimis gravity threshold and if or what kind 
of hostile intent is required.2 But while many of the elements discussed above have been 
identified and debated, so far there are few examples of a detailed and systematic analysis of 
which elements form part of a prohibited ‘use of force’ and especially, how these elements 
interrelate with one another.3 Such an analysis is important in order to clarify the scope and 
content of a cardinal rule of public international law,4 as well as to enable a meaningful 
discussion and debate of the lawfulness of specific incidents that at least uses a shared 
language even if the particular elements themselves are disputed. Furthermore, there are 
some well-known examples of unlawful ‘uses of force’ that defy conventional categorisation 
because some of the otherwise apparently fundamental features of a ‘use of force’ are 
missing – for example, an unresisted (‘bloodless’) invasion in which no shots are fired. How 
are such ‘uses of force’ to be reconciled with a coherent understanding of this term? This is 
the subject of Part III.  
 
 
1 See Chapter Six. 
2 See Chapter Seven. 
3 Some examples that do discuss the elements of a prohibited ‘use of force’ includ Olivier Corten, The Law 
against War : The Prohibition on the Use of Force in Contemporary International Law (Hart, 2010), 51-92; 
Tom Ruys, ‘The Meaning of “Force” and the Boundaries of the Jus Ad Bellum: Are “Minimal” Uses of Force 
Excluded from Un Charter Article 2 (4)?’ (2014) 108(2) American Journal of International Law 159; Marco 
Roscini, Cyber Operations and the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2014), 45-67 in 
relation to cyber operations; Christian Henderson, The Use of Force and International Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 1 edition, 2018), 50-80. 
4 See Chapter Four. 
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Chapter Eight will discuss anomalous examples of ‘use of force’ in the subsequent agreement 
and subsequent practice of States that do not conform with the usual understanding of this 
term because they do not display one or more of the elements discussed in Part II. It will also 
discuss anomalous examples of non-‘use of force’, namely, acts which appear to meet the 
criteria for an unlawful ‘use of force’ but are not characterised as such by States. Chapter 
Nine will then put forward a hypothesis that explains these anomalous examples and their 
implications for the interpretation of a ‘use of force’ under article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 
This chapter will explain the theory of type and how it applies to the meaning of a ‘use of 
force’ under article 2(4), using illustrative examples from recent State practice. It will be 
concluded that a ‘use of force’ is a type rather than a concept: i.e., rather than a checklist of 
fixed elements that must always be present for the definition of a ‘use of force’ to be met, it is 
the relationship between the elements of a ‘use of force’ (not all of which are necessary) and 
their relative weight that determines whether the threshold of the definition is reached. 
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Chapter Eight: Anomalous examples of 
‘use of force’ and non-‘use of force’ 
Introduction  
The above conclusions regarding the meaning and elements of a ‘use of force’ under article 
2(4) of the UN Charter are supported by the principles of treaty interpretation. But there is an 
interesting and important problem: there are several well-known and accepted ‘uses of force’ 
that violate the prohibition in article 2(4) but do not conform to all of the criteria set out 
above. Conversely, there are also some acts that do use physical means or have physical 
effects but are still not regarded as violating article 2(4). This chapter will set out some of 
these anomalous examples and then put forward some possible explanations and the 
implications for the interpretation of a prohibited ‘use of force’ under article 2(4). 
Anomalous examples of ‘use of force’  
Subsequent	 agreements	 regarding	 anomalous	 categories	 of	 ‘use	 of	
force’:	The	1974	Definition	of	Aggression	
It is instructive to examine anomalous acts which States agree fall within the scope of article 
2(4). For this purpose, the 1974 Definition of Aggression serves as a key example.1 As 
explained in Chapter Six, the 1974 Definition is a subsequent agreement on the interpretation 
of the prohibition of the use of force in article 2(4) of the UN Charter under article 31(3)(a) 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘VCLT’). Some of the acts of aggression 
(and therefore ‘uses of force’) referred to in the 1974 Definition of Aggression are not strictly 
‘armed’ or kinetic forms of force. Article 2 of the 1974 Definition of Aggression provides 
that: 
 
‘The first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall constitute 
prima facie evidence of an act of aggression although the Security Council may, in 
conformity with the Charter, conclude that a determination that an act of aggression has 
 
1 UN General Assembly, ‘Definition of Aggression’, 14 December 1974, GA Res. 3314 (XXIX). 
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been committed would not be justified in the light of other relevant circumstances, 
including the fact that the acts concerned or their consequences are not of sufficient 
gravity.’ 
 
Article 3 lists acts which may qualify as acts of aggression and is set out and discussed 
below. It provides that: ‘Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, 
subject to and in accordance with the provisions of article 2, qualify as an act of aggression’. 
Article 4 notes that ‘[t]he acts enumerated [in article 3] are not exhaustive and the Security 
Council may determine that other acts constitute aggression under the provisions of the 
Charter’. Since articles 1 and 2 of the Definition refer to ‘armed force’, then the acts listed in 
article 3 must all only relate to armed force. As some of the listed acts do not conform to a 
normal understanding of ‘force’ and do not exhibit all of the elements identified in the 
preceding chapter, it is helpful to examine those acts to assist in the interpretation of the term 
‘use of force’ in article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The relevant acts that will be analysed below 
are invasion and military occupation (article 3(a)), blockade (article 3(c)), mere presence in 
violation of a Status of Forces Agreement (‘SOFA’) (article 3(e)) and indirect use of force 
either through inter-State assistance (article 3(f)) or through non-State armed groups (article 
3(g)).  
(a)	The	 invasion	or	attack	by	 the	armed	 forces	of	a	State	of	 the	 territory	of	
another	 State,	 or	 any	 military	 occupation,	 however	 temporary,	 resulting	
from	 such	 invasion	 or	 attack,	 or	 any	 annexation	 by	 the	 use	 of	 force	 of	 the	
territory	of	another	State	or	part	thereof	
Ian Brownlie has noted that ‘[i]nvasion and unopposed military occupation following a threat 
of force, as in the case of the German occupations of the Czechoslovakian territories 
Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939, are usually regarded as a case of actual resort to 
force.’2 However, the inclusion of military occupation in itself (as opposed to the preceding 
invasion or attack) as an act of aggression in the 1974 Definition (and therefore an illegal use 
of force under article 2(4) of the UN Charter) is anomalous because occupation may follow 
from either a lawful or unlawful use of force and is not unlawful in itself under the jus contra 
bellum. Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations defines a territory as occupied ‘when it is 
actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the 
territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.’3 The lawfulness of 
an occupation is determined under the jus contra bellum, but once it is factually in place then 
an occupation is regulated by the laws of occupation, including the 1907 Hague Regulations,4 
 
2 Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (Clarendon, 1963), 365, footnote omitted. 
3 Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annex to Hague Convention Respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907. There is debate over when the laws of occupation begin 
to apply: see Marten Zwanenburg, Michael Bothe and Marco Sassòli, ‘Is the law of occupation applicable to the 
invasion phase?’, (2012) 94 International Review of the Red Cross 29. 
4 Ibid. 
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the Fourth Geneva Convention 19495 and customary international humanitarian law.6 As with 
an unresisted invasion, an occupation may also meet with no armed resistance and may 
therefore involve no physical means or physical effects in terms of damage to persons or 
property.  
 
In the Armed Activities case, the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) held that the illegal 
occupation of Ituri by Uganda constituted a violation of the principle of the non-use of force.7 
However, this characterisation of the occupation of Ituri was criticised by Judge Pieter 
Kooijmans since it undermines the separation of the jus contra bellum (which prohibits 
aggression) and the jus in bello (which sets out the regime governing military occupation and 
makes no distinction ‘between an occupation resulting from a lawful use of force and one 
which is the result of aggression’.8 Judge Kooijmans argued that article 3(a) of the 1974 
Definition of Aggression ‘lent credibility’ to the impression of Governments that 
‘“occupation” has become almost synonymous with aggression and oppression’, and held:9 
‘[t]his resolution, as important as it may be from a legal point of view, does not in all its 
terms reflect customary law. The reference to military occupation as an act of aggression is in 
my opinion less than felicitous.’ As Bengt Broms has stated:10 ‘it could be argued in view of 
the way in which the paragraph has been construed that the military occupation or the 
annexation presupposes the existence of an act of aggression in the form of an invasion or 
attack and that it would therefore not have been necessary to include them separately in this 
paragraph.’ The inclusion in article 3(a) of military occupation as an act of aggression (and 
therefore a ‘use of force’) is therefore controversial. Nevertheless, since it is a listed act in the 
1974 Definition of Aggression, it may be considered that States have made a subsequent 
agreement under article 31(3)(a) of the VCLT that it as a ‘use of force’ in a violation of article 
2(4) of the UN Charter.  
(c)	 The	 blockade	 of	 the	 ports	 or	 coasts	 of	 a	 State	 by	 the	 armed	 forces	 of	
another	State;11	
A blockade is defined as ‘a belligerent operation to prevent vessels and/or aircraft of all 
nations, enemy and neutral, from entering or exiting specified ports, airports, or coastal areas 
belonging to, occupied by, or under the control of an enemy nation. The purpose of 
 
5 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, 75 
U.N.T.S. 
6 See ICRC, Customary IHL Database, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul (accessed 
26 October 2018). 
7 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda) (2005) ICJ 
Reports 168, para. 345. 
8 Ibid., Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans, paras. 56, 58–63. 
9 Ibid., para. 63, footnote omitted. 
10  “The Definition of Aggression”; Recueil des cours, Vol. 154 (1977), p. 348, cited by Judge Kooijmans, 
Separate Opinion, ibid., para. 63 at footnote 12. 
11 *The footnote to para 9, 1974 Sixth Committee Report states: ‘The Sixth Committee agreed that nothing in 
the Definition of Aggression, and in particular article 3 (c) shall be construed as a justification for a State to 
block, contrary to international law, the routes of free access of a land-locked country to and from the sea.’ 
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establishing a blockade is to deny the enemy the use of enemy and neutral vessels or aircraft 
to transport personnel and goods to or from enemy territory …’12 For a blockade to be 
binding under treaty and customary international law, it must meet certain requirements, 
including that it be effective,13 and ‘applied impartially to the vessels and aircraft of all 
States’.14 This requires that it be ‘“maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to 
the coast of the enemy”. This does not mean that all aircraft and vessels must in fact be 
prevented from either entering or leaving the blockaded area. Rather, it is sufficient if the 
maintaining force is of a strength or nature that there is a high probability that ingress to and 
egress from the blockaded area will be detected, and prevented by the blockading power.’15 
 
A blockade is an anomalous example of an illegal use of force because until it is challenged 
and enforced, there is a lack of employment of physical means or physical effects – only an 
expressed intention to use force under certain circumstances (when the blockade is 
challenged). According to Brownlie, ‘a naval blockade involves an unlawful use of force, 
although the tactical posture is passive, since its actual enforcement includes the use of force 
against vessels of the coastal state’.16 But article 3(c) of the 1974 Definition of Aggression 
does not specify that a blockade must be actually enforced in order to qualify as an act of 
aggression. An unchallenged blockade could be considered an act of aggression and therefore 
a ‘use of force’ because it is an act of warfare that confers a military advantage and is usually 
employed in conjunction with other forms of force as part of a broader military operation 
against the armed forces of the blockaded State.17 However, as with the example to be 
discussed below of overstaying a Status of Forces agreement, it is not clear if a blockade that 
is unchallenged may really amount to a ‘use of force’ under article 2(4) of the UN Charter.18 
Nevertheless, an unchallenged blockade constitutes a ‘threat of force’ against the blockaded 
State and may therefore still violate article 2(4) of the UN Charter.  
 
 
12 Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, ‘Blockade’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2015) 
<http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e252> (accessed 26 
October 2018), para. 1. On the law of blockade generally, see further Lassa Oppenheim and Hersch Lauterpacht 
(eds), International Law, vol. II Disputes, War and Neutrality (Longmans London, 7th edition, 1952) 768–97; 
Robert W. Tucker, The Law of Neutrality at Sea (United States Government Printing Office, 1957, reprinted 
2006 and 2008). 
13 Ibid., para. 33; Declaration respecting Maritime Law between Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, 
Russia, Sardinia and Turkey (signed and entered into force 16 April 1856) (1856) 115 CTS 1, ‘Paris 
Declaration’), para. 4; Déclaration relative au Droit de la Guerre Maritime [Declaration concerning the Laws 
of Naval War] (26 February 1909, not entered into force) (1909) 208 CTS 338. (‘London Declaration’), art. 2; 
San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea (adopted 12 June 1994) 
reproduced in Louise Doswald-Beck (ed) San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed 
Conflicts at Sea (CUP Cambridge 1995), para. 95) 
14 Heintschel von Heinegg (2015), above n.12, para. 44; London Declaration 1909, ibid., art. 5. 
15 Heintschel von Heinegg (2015), ibid., para. 33. 
16 Above n.2, 365-6, footnote omitted. 
17 Heintschel von Heinegg (2015), above n.12, para. 1. 
18 This is noted by Mary Ellen O’Connell, ‘The Prohibition of the Use of Force’ in Nigel D White and Christian 
Henderson (eds), Research Handbook on International Conflict and Security Law : jus ad bellum, jus in bello 
and jus post bellum (Elgar, 2013) 89, 111. 
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When it comes to actually enforcing the blockade against vessels flagged to neutral States, 
the question becomes more interesting. If a neutral warship or military aircraft attempts to or 
does breach a blockade, the neutral State commits a violation of the law of neutrality, but the 
blockading State does not have a right to attack it unless in the exercise of the right of self-
defence.19 But a more interesting legal question is raised when it comes to the enforcement of 
a blockade against a neutral merchant vessel on the high seas: does such enforcement amount 
to a ‘use of force’ against the flag State under article 2(4) of the UN Charter?  
 
Under the jus contra bellum, the enforcement of a blockade against a ship flagged to a neutral 
State may amount to a use of force within the meaning of article 2(4) and violate the 
prohibition of the use of force unless justified by one of the recognised exceptions i.e. self-
defence. This view is supported by State practice, for example the position taken by the UK 
during the Gulf War, when it claimed that Iran’s visit of a British-flagged merchant vessel on 
the high seas was justified as a measure of self-defence under article 51 of the UN Charter.20 
This implies the legal view that stopping and searching a foreign-flagged merchant vessel on 
the high seas would otherwise constitute an unlawful use of force in violation of article 2(4) 
of the UN Charter – i.e. that it would not be justified by the law of neutrality.21 It is not the 
blockade itself that transforms the capture or attack of the neutral ship into a use of force – 
due to the principle of exclusive flag State jurisdiction, such interference with a vessel 
flagged to a third State on the high seas takes place in ‘international relations’ and is arguably 
itself a use of force unless the capturing/attacking State has lawful grounds for the exercise of 
jurisdiction over the vessel, for example, under article 110 of the UN Convention on the Law 
of the Sea.22  
 
But under the laws of naval warfare (jus in bello), ‘since neutral merchant vessels and 
civilian aircraft are obliged to respect a blockade that conforms to the legal requirements of 
publicity and effectiveness they become liable to interception and capture if they act in 
violation of the legitimate right of the blockading power to prevent egress from, or ingress to, 
the blockaded area’.23 Under the jus in bello, neutral merchant vessels and civilian aircraft are 
liable to be attacked if they are clearly resisting interception and capture, because such an act 
leads to loss of civilian status and renders the vessel or aircraft a legitimate military 
objective.24 However, these rules apply under the laws of neutrality and armed conflict, not 
under the jus contra bellum. The law of blockade and jus in bello do not prohibit the attack, 
 
19 Heintschel von Heinegg (2015), above n.12, para. 48. 
20 Statement by the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 28 January 1986, House of Commons 
Debates, Vol. 90, col. 426, printed in 57 British Year Book of International Law 583 (1986). 
21 This legal position has been criticised by Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg as not reflective of State practice and 
irreconcilable with the equal application of the jus in bello: ‘“Benevolent” Third States in International Armed 
Conflicts: The Myth of the Irrelevance of the Law of Neutrality’, in M.N. Schmitt and J. Pejic (eds.), 
International Law and Armed Conflict: Exploring the Faultlines (Koninklijke Brill BV: 2007), 562-3. 
22 See discussion of maritime law enforcement against foreign-flagged vessels with no basis for jurisdiction 
further below in this chapter for a further discussion of this point.  
23 Heintschel von Heinegg (2015), above n.12, para. 42. 
24 Heintschel von Heinegg (2015), above n.12, para. 47. 
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but neither do they justify it under the jus contra bellum. Therefore, attacking a merchant 
vessel attempting to resist intercept and capture by the blockading State in these 
circumstances would be an unlawful use of force unless justified by self-defence.  
 
This raises the question of whether the law of neutrality and these rights of blockade continue 
to apply in the post-Charter era in the traditional way of providing a full justification for 
certain forcible action. On one view, belligerent rights and the traditional law of neutrality 
continue to exist in the post-Charter era, which means that the impairment of the rights of 
third States must be accepted.25 On another view, the law of neutrality was abolished by the 
UN Charter and either belligerent rights no longer exist, or they have continued in a modified 
form under the rubric of self-defence.26 As Stephen Neff notes, there are serious difficulties 
with each position,27 and this controversial question remains open. Even if one takes the 
position that these belligerent rights continue to exist but have been modified by the modern 
jus contra bellum, a further question would be raised, of whether the very imposition of a 
blockade remains a lawful instrument even for a State acting in self-defence, since the 
principle of effectiveness requires that the blockading State enforce the blockade against 
neutral vessels resisting interception and capture – in other words, that the blockading State 
use force against the vessels of third States.28 
	(e)	 The	 use	 of	 armed	 forces	 of	 one	 State	which	 are	within	 the	 territory	 of	
another	State	with	the	agreement	of	the	receiving	State,	in	contravention	of	
the	 conditions	 provided	 for	 in	 the	 agreement	 or	 any	 extension	 of	 their	
presence	in	such	territory	beyond	the	termination	of	the	agreement;		
This is an anomalous example of a ‘use of force’ because mere continuing presence of the 
armed forces of one State within the territory of another State in contravention of a Status of 
Forces Agreement, even without the actual employment of physical means or the producing 
of physical effects, may suffice under article 3(e) of the 1974 Definition of Aggression to 
 
25 Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg (2007) argues in the affirmative, above n.21, 543-568.  
26 For a discussion of the scope of application of the laws of war and the law of neutrality in the post-Charter era 
with respect to the enforcement of blockades against neutral vessels, see Douglas Guilfoyle, ‘The Mavi 
Marmara Incident and Blockade in Armed Conflict’ (2011) 81(1) British Yearbook of International Law 171, 
177, with further references. See further Michael Bothe, Neutrality in Naval Warfare, What is left of the 
traditional law?, in Astrid J.M. Delissen and Gerard J. Tanja (eds) Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict, 
Challenges Ahead (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff: 1991), 387; Dietrich Schindler, ‘Transformations in the Law of 
Neutrality since 1945’, in Astrid J.M. Delissen and Gerard J. Tanja (eds), Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict, 
Challenges Ahead (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff: 1991), 367. 
27 See Stephen C Neff, ‘Towards a Law of Unarmed Conflict: A Proposal for a New International Law of 
Hostility’ (1995) 28(1) Cornell International Law Journal 1 for a critique of the different schools of thought on 
this question.  
28 James Farrant (‘Modern Maritime Neutrality Law’, 90 International Law Studies 198 (2014) 200-307) argues 
that for policy reasons that the requirement of impartiality should be removed from the law of blockade, so that 
the blockading belligerent is not required to enforce the blockade against neutral shipping. For an original 
proposal to overcome the associated legal and policy issues with belligerent rights in the post-Charter era, see 
Neff, above n.27. 
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constitute an act of aggression (and therefore a ‘use of force’ in violation of article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter), although this is a controversial proposition. Thomas Bruha observes that article 
3(e): 
 
‘is somewhat out of line, when compared with the other acts listed in the article. The mere 
continuance of the presence of armed forces in the territory of another state in violation 
of, or after the termination of the agreement concluded with it, does not necessarily entail 
the use of armed force in the ordinary sense of the word. … even if one considers the 
continued stationing of armed forces “within” another state as a special case of non–
transfrontier use of armed force comparable to occupation, it leaves many questions open: 
what degree of violation of the agreement is required? Must the continued presence of the 
armed forces in the host state be enforced with threats or other manifestations of the use 
of armed force?’29 
 
The ICJ dealt with this point in the Armed Activities case. In that case, the Court found that 
Uganda’s actions were not justified by consent or self-defence, and that they were a violation 
of the prohibition of the use of force. The Court acknowledged the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (‘DRC’) has previously consented to the presence of Ugandan troops on its 
territory for a limited purpose of responding to cross-border attacks, but that the DRC had a 
right to unilaterally withdraw this consent without any formalities required.30 The Court 
found that the DRC had at least by 8 August 1998 withdrawn its consent to the presence of 
Ugandan troops on its territory.31 The Lusaka Agreement provided for the withdrawal of 
Ugandan troops from the DRC within a particular timeframe, but the Court found that this 
did not constitute consent by the DRC to the presence of the Ugandan troops during the 
withdrawal period,32 and that such presence could only be justified, if at all, on the basis of 
self-defence.33 A more recent example is provided by Bruha with respect to ‘[t]he 
involvement of units of the Russian Black Sea forces stationed in the Ukraine harbour of 
Sevastopol in the interventionist activities of Russia leading to the illegal annexation of the 
Crimea … Although the facts are not fully clarified yet, there is no doubt that these activities 
violated the Russian–Ukraine Black Sea Fleet Agreement of 1997. Furthermore, and even if 
no use of armed force was involved, these activities may be considered as aggression 
 
29 ‘The General Assembly’s Definition of the Act of Aggression’ in Claus Kreß and Stefan Barriga (eds), 
Commentary on the Crime of Aggression (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 142, 163. 
30 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda) (2005) ICJ 
Reports 168, para. 47. 
31 Ibid., para. 53. 
32 Ibid., para. 99. This finding was contested by Judge Parra-Aranguren (Separate Opinion, paras. 3-20) and 
Judge ad hoc Kateka (Dissenting Opinion, para. 22). 
33 Ibid., para. 112; cf Claus Kreß, ‘The State Conduct Element’ in Claus Kreß and Stefan Barriga (eds), The 
Crime of Aggression: A Commentary (Cambridge University Press, 2017) 412, 445, who argues that ‘the ICJ 
refrained from characterising as a use of force the unlawful presence of Ugandan troops during the withdrawal 
period’ on the basis of paragraph 99 in conjunction with paragraph 345(1) and draws from this the implication 
of the ‘requirement that the armed forces of the aggressor state adopt a hostile intent’ (footnote omitted). 
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according to article 3(e) of the Definition, because they were instrumental to and occurred in 
the context of aggressive activities of Russia against Ukraine.’34  
(f)	The	action	of	a	State	 in	allowing	 its	 territory,	which	 it	has	placed	at	 the	
disposal	of	another	State,	to	be	used	by	that	other	State	for	perpetrating	an	
act	of	aggression	against	a	third	State;		
This ‘use of force’ is also characterised by its lack of physical means or direct physical 
effects, unless one considers purely indirect means. This form of act of aggression is distinct 
from the other acts in that it appears to either be a new form of attribution or a broad 
understanding of the concept of ‘force’.35 This is because the conduct referred to in article 
3(f) is more ‘properly characterised as aid or assistance in the commission of an unlawful use 
of force by another State within the meaning of Article 16 of the International Law 
Commission (‘ILC’) Articles on State Responsibility and customary international law’.36 The 
analysis of article 3(f) by Claus Kreß37 observes that paragraph 8 of the ILC commentary is 
ambiguous on this point because it characterises the conduct of the assisting State firstly as a 
breach of the obligation not to use force but in the same paragraph also discusses the Federal 
Republic of Germany’s acceptance ‘that the act of a State in placing its own territory at the 
disposal of another State in order to facilitate the commission of an unlawful use of force by 
that other State was itself an internationally wrongful act’. Kreß observes that: 
 
‘While the first formulation suggests that the ILC believes that the state conduct described 
in littera (f) constitutes as such a use of force, the second rather suggests that the ILC 
characterises such aid and assistance in the commission of an unlawful use of force by 
another state as an internationally wrongful act related to but distinguishable from a use 
of force. In any event, the ILC has emphasised that “the assisting State is responsible for 
its own act in deliberately assisting another State to breach an international obligation by 
which they are both bound” and that “it is not responsible, as such, for the act of the 
assisted State”.’38 
 
If, as the conclusion above suggests, the internationally wrongful act of the assisting State is 
not a result of the attribution of the act of aggression of the acting State to it but is an 
unlawful act in its own right, then the conduct described in article 3(f) it is not a form of 
attribution, so that the means employed by the ‘active’ State are not to be attributed to the 
‘passive’ State which allows its territory to be used. Accordingly, because of the wording of 
the 1974 Definition then the conduct described in article 3(f) must be considered a ‘use of 
force’ even though it does not conform to a normal understanding of this term.  
 
 
34 Above n., 163, footnote 145 (emphasis added). 
35 Kreß (2017), above n.33, 446. Kreß notes (446, footnote 167) that the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration 
does not contain a similar provision. 
36 Kreß (2017), ibid., 446, citations omitted. 
37 Ibid., 446. 
38 Ibid., footnotes omitted. 
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This unique form of a prohibited ’use of force’ requires that the assisting State place its 
territory at the disposal of another State; that the other State use the territory to perpetrate an 
act of aggression; and that the assisting State ‘allowed’ the use of its territory for this 
purpose. In terms of the acting State ‘making use of’ the territory of the assisting State for 
perpetrating an act of aggression, Kreß notes that this occurs ‘if its armed forces or the 
weapons that are used in the act of aggression are located on that territory’, but that article 
3(f) does not require a direct territorial connection with the act of aggression.39 Examples of 
use of territory falling within the scope of article 3(f) would thus include ‘a command-and-
control facility through which the act of aggression is being directed, or a military base from 
which targeting information for use in the course of the act of aggression is provided’.40 The 
required degree of involvement of the aggressor (assisting) State within the meaning of 
article 3(f) requires something approaching ‘active collusion’ rather than ‘mere acquiescence’ 
or a failure to prevent the use of its territory for perpetrating an act of aggression.41 This 
degree of involvement therefore requires that the assisting State foresee the misuse of its 
territory and have ‘knowledge of the circumstances’ of the acts concerned,42 but does not 
require that the assisting State places its territory at the disposal of the acting State with the 
intention that the acting State use it for the purpose of carrying out an act of aggression.43 
 
An example of inter-State assistance in which article 51 was invoked is Germany’s assistance 
to the coalition’s use of force in Syria and Iraq in 2015. The German parliament approved the 
military measures against IS in Iraq and Syria on the basis of article 51 of the UN Charter, 
article 42(7) of Treaty of the European Union and Security Council Resolutions 2170 (2014), 
2199 (2015) and 2249 (2015).44 Germany notified the UN Security Council under article 51 
of the UN Charter that it had ‘initiated military measures against the terrorist organization 
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)’ ‘in the exercise of the right of collective self-
defence’, and that ‘[e]xercising the right of collective self-defence, Germany will now 
support the military measures of those States that have been subjected to attacks by ISIL’.45  
 
Although Germany’s invocation of article 51 could be evidence of a belief that the acts being 
justified would otherwise violate article 2(4), the invocation itself was ambiguous in this 
respect. Since Germany’s ‘military measures’ were confined to support of coalition forces 
 
39 Ibid, 447. 
40 Ibid., 447. 
41 Thomas Bruha, ‘The General Assembly’s Definition of the Act of Aggression’ in Claus Kreß and Stefan 
Barriga (eds), Commentary on the Crime of Aggression (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 142, 164. 
42 Ibid., 164. 
43 Kreß (2017), above n.33, 446. 
44 Antrag der Bundesregierung, Drucksache 18/6866 (1 December 2015), Einsatz bewaffneter deutscher 
Streitkräfte zur Verhütung und Unterbindung terroristischer Handlungen durch die Terrororganisation IS auf 
Grundlage von Artikel 51 der Satzung der Vereinten Nationen in Verbindung mit Artikel 42 Absatz 7 des 
Vertrages über die Europäische Union sowie den Resolutionen 2170 (2014), 2199 (2015), 2249 (2015) des 
Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen. 
45 Letter dated 10 December 2015 from the Chargé d’affairs a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Germany to the 
United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2015/946 (10 December 2015), 
paras. 1 and 3. 
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through the provision of intelligence, aerial refuelling and weapons delivery to coalition 
States, they would not qualify as a prohibited ‘use of force’ under article 2(4) (as opposed to 
an internationally wrongful act through ‘aid and assistance’ to another State’s wrongful act), 
so the legal (as opposed to political) reasons for invoking article 51 to justify those measures 
is unclear. It is submitted that the decisive point regarding primary responsibility for a 
prohibited ‘use of force’ in these circumstances is the absence of inter-State claims that such 
assistance violates the prohibition of the use of force, as there is a lack of subsequent practice 
of the parties to the UN Charter demonstrating their agreement that the term ‘use of force’ in 
article 2(4) includes such forms of inter-State assistance.  
(g)	The	sending	by	or	on	behalf	of	a	State	of	armed	bands,	groups,	irregulars	
or	mercenaries,	which	carry	out	acts	of	armed	force	against	another	State	of	
such	 gravity	 as	 to	 amount	 to	 the	 acts	 listed	 above,	 or	 its	 substantial	
involvement	therein.		
Similar to article 3(f), article 3(g) of the 1974 Definition of Aggression relates to forms of 
indirect aggression in which the State facilitates the unlawful use of force by another State (in 
the case of article 3(f)) or by non-State actors (in the case of article 3(g)). According to the 
ICJ, the description in article 3(g) applies to the concept of ‘armed attack’ and is customary 
international law.46 The ICJ in the Nicaragua case held that: 
 
‘The Court sees no reason to deny that, in customary law, the prohibition of armed attacks 
may apply to the sending by a State of armed bands to the territory of another State, if 
such an operation, because of its scale and effects, would have been classified as an 
armed attack rather than as a mere frontier incident had it been carried out by regular 
armed forces. But the Court does not believe that the concept of “armed attack” includes 
not only acts by armed bands where such acts occur on a significant scale but also 
assistance to rebels in the form of the provision of weapons or logistical or other support. 
Such assistance may be regarded as a threat or use of force, or amount to intervention in 
the internal or external affairs of other States.’47 
 
There is debate about whether the State’s ‘substantial involvement’ must relate to ‘sending’ 
or to the acts of armed force of the armed bands.48 Kreß points out that the French version is 
unambiguous that substantial involvement refers to substantial involvement in the sending: 
‘L’envoi par un Etat ou en son nom des bandes ou de groupes armés, de forces irrégulières 
ou de mercenaires qui se livrent à des actes de force armée contre un autre Etat d’une 
gravité tell qu’ils équivalent aux actes énumérés ci-dessus, ou le fait de s’engager d’une 
manière substantielle dans une telle action’.49 There is also some debate about whether 
 
46 Case concerning Military and Paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of 
America), Merits, Judgment 1986 ICJ Reports 14 (‘Nicaragua Case’), para.195. 
47 Ibid., para.195. 
48 Bruha, above n.41, 165. 
49 (2017), above n.33, 448. 
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‘substantial involvement’ is an alternative to or an application of the attribution test (direction 
or control) – in other words, whether the conduct described in article 3(f) is a form of 
‘indirect force’ by the State itself, or a form of attribution of the acts of force by the armed 
group to the State. Article 3(g) of the 1974 Definition of Aggression must be read together 
with the chapeau of article 3 and article 2 of the Definition of Aggression which refers to the 
first use of force by a State. Later ICJ judgments also discuss article 3(g) in terms of 
attribution.50 Dapo Akande and Antonios Tzanakopolous51 argue that article 3(g) reflects a 
customary rule for the attribution of acts by non-State actors to a State. Their position is that 
article 3(g) is merely an application of the direction or control test and that this is how the ICJ 
has interpreted it in Nicaragua and in the Armed Activities case. Kreß argues that the test of 
attribution as set out in article 8 ILC Articles should be applied to interpret the term 
‘sending’, which according to the ICJ ‘requires effective control over the specific acts in 
question, which is a very demanding threshold’.52 But he goes on to discuss the ‘alternative 
of the substantial involvement of a state in the sending’, suggesting that this ‘should, at the 
present stage of the legal development at least, be confined to the exercise of overall control 
by the aggressor state over the persons concerned, within the meaning of the case law of the 
international criminal courts, as initiated by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia’ in the Tadic case.53 Kreß’ argument is that it is controversial whether the overall 
control test of attribution forms part of customary international law (the ICJ has held that it 
does not). If we follow the ICJ, then ‘the substantial involvement-limb of article 3(g) of the 
Annex to 1974 GA Resolution 3314 should perhaps best be considered as the articulation of a 
lex specialis on attribution in the legal context of the prohibition of the use of force’, 
especially considering that the ICJ has not elaborated on the meaning of ‘substantial 
involvement in the sending’.54 But if one adopts this interpretation, the result is that the 
‘substantial involvement’ alternative in article 3(g) is rendered ‘entirely redundant’.55  
 
Kreß acknowledges that ‘[t]he ordinary meaning of “substantial involvement” is even wide 
enough to cover, beyond the exercise of overall control by a state over violent non-state 
actors, the (mere) toleration by a state of acts of armed force carried out by non-state actors 
from the territory of that state against another state’.56 But he argues against this broad 
interpretation since the negotiations on the 1974 resolution do not show consensus on this 
point, the ICJ has not adopted this interpretation and since the lack of general acceptance of 
the US attempt to establish a ‘harbouring doctrine’ after the 9/11 terror attacks does not 
support a new customary international law rule on attribution.57 Others scholars, such as 
Raphaël van Steenberghe interpret the ICJ case law and article 3(g) of the 1974 Definition 
 
50 e.g. the Armed Activities case, above n.30, para. 146. 
51 ‘The ICJ and the concept of aggression’ in The Crime of Aggression: A Commentary (Kreß and Barriga eds., 
2017 CUP), 214, 223-4. 
52 (2017), above n.33, 449, footnote omitted. 
53 Ibid., 449, referring to Prosecutor v Tadić, Judgment, ICTY-94-1-A, 14 July 1999, para. 145. 
54 Ibid., 449. 
55 Ibid., 449. 
56 Ibid., 450, footnote omitted. 
57 Ibid., 450, footnote omitted. 
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differently and address the issue in terms of State ‘substantial involvement’ as an alternative 
to attribution.58 In the end, the interpretation of the term ‘substantial involvement’ in article 
3(g) affects the scope of article 2(4) (as well as article 51). If one accepts that ‘substantial 
involvement’ is an alternative to the standard attribution test, the scope of article 2(4) and 
article 51 may be slightly broader and cover more State forms of involvement in attacks by 
non-State armed groups. An in-depth analysis of the interpretation of article 3(f) and indirect 
uses of force by a State are beyond the scope of this work. Suffice it to note here that this 
unlawful use of force is anomalous because, like the other form of indirect use of force under 
article 3(f) of the 1974 Definition, it is characterised by its lack of physical means or direct 
physical effects, unless one considers purely indirect means.  
Conclusion		
Although articles 1 and 2 of the 1974 Definition refer to ‘armed force’, the acts in article 3 
listed above do not correspond to a normal understanding of ‘force’, but show that UN 
Member States interpret the concept of ‘force’ to include particular acts which do not 
correspond with the general definition of this term because they lack physical means and/or 
(direct) physical effects. Some explanations for this are considered at the end of this chapter. 
Lower	gravity	anomalous	examples	of	‘use	of	force’	
In addition to the acts set out in the 1974 Definition, there are other anomalous examples of 
acts characterised by States as a prohibited ‘use of force’ despite a lack of certain elements 
such as ‘use’ of physical force or a lack of physical effects. These include the following: 
Intentionally	crossing	a	border	bearing	arms	with	an	intention	to	use	them	
even	before	any	weapons	are	actually	fired	
The mere crossing of a border by armed forces has sometimes been treated by States as a 
violation of the prohibition of the use of force, despite a lack of employment of physical 
means or of physical effects. For example, in the case of the Temple of Preah Vihear, 
Cambodia argued that Thailand committed a ‘flagrant violation of Article 2, paragraph 4 of 
the Charter’59 when it sent detachments of its armed forces to territory claimed by Cambodia 
in 1954 but subject to a border dispute between those two States, despite a lack of armed 
confrontation.60 Similarly, in September 1964, Malaysia complained to the UN Security 
Council that Indonesia had committed ‘blatant and inexcusable aggression’ when it sent 
heavily armed paratroopers into Malaysian territory in the context of a broader political 
 
58 La légitime défense en droit international public (Brussels, Larcier: 2012) 319-322. 
59 Application instituting proceedings, 30 September 1959, Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents, ICJ Rep 
(1962) vol 1, 15. 
60 See also Olivier Corten, The Law against War : The Prohibition on the Use of Force in Contemporary 
International Law (Hart, 2010), 83. 
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dispute.61 The practice is however not clear-cut. For example, when Israeli commandos 
assassinated Khalil al-Wazir in Tunis on 16 April 1988, the UN Security Council adopted 
Resolution 611 (1988) condemning ‘the aggression … against the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Tunisia in flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations, international 
law and norms of conduct’.62 However, it is unclear from the international response to this 
incident whether the mere act of sending Israeli armed forces into Tunisia for the purpose of 
carrying out the assassination (as opposed to the actual assassination itself) was sufficient in 
itself to constitute a prohibited ‘use of force’, having regard to the fact that no direct combat 
took place between the Israeli commando unit and Tunisian armed forces.63 
Aerial	incursion		
Similarly, there have been numerous instances of aerial incursion that States have treated as 
violations of the prohibition of the use of force, and in some cases, as an armed attack under 
article 51 of the UN Charter giving rise to a right to self-defence despite the lack of 
employment of physical force and lack of physical effects. For instance, Iraq, Lebanon and 
Libya have issued complaints to the UN Security Council regarding recurrent US incursions 
into their airspace, invoking the right of self-defence.64 Likewise,  the attempted US hostage 
rescue operation in Tehran on 24 April 1980 was characterised by both the US (due to its 
invocation of article 51)65 and Iran66 as ‘force’ despite the relatively short period of the 
incursion and lack of any direct encounter with Iranian forces.67 But the practice is mixed, 
since in similar cases of aerial incursion, article 2(4) or article 51 were not invoked. In the 
Nicaragua case, unauthorized overflight of territory was treated as a violation of sovereignty 
and was not characterised as a use of force.68  
 
The basic principle and governing law with respect to sovereignty over air space was set out 
by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case:  
 
‘The basic legal concept of State sovereignty in customary international law, expressed in, 
inter alia, Article 2. paragraph 1, of the United Nations Charter, extends to the internal 
 
61 Letter from representative of Malaysia to the President of the Security Council dated 3 September 1964, 
S/5930, OR, 19th year, Suppl. for July-Sept 1964, 263. See also Corten, ibid., 78. 
62 UN Security Council Resolution 611 (25 April 1988) UN Doc. S/RES/611. 
63 For a detailed legal analysis of this incident, see Erin Pobjie, Fanny Declercq and Raphaël van Steenberghe, 
‘The Killing of Khalil Al-Wazir by Israeli Commandos in Tunis – 1988’ in Tom Ruys and Olivier Corten (eds), 
The use of force in international law: A case-based approach (Oxford University Press, 2018) 403. 
64 Ruys, ibid., 184. 
65 Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to 
the President of the Security Council dated 25 April 1980, UN Doc. S/13908. 
66 Note Verbale dated 28 April 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Iran to the United Nations 
Addressed to the Secretary-General (29 April 1980), UN Doc. S/13915. 
67 For an overview of the facts and the positions taken by the main protagonists and third States, see Mathias 
Forteau and Alison See Ying Xiu, ‘The US Hostage Rescue Operation in Iran – 1980’ in Tom Ruys and Olivier 
Corten (eds), The use of force in international law: A case-based approach (Oxford University Press, 2018) 
306.  
68 Above n., 46, Dispositif para. 5 and paras. 87-92, referring to Nicaragua’s claims of high-altitude 
reconnaissance flights and low-altitude flights which caused ‘sonic booms’. 
  168
waters and territorial sea of every State and to the air space above its territory. As to 
superjacent air space, the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation (Art. 
1) reproduces the established principle of the complete and exclusive sovereignty of a 
State over the air space above its territory. That convention, in conjunction with the 1958 
Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea, further specifies that the sovereignty of the 
coastal State extends to the territorial sea and to the air space above it, as does the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea adopted on 10 December 1982. The Court has 
no doubt that these prescriptions of treaty-law merely respond to firmly established and 
longstanding tenets of customary international law.’69 
 
In that case, the ICJ held that ‘[t]he principle of respect for territorial sovereignty is … 
directly infringed by the unauthorized overflight of a State's territory by aircraft belonging to 
or under the control of the government of another State’.70 However, the practice surveyed 
above demonstrates that States sometimes treat aerial incursion as an unlawful ‘use of force’ 
and not only a violation of sovereignty. If one considers that aerial incursion may indeed 
constitute an unlawful use of force, then the interesting question is raised of why this should 
be so, even when there is no application of physical force or physical effects. Note that this 
differs slightly from the issue of the legal regime governing the territorial State’s response to 
such incursion, which is discussed below in the context of anomalous non-uses of force.  
Conclusion	
The anomalous examples of ‘use of force’ discussed above seem to be characterised by no 
use of weapon or no physical effects, but an interference with sovereignty. The first category 
involves military incursion without recourse to the use of weapons, for example: unopposed 
invasion and unopposed military occupation; intentionally crossing a border bearing arms 
with an intention to use them even before any weapons are actually fired and aerial incursion 
into sovereign airspace. Other examples involve unconsented mere presence in territory, such 
as an unchallenged blockade, and overstaying a Status of Forces Agreement. Another 
category of anomalous examples relates to the indirect use of force through assisting another 
State or non-State armed groups in their use of force. 
Anomalous examples of non-use of force 
In addition to the above anomalous accepted instances of ‘use of force’ that do not 
correspond to the general interpretation of this term, there are also anomalous examples of 
forcible acts that appear to meet the key criteria of a ‘use of force’ but are nevertheless not 
characterised as illegal uses of force under article 2(4) of the UN Charter. This part will 
discuss anomalous examples of non-use of force in the air and at sea. 
 
69 Above n.46, para 212. 
70 Ibid., para. 251. 
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Forcible	response	to	aerial	incursion	
The previous analysis discussed State practice regarding aerial incursion into sovereign 
airspace and its characterisation as a ‘use of force’ in some instances. A related anomaly is 
the legal characterisation of forcible response to such incursion, such as shooting down the 
aircraft, as not a ‘use of force’ and therefore falling outside the scope of the jus contra 
bellum. For instance, in the 1946 shooting down in Yugoslav airspace of a US military plane 
(which entered due to bad weather), the US complained that it was a violation of article 
2(4).71 In 1983, the Korean aircraft KAL flight 007 was mistaken for a spy plane and shot 
down by fighters in Soviet airspace. This was widely condemned but article 2(4) was not 
invoked; instead, the shooting down of the aircraft was condemned as inhumane and 
disproportionate and in violation of annex 2 of the Chicago Convention regarding 
interception of civilian aircraft.72 In 1996, the Cuban airforce shooting down two civil aircraft 
was widely condemned as a violation of article 3bis of the Chicago Convention and resulted 
in UN Security Council Resolution 1067 (1996) condemning it without mentioning article 
2(4).73 
 
Scholars are divided over the question of whether the use of force by a State against intruding 
military aircraft in its own territory is governed by the jus contra bellum, or law 
enforcement/air law.74 For example, Olivier Corten argues that the shooting down of a single 
military aircraft intruding in airspace is governed by air law rather than the jus contra bellum: 
‘if the measures taken against an intruding aircraft are considered police measures for air 
security, we are referred on to other conditions of lawfulness: prior warning, unless there is a 
manifest hostile intent, necessary and proportionate measure, or riposte in self-defence’.75 In 
Corten’s view, air law and the jus contra bellum have ‘two separate domains of 
application’.76 In support of this view, he cites articles 1 and 3bis(a) of the Chicago 
Convention on International Civil Aviation, the latter which however states that ‘[t]his 
provision shall not be interpreted as modifying in any way the rights and obligations of States 
set forth in the Charter of the United Nations’. Corten also notes the International Law 
Commission’s discussion of circumstances precluding wrongfulness uses example of aircraft 
in distress entering airspace unauthorised as being justified as force majeure or distress. Since 
the ILC regards article 2(4) as a peremptory norm, this aircraft example must not fall under 
the jus contra bellum but under aviation rules since jus cogens cannot be justified by 
 
71 Tom Ruys, ‘The Meaning of “Force” and the Boundaries of the Jus Ad Bellum: Are “Minimal” Uses of Force 
Excluded from UN Charter Article 2 (4)?’ (2014) 108(2) American Journal of International Law 159, 173, 175, 
176, 184. 
72 This lead to the drafting of article 3bis with specific rules for intercepting civilian aircraft (considered 
customary international law). For a discussion of this incident, see Corten, above n.60, 61-62. 
73 Ruys, above n.71, 204, footnotes 275-8, 207 at footnote 299; Corten, above n.60, 62-3. See also Corten 63-4 
for a discussion of other aerial incidents in which article 2(4) was not invoked. 
74 See discussion in Chapter Five, ‘international relations’, on whether this falls under the scope of the 
prohibition, or if the response is governed by law enforcement jurisdiction. 
75 Above n.60, 60. 
76 Ibid., 61, citing K-G Park. 
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circumstances precluding wrongfulness and lex specialis is not applicable to such norms.77 
According to Corten, the way to determine which body of rules is applicable depends ‘on the 
type of action in question, whether a simple police measure in the first instance, or an act of 
force in international relations in the second’.78 Tom Ruys argues: ‘contrary to what Corten 
suggests, one cannot rely on the argument that “minimal” use of armed force by way of 
enforcement measures within a state’s own territory would somehow find its legal basis in 
“particular (and mainly conventional) legal regimes on land (such as the Schengen 
convention), at sea (such as the Montego Bay convention), or in the air (such as the Chicago 
convention).” None of the conventions cited provides a legal basis for forcible action against 
unlawful territorial incursions by military or police forces of another state.’ He concludes 
that: ‘whenever state A deliberately uses (potentially) lethal force within its own territory— 
including its territorial sea and its airspace—against military or police units of state B acting 
in their official capacity, that action by state A amounts to the interstate use of force in the 
sense of UN Charter Article 2(4).’79  
 
A recent incident raising this issue concerned the shooting down of a Russian fighter jet by 
Turkey on 24 November 2015. The Russian jet was in the region as part of Russia’s ongoing 
operation in Syria fighting the opposition with the consent of the Assad government. Russia 
disputes that its jet crossed the Turkish border, but Turkey claimed that: 
 
‘2 SU-24 planes, the nationality of which are unknown have approached Turkish national 
airspace in Yayladaga/Hatay region. The planes in question have been warned 10 times 
during a period of 5 minutes via “Emergency” channel and asked to change their headings 
south immediately. Disregarding these warnings, both planes, at an altitude of 19.000 feet, 
violated Turkish national airspace to a depth of 1,36 miles and 1,15 miles in length for 17 
seconds from 9.24’.05” local time. Following the violation, plane 1 left Turkish national 
airspace. Plane 2 was fired at while in Turkish national airspace by Turkish F-16s 
performing air combat patrolling in that area in accordance with the rules of engagement. 
Plane 2 crashed onto the Syrian side of the Turkish-Syrian border.’80  
 
Russia strongly protested against the shooting down of its jet and claimed that at the time it 
was shot down, it was 4km within Syrian territory. It is clear that if Russia’s aerial incursion 
was an armed attack, Turkey would have the right to use force in self-defence under article 
51 of the UN Charter. Under the jus contra bellum, Turkey’s response would be governed by 
the conditions of necessity and proportionality.81 If it is proportionate to the goal of halting 
 
77 Ibid., 64-5. 
78 Ibid., 65. 
79 Above n.71, 181-188, footnote omitted.  
80 Turkish letter to UN Secretary General dated 24 November 2015, published on 
http://live.aljazeera.com/Event/Turkey_downs_Russian_jet/207503335 (accessed 26 October 2018). 
81 Nicaragua case, above n.46, para. 176; Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, Advisory Opinion 
1996 ICJ Rep 226 (‘Nuclear Weapons’), para. 41. 
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the attack,82 then the plane may be shot down. The key issue would then be when the right to 
self-defence arises – i.e. when an ‘armed attack’ ‘occurs’. There are different views regarding 
when the right to self-defence arises: e.g. ‘interceptive self-defence’83 or imminence.84 But if 
such an aerial incursion does not constitute an armed attack, then there is difficulty with 
explaining the legal basis for response to those small-scale incidents due to the ‘gap’ between 
a prohibited ‘use of force’ under article 2(4) and the higher gravity threshold of an ‘armed 
attack’ under article 51. Since it is very restrictive to hold that States can only respond to 
aerial incursions by military aircraft within their territory with force in the event of a strictly 
construed armed attack, there are three solutions to this problem. Firstly, one can interpret a 
lower threshold for ‘armed attack’ giving rise to a right of self-defence. Secondly, one can 
find an exception to the prohibition of the use of force outside article 51 self-defence and 
Chapter VII enforcement action – for example, ‘proportionate defensive action against 
incipient attack’,85 or forcible countermeasures by the victim State to acts violating article 
2(4) but falling short of article 51 armed attack86 (however, this view is firmly in the minority 
position since it is widely accepted that since the advent of the UN Charter forcible 
countermeasures (i.e. armed reprisals)87 are unlawful).88 The third possibility is to interpret 
the prohibition of the use of force as not applying to a State’s use of force against incursions 
by the military of another State within its own territory, e.g. on the basis that such uses of 
force are not ‘in international relations’ or against the territorial integrity or sovereignty of 
another State or against the purposes of the United Nations. However, it remains disputed 
whether there is a right to use force against intruding military aircraft unless in self-defence.89 
 
 
82 David Kretzmer, ‘The Inherent Right to Self-Defence and Proportionality in Jus Ad Bellum’ (2013) 24(1) 
EJIL 235. 
83 Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (Cambridge University Press, 5th ed., 2011), 204-
5:‘Interceptive self-defence is lawful, even under Article 51 of the Charter [fn], for it takes place after the other 
side has committed itself to an armed attack in an ostensibly irrevocable way. … an interceptive strike counters 
an armed attack which is already in progress, even if it is still incipient.’ 
84 On the requirement of imminence, see Noam Lubell, ‘The Problem of Imminence in an Uncertain World’ in 
Marc Weller (ed), The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford University Press, 
2015) 697. 
85 Ruys (2014), above n.71, 176. 
86 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America), Judgment 2003 ICJ Rep 161 (‘Oil 
Platforms’), Separate Opinion of Judge Simma, para.13: ’To sum up my view on the use of force/self-defence 
aspects of the present case, there are two levels to be distinguished: there is, first, the level of "armed attacks" in 
the substantial, massive sense of amounting to "une agression armée", to quote the French authentic text of 
Article 51. Against such armed attacks, self-defence in its not infinite, but still considerable, variety would be 
justified. But we may encounter also a lower level of hostile military action, not reaching the threshold of an 
"armed attack" within the meaning of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Against such hostile acts, a State 
may of course defend itself, but only within a more limited range and quality of responses (the main difference 
being that the possibility of collective self-defence does not arise, cf. Nicaragua) and bound to necessity, 
proportionality and immediacy in time in a particularly strict way.’ 
87 Claus Kreß, ‘The International Court of Justice and the Non-Use of Force’ in Marc Weller (ed), The Oxford 
Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2015) 561, 593 
88 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, above n.81, para.46; ILC, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of State for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, in Report of the International Law Commission on the 
Work of Its Fifty-Third Session’ (A/56/10, 2001), art. 50. 
89 See discussion in Chapter Five, ‘International relations’. 
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Maritime	 law	enforcement	against	 foreign-flagged	vessels	with	no	basis	 for	
jurisdiction		
A further example of forcible acts that appear to meet the criteria for a ‘use of force’ but are 
not consistently characterised as such relates to maritime law enforcement against foreign-
flagged vessels that is without lawful basis.  
 
The use of force at sea is a complex issue, because it is governed by a parallel legal regime: 
the law of the sea. The law of the sea as embodied in the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (‘UNCLOS’)90 recognises different legal spaces in the sea, and strikes a balance between 
the rights of coastal States and the general interest of all States to freedom of navigation and 
peaceful uses of the sea. The resulting regime can result in multiple States having 
enforcement jurisdiction over the same physical space because of the principle of exclusive 
flag State jurisdiction, territorial sovereignty of the coastal State over internal waters and the 
territorial sea (with the territorial sea subject to certain rights of other States such as innocent 
passage), a customs and immigration enforcement area within the contiguous zone but 
outside territorial waters, and the exclusive economic rights of the coastal State within its 
Exclusive Economic Zone (subject to freedoms of the high seas such as navigation, overflight 
and laying of cables). This is the most fraught zone of the seas, because it is here that there is 
a complex balance between the rights of the coastal State and the rights of all other States – 
this is a result of a compromise to create a new zone, the Exclusive Economic Zone of 200 
nautical miles, while preserving other rights of third States. Not all rights are assigned within 
this area, so there remains uncertainty over the legal rights that the coastal State and other 
States are entitled to exercise within this zone. UNCLOS also recognises other maritime 
spaces such as transit straits, archipelagic seas; and the high seas (subject to freedom of 
navigation and peaceful uses).91  
 
In respect of maritime law enforcement with no basis for jurisdiction, despite the presence of 
elements of a ‘use of force’ identified in Part II, States do not always characterise such acts as 
a violation of article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Two examples will be discussed in the following 
section: non-innocent passage through the territorial sea by submerged submarines, and 
unlawful attempts to exercise law enforcement jurisdiction on the high seas against foreign 
vessels (which has no legal basis outside certain recognised exceptions under customary 
international law and treaty – see article 110 UNCLOS).  
 
An anomalous example of forcible acts which are not usually characterised as an unlawful 
‘use of force’ is the non-innocent passage of submerged submarines through the territorial 
 
90 UN General Assembly, 1994 UNTS 397 (concluded 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 
1994). 
91 For an overview of maritime zones and the implications for maritime security see Natalie Klein, Maritime 
Security and the Law of the Sea (Oxford University Press, 2011), 62-146. See also Francesco Francioni, 
‘Peacetime Use of Force, Military Activities, and the New Law of the Sea’ (1985) 18 Cornell International Law 
Journal 203. 
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waters of another State. The coastal State has sovereignty over the territorial sea, which may 
extend twelve nautical miles from the baseline.92 Foreign vessels, including warships and 
submarines, have a right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.93 According to article 
19(1) of UNCLOS, ‘[p]assage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good 
order or security of the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in conformity with this 
Convention and with other rules of international law.’ Article 19(2) of UNCLOS specifies 
acts which render passage not innocent, including ‘(a): any threat or use of force against the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the coastal State, or in any other 
manner in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the 
United Nations’. Article 20 states that: ‘[i]n the territorial sea, submarines and other 
underwater vehicles are required to navigate on the surface and to show their flag’. 
Furthermore, according to article 25(1): ‘[t]he coastal State may take the necessary steps in 
its territorial sea to prevent passage which is not innocent’. Under customary international 
law, foreign government vessels such as warships and submarines have sovereign immunity 
from the jurisdiction of any State except their flag State.94 UNCLOS is silent on the measures 
that may be taken in response to non-innocent passage and its article 25 does not explicitly 
authorise a forcible response to non-innocent passage. Thus, it is unclear which legal regime 
– jus contra bellum or law enforcement – governs the forcible response of the coastal State to 
non-innocent passage by foreign government vessels.  
 
This issue comes to the fore in instances of submerged submarines entering the territorial 
waters of another State in violation of article 20 of UNCLOS. For example, in 1982, ‘Sweden 
utilized depth charges and mine detonations in its efforts to force a submarine that was near 
one of its naval bases to the surface, and further threatened to sink foreign submarines if they 
refused to surface and leave Sweden's waters. This threat was generally tolerated by other 
states, and could thus be indicative of what responses may lawfully be taken to respond to 
this particular security concern.’95 A similar issue was raised in 2004 when a submerged 
submarine which was later identified as Chinese, entered Japan’s territorial sea. ‘[A] 
“maritime security operation” (kaijo-keibi-kodo) was ordered to the Commander of the Japan 
Maritime Self-Defense Force (‘JMSDF’ Fleet), and patrol helicopters and vessels of the 
JMSDF joined the operation.’96  The incident was framed by Japan as a violation of 
international law (specifically of article 20 UNCLOS to which Japan and China are party). 
Interestingly, there was no invocation of the language of article 2(4) or article 51 of the UN 
Charter. Japan demanded an apology, explanation and assurance of non-repetition. Despite 
 
92 UNCLOS, arts. 2 and 3. 
93 UNCLOS, art.17. 
94 Klein, above n.91, 64; UNCLOS, art. 32: ‘With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in 
articles 30 and 31, nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government ships 
operated for non-commercial purposes.’ 
95 Klein, above n.91, 41, footnotes omitted. For a discussion of the international response to this incident, see 
Corten, above n.60, 118-119 and Romana Sadurska, ‘Foreign Submarines in Swedish Waters: The Erosion of an 
International Norm’ (1984) 10 Yale Journal of International Law 34. 
96 Yukiya Hamamoto, ‘The Incident of a Submarine Navigating Underwater in Japan’s Territorial Sea’ (2005) 
48 The Japanese Annual of International Law 123, 123. 
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calls in the Japanese Diet for greater clarity over the measures that may be taken against 
submerged submarines in such situations, the government response plan does not address 
what measures it believes a State may take in response to violations of article 20.97 
 
These examples are anomalous because a coastal State may not exercise law enforcement 
jurisdiction over a foreign warship or submarine, since foreign government vessels enjoy 
sovereign immunity. Thus, a use of force against submerged submarines in the territorial sea 
in an attempt to bring them to the surface and require them to leave the territorial sea is not 
authorised by UNCLOS nor customary international law. In the absence of a basis for the 
exercise of jurisdiction against such vessels, a use of force against them would appear to be in 
international relations and fall within the ambit of the prohibition of the use of force under 
article 2(4) of the UN Charter. ‘To the extent that any maritime security threats or breaches 
are state sponsored, law enforcement powers against sovereign immune vessels are not 
available. Instead, questions involving the threat or use of force may arise and diplomatic or 
other avenues for dispute settlement must be pursued.’98 Although States do not always 
invoke self-defence to respond to submerged submarine in territorial waters, omitting to 
invoke article 2(4) or article 51 does not necessarily indicate an opinio juris that such 
incidents definitively fall outside the scope of article 2(4), since it could be motivated by 
other considerations (such as political) and also due to uncertainty over the applicable legal 
framework.  
 
With respect to attempted law enforcement against foreign flagged vessels on the high seas, 
this is sometimes but not always characterised as an unlawful use of force under the jus 
contra bellum. On the high seas, the principle of mare liberum and exclusive flag State 
jurisdiction with only few exceptions applies. This was affirmed by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice in the SS Lotus case: ‘It is certainly true that – apart from certain special 
cases which are defined by international law – vessels on the high seas are subject to no 
authority except that of the State whose flag they fly.’99 Exceptions to sole flag State 
jurisdiction on the high seas include the right of hot pursuit, plus ‘the right of visit in relation 
to piracy, slave trading, drug trafficking, people smuggling, and unauthorized 
broadcasting’.100 Therefore, attempts by a State to exercise jurisdiction against a foreign 
 
97 See further Mikanagi T and Ogi H, ‘The Japanese View on Legal Issues Related to Security’ (2016) 59 
Japanese Yearbook of International Law 360, 367-369 for extracts of parliamentary question and answer 
sessions relating to measures against foreign government ships conducting non-innocent navigation inside the 
territorial sea: ‘Regarding the following question, Deputy Commandant of the Japan Coast Guard Kunio 
Kishimoto explained as follows:' 
"(Question asked by Member of the House of Councilors Masahisa Sato) The Japan Coast Guard can take 
necessary steps to require foreign government ships to leave the territorial sea which are permitted under Article 
25 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. While it cannot conduct forcible boarding or arrest, 
I think that in certain circumstances, it can take forcible steps to require foreign government ships to leave the 
territorial sea, including ramming and the use of water cannons, as an exercise of police power. I would like to 
ask the view of the Coast Guard." 
98 Klein, above n.91, 65. 
99 SS Lotus Case (France v Turkey) [1927] PCIJ Ser A No 10 (7 September) 25. 
100 Klein, above n.91, 108; see UNCLOS, arts. 99-111. 
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vessel on the high seas outside of these recognised exceptions or on the basis of a specific 
treaty (such as the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement101) have no legal basis. With respect to 
interdiction (unilateral boarding and arrest of a vessel) by the non-flag State on the high seas, 
Douglas Guilfoyle argues that such unauthorised interference is ‘a clear attack on a State's 
sole means of exercising a fundamental right’.102 
 
A prominent example of a high-gravity employment of force in purported law enforcement 
on the high seas without lawful basis is the 1967 bombing of a Liberian-flagged oil tanker, 
Torrey Canyon, by the United Kingdom to prevent marine pollution after it ran aground on 
the high seas outside British territorial waters.103 ‘The operation, conducted by the RAF, 
lasted several days with napalm bombs being dropped on the wreck to release and burn the 
oil remaining in the ship’s tanks.’104 The legal debate following the incident turned around 
the lawfulness of police measures on the high seas to prevent the risk of pollution, including 
the possibility of invoking necessity as a grounds precluding wrongfulness.105 Although the 
UK had no grounds for exercising law enforcement jurisdiction over the Liberian-flagged 
vessel on the high seas, and despite the high gravity of means and physical effects, the 
incident was not characterised as a ‘use of force’ under article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Corten 
argues that this precedent confirms that two separate legal frameworks can apply to the use of 
force at sea: one relating to police measures based on treaty- or customary rules of the law of 
the sea, and the other governed by the jus contra bellum.106 However, due to the lack of legal 
grounds for exercising law enforcement jurisdiction in this case, this argument is not 
convincing and the reasoning may lie elsewhere.107 
 
The Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v Canada) case108 before the ICJ is also sometimes cited in 
support of the argument that there is a de minimis gravity threshold that divides a ‘“minimum 
use of force”, that can be ascribed to simple police measures, and a more serious use, that 
might come within the ambit of article 2(4)’.109 In that case, Canada had entered a reservation 
to its acceptance of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction excluding the Court’s jurisdiction 
over ‘disputes arising out of or concerning conservation and management measures taken by 
Canada with respect to vessels fishing in the NAFO Regulatory Area, as defined in the 
Convention on Future Multilateral Co-operation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, 1978, 
and the enforcement of such measures’. On the same day, Canada introduced domestic 
 
101 United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks 
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (1995) 2167 UNTS 88, art. 21(14), discussed in Klein, above n.91, 78. 
102 ‘Interdicting Vessels to Enforce the Common Interest: Maritime Countermeasures and the Use of Force’ 
(2007) 56(1) The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 69, 80. 
103 See Ruys (2014), above n.71, 203, footnote 271; Corten, above n.60, 58-9. 
104 Corten, ibid., 59, citing Keesing’s Contemporary Archives (1967) 22.003. 
105 Corten, ibid., 59. 
106 Ibid., 59. 
107 This case is discussed further in Chapter Nine. 
108 Fisheries Jurisdiction case (Spain v Canada), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment 1998 ICJ Rep 432. 
109 Corten, above n.60, 172, footnote omitted. 
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legislation regarding conservation and management measures over parts of the high seas. 
Canada then later enforced that legislation on the high seas 245 miles from the Canadian 
coast against a Spanish fishing vessel, the Estai, by boarding, inspecting and seizing the 
vessel. Spain protested and claimed that this was an unlawful use of force in violation of 
article 2(4). Canada argued that the Court had no jurisdiction to hear the dispute, since it fell 
within the scope of its reservation. Spain argued that since the acts complained of where 
unlawful under the UN Charter, they could not be regarded as falling within the scope of the 
Canadian reservation.  Consequently, the case was ultimately concerned with whether the 
matter was a ‘dispute[] arising out of or concerning conservation and management measures 
taken by Canada with respect to vessels fishing in the NAFO Regulatory Area, as defined in 
the Convention on Future Multilateral Co-operation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, 
1978, and the enforcement of such measures’.  
 
The Court found that it had no jurisdiction because the measures taken against the Estai fell 
within the scope of Canada’s reservation. In particular, it stated: 
 
‘Boarding, inspection, arrest and minimum use of force for these purposes are all 
contained within the concept of enforcement of conservation and management measures 
according to a “natural and reasonable” interpretation of this concept.’110  
 
This statement has been relied upon by Corten to support his position regarding a de minimis 
gravity threshold distinguishing law enforcement measures from a ‘use of force’ at sea. 
However, a closer reading shows that the Court was ruling on whether the matter arose from 
‘conservation and management measures’ or their enforcement (to see if it fell within the 
scope of Canada’s reservation from its acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction). Therefore, no 
firm conclusion can be drawn from this judgment about the boundaries between use of force 
under article 2(4) and the enforcement of conservation and management measures at sea. The 
reason is that the Court did not include the legality of such measures under international law 
in its interpretation of Canada’s reservation, and instead focused on the technical aspects of 
the definition. In fact, the Court explicitly held that it was not considering the legality of the 
measures since it did not have jurisdiction to do so. It was left unsettled whether the 
enforcement measures violated article 2(4). In fact, the Court explicitly declined to scrutinise 
the legality of the measures under international law, and was careful to distinguish between 
the legality of the measures under international law and the question of consent to 
jurisdiction. The judges also disagreed on whether the legality of the measures under 
international law was relevant to interpretation of Canada’s reservation.111 This case therefore 
provides no support either in favour or against a gravity threshold that distinguishes law 
enforcement measures and a ‘use of force’ under article 2(4).  
 
110 Above n.108, para. 84. 
111 See Dissenting Opinion of Judge Torres Bernárdez, paras. 343 and 345; and Dissenting Opinion of Vice-
President Weeramantry, para. 23 ff. 
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Conclusion	
An analysis of anomalous examples of non-‘use of force’ such as forcible response to aerial 
incursion, maritime incursion by submerged submarines and the Torrey Canyon incident may 
further clarify the complex relationship between competing applicable legal frameworks and 
where the boundaries between them lie, as well as indicate which elements of a ‘use of force’ 
are necessary and the relationship between those elements. The next section will discuss 
possible legal explanations for these anomalous ‘uses of force’ and non-‘uses of force’ under 
article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 
Possible explanations 
The problem remains of how to reconcile these seemingly anomalous examples with a 
coherent definition of a prohibited ‘use of force’ under article 2(4) of the UN Charter. There 
are several possible explanations for these anomalous examples of ‘use of force’ and non-
‘use of force’, namely, that these are agreed exceptions to the general interpretation of a ‘use 
of force’ under article 2(4), the concept of ‘use of force’ is broader than generally understood 
or that a ‘use of force’ is characterised not by a checklist of essential elements, but of a basket 
of elements to be weighed and balanced. Each of these interpretive possibilities are discussed 
further below. 
1.	These	are	agreed	exceptions	to	the	general	interpretation	of	article	
2(4)	
One possibility is that these anomalous examples are merely agreed exceptions to the general 
interpretation of a ‘use of force’ under article 2(4) and customary international law. This 
possibility is not excluded but would need to be strongly supported by subsequent agreement 
or evidence of subsequent practice demonstrating the parties’ agreement to this interpretation. 
If one considers 1974 Resolution 3314 as a subsequent agreement regarding the interpretation 
of article 2(4) of the UN Charter,112 an argument could be constructed to support recognised 
exceptions to the general interpretation of this term, as set out in the preceding section, 
namely: military occupation (as distinct from the invasion or armed attack preceding it) 
(article 3(a)), an unenforced blockade (article 3(c)), mere continuing presence in 
contravention of SOFA (article 3(e)) and indirect aggression either through ‘[t]he action of a 
State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be used 
by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State’ (article 3(f)) or 
‘[t]he sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, 
which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the 
acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein’ (article 3(g)). In this case, the general 
 
112 See Chapter Six. 
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definition of a prohibited ‘use of force’ would apply, requiring the presence of the identified 
elements of a ‘use of force’, unless an act fell within the scope of an agreed special case.  
 
This is of course possible, but there are two issues with this explanation. The first is that it 
would be preferable to find a solution that results in a consistent interpretation of this 
provision. This is not an insurmountable objection, since it may be that this is the situation 
lex lata even though it may not be the preferred interpretive outcome as a matter of legal 
policy. The second and more important issue with this explanation is that, although it 
explains certain anomalous examples of ‘use of force’ that do not display the usual elements 
(such as physical means or physical effects), it does not fully explain the phenomena in 
question. For instance, it does not explain anomalous examples of non-use of force discussed 
above (although of course, these could also be subsequent agreements regarding acts that fall 
outside the scope of the prohibition). It also does not provide a satisfactory definition of an 
unlawful ‘use of force’ for acts that do not fall within subsequently agreed special exceptions 
to the general definition. As will be argued in more detail in the following chapter, a 
prohibited ‘use of force’ (even one that is a ‘standard’ type of force and not a special case 
such as unresisted invasion) is not characterised by a checklist of essential elements. The 
theory of subsequently agreed special types of ‘use of force’ therefore does not provide a full 
explanation of how to identify whether certain acts fall within the general definition. 
2.	 The	 interpretation	 of	 ‘use	 of	 force’	 is	 broader	 than	 generally	
understood	
An alternative explanation for these anomalous uses of force and non-uses of force is that the 
definition of a prohibited ‘use of force’ is broader than previously understood, and 
encompasses acts which do not conform with the prototypical understanding of ‘force’ as 
derived in Part II above. The 1974 Definition could be regarded as a subsequent agreement 
that shows that UN Member States share a broader understanding of the concept of ‘armed 
force’. The majority of the acts listed (articles 3(a)-(d)) involve classical acts of inter-State 
warfare, namely, invasion, military occupation, bombardment, blockade and attacks on the 
armed forces of a State or its marine and air fleets. The remainder of listed acts involve a 
special case of violation of sovereignty that could be (at a broad level) considered similar to 
military occupation due to the unconsented to and thus unlawful presence of the armed forces 
of another State within a State’s territory (in the case of article 3(e)), and as closing loopholes 
in unlawful conduct by enclosing forms of indirect aggression such as certain forms of 
assistance to another State to commit aggression (article 3(f)) or through sending/substantial 
involvement in the armed attack against a State by a non-State armed group (article 3(g)). All 
of these acts (including the case of attacks against the marine or air fleets of a State, due to 
the nexus to the State demanded by the scale of the attack, as denoted by the term ‘fleets’) 
share in common a violation of the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political 
independence of the victim State and serve to protect these interests. Therefore, in this sense 
it could be hypothesized that an unlawful use of force is something broader than the 
  179 
application of violence between States, and encompasses any significant injury to the 
fundamental rights of State sovereignty and political independence.  
 
This is more satisfactory than the previous hypothesis, because it provides a coherent (if 
presently vague) definition of a ‘use of force’. But it is also problematic because like the first 
hypothesis, it does not fully explain why some acts fall within or outside the definition. Why 
is it that these acts should still be considered a ‘use of force’ under article 2(4) despite lacking 
certain elements, such as physical means or physical effects? Does it mean that those 
elements are not really necessary for an act to constitute a prohibited ‘use of force’? How is 
this to be reconciled with the fact that most uses of force do display these elements? And, 
even more problematically, the possibility under consideration does not explain why other 
acts which may very well violate the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political 
independence of the victim State are not characterised as prohibited ‘uses of force’, such as 
certain forms of support for armed non-State groups? It seems that to conclude that the 
anomalous examples discussed above are explained by a broader understanding of ‘use of 
force’ is also not satisfactory because it risks giving the prohibition of the use of force an 
overreach. 
3.	‘Use	of	force’	as	type	(Typus)	rather	than	a	concept		
The third and, as will be shown, more convincing hypothesis is that these anomalous 
examples of use of force and non-use of force may be reconciled with a consistent 
interpretation of ‘use of force’ if it is accepted that a ‘use of force’ under article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter is a type (in German: Typus) rather than a concept. In other words, it may be that 
not all of the elements identified in the previous chapter are necessary, although in particular 
combinations they may be sufficient, to constitute a ‘use of force’. This hypothesis is 
explored in more detail in the following chapter. 
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Chapter Nine: Type theory 
Introduction 
This final chapter will pull together the threads from the previous chapters and propose a 
framework for the definition of a prohibited ‘use of force’ that incorporates the elements 
identified in Part II and reconciles the anomalous examples of ‘use of force’ and non-‘use of 
force’ identified in the previous chapter. It will be argued that a prohibited ‘use of force’ 
under article 2(4) of the UN Charter and customary international law is not a single category 
in which essential elements must all be present in order for an act to fall within the definition, 
but rather that there are different ‘types’ of ‘use of force’ in relation to which these elements 
may be present in different combinations and must be weighed and balanced to determine if 
they meet a particular threshold. The theory of ‘type’ will be firstly set out, before explaining 
how it applies to the prohibition of the use of force between States in international law, with 
illustrative examples from State practice. Finally, this chapter will propose a general 
definition of ‘use of force’ according to this theory. 
What is a type? 
In the sense employed here, type (in German: Typus) denotes a category (here: ‘use of force’) 
which contains certain conditions (elements, such as physical means, physical effects etc.), 
not all (or even any) of which are necessary or sufficient, but which must be weighed and 
balanced to determine whether the threshold for the definition is met. A type is to be 
distinguished from a concept, in which an object (e.g. a forcible act) belongs to the set (‘use 
of force’) only if the shared group of necessary conditions are met (i.e. the conditions are all 
necessary and are jointly sufficient). A typical example of a concept is the definition of 
crimes: due to the requirements of nullum crimen sine lege, crimes under domestic and 
international law are typically defined by elements which must all be met in order for a 
particular act to fall within the definition. An example for illustrative purposes is the war 
crime of wilful killing. The Elements of this crime under article 8(2)(a) of the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court define this crime as requiring the following elements 
(footnotes omitted): 
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Elements  
 
1. The perpetrator killed one or more persons.  
2. Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions 
of 1949.  
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected 
status. 
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international 
armed conflict. 
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of 
an armed conflict.  
 
Under this definition, each of the above elements are necessary and when these elements are 
all fulfilled, then they are also jointly sufficient for meeting the definition of the crime.  
 
In contrast, it is proposed that a prohibited ‘use of force’ between States within the meaning 
of article 2(4) of the UN Charter is defined by a basket of elements, not all (or possibly, any) 
of which are necessary conditions; these elements do not all have to be present in order for an 
act to meet the definition. Instead, these elements are identified and weighed up to determine 
whether the threshold of the definition is met. In other words, individually each these 
elements may not be necessary, but in a given case a particular combination of them may be 
jointly sufficient to constitute a prohibited ‘use of force’. Conversely, if none of the elements 
are present, although they are not individually necessary, then the act will not constitute a 
prohibited ‘use of force’. 
 
The crime of Nötigung (coercion) under German criminal law provides an instructive 
illustration of the idea of type. Nötigung is a catch-all provision in section 240 of the German 
Criminal Code which criminalises the threat or use of force to coerce another person to carry 
out, suffer or refrain from an act.1 The crime is defined as follows: 
 
Section 240 of the Strafgesetztbuch (German Criminal Code)2 
Using threats or force to cause a person to do, suffer or omit an act 
 
(1) Whosoever unlawfully with force or threat of serious harm causes a person to commit, 
suffer or omit an act shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding three years or a fine. 
(2) The act shall be unlawful if the use of force or the threat of harm is deemed inappropriate 
for the purpose of achieving the desired outcome. 
(3) The attempt shall be punishable. 
 
1 I am grateful to Christian Kaerkes for his invaluable assistance with this topic. 
2 Criminal Code in the version promulgated on 13 November 1998, Federal Law Gazette [Bundesgesetzblatt] I 
p. 3322, last amended by Article 1 of the Law of 24 September 2013, Federal Law Gazette I p. 3671 and with 
the text of Article 6(18) of the Law of 10 October 2013, Federal Law Gazette I p 3799. 
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(4) In especially serious cases the penalty shall be imprisonment from six months to five 
years. An especially serious case typically occurs if the offender 
1. causes another person to engage in sexual activity; 
2. causes a pregnant woman to terminate the pregnancy; or 
3. abuses his powers or position as a public official.3 
 
The definition of the crime of Nötigung requires that the behaviour be unlawful. This is 
essentially a means-ends analysis, as set out in sub-section (2). However, it can also be 
unlawful under this analysis to achieve a lawful outcome with a lawful act if the means (the 
use of force or the threat of harm) ‘is deemed inappropriate’ for that purpose. For example, 
this is usually discussed in relation to making threats to lodge a legitimate criminal complaint 
with the authorities in cases where the desired outcome of the threat (for instance, repaying a 
debt) is not connected with the criminal complaint itself (i.e. a case of blackmail). Other 
examples of Nötigung include: a) locking up a person;4 b) preventing a person from entering 
a building;5 c) ‘unwanted’ anaesthesia;6 d) turning off the heating of a property to compel the 
tenant to pay the rent;7 and e) tailgating in traffic.8 
 
What is interesting about the crime of Nötigung for our purposes is that the German courts 
have interpreted this crime as comprising a number of factors which must be weighed up, and 
which do not all have to be present for a particular act to be ‘deemed inappropriate’ under 
section 240(2) and thus fall within the scope of the crime. Under the current definition of ‘use 
of force’ with respect to Nötigung, two elements of ‘force’ must be present: ‘force’ is defined 
as any physical action that produces a physical effect on the victim (to break his or her 
(expected) resistance).9 However, the threshold of these requirements is extremely low; the 
mere act of sitting down or turning a key meets the requirements for a physical action, and a 
physical reaction (such as perspiring) can suffice to meet the requirements for a physical 
effect. There is one minor limitation to this, however: force against objects is usually not 
enough unless it also indirectly impacts on a person (e.g. destroying windows of a building in 
the winter, so that the residents must vacate the premises).  
 
In order to meet the elements of the crime of Nötigung, all relevant factors must be 
considered, although their specific requirements are debatable, including:  
 
• lawfulness, weight and acceptability of the desired outcome; 
• the intensity of the force; 
 
3 Translation of the German Criminal Code provided by Prof. Dr. Michael Bohlander, available at 
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html#p2015 (accessed 22 October 2018). 
4 BGHSt 20, 194. 
5 OLG Düsseldorf, NJW 1986, 942, 943. 
6 BGH, NJW 1953, 351. 
7 OLG Hamm, NJW 1983, 1505, 1506. 
8 BGHSt 19, 263, 265 ff. 
9 BVerfGE 92, 1. 
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• motivation; 
• the weight of the encroachment on the freedom of the recipient of the use of force; 
• a greater than insignificant effect on the receiver; 
• priority of public authority (i.e. no vigilantism);  
• internal connection between the act and desired outcome;  
• effect on constitutional rights; 
• legally relevant (not merely morally questionable) actions; 
• Individual autonomy (it is not unlawful if the act is considered an autonomous 
decision and is not required by the law); 
• the factors listed in sub-section (4) are considered especially grave; and 
• the context of the action / circumstances of the case.  
• It is controversial whether long-term objectives of an act (e.g. environmental 
protection in violent demonstration cases) are legally relevant to determining if the 
definition of the crime is met; the majority does not consider them.10  
 
Once the definition of ‘force’ is met, then one must weigh up the relevant factors against each 
other to determine whether the ‘force’ is unlawful under section 240. Each of the factors set 
out above may not be individually sufficient or even necessary conditions for an act to meet 
the definition of Nötigung. To give some examples of the way that this balancing act has been 
carried out by the German courts:11 
 
• Loading and aiming a gun to scare people away constitutes ‘force’. It is unlawful if 
one could have requested assistance from the police in time (priority of public 
authority). Another factor is the potential danger of a gun and the violation of the law 
which forbids the possession of firearms.12 
 
• Turning off the heating of an apartment can be an unlawful use of force or threat of 
harm. It is to be considered that cold temperatures can have deleterious effects on 
health and make the apartment uninhabitable. Another relevant aspect is whether or 
not the claim (here, the rent) is disputed.13 
 
• With respect to a sit-in protest: To determine lawfulness, it is to be considered 
whether the protest is protected by the right to freedom of speech and/or freedom of 
assembly. Furthermore, a road blockade which only lasts for one minute is of such a 
short duration that it may not be punishable. Another factor is whether all or only 
 
10 For a discussion of these factors, see Claus Roxin, ‘Verwerflichkeit und Sittenwidrigkeit als 
unrechtsbegründende Merkmale im Strafrecht, 1964 JuS 373. 
11 For key German jurisprudence regarding Nötigung, see BVerfGE 92, 1; BGHSt 23, 46 and BGHSt 37, 350. 
12 BGH, NJW 1993, 1869, 1870. 
13 OLG Hamm, NJW 1983, 1505, 1506 f. 
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some entrances are affected. It was also considered that the only people affected were 
those against whom the protest was directed.14 
 
• A ‘tailgating-case’: Here, the court considered the danger of the behaviour with respect 
to important legal rights (i.e. possible traffic accident, because the car could probably 
not stop in time). The motive of the tailgating (to be able to drive slightly faster) was 
unreasonable. Another factor was again the duration of the dangerous act.15 
 
In each of these cases, the factors identified above are not explicitly weighed up against each 
other in detail. Rather, the relevant factors in the specific case are identified and the court 
determines whether these factors are sufficient to meet the requirements for an unlawful use 
of force for the crime of Nötigung. 
Type theory and 'use of force' 
It is proposed that a prohibited ‘use of force’ between States within the meaning of article 
2(4) of the UN Charter is a type rather than a concept – that is, it is characterised by a basket 
of elements, not all of which must necessarily be present in order for an act to meet the 
definition. Instead, these elements are identified and weighed up to determine whether the 
threshold of the definition of ‘use of force’ is met. In other words, individually each of these 
elements may not be necessary, but in a given case a particular combination of them may be 
jointly sufficient to constitute a prohibited ‘use of force’. If some elements are weak, but 
other elements are of a higher gravity/intensity, then the balancing of the elements under the 
particular circumstances may result in an act meeting the definition of an unlawful ‘use of 
force’ under article 2(4). As with the crime of Nötigung, there are two kinds of elements to 
weigh up to determine whether an act constitutes an unlawful ‘use of force’ under article 
2(4): firstly, those relating to whether an act is a ‘use of force’, and secondly, contextual 
elements that must be present for that ‘use of force’ to fall within the scope of article 2(4) and 
thus be unlawful under that provision.  
 
Accordingly, if a ‘use of force’ is a type, then all ‘uses of force’ share at least one (more 
likely, several) elements in common; however, for an act to fall within the definition of ‘use 
of force’, it does not have to display all elements. The consequence of this is that there will 
be several different types of ‘use of force’, for example, classical uses of force employing 
armed force of a high gravity (bombardment, invasion against opposition), as well as uses of 
force that do not employ physical/armed force, such as an unresisted invasion or occupation. 
This theory is supported by the analysis of anomalous examples of ‘use of force’ and non-
‘use of force’ in the previous chapter, which has demonstrated that each of the elements of a 
‘use of force’ must not always be present for an act to constitute an unlawful ‘use of force’. 
 
14 BayObLG, NJW 1993, 213, 214. 
15 BGHSt 19, 263, 265 ff. 
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Putting it all together, it is apparent that none of the elements of a ‘use of force’ identified in 
Part II are strictly necessary for an act to meet the definition, except for the object/target of 
the use of force (as explained in Chapter Five with respect to 'international relations', a nexus 
is probably required between the object or target of the ‘use of force’ and another State). The 
examples of ‘use of force’ which disprove the necessity of each of the elements of a 
prohibited ‘use of force’ are summarised below: 
 
• Physical force: military incursion without recourse to the use of weapons, unresisted 
invasion or military occupation, unconsented mere presence. Controversial: cyber 
operations, non-kinetic non-cyber operations. 
 
• Physical effects: as above. Although there are ‘uses of force’ which do not have any 
physical effects, it would appear that in order to be legally relevant to the equation of 
whether an act is a ‘use of force’, any effects must be physical and direct (no 
intermediate steps between the act and its result). In other words, although a physical 
effect is not necessary for an act to constitute an unlawful 'use of force', non-physical 
and non-direct effects will not be relevant to the calculation. As discussed in Chapter 
Seven, it is legally uncertain whether the physical effects must actually ensue (as 
opposed to merely potential effects), and if they must be permanent. 
 
• Gravity: as discussed in Chapter Seven, it is legally uncertain if there is a lower 
gravity threshold for an act to fall within the scope of the jus contra bellum. However, 
since even a single shot fired across the border by the military of one State could be 
considered an unlawful ‘use of force’, this appears to negate the argument that there is 
a gravity threshold for a prohibited ‘use of force’ under article 2(4).  
 
• Intent: as discussed in Chapter Seven, although it is legally uncertain, it seems that 
even an accidental use of force could be considered a violation of article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter under certain circumstances, such as ‘the accidental projection of armed 
force … across a border’ (for example, shots or shells fired).16 
 
This disproves the null hypothesis (the commonly accepted position which, if proven, would 
disprove the alternative hypothesis) that a ‘use of force’ is not a type but a concept, for which 
there is a checklist of fixed elements that must always be present for the definition to be met. 
Rather, determining that an act meets the definition of a ‘use of force’ is not a matter of going 
through a checklist of elements to see whether or not each element is present. Instead, it is an 
equation that must be weighed up.  
 
 
16 Tom Ruys, ‘The Meaning of “Force” and the Boundaries of the Jus Ad Bellum: Are “Minimal” Uses of Force 
Excluded from UN Charter Article 2 (4)?’ American Journal of International Law 108, no. 2 (2014): 159–210, 
191. 
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On the basis of this type hypothesis, two kinds of factors are proposed that determine or 
indicate an unlawful ‘use of force’ under article 2(4): firstly, factors relevant to whether the 
act is a ‘use of force’, and secondly, contextual elements that are required in order to bringing 
the ‘use of force’ within the scope of article 2(4) and render it unlawful. Since the latter are 
fundamental requirements, they are dealt with first: 
 
1) Fundamental requirements (contextual elements): These are the necessary (but 
insufficient) contextual elements to bring a ‘use of force’ within the scope of article 2(4). 
These elements must always be present for an act to constitute an unlawful ‘use of force’ in 
violation of article 2(4), but on their own they will not suffice for an act to violate that 
provision (since it must also meet the definition of ‘use of force’. ‘Threat of force’ is not 
considered here, but in respect of ‘threats of force’ under article 2(4), it is submitted that the 
same framework of analysis would apply).17 These fundamental requirements follow 
explicitly from the text of article 2(4) itself, such as: 
 
• two or more States;  
 
• international relations;  
 
• ‘against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations’.  
 
Each of these elements is discussed in further detail in Chapter Five. 
 
2) The second type of factor are indicative factors (of whether an act is a ‘use of force’): 
These relate to the meaning of ‘use of force’ rather than to the other terms of article 2(4). 
These factors are more likely to be based on subsequent agreement or subsequent practice 
(rather than the fundamental requirements which are more likely to be text-based), since they 
do not come from a plain reading of the text of article 2(4) (or are not explicit) but are the 
result of a shared understanding of the parties to the UN Charter. These may include the 
following factors identified in Chapters Six and Seven: 
 
• Means: Physical force 
 
• Physical Effects:  
 
⁃ Direct physical effects 
 
⁃ Permanent vs. temporary 
 
17 The concept of ‘threat of force’ in article 2(4) is significantly less explored – see Nikolas Stürchler, The 
Threat of Force in International Law (Cambridge University Press, Paperback ed., 2009) for one innovative 
analysis. 
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⁃ Actual vs. potential 
 
• Object/target: In particular, the required nexus to a State. For non-State 
objects/targets that do not have a close association with a State, more will be required 
to bring the act within the scope of article 2(4), such as the presence of other factors 
including possibly the gravity of the (potential) effects, a pre-existing dispute between 
States or a coercive intent against a State.  
 
• Gravity of effects: Noting again that the question of whether there is a de minimis 
gravity threshold is not solved by the text of article 2(4), which neither specifies nor 
excludes a gravity threshold for a use of force to fall within the scope of the 
prohibition. As discussed in Chapter Seven, any such threshold may also differ by 
domain.  
 
• Hostile intent: The text of article 2(4) strongly indicates that at the very least, an 
intended action is required. The text does not explicitly require or exclude an intended 
effect, although State practice indicates that mistaken forcible acts are usually not 
treated as violating the prohibition of the use of force. There is textual support for the 
position that a coercive intent is required under article 2(4), due to the relationship 
between the prohibition of threats and uses of force; the relationship of the non-
intervention principle and the principle of the non-use of force; and the object and 
purpose of the prohibition of the use of force in article 2(4). It is possible that hostile 
intent is an indicative factor that can turn a forcible act into a ‘use of force’ that would 
otherwise not meet various criteria, such as gravity or if the harm is only potential but 
unrealised. Interestingly, legal clarity over certain types of acts as definitely 
constituting unlawful uses of force may relate to intention. For example, as discussed 
earlier,18 the listed as acts of aggression in the 1974 Definition constitute a 
‘subsequent agreement’ by UN Member States that those acts are unlawful ‘uses of 
force’ in violation of article 2(4). Thus, if a State commits one of these acts, it is 
highly likely that it had a hostile intent, since the act is unambiguously unlawful.  
 
Other relevant factors that may relate to one or more of the above elements are: 
 
• The particular nexus between the object/target and another State 
 
• Type of weapon: The type of weapon employed could be relevant to the gravity of the 
(potential) effects, and also to whether the ‘use of force’ is perceived to be in 
‘international relations’, since certain sophisticated weapons could only have been 
developed by States and are not easily available to other actors, thus making it more 
 
18 See Chapter Six. 
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likely for the victim State to conclude attribution and hostile intent. A recent example 
is the use of chemical weapon Novichok in the Skripal assassination attempt, 
discussed below. 
 
• Political context: As discussed in Chapter Five, the political context of a forcible act, 
such as whether there is a pre-existing political dispute, influences its characterisation 
as a violation of article 2(4). This relates to the ‘international relations’ dimension, 
since the presence of such a political dispute may bring an act within the realm of 
international relations and a use of force between States. It may also relate to elements 
relating to whether the act is a ‘use of force’, such as gravity (e.g. by increasing the 
perceived level of security threat to the State) and intention (by demonstrating a 
hostile/coercive intention, or at the very least, an intention to influence or resolve a 
political dispute using force). 
 
• Who carries out the forcible act: i.e. it is a relevant factor to the characterisation of 
an act as a violation of article 2(4) whether it is carried out by military or police/other 
traditional law enforcement bodies, e.g. the coast guard.19 This is relevant not only in 
terms of attribution, but also to the perception by the other State with respect to the 
perceived military nature of the act, and may also be relevant to the assessment of 
gravity and intent. Due to grey zone operations, this could become increasingly 
relevant, e.g. the use of maritime militia in the South and East China Seas.20 
 
• Location of forcible act: It is also relevant to the assessment of whether an act 
constitutes a prohibited ‘use of force’ whether the conduct and/or its effects occur 
within or outside a State’s own territory (on land, sea or air respectively); within a 
third State’s territory (land, sea or air); in disputed territory or in zones to which 
special legal rules apply such as a State’s Exclusive Economic Zone, the high seas, 
international airspace, outer space or terra nullius. This is relevant not only to the 
applicable legal framework and jurisdiction, but also to the ‘international relations’ 
aspect of the article 2(4) prohibition, and potentially also gravity (due to differences 
in potential threat or type of force that is possible in each domain).21 
 
19 See Ruys, above n.16, 207, who notes that ‘forcible acts by military units are more likely to trigger Article 
2(4) than forcible acts by police units’. 
20 See Junichi Fukuda, ‘A Japanese Perspective on the Role of the U.S.-Japan Alliance in Deterring—or, If 
Necessary, Defeating—Maritime Gray Zone Coercion,’ in The U.S.-Japan Alliance and Deterring Gray Zone 
Coercion in the Maritime, Cyber, and Space Domains (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2017), 
23-41, which discusses the Japanese legal framework for response to various types of maritime incidents. 
21 See Chapter Five. 
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Balancing the elements 
According to the type theory proposed here, the above elements must be weighed and 
balanced to determine whether an act is a prohibited ‘use of force’ under article 2(4), and 
may be combined in different permutations to produce different types of ‘use of force’ which 
may not share all of the same elements. Part of such a balancing and weighing exercise 
implies that the weaker certain elements are, the higher the number or gravity/intensity of the 
other elements must be in order for the act to constitute a prohibited ‘use of force’. For 
example, applying this framework to the anomalous examples set out in the previous chapter 
could result in the following two types of ‘use of force’ which display a different 
combination of elements, and highlights a unique third category of ‘use of force’ that is the 
result of subsequent agreement: 
1.	Military	incursion	without	recourse	to	the	use	of	weapons	
For example: unresisted invasion; military occupation (article 3(a) of the 1974 Definition of 
Aggression); intentionally crossing a border bearing arms with an intention to use them even 
before any weapons are actually fired; aerial incursion  
 
Elements/indicative factors:  
 
• Lack of physical means. 
• Lack of physical effects but high potential effects if escalation occurs. 
• Political context: in clear-cut cases (such as invasion and military occupation), the use 
of force occurs in the context of a political dispute and is clearly in ‘international 
relations’. 
• Actor: military units, indicating a clearly implied intention to use force if resisted 
(hostile intent, possibly coercive intent depending on context). 
• Location: within the territory (including airspace) of another State, constituting a 
violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity and a high threat of escalation to 
physical means and physical effects on the territorial State. 
2.	Unconsented	presence	in	territory	
Examples: the blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State 
(article 3(c) of the 1974 Definition of Aggression); the use of armed forces of one State 
which are within the territory of another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in 
contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their 
presence in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement (article 3(e) of the 1974 
Definition of Aggression). 
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Elements/indicative factors: As in the previous example, there is a lack of physical means 
and physical effects, but the following elements and indicative factors are present: 
 
• Political context: in clear-cut cases (blockade), the use of force occurs in the context 
of a political dispute and is clearly in ‘international relations’. In the less clear-cut 
case of overstaying in violation of a Status of Forces Agreement, the political context 
may be a decisive factor in the characterisation of the act as a prohibited ‘use of force’ 
by indicating if the act is one in ‘international relations’ and if there is a 
hostile/coercive intent. 
 
• Actor: military units, indicating an implied intention to use force if resisted (hostile 
intent, possibly coercive intent depending on context). 
 
• Location: within the territory (including airspace) of another State, constituting a 
violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity and a threat of escalation to physical 
means and physical effects on the territorial State. 
3.	Special	case:	Indirect	use	of	force	
Examples: The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of 
another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a 
third State (article 3(f) of the 1974 Definition); the sending by or on behalf of a State of 
armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against 
another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial 
involvement therein (article 3(g) of the 1974 Definition). 
 
Unlike the previous examples, due to the lack of both direct physical means or direct physical 
effects, this category of unlawful ‘use of force’ appears to really be an agreed special case 
rather than meeting the definition through a combination of elements that reaches a particular 
threshold. It is submitted that indirect force, unlike the other ‘types’ of force discussed in this 
chapter, is a result of subsequent agreement between States regarding the interpretation of 
article 2(4) of the UN Charter to cover certain forms of indirect force. 
Illustrative examples of balancing the elements of a 
‘use of force’ 
Applying the type idea to specific instances of inter-State ‘use of force’ further illustrates the 
notion of weighing the various elements of a prohibited ‘use of force’ to determine whether 
the particular threshold for such characterisation is met.  
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Relationship	between	object/target	 (nexus	with	 State)	 and	potential	
effects	
A use of force with only potential but unrealised effects may require a higher level of 
(potential) gravity, intention, or an object/target that has a particularly close connection to 
another State (such as Foreign Minister/President) in order to be characterised as unlawful 
under article 2(4) of the UN Charter. (Interestingly, although these elements can be 
considered as elements of a ‘use of force’, they may also relate to whether the act is in 
‘international relations’.) This is illustrated through the juxtaposition of two examples: the 
attempted assassination of former US President George Bush in 1993, and the attempted 
assassination of the former Russian intelligence officer Sergei Skripal in England in 2018.  
 
In the first incident, the Iraqi Intelligence Service (‘IIS’) allegedly directed and carried out an 
attempted assassination of former US President George Bush by planning to explode a car 
bomb next to his motorcade on a visit to Kuwait from 14 to 16 April 1993.22 In response, on 
26 to 27 June 1993, the US retaliated by launching twenty-three Tomahawk missiles against 
the headquarters of the IIS in Baghdad, destroying the building, killing at least six civilians 
and injuring twenty others. To justify the strike, the US referred to article 51 of the UN 
Charter and stated that it was exercising the ‘right to self-defence by responding to the 
Government of Iran’s unlawful attempt to murder the former Chief Executive of the United 
States Government, President George Bush …’23 The international response to the US action 
was mixed.24 However, some States that expressed support or understanding for the US 
action referred expressly to the nature of the target of the assassination attempt, including 
Japan, Brazil, New Zealand and Spain.25 In particular, New Zealand asserted that ‘any nation 
that seeks to assassinate the Head of State or a member of the senior political leadership of 
another State commits an act of aggression. Such actions are at the most serious end of the 
scale because Heads of State symbolize the sovereignty and integrity of their country’.26 
Some scholars also ‘emphasized that the protection of a state’s elected officials would be an 
essential attribute of state sovereignty, especially taking into account the destabilizing effects 
that an assassination of a Head of State could have on the nation’.27 Thus, although the 
 
22 For an explanation of the facts, reaction of States and legal analysis of this incident, see Paulina Starski, ‘The 
US Airstrike against the Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters –1993’ in Tom Ruys and Olivier Corten (eds), The Use 
of Force in International Law: A Case-Based Approach (Oxford University Press 2018), 504. 
23 Letter from the Permanent Representative of the US to the UN addressed to the President of the Security 
Council (26 June 1993), UN Doc S/26003. 
24 Starski (ibid., 505, footnotes omitted) notes that ‘Quite a few scholars discussing the 1993 raid find that the 
legality of the US riposte was viewed largely favourably by the international community and met only with little 
opposition. This finding does not appear to be entirely accurate if the statements of relevant actors are analysed 
closely.’ For a close analysis of the reaction of the international community, see Starksi, 507-509; see also 
Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed., 2008),196 ff. 
25 See Starski, above n.22, 507-510, 545-5. 
26 UN Security Council Verbatim Record (27 June 1993), UN Doc S/PV.3245 23 (New Zealand). 
27 Starski, above n.22,  512, citing Alan D Surchin, ‘Terror and the Law: The Unilateral Use of Force and the 
June 1993 Bombing of Baghdad’ (1995) 5 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 457, 474 and 
Robert F Teplitz, ‘Taking Assassination Attempts Seriously: Did the United States Violate International Law in 
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international response to the incident was ‘not unanimous and in most cases not 
unequivocal’28 regarding the US’s self-defence claim, what matters for our purposes is the 
characterisation of the attempted assassination itself as an unlawful use of force on the basis 
of the close nexus between the target and the victim State. 
 
In contrast, the attempted assassination of the Russian Sergei Skripal in the UK by suspected 
Russian agents29 shows that when there is a relatively low nexus with the territorial State, the 
(attempted) killing of an individual by foreign State agents is not enough on its own to 
characterise the incident as an unlawful ‘use of force’ in violation of article 2(4). In the 
Skripal incident, despite the use of a chemical weapon allegedly by Russian agents on the 
territory of the United Kingdom, it was not widely denounced as a violation of article 2(4), 
possibly because of a less close connection between Mr Skripal and the territorial State. For 
such targets that do not have a close association with a State, other elements of a ‘use of 
force’ must be more serious to bring the act within the scope of article 2(4), such as the 
gravity of the (potential) effects, a pre-existing dispute between States or a coercive or hostile 
intent against a State. In that case, the use of a prohibited weapon with serious potential 
effects for the population of the territorial State was emphasised by the UK when it alleged 
an unlawful use of force.30 In this instance, however, there is a link between the potential 
effects of the forcible act and ‘international relations’; an act of a potentially higher gravity of 
effects is more likely to bring the matter within the realm of ‘international relations’ and 
constitute a dispute between States. This is explored further below. 
Relationship	between	temporary	effects	and	higher	gravity	threshold	
As mentioned in Chapter Seven, it is possible that an act with only temporary effects would 
require a higher gravity threshold before States would characterise it as an unlawful ‘use of 
force’ in violation of article 2(4) of the UN Charter. This issue will become increasingly 
relevant given States’ increased reliance on technology for military, civilian and commercial 
purposes and the correspondingly enhanced risk of targeting of these technologies by other 
States using means which temporarily interfere with or disable them, such as cyber 
operations (e.g. Distributed Denial of Service attacks) and satellite interference.31 
 
Forcefully Responding to the Iraq Plot to Kill George Bush’ (1995) 28 Cornell International Law Journal 569, 
609. 
28 Starski, ibid., 507. 
29 See Chapter Seven, ‘Effects’. 
30 See discussion in Chapter Seven. 
31 See e.g. Dean Cheng, ‘Space Deterrence, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and Asian Security: A U.S. Perspective’ 
(RAND Corporation, 2017) 74, 75: ''Given the distances encompassed within the Asia-Pacific theater, now 
extending even to the Indian Ocean as part of the “Indo-Pacific,” space-based systems play a central and 
growing role in coordinating forces and creating a common situational picture. This reliance on space is 
especially great for U.S. forces, because they are typically conducting expeditionary operations far from the 
U.S. homeland. Consequently, space capabilities will likely play an outsized role in key mission areas in future 
conflicts between technologically enabled militaries; space assets will play a critical role in such areas as ISR 
[intelligence, surveilance and reconnaissance], meteorology, communications, PNT [positioning, navigation and 
timing], and SSA [space situational awareness].' 
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Relationship	between	‘international	relations’,	gravity	and	intention	
As argued in Chapter Seven, the elements of ‘international relations’, gravity and intention 
are interrelated. This is illustrated in the following case study on excessive or unlawful 
maritime law enforcement and ‘use of force’. With respect to excessive maritime law 
enforcement, there is mixed practice in this regard. First of all, why would a use of force 
against a civilian vessel registered to another State be considered ‘force’ under article 2(4) at 
all? The reason is the principle of exclusive flag State jurisdiction – a use of force against a 
civilian vessel by a non-flag State is the exercise of enforcement jurisdiction within a domain 
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of another State. It may therefore under certain 
circumstances fall under ‘international relations’ and be considered to be against the 
sovereignty of another State (i.e. the flag State). It is important to note that different 
international law principles apply to use of force in law enforcement versus a use of inter-
State force under the jus contra bellum.32 Patricia Jiminez Kwast makes an interesting 
argument that there are two separate issues: which legal category applies (law enforcement or 
use of force), and whether the act complies with the lawful requirements of that category – 
just because law enforcement action is unlawful under that framework, does not 
automatically render it a violation of the prohibition of the use of force.33 Tom Ruys posits 
that ‘[a]n argument could therefore be developed that enforcement action undertaken by the 
territorial state within its territory or, by extension, against merchant vessels in relation to a 
coastal state’s Exclusive Economic Zone or continental shelf – even if the action is tainted by 
illegality – is presumed not to affect the international relations between those states and 
accordingly remains beyond the reach of Article 2(4). Only if it appears from the 
circumstances of the case that the force used “directly arises from a dispute between 
sovereign States” will this presumption be rebuted.’34 In light of the increasing constabulary 
role of navies, especially in the South and East China Seas, the distinction between these two 
applicable legal frameworks and their boundary is of especial relevance.35 
 
State practice shows that States do sometimes consider purported maritime law enforcement 
to be a use of force. There are numerous examples in State practice where forcible acts at sea 
 
32 For an overview of the jurisprudence regulating use of force in maritime law enforcement, see Matteo 
Tondini, ‘The Use of Force in the Course of Maritime Law Enforcement Operations.’ Journal on the Use of 
Force and International Law 4, no. 2 (July 3, 2017), 253; with respect to international human rights law 
principles applicable to the use of force in law enforcement, see Nigel Rodley and Matt Pollard, The Treatment 
of Prisoners under International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 3rd edition, 2009), 246-278. 
33 ‘Maritime Law Enforcement and the Use of Force: Reflections on the Categorisation of Forcible Action at 
Sea in the Light of the Guyana/Suriname Award’ Journal of Conflict and Security Law 13, no. 1 (March 20, 
2008), 49. 
34 Above n.16, 206. 
35 See Matteo Tondini, above n.32; Ivan T Luke, ‘Naval Operations in Peacetime: Not Just “Warfare Lite”’ 
(2013) 66(2) Naval War College Review 11, 13; Scott W. Harold et al, The U.S.-Japan Alliance and Deterring 
Gray Zone Coercion in the Maritime, Cyber, and Space Domains, Santa Monica, California: RAND 
Corporation, 2017. 
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were characterised by States as a violation of article 2(4): the 1975 Mayaguez incident (self-
defence); the Germany/Iceland Fisheries Jurisdiction case (Germany claimed a violation of 
article 2(4), although the Court did not rule on this point); the Canada/Spain Fisheries 
Jurisdiction case (Spain claimed violation of article 2(4), but the Court held it had no 
jurisdiction – discussed further below); and the Guyana/Suriname arbitration. However, State 
practice is not consistent and numerous similar incidents have not been characterised as an 
unlawful use of force under article 2(4). These include the 1962 Red Crusader 
(Denmark/UK) case; the 1967 Torrey Canyon incident; the 1985 Rainbow Warrior incident 
and the M/V Saiga (No. 2) incident in 1997. It is therefore illustrative to examine these 
incidents through the lens of the type hypothesis (i.e. the identification and balancing of the 
elements of a ‘use of force’) to see why some of these incidents were characterised as an 
unlawful ‘use of force’ and others were not. 
Excessive	maritime	law	enforcement	
The Mayaguez incident in 1975 occurred in the context of the Vietnam War and the recent 
ousting of the US-backed Khmer Republic by the Khmer Rouge. The US-flagged container 
ship the Mayaguez and its crew was seized by Cambodian naval forces within Cambodian 
territorial waters, although the US disputed the twelve nautical mile rule at the time. During 
the seizure of the vessel, the Khmer Rouge naval vessel fired a machine gun and then a 
rocket-propelled grenade across the bow of the ship before boarding and seizing the vessel.36 
The US launched a rescue operation, citing article 51 of the UN Charter.37 The seizure of the 
Mayaguez was thus considered an unlawful ‘use of force’ by the United States giving rise to 
a right to self-defence. In this incident, the gravity of the physical means was moderate, as 
was the gravity of the physical effects (the seizure of the vessel and its crew). However, the 
target of the use of force had a strong connection to the victim State (given the political 
context) and due to the surrounding events, was clearly in the ‘international relations’ 
between the two States concerned. 
 
In contrast, in the Red Crusader incident in 1962, maritime law enforcement was found to be 
excessive and unlawful, but was not characterised as a violation of article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter. In that incident, Danish authorities arrested a British-flagged vessel in Danish 
territorial waters, and fired shots at the vessel without warning. The international commission 
of inquiry found:38 
 
 
36 Raphl Wetterhahn, The Last Battle: The Mayaguez Incident and the End of the Vietnam War. New York, 
N.Y., U.S.A.: Plume, 2002; for a legal analysis of the incident, see Natalino Ronzitti, ‘The Mayaguez Incident - 
1975’ in Tom Ruys and Olivier Corten (eds), The use of force in international law: A case-based approach 
(Oxford University Press, 2018) 213. 
37 Letter dated 14 May 1975 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United 
Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (15 May 1975) UN Doc S/11689. 
38 Judgment of 23 May 1962 (1967) 35 ILR 499. 
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‘In opening fire at 03.22 hours up to 03.53 hours, the commanding officer of the Niels 
Ebbeen exceeded legitimate use of armed force on two counts: (a) firing without warning 
of solid gun-shot; (b) creating danger to human life on board the Red Crusader without 
proved necessity, by the effective firing at the Red Crusader after 03.40 hours.’39 
 
Similarly, in the M/V Saiga No. 2 incident in 1997, maritime law enforcement was found to 
be excessive but not an unlawful ‘use of force’ under article 2(4) of the UN Charter. In that 
incident, Guinea arrested a vessel flagged to St Vincent and the Grenadines within the 
Exclusive Economic Zone of Guinea, injuring at least two crew members. St Vincent and the 
Grenadines did not claim that it was a violation of article 2(4), but of UNCLOS articles 56(2) 
and 58, 111, 292 (freedom of navigation, violation of hot pursuit conditions and prompt 
release). The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea also did not raise article 301 of 
UNCLOS nor article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The Tribunal instead applied the requirements 
for lawfulness of use of force in law enforcement measures:40 
 
‘In considering the use of force used by Guinea in the arrest of the Saiga, the Tribunal 
must take into account the circumstances of the arrest in the context of the applicable 
rules of international law. Although the Convention does not contain express provisions 
on the use of force in the arrest of ships, international law, which is applicable by virtue of 
article 293 of the Convention, requires that the use of force must be avoided as far as 
possible and, where force in unavoidable, it must not go beyond what is reasonable and 
necessary in the circumstances. Considerations of humanity must apply in the law of the 
sea, as they do in other areas of international law. These principles have been followed 
over the years in law enforcement operations at sea.’ 
 
In the Red Crusader and M/V Saiga (No. 2) incidents, the physical means employed and their 
physical effects were of relatively low gravity, there was no apparent coercive or hostile 
intent against the flag State given that Denmark and Guinea respectively were enforcing 
domestic laws within their own territorial sea (in the case of the Red Crusader) or Exclusive 
Economic Zone (in the case of the M/V Saiga No. 2) and it is not apparent that the vessels 
were targeted due to their nationality nor in the context of a political dispute between the 
States concerned. Hence, it would seem that there was not a sufficient combination of 
elements of a ‘use of force’ including their relative weight. Accordingly, the incidents were 
deemed to fall within the realm of law enforcement rather than the jus contra bellum.  
Maritime	 law	 enforcement	with	no	 basis	 for	 jurisdiction:	 purported	
exercise	 of	 law	 enforcement	 against	 foreign-flagged	 vessels	 in	 the	
territorial	waters	of	another	State,	on	 the	high	seas	or	 in	a	disputed	
 
39 See Olivier Corten, The Law against War : The Prohibition on the Use of Force in Contemporary 
International Law (Hart, 2010), 58, who states that ‘When the “use of armed force” is applied here, there is 
plainly no question of applying article 2(4) of the UN Charter.’ 
40 M/V “Saiga” (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea), ITLOS Case No. 2, Merits, ( July 1, 1999), paras. 155–56. 
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maritime	zone	
In the incidents of the Fisheries Jurisdiction case (Germany v Iceland) and the Guyana v 
Suriname arbitration, the purported maritime law enforcement by Iceland and Suriname 
respectively were characterised by the ‘victim’ State as either an unlawful use or threat of 
force. These incidents both occurred in disputed maritime zones. In the former case, Iceland 
sought to unilaterally extend its fisheries jurisdiction to fifty miles from the baseline. 
Germany challenged this and claimed that Iceland’s actions in enforcing this extended 
fisheries jurisdiction zone against German fishing vessels by cutting their nets and firing 
warning shots and live rounds was a violation of article 2(4) of the UN Charter.41 The 
International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) did not analyse Germany’s submission regarding use of 
force in substance. Instead, it made a finding on procedural grounds that it was unable to 
accede to the submission, since it was not put in concrete terms seeking specific damages 
with evidence to support each claim.42 In the case of Guyana v Suriname in 2007, Guyana 
claimed that the Surinamese navy had violated article 2(4) of the UN Charter by ordering an 
oil rig and drill ship operating under licences issued by Guyana to leave the disputed 
maritime zone in which they were operating.43 The tribunal held that ‘the action mounted by 
Suriname on 3 June 2000 seemed akin to a threat of military action rather than a mere law 
enforcement activity.’44 Applying the Type hypothesis to these incidents, they were each 
characterised by the other State (and the arbitral tribunal in Guyana v Suriname) as a ‘use’ or 
‘threat’ of force despite the relatively low gravity of each incident in terms of their physical 
means and effects. One explanation is that since each incident took place within a disputed 
maritime zone and as a means of enforcing the State’s claim to that zone, it was a coercive 
measure and perceived to be in the ‘international relations’ between the respective States. 
Thus, even incidents of low gravity in physical means and physical effects may suffice to 
meet the definition of unlawful use or threat of force when combined with a clear coercive 
intent and when the incident clearly takes place within ‘international relations’. 
 
In contrast, the incident of the Torrey Canyon in 1967, in which the British RAF dropped 
napalm bombs on a Liberian-flagged oil tanker which ran aground on the high seas 
(discussed in the previous chapter), was not characterised as an unlawful ‘use of force’ 
despite the lack of legal grounds for the UK to exercise law enforcement jurisdiction against 
the vessel to prevent marine pollution under either treaty or customary international law. 
Clearly, a high gravity of physical means and physical effects were present in this case. One 
basis for the lack of any invocation of article 2(4) in relation to this incident could be that the 
contextual element of ‘international relations’ was missing, due to the interplay between the 
 
41 Part V of Germany’s memorial, and Annexes G, H, I, K and L. 
42 Para 76. This reasoning was criticised by some of the judges, e.g. Declaration of Judge Dillard, 207-8; 
Separate Opinion of Judge Waldock, para. 13; Dissenting Opinion of Judge Onyeama, 250-1. 
43 Arbitral Tribunal Constituted pursuant to article 287, and in accordance with Annex VII of the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (Guyana and Suriname, 17 September 2007), para. 151 ff. See also Corten, 
above n.39, 72-3 and Ruys, above n.16, 205. 
44 Ibid., paras. 443-44. 
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elements of intention and ‘international relations’. Given that the UK had a clear and limited 
intention to release and burn the remaining oil in the vessel’s tanks to prevent marine 
pollution on the high seas (an intention that was accepted as legitimate by the international 
community as a whole, as demonstrated by the subsequent adoption of the International 
Convention on Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties45 to permit 
this type of action), and the application of force, though deliberate, was not coercive nor 
hostile with respect to the flag State, it was not regarded by any State to engage the 
‘international relations’ between the UK and the flag State of the vessel, Liberia, or any 
other State.46  
 
In the Rainbow Warrior affair, on 10 July 1985, on official orders, French secret service 
agents carried out an attack against a British-flagged civilian (Greenpeace) vessel moored in 
the internal waters of New Zealand. Two high explosive devices detonated and sunk the 
vessel, killing a Dutch citizen who was on board.47 The New Zealand government argued that 
the attack against the Rainbow Warrior was a ‘serious violation of basic norms of 
international law … specifically, it involved a serious violation of New Zealand sovereignty 
and of the Charter of the United Nations’ and sought reparations.48 However, New Zealand 
did not allege a violation of article 2(4). Olivier Corten argues that this is probably because 
the operation was limited in scope and was not ordered by ‘the highest echelons of the 
State’.49 Applying the Type theory analysis to this incident, we can see that the physical 
means employed were of relatively high gravity. However, the physical effect on the ‘victim’ 
State (New Zealand) was confined to a violation of sovereignty, since the vessel was British-
flagged and the person killed in the attack was of Dutch nationality. Furthermore, although 
the attack clearly took place in the ‘international relations’ between the two States since it 
was officially ordered, and carried out by French government agents and constituted a serious 
violation of the sovereignty of New Zealand, there was no hostile or coercive intention vis-a-
vis New Zealand. As such, New Zealand did not treat the matter as an unlawful ‘use of force’ 
against it but as a domestic crime (by the secret service agents who carried out the attack) and 
a violation of its sovereignty by France. 
 
45 (adopted 29 November 1969, entered into force 6 May 1975), 970 UNTS 221; see also (the subsequently 
adopted) UNCLOS art 221 which also authorises States to ‘take and enforce measures beyond the territorial sea 
proportionate to the actual or threatened damage to protect their coastline or related interests, including fishing, 
from pollution or threat of pollution following upon a maritime casualty or acts relating to such a casualty, 
which may reasonably be expected to result in major harmful consequences. 
46 This kind of limited intention negating the ‘international relations’ contextual element and resulting in a ‘use 
of force’ falling outside the scope of article 2(4) is to be distinguished from other claims of limited purpose to 
legally justify a ‘use of force’, such as humanitarian intervention, since the latter is less unambiguously to be 
regarded as occurring within ‘international relations’ and is also not universally regarded as a legitimate (as 
evidenced by the continuing heated controversy surrounding its morality and legality). 
47 Memorandum of the Government of New Zealand to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, RIAA, vol 
XIX, 201. 
48 Ibid., 201-202. 
49 Above n.39 86. 
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Testing type theory 
The above examples illustrate how type theory might apply to a ‘use of force’ in article 2(4) 
and shows how the balancing of elements may be carried out with respect to particular 
incidents to determine whether they are an unlawful ‘use of force’ in violation of that 
provision. This naturally leads to the question of how to test the elements and the relationship 
between them. An interesting question for further research is where the threshold lies for a 
‘use of force’ in terms of the balancing equation for the different combinations of elements. 
For instance, does the gravity threshold differ according to the domain in which the act takes 
place? What is the relationship between, for example, ‘international relations’, gravity and 
intention? If certain elements are missing (such as an actual physical effect), which elements 
must be present and what relative weight is required to compensate for the missing element? 
To answer these questions, one would need to examine the subsequent practice of States to 
determine if it demonstrates their agreement regarding the interpretation of a ‘use of force’ 
under article 2(4) in these different situations.  
 
It is very difficult (and perhaps not even possible) to isolate and test these individual elements 
of article 2(4) for two main reasons. Firstly, since they are always found in some combination 
(not necessarily always the same combination) and the interpretation of each of those 
elements is also not fully clear, it is not possible to control the variables and test only for one 
of them (for example, the lower gravity threshold). The interrelationship between the 
different elements of article 2(4) is also not yet fully developed. For example, what is the 
relationship between ‘international relations’ and ‘use of force’? It may be that gravity and 
intention (usually discussed in the context of the term ‘use of force’) are instead (or also) 
indications as to when a use of force is interpreted by States to be in ‘international relations’ 
and therefore falling within the scope of the prohibition in article 2(4). 
 
Secondly, States do not refer to individual elements of the prohibition (for example, 
‘international relations’, ‘use of force’) in their legal discourse, so it is extremely challenging 
to definitively determine from their subsequent practice how they are interpreting a particular 
element of article 2(4), such as a lower gravity threshold. On that point, even what is meant 
by ‘lower threshold’ of a use of force under article 2(4) can have several meanings. It usually 
refers to the lower boundary delineating acts which fall into the scope of article 2(4) and 
those which do not. But beyond that, the lower threshold may itself (and probably does) 
comprise several distinct elements, which could encompass the gravity of the means and/or 
effects, hostile intent or the extent to which the acts could be considered to fall within a 
different legal framework (for instance, maritime law enforcement under law of the sea). As 
discussed earlier, it is also possible that there is a different gravity threshold depending on the 
domain in which the act or its effects take place, i.e. land/sea/air/outer space. It therefore 
seems somewhat artificial to try to elucidate the meaning of one particular element of article 
2(4) (such as a lower gravity threshold of ‘use of force’) in isolation from the others. Testing 
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type theory through a detailed and comprehensive analysis of State practice is outside the 
scope of the present work. 
Conclusion 
Scholars until now have been operating under the illusion that the use of force is a concept, 
for which certain elements must always be present for the definition to be met. This has led to 
the rejection by scholars of particular elements as being relevant to the assessment of whether 
an act is a ‘use of force’ due to anomalous examples of ‘use of force’ which do not display 
that element.50 The idea that a ‘use of force’ is a concept has been disproven in this work, by 
showing that for each element of a ‘use of force’, there are widely-accepted examples of 
unlawful ‘use of force’ which do not contain this element. Therefore, none of the elements of 
a ‘use of force’ – including physical means or physical effects – is strictly necessary for the 
definition to be met. This work has argued that rather than a concept, a ‘use of force’ is a 
type, characterised by a basket of elements which do not all have to be present and which 
must be weighed and balanced to determine whether the threshold for the definition is met 
and an act is an unlawful ‘use of force’ under article 2(4) of the UN Charter.  
 
The following framework for an unlawful ‘use of force’ under article 2(4) in accordance with 
the Type theory is proposed: 
 
A ‘use of force’ must take place within the context of the following fundamental 
requirements to fall within the scope of article 2(4): 
 
• Two or more States (including that the object/target of the ‘use of force’ have a 
sufficient nexus to another State) 
• International relations  
• ‘Against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations’  
 
The following (non-essential) elements of a ‘use of force’ must be identified and weighed up 
to determine whether an act meets the threshold of the definition of a ‘use of force’: 
 
• Physical force 
• Direct physical effects (which may possibly be temporary and/or potential) 
• Gravity 
• Coercive or hostile intent 
 
The following indicative factors may relate to one or more of the above elements: 
 
50 For example, Roscini rejects directness as an element of ‘use of force’ on this basis. Marco Roscini, Cyber 
Operations and the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2014), 48. 
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• The nexus between the object/target and another State 
• Type of weapon 
• Political context 
• Who carries out the forcible act 
• The location/domain 
 
It is an interesting question whether these are legal criteria, or ‘merely factors that influence 
States making use of force assessments.’51 It is submitted that in so far as these criteria are 
supported by principles of treaty interpretation including the subsequent agreement and 
subsequent practice of States in their application of article 2(4) of the UN Charter52 (the 
approach taken in this work), they are legal and not merely political criteria, although the 
distinction may be a fine one in practice. This is due to inherent connection between 
international law and political decision-making, which is recognised in the process of 
customary international law formation (through the requirements of State practice and opinio 
juris) as well as in principles of treaty interpretation (through the elements of subsequent 
agreement and subsequent practice of States). This close connection between international 
law and politics comes to the fore especially in matters close to the heart of State power, such 
as the prohibition of the use of force. However, in respect of the interpretation of the term 
‘use of force’ in the UN Charter, a legal process of treaty interpretation applies and it has 
been the purpose of this work to apply this process to identify legal criteria for identifying an 
unlawful ‘use of force’ under international law. 
 
Although other scholars have also noted that ‘there are various elements that need to be taken 
into account in determining whether an unlawful use of force has occurred’,53 the unique 
contribution of this work has been to firstly, identify those elements and analyse the range of 
interpretations of the text of article 2(4); secondly, to propose the idea that not all of these 
elements are necessary, and that they must be balanced to reach a certain threshold, which 
may differ depending on the type of force or domain (i.e. type theory); and finally, to apply 
type theory to specific incidents and explore the possible relationship between these 
elements.  
 
The identification of the elements of a prohibited ‘use of force’ and the proposal regarding 
type theory provides an analytical framework and shared language for analysing forcible 
incidents and assessing whether or not they meet the threshold for a prohibited ‘use of force’ 
between States under international law. Thoroughly testing the type hypothesis to determine 
the relationship between the elements of a ‘use of force’ and their required combined 
threshold would require extensive analysis of subsequent practice to see which meanings 
 
51 This is the approach taken by the Tallinn Manual, Commentary to rule 11, para. 9. 
52 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, article 31(3)(b). 
53 Christian Henderson, The Use of Force and International Law, 1st edition. (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2018),80; see also Corten, above n.39, Ruys, above n.16 and Roscini, above n.50. 
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States have adopted in various contexts, and is an interesting avenue for future research into 
the meaning of a prohibited ‘use of force’ between States under international law.
  202 
Conclusion 
This work has sought to engage with the prohibition of the use of force between States under 
international law, in order to clarify the meaning of an unlawful ‘use of force’ under the jus 
contra bellum. In doing so, it was first necessary to untangle the complex relationship 
between the two main legal sources of the prohibition: article 2(4) of the UN Charter and 
customary international law. Part I of this work noted that even if the content is currently 
identical, each source of law has a different method of interpretation and application, and 
argued that the preferable approach is to focus on interpreting article 2(4) of the UN Charter 
to determine the meaning of a prohibited ‘use of force’ under international law. Part II carried 
out a textual analysis of article 2(4) of the UN Charter to ascertain the scope and context and 
the range of interpretive possibilities of this provision. This part analysed the meaning of 
each of the terms of article 2(4), with a particular focus on ‘international relations’ and of 
course, ‘use of force’. Part III challenged the paradigm of a ‘use of force’ as a coherent 
concept by presenting anomalous examples of ‘use of force’ and non-‘use of force’, proposed 
the explanation of type theory and explained how it applies to the definition of ‘use of force’. 
 
Similar to its companion, ‘threat of force’ in the same provision, the term ‘use of force’ until 
now has not enjoyed the same level of clarity as concepts at the other end of the scale, 
namely, ‘armed attack’ and aggression. As a result, the term has been somewhat of a black 
box whose contents are opaque, rendering legal debates about incidents of purported ‘use of 
force’ between States relatively superficial compared to analyses of instances of ‘armed 
attack’. Although slowly changing, the elements of a ‘use of force’ have not yet been fully 
expounded, much less the relationship between those elements and their combined threshold 
required for an act to rise to the level of a prohibited ‘use of force’ in violation of article 2(4) 
of the UN Charter. 
 
This work has accordingly sought to unpack the contents of an unlawful ‘use of force’ at the 
level of textual analysis, including subsequent agreements. Its major contribution has been to 
propose the idea that an unlawful ‘use of force’ is not a concept (with a checklist of necessary 
elements), but rather a type (in German: Typus), characterised by a basket of elements which 
must not all be present and which must be weighed and balanced to determine whether the 
threshold for the definition is met and an act is an unlawful ‘use of force’ under article 2(4) of 
the UN Charter. A framework for an unlawful ‘use of force’ under article 2(4), bringing 
together each of the elements of that provision, was set out at the end of the previous chapter.  
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Type theory sets out an analytical framework that can be interrogated, debated, discussed and 
applied. Even if the particular elements, their relationship and their combined threshold is 
debated, at the very least, the benefit of type theory is that it provides a shared language and 
coherent framework for legal analysis and scholarly debate regarding the content of a 
prohibited ‘use of force’ between States under international law. The analytical framework 
proposed here has the potential to facilitate clearer analysis of ‘uses of force’ between States, 
and this clarity may in turn contribute to greater compliance with the prohibition of the use of 
force.  
 
In sum, the text of article 2(4) leaves open a range of possible interpretations regarding the 
meaning of a prohibited ‘use of force’, some more plausible or desirable than others as a 
matter of legal construction and legal policy. It is ultimately for States to decide and 
determine through their subsequent agreement and subsequent practice which interpretations 
are authentic, and in the relevant case, for the applicable international court or tribunal to 
interpret and apply article 2(4) (which interpretation will strictly only be directly binding on 
the parties to that particular case, although of course a decision of the International Court of 
Justice for example will be considered highly influential).1 
 
However, in the end, as the Rapporteur of Commission 1 (responsible for drafting the general 
provisions of the UN Charter including the preamble, Purposes and Principles) at the San 
Francisco Conference, the President of the Commission, Mr Zeineddine of Syria, presaged: 
 
‘The future action of [the United Nations] and its members depends more on the support 
behind the provisions and the spirit as it demonstrates itself in practice than upon the text 
itself. Its future depends on the international consciousness as revealed by public opinion 
in all lands rather than additional provisions to amplify the text or on further clarification 
and precision.’2 
 
While clarity of the interpretation of the text of the UN Charter and particularly article 2(4) 
remains important and may contribute to greater compliance with that provision, what 
ultimately counts is the political will of States and of their populations to resolve 
international disputes peacefully and to refrain from the threat or use of force in international 
relations. 
 
 
1 Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems, (London: 
Stevens, 1950), xv. 
2 UNCIO, vol. VI, Doc. 1006 I/6 (15 June 1945), 18. 
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